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**IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

**FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT**

**DIVISION TWO**

In re A.B., a Person Coming Under the  
Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT  
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

V.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

E061327

(Super.Ct.No. RIJ1400162)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Tamara L. Wagner,  
Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and  
Appellant.

Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, and Anna M. Marchand, Deputy County  
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

V.B. (mother) appeals from the trial court's finding that her daughter A.B. (the minor) qualified as a dependent child. (Welf. & Inst. Code<sup>1</sup>, § 300, subds. (b), (g).) She contends insubstantial evidence supports this jurisdictional finding because she cannot have acted negligently in leaving the minor with the minor's maternal grandmother, who had never given mother a reason to suspect abuse or neglect, on the day the injuries that led to the dependency petition occurred. In addition, mother challenges dispositional terms requiring her to submit to counseling, a parenting program, and mental health services.

We find substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional finding and affirm the trial court's dispositional orders.

#### FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 6, 2014, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) took the minor into protective custody after receiving an immediate response referral. The minor was four months old at the time. The referral to DPSS occurred when the maternal grandmother brought the minor to an emergency room with "2 large bruises on her head." At the time, mother and the minor lived with the maternal grandmother, and the maternal grandmother provided daycare when mother was at work. The maternal grandmother told hospital personnel that the minor had been holding her bottle and must have thrown it in the air and gotten bruised when it fell on her. An

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<sup>1</sup> Unless otherwise specified, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

emergency room physician concluded that the maternal grandmother's description of how the injuries occurred was not consistent with what he observed, and law enforcement was contacted.

The DPSS social worker interviewed the maternal grandmother, who again repeated the same basic story. The maternal grandmother explained that she had been home with the minor for more than an hour. She stated she prepared a bottle and gave it to the minor, who was still in her car seat on the maternal grandmother's bed. According to the maternal grandmother, the minor took the bottle and held it on her own; she had been doing this for "one month." The maternal grandmother then told the DPSS social worker that she and the minor were "watching TV" when she "heard the infant cry and noticed the bottle on the floor." The maternal grandmother thought the minor was crying because her bottle was missing. She told the DPSS social worker she did not know an injury had occurred until she retrieved the bottle from the floor, handed it back to the minor, and saw a red mark on the minor's face.

The DPSS social worker interviewed mother, who was 20 years old at the time, and had arrived at the hospital after her shift ended. Mother agreed with the maternal grandmother that the minor could hold her own bottle, although she estimated this had been occurring for, "I'm not sure, a couple of months." Mother also indicated the minor's father (father)<sup>2</sup> was incarcerated.

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<sup>2</sup> Father is not a party to this appeal. We therefore do not discuss findings or orders pertinent only to him.

After a doctor reported to mother that imaging showed the minor had no intracranial bleeding, the DPSS social worker told mother she would like to have the minor examined by “forensic doctors who specialize in child abuse” on the following day. Mother “began yelling, stating she would not take the infant to the [forensic doctors] as it would be a waste of her time.” When the DPSS social worker responded that the report of how the injuries occurred was inconsistent with the injuries, mother “was out of control yelling.”

At this point, law enforcement entered the room where mother was, and the DPSS social worker left. When the DPSS social worker returned, she told mother the minor was being taken into protective custody and gave her verbal notice of the detention hearing. Mother again began “yelling and screaming.” She “stated that she was not at home when the incident occurred, however she knew the maternal grandmother would never hurt the [minor].” The DPSS social worker and a law enforcement officer asked mother to calm down, but mother left the room with the minor against the advice of law enforcement. Mother screamed, “I want my mother” and ran down a hospital hallway. Law enforcement officers, hospital security, and “several hospital staff” responded and asked mother to calm down. Hospital staff members asked mother to hand them the minor.

The DPSS social worker described the situation as “completely out of control.” When she advised mother to calm down, mother kned the DPSS social worker in the groin and punched her in the stomach. Hospital staff took the minor from mother and

escorted the DPSS social worker and the minor to a county vehicle. Later, the DPSS social worker learned mother had “physically assaulted” both law enforcement officers, although mother was not arrested.

The minor was placed in a foster home the day after the events described above. The foster mother and the DPSS social worker saw the minor place her hands on the sides of her bottle. However, the minor “was unable to fully control the bottle due to her young age and lack of fine motor skills, [and] the bottle fell from her grasp.”

Also on the day after the injury, Dr. Sheridan, a forensic doctor, examined the minor. Dr. Sheridan concluded that an infant of the minor’s age “would not be holding a bottle or have the capability to throw a bottle into the air.” The doctor also concluded that the minor’s injuries were not consistent with the maternal grandmother’s explanation and added that the injury could have occurred if the minor had fallen off the bed. According to Dr. Sheridan, the cause of the minor’s bruising was “unknown at [the] time as no one is reporting the truth of how the injury occurred.”

DPSS filed a petition to have the minor declared a dependent under subdivisions (b), (e), and (g) of section 300. As for mother, allegation b-1 asserted that the minor had sustained bruising and scratching to her head and face while in mother’s custody, but that the explanation given was not consistent with her injuries. (§ 300, subd. (b).) In allegation e-1, DPSS also alleged that the minor’s injuries constituted “severe physical abuse” within the meaning of subdivision (e) of section 300.

The detention report attached to the petition included a conclusion by the DPSS social worker that mother “showed very little concern for the infant and the infant’s well being.” The detention report further opined that mother “clearly has no understanding as to infant development and milestones which is evident by her statement that the infant is holding her own bottle and has done so for 2 months.” DPSS’s recommendation was that the minor remain detained, with supervised visitation between mother and the minor as directed by DPSS.

At a detention hearing, the trial court adopted the recommendations in the detention report. It also, however, ordered DPSS to make every effort to arrange a visit between mother and the minor within 24 hours. The court authorized DPSS to place the minor with mother upon approval of an appropriate safety plan. On February 13, 2014, mother moved into the paternal grandmother’s home, and “it was determined that the child would be returned to the care of the mother on the condition that she reside with the paternal grandmother.” The minor was therefore returned to mother on February 13, 2014.

On February 20, 2014, the court formally returned the minor to mother under family reunification services. It also ordered that the minor not be left alone with the maternal grandmother, but indicated that mother could supervise visitation between those two. The minor remained detained as to father.

On March 10, 2014, DPSS filed a jurisdiction/disposition report. The author reported observing the minor holding her own bottle, although it “started to tip backwards

as [she] is not strong enough to maintain the bottle in that position on her own.” Mother asserted that the minor could hold onto the bottle without assistance at times, but that on other occasions the bottle “does tip backwards and out of her grasp.”

When she was reinterviewed, the maternal grandmother denied telling previous interviewers that the minor had thrown the bottle into the air; instead, “she assume[d] the bottle hit [the minor] when she dropped it, but . . . she [wa]s not certain.” In general, however, the maternal grandmother maintained that the injury had occurred when the minor lost control of her bottle. She added a new fact, namely that she took her eye off the minor because she turned to get her cell phone so she could pay bills.

The maternal grandmother also provided four pieces of documentary evidence purportedly proving the feasibility of her story. These documents, which were attached to the jurisdiction/disposition report, consisted of: (1) a screen shot of a January 30, 2014 Facebook post in which the maternal grandmother wrote that the minor “kept throwing her bottle and laughing at me [for] