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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

A.W.,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA
COUNTY

Respondent,

ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES BUREAU *et al.*,

Real Party in Interest,

A137046

(Alameda County Super. Ct.
No. OJ12019038)

A.W. (Mother), mother of one-year-old A.W., petitions this court pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, to set aside the juvenile court’s order bypassing reunification services and setting a permanency hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (section 366.26 hearing).¹ She contends: (1) there was no substantial evidence supporting the finding that she failed to make reasonable efforts to alleviate the problems that led to the removal of A.W.’s sibling, A.A.²; and (2) the

¹ All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.

² Mother has another child, two-year-old A.A., who is in a “[p]ermanently planned” placement outside of Mother’s custody, and who is not a party to this petition.

juvenile court erred in failing to order reunification services because reunification was in A.W.'s best interest. We reject the contentions and deny the petition on the merits.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Alameda County Social Services Bureau (the Bureau) filed an original petition on May 31, 2012, with allegations pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) [failure to protect], (g) [no provision for support], and (j) [abuse of sibling]. The petition alleged that A.W. was “a product of an incestuous relationship between [Mother] and [the] maternal grandfather” and was “born with a number of genetic disorders, including cerebral [palsy], lung disease, poor oral-motor coordination, abnormal EEG tests indicating a possible neurological disorder, and increasing hearing loss[.]” A.W.'s sibling, two-year-old A.A., was also the maternal grandfather's biological child, and was “also classified as medically-fragile, having been born with a number of genetic disorders.” Mother's reunification services as to A.A. had been terminated on or about April 30, 2012, “primarily because of her repeated failure to protect herself and [A.A.] from contact with the maternal grandfather, notwithstanding the existence of a restraining order prohibiting such contact.” Mother continued to have a relationship with the maternal grandfather, said she loved him, and failed to take A.W. to all of her medical appointments, “ostensibly because she was instead spending time with the maternal grandfather.” Mother had no stable residence and moved around between hotels. For approximately six weeks, Mother thwarted the Emergency Response Worker's attempts to make contact with her and A.W. by regularly giving the worker incorrect addresses and failing to keep appointments with the worker.

According to the detention report, A.W. was in a foster home. On April 1, 2012, the maternal grandfather (Father) was arrested for driving under the influence while Mother and A.W. were in the car. In April and May, the Emergency Response Worker made numerous efforts to get in touch with Mother, including calling or going to motels at which Mother said she was staying, going to Father's home, and calling her on her cell phone, which was later disconnected. Mother was evasive and gave the worker incorrect or invalid addresses, said she was staying at certain motels when she was not, and refused

to provide information requested by the worker. The Bureau eventually obtained a search and seizure warrant pursuant to which A.W. was taken into protective custody on May 29, 2012. The juvenile court detained A.W. on June 1, 2012.

According to a jurisdiction/disposition report filed June 14, 2012, A.W. was doing well in her foster family's care. She was receiving "sufficient . . . interpersonal stimulation, follow-up on medical appointments, and nurturing." During an interview with the Emergency Response Worker, Mother was untruthful "regarding medical appointments, residence, or visitation with [Father]." She reported she suffers from depression but is not taking any medication for it. She said she understood that she "los[t] [her] kids" because she "kept dealing with [Father]." When asked about her relationship with Father, Mother "predictably stated that she is no longer seeing him." However, "after being presented with evidence," she admitted having contact with him. Mother "present[ed] as being younger than her age" and "d[id] not see herself as a victim" "in a psychologically abusive and complex sexual relationship with her biological father."³ Father "presented as sickly" during an interview with the worker and said, " 'I'm not feeling well. I don't have nothing to do with [Mother]. I haven't seen her. I've been in South San Francisco for three days now. This stuff is raising my blood pressure. I'm done. She don't live here.' " There was no known criminal action pending against Father, although records indicated that an investigation was initiated when Mother reported that A.A. was conceived when Father raped her. Mother had apparently "failed and/or refused to revisit the matter and either press charges or provide further information that could lead to criminal prosecution."

³ Mother is 21 years old. As a child, she had been removed from her parents' custody "for domestic violence and drugs" and had been raised in out-of-state foster care, where she experienced "indifference and neglect from foster parents, rape from a relative's husband, instability and constant fear." She "went to so many schools that she did not graduate," then was sent to California to live with Father after being "displaced by Hurricane [Katrina]." Father "took advantage of her fragility and raped her until she became pregnant with his child." She stated she "has had a very difficult life" and that Father "is all the support she has."

The report further stated that the Bureau had provided Mother with various services between December 2011 and April 2012, including transportation, case plan support and referrals to various service providers including psychological and medication evaluation, visitation services, follow-up with the police department and district attorney's office regarding "their investigation of [Father]," assistance with locating housing and housing programs, and development of a "safety plan." All medical personnel who had treated A.W. and A.A. had reported that "[M]other ha[d] been consistently nurturing and loving in . . . her interaction with them." They . . . also reported consistent follow-up on medical appointments with only a few exceptions." Mother had visited A.W. twice since the removal. They were very happy to see each other and A.W. had "a nicely-bonded relationship with [Mother]." A.W. had also established a close bond with the foster mother and regularly looked to see if she was around. The foster mother reported that A.W.'s development had "improved markedly in the short time she [had] been in placement." A.W. had learned to sit up, was smiling more, making sustained eye contact, and eating much better than she was before. The foster mother was keeping up with all of A.W.'s appointments. The Bureau concluded, "This case is one of many complexities and layers. However, . . . it is primarily a matter of the safety and protection of [A.W.] and [Mother's] inability and/or unwillingness to ensure her protection." The Bureau noted that while it was "deeply sympathetic to the circumstances of [Mother]" and had worked with her in an attempt to keep her and her children safe, Mother had "repeatedly thwarted [the Bureau's] efforts to assist her and her children" and continued to maintain a relationship with Father while evading the Bureau for six weeks while it sought to verify A.W.'s safety and whereabouts. The Bureau recommended that A.W. not be returned to Mother and that Mother not be provided with reunification services.

On July 27, 2012, the Bureau filed an addendum report stating that Mother was having supervised visits with A.W. and that A.W. responded to her well. Mother missed a visit on June 26. She also cancelled an orientation for sibling visitation that the social worker had scheduled for June 28. A July 17 visitation did not take place because A.W.

had a doctor's appointment that was scheduled at the last minute. Neither the foster mother nor the Bureau was able to reach Mother about the cancellation because Mother's phone had been disconnected. When Mother, unaware of the cancellation, appeared for the visit that day, she was "disheveled, her hair was not groomed, and her clothes were dirty and had an odor." She appeared "more depressed than she had presented before, and appeared to be trembling a little." She said she had been staying at a hospital at which A.A. was staying and had "just been walking around" since he was discharged. She showered at the hospital, which "allow[ed] her to come whenever she need[ed] to." When asked where her medication and clothes were, she responded that they were in a bag at her therapist's office, and that she "just goes there when she needs them." She said she was not seeing her therapist regularly.

When the worker asked Mother why her phone had been disconnected, she said she had spent her money on throwing a birthday party for A.A. This was the second time since A.W.'s removal that Mother's phone had been disconnected for failure to make payments. The first time, A.W.'s attorney had to obtain an ex parte order for A.W. to undergo a medical procedure because Mother had not called the hospital to give consent for the procedure as instructed, and her phone was disconnected when the hospital tried to reach her.

The foster mother reported that Mother had not attended any of A.W.'s medical appointments since A.W. was placed outside the home, despite the fact that Mother had requested, and obtained, a court order on June 14, 2012, allowing her to attend all appointments. Mother had provided the foster mother with a list of all of the appointment dates so she knew when the appointments were, and the foster mother also contacted Mother whenever there was an appointment coming up. The foster mother had also given Mother the dates and times of all new appointments that had been made. A.W. continued to do well in the foster mother's care. She was eating more solid food and had gained significant weight, and she could almost sit up on her own, could keep herself standing while holding onto something, and was trying to crawl. At a July 24 visit, "it was evident how much physical, emotional and developmental progress" A.W. had made.

On July 17, Mother reported that she had obtained housing at Covenant House, a transitional housing project. On July 31, the juvenile court sustained the petition as amended.⁴ Disposition was continued for a contested hearing.

According to a second addendum report filed August 28, 2012, Mother failed to attend a case review for A.A. that was scheduled to take place on August 2. She did attend an orientation to set up sibling visitation, but the visitation center said that Mother would not be allowed to schedule sibling visitation there because she had too many “ ‘no shows’ to scheduled visits with [A.A.]” The center reported that Mother had attended only four out of 17 scheduled visits with A.A. between May 9 and July 11; four visits were canceled due to A.A. being sick, or “due to an emergency,” and nine visits were canceled due to Mother’s failure to show up and call. On August 20, Mother’s therapist left a voice mail message for the social worker, stating Mother had asked her to inform the worker that Mother was not going to attend a visit with A.W. that had been scheduled for that day. The worker found the message puzzling because there was no visit scheduled for that day.

The worker also called the transitional housing project at which Mother said she was staying in order to verify her residence. The project, which was also a homeless shelter, “would not verify [Mother’s] residency there,” so the worker was unable to determine whether Mother was staying there as a homeless resident or a transitional resident, or whether she was staying there at all. In an attempt to verify Mother’s address, the worker also conducted a review of Mother’s financial assistance benefits. The worker learned that Mother had applied for food stamps on June 28 using a different birthday and social security number, and that Mother had not provided a residence address. Records showed Mother received \$200 in expedited food stamp benefits and had a pending application for general assistance cash benefits. The Bureau stated, “The evidence continues to demonstrate that, while [Mother] continues to state that she is

⁴ The allegations under section 300, subdivisions (b) [failure to protect] and (j) [abuse of sibling] were sustained, and the allegations under subdivision (g) [no provision for support] were stricken.

attempting to establish a lifestyle that would safely and sufficiently support caring for her medically-fragile child, the facts . . . reveal that she is unwilling and/or unable to consistently and reliably engage in the most basic required activities, such as visitation.”

The contested dispositional hearing took place over four dates between August and November 2012. Leslie Calhoun testified she was the family reunification worker for Mother and A.W.’s sibling, A.A., for approximately one year. She outlined what Mother’s case plan was in A.A.’s case, which included developing a positive support system with family and friends, not having contact with Father, obtaining stable housing, attending domestic violence support groups and individual therapy, having regular visitation, working with an infant-parent therapist, and attending A.A.’s medical appointments. The Bureau offered numerous services to Mother, including providing her with a therapist and an infant-parent therapist, providing transportation and visitation, calling housing shelters and transitional homes, moving her to her new placements, working with case managers at her inpatient program, referring her to various programs and to a psychological and medical evaluation, and assisting her in obtaining a restraining order against Father. Calhoun also followed up with law enforcement regarding a possible criminal prosecution against Father, but Father was ultimately not prosecuted due to Mother’s lack of cooperation.

Calhoun testified that she ultimately recommended services be terminated in A.A.’s case because, despite the Bureau’s effort in “doing everything [it] could to support [Mother] in getting [A.A] back,” Mother consistently failed to follow up with referrals and misrepresented her relationship with Father. She did not follow through on the referral for a psychological evaluation or for a medical evaluation, and had participated in only one domestic violence class session. At Harrison House, where Mother stayed for some time, her attendance at classes geared towards gaining independence was reported to be low, as was her commitment to the community. She would leave first thing in the morning and come back “just at curfew,” or at times after curfew. Harrison House staff also suspected that Mother was giving her supplemental security income to Father because she was receiving payments but was not saving any money and not paying rent

on time. After approximately four months, Mother abruptly left Harrison House and later called Calhoun to say that she had moved to San Jose. She provided Calhoun with an address in San Jose, but Calhoun could not verify the address because it “didn’t exist.” Mother continued to assert that it was a “real location.”

Dr. Jill Miller, Mother’s therapist, testified she began working with Mother in October 2010. Mother had a “history of complex trauma,” sexual abuse, and traumatic bonding to Father, who was the perpetrator of much of the abuse. That history made rehabilitation difficult without ongoing support. Dr. Miller’s treatment plan for Mother included reducing symptoms associated with depression, creating a coherent narrative about the past history and ongoing impact of her trauma, and tracking goals around what Mother could do in the community to keep herself safe. Dr. Miller believed Mother had made various efforts since A.A.’s removal to rehabilitate herself by disclosing Father as the perpetrator of abuse and seeking a restraining order against him. Mother made an effort to engage consistently in therapy and had, over time, made progress in opening up during sessions. Mother had also made efforts to stabilize her living arrangements and was staying at Covenant House at the time of the hearing. Dr. Miller had no knowledge of ongoing contact between Mother and Father but believed what Mother told her—that she was staying away from Father. Dr. Miller acknowledged she was aware that Mother and A.W. were in Father’s car when he was arrested for driving under the influence. At that time, Mother explained that she had just happened to run into Father—who lives in Oakland—at a gas station in Stockton, where she was visiting a friend. Dr. Miller concluded it would take time, additional support, and practical resources to eliminate the causes that led to A.A.’s removal. When asked for a prognosis as to how long Mother would need to be treated in order to eliminate the various risk factors, Dr. Miller responded that she could not predict exactly how long it would take because “[y]oung people or individuals who have this level of sexual abuse and trauma history are in a healing process for a very long time.” When asked whether Mother was at a point where she could keep A.W. safe, Dr. Miller responded, “I think that she continues to make steps forward in order to do that,” and that she was “on track to being able to do that.”

Kelvin Dunn, a case manager at a hospital in Oakland, testified he met Mother in late 2010. As part of his job, he worked with homeless families and families at risk, and had been assigned to work with Mother. In late 2011 or early 2012, he began to suspect that Mother was continuing to have contact with Father, against whom she had a restraining order, because she would give “conflicting stories” and did not give clear answers when Dunn asked her what she was doing or where she was. In late January, when he called Mother to remind her of an appointment that was scheduled for that morning, Mother said she was just leaving Harrison House on her way to the hospital. Dunn was surprised to see Mother at the hospital just minutes later because Harrison House was seven miles away and Mother did not have a car. After the appointment, Mother acted suspiciously by “just . . . flying down the hall,” so Dunn got in his car to look for her. He saw Mother driving a white car, so he followed her to a location where he saw Father—whom he had met many times and recognized—get inside the car that Mother was driving. Dunn further testified that A.W. looked healthier since she had been in foster care and that because of her improved health, the number of required appointments had been reduced.

A.W.’s foster mother testified that A.W. was placed with her on May 31, 2012, when she was six months old. At the time, A.W. could not sit or roll over, ate very little, and weighed only 13 pounds. Over time, A.W. ate more and gained significant weight and mobility. A.W. was scheduled to receive hearing aids and was being treated with inhalers for her asthma. Her gastrointestinal problems were being controlled, although her vomiting episodes increased after visits with Mother. Concerns regarding a neurological disorder had been dismissed. A.W. had two to three appointments per week. Mother had attended one appointment with the feeding therapist and one with the neurologist.

Mother testified she came to live with Father in Stockton when she was 17 years old and lived with him there, and later in Oakland, for a total of three years. At the time of her testimony, Mother had been living by herself in a studio apartment in Oakland for two months. When asked why she had previously moved to San Jose, she said she did so

in order to distance herself from Father. She admitted she gave a false address in San Jose and said she did so because she was moving from motel to motel and believed A.W. would be removed from her care if she did not have a stable residence. Mother also admitted she was with Father in April 2012 when he was arrested for driving under the influence. She explained that she had coincidentally run into him at a gas station and got in his car because he asked if he could take her out for her birthday. Mother testified this was the only time since the restraining order was issued in 2011 that she had contact with Father. She denied seeing Father in late January as Dunn had testified and believed Dunn did not testify truthfully because he “may have something against [her].”

On November 2, 2012, three days before the final day of the contested disposition hearing, the Bureau filed a third addendum report. According to the report, A.W. continued to gain weight and had received hearing aids as scheduled. Mother was visiting with A.W. and A.A. for three hours on a weekly basis. The foster mother reported that A.W. had returned home from a number of these visits with “some kind of injury” and was more difficult to feed for days after the visits. Visitation staff reported that A.W. hit her head during a visit on two separate occasions and had a two-inch scratch around the right side of her hairline. Because of these injuries, the foster mother was concerned that Mother might not be capable of looking after both of the children at the same time. The foster mother also reported that she became nervous when Mother came to a medical appointment on October 30, 2012, because there was a man who “kept smiling at [A.W.]” and tried to come along when A.W. was called to the examining room. When the foster mother asked Mother who the man was, Mother quickly said, “I don’t know.”

Child welfare worker Kathrina Rashid testified as a rebuttal witness and as “an expert in psychology with an emphasis on domestic violence and sexual abuse.” She testified she filed a petition on A.W.’s behalf and worked on A.W.’s case for approximately five months. She agreed with Dr. Miller that Mother was traumatically bonded to her Father, which meant it would be very difficult for Mother to leave him. She spoke of the dynamics of a relationship in which a victim is traumatically bonded to

an abuser, and how they played out in Mother's relationship with Father. Rashid believed that obtaining a restraining order was a positive step but that Mother had not addressed her trauma and had not reached her treatment goals, which would take "years and years and years of treatment" to reach. Rashid further testified that Mother was meeting her visitation goals and that the bumps and scratches seen on A.W. were not of concern, as "frankly, . . . [k]ids get scratched." She also did not believe, based on the information available to her, that the man who showed up at A.W.'s appointment on October 30, 2012, was Father. Rashid was concerned about the feeding issues that occurred after visits but was not sure whether Mother was causing those issues.

The juvenile court found there was clear and convincing evidence that reunification services should be denied to Mother because Mother had failed to make reasonable efforts to treat the issues that had led to the removal of A.W.'s sibling, A.A. The juvenile court stated that Mother had far to go, and "little babies can't wait for parents to catch up." The juvenile court scheduled a section 366.26 hearing for February 25, 2013, and ordered visitation between Mother and A.W. as frequently as possible consistent with A.W.'s well-being.

DISCUSSION

Bypass of reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)

"There is a presumption in dependency cases that parents will receive reunification services." (*Cheryl P. v. Superior Court* (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 95.) However, section 361.5 sets forth a number of circumstances in which reunification services may be bypassed altogether. These bypass provisions are "a legislative acknowledgement 'that it may be fruitless to provide reunification services under certain circumstances.' [Citation.]" (*Id.* at p. 96.) " 'Once it is determined one of the situations outlined in subdivision (b) applies, the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of governmental resources. [Citation.]' " (*In re Ethan N.* (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55, 65.)

The juvenile court in this case bypassed reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), which seeks to address " 'the risk of recidivism by the parent despite

reunification efforts’ ” (*Cheryl P. v. Superior Court, supra*, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 96) by authorizing the juvenile court to bypass reunification services to a parent if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the parent previously failed to reunify with the child’s sibling resulting in a termination of reunification services or parental rights; and (2) the parent has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling. (*Cheryl P. v. Superior Court, supra*, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 95; see also *In re Albert T.* (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 207, 217.) Courts “do not read the ‘reasonable effort’ language in the bypass provisions to mean that *any* effort by a parent, even if clearly genuine, to address the problems leading to removal will constitute a reasonable effort and as such render these provisions inapplicable. It is certainly appropriate for the juvenile court to consider the *duration, extent and context* of the parent’s efforts, as well as any other factors relating to the *quality and quantity* of those efforts, when evaluating the effort for reasonableness. And while the degree of progress is not the *focus* of the inquiry, a parent’s progress, or lack of progress, both in the short and long term, may be considered to the extent it bears on the *reasonableness* of the effort made.” (*R.T. v. Superior Court* (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 908, 914.) Thus, “although success alone is not the sole measure of reasonableness, the *measure* of success achieved is properly considered a factor in the juvenile court’s determination of whether an effort qualifies as reasonable.” (*Id.* at p. 915.)

When a juvenile court’s decision to bypass reunification is challenged, we apply the substantial evidence rule. (*In re Brooke C.* (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 377, 382.) “We review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the necessary findings *based on the clear and convincing evidence standard.*” (*In re Isayah C.* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 694.)

Mother does not dispute that the first prong has been satisfied, as the record shows her first child, A.A., was declared a dependent of the juvenile court and her reunification services as to A.A. were terminated. She contends instead that there was no substantial

evidence supporting the juvenile court's finding that she failed to make reasonable efforts to alleviate the problems that led to A.A.'s removal. We disagree.

Here, the Bureau provided Mother with numerous services in connection with A.A.'s case, including therapy, transportation, referrals to various service providers including psychological and medication evaluations, assistance with locating housing and housing programs, visitation services, assistance in obtaining a restraining order against Father, and follow-up with law enforcement regarding a criminal investigation against Father. At the time of the contested dispositional hearing, Mother was generally in compliance with her visitation plan as to A.W. and was attending therapy sessions regularly. However, she had participated only marginally in the various other services the Bureau had provided to her throughout A.A.'s case. For example, she had attended only one domestic violence class session, had not followed through on referrals for psychological and medical evaluations, and had failed to attend required classes or comply with her curfew at Harrison House. She thwarted the Bureau's efforts to get in touch with her and A.W. and was evasive about her residence, requiring the Bureau to do such things as obtain a search and seizure warrant and contact housing facilities, motels, and the social security office in order to obtain information regarding her residence. Mother also failed to attend medical appointments for A.W., a medically-fragile child, on any regular basis after A.W. was removed from her care.

Mother asserts she "made reasonable efforts to find stable, safe, and suitable housing," but the record shows she left Harrison House abruptly and without notice, moved around between hotels in San Jose, misrepresented her living situation and gave a false address to the social worker, and otherwise failed to make her whereabouts known. Mother also asserts she made reasonable efforts to distance herself from Father by disclosing and reporting he had sexually abused her and by obtaining a restraining order against him. While these were commendable and positive steps for Mother, she negated the efforts she made by continuing to be untruthful about her relationship with Father and seeing him on at least two occasions after the issuance of a restraining order. As both her therapist and child welfare worker Rashid testified, it was going to take a long time for

Mother to be able to work on addressing her traumatic bonding to Father and to recognize the danger Father posed to her and the children. There was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that Mother had not made reasonable efforts to alleviate the problems that had led to A.A.'s removal.

Best interest of child under section 361.5, subdivision (c)

Section 361.5, subdivision (c) provides in relevant part: "The court shall not order reunification for a parent or guardian described in paragraph . . . (10) . . . of subdivision (b) unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child." Thus, while section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) gives the juvenile court *authority* to bypass reunification services, the court can nevertheless order reunification services if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ordering services is in the best interest of the minor. A juvenile court has broad discretion when determining whether reunification services would be in the best interests of the child. (*In re Angelique C.* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 523.) An appellate court will reverse that determination only if the juvenile court abuses its discretion. (*Id.* at pp. 523-524.) It is the parent's burden to "affirmatively show that reunification would be in the best interest" of the child. (*In re Ethan N., supra*, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 66.)

Mother contends that even if section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) was established, the juvenile court should have ordered services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (c) because A.W. had a positive bond with her and because Mother had shown a "willingness and capacity to engage in services." Mother points out that she regularly visited A.W. and that they "had a nicely bonded relationship" according to the Bureau's reports. However, the reports also stated that A.W. had a close bond with the foster mother and regularly looked to see if she was around. A.W.'s development had "improved markedly" while in the foster mother's care, and the foster mother was keeping up with all of A.W.'s medical needs, including taking her to all of her many appointments. In contrast, even though Mother had permission to attend all medical appointments, she had attended only two appointments at the time of the dispositional hearing.

Mother also asserts she was in compliance with part of her case plan and that she was taking “steps to be in a position to protect A.W.” However, “children should not be required to wait until their parents grow up.” (*Randi R. v. Superior Court* (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 73.) As noted, it was going to take a long time for Mother to address the trauma she had experienced and to be in a position to protect and care for A.W. There was no abuse of discretion.

DISPOSITION

The writ petition is denied. Our opinion is final as to this court forthwith.

McGuiness, P.J.

We concur:

Siggins, J.

Jenkins, J.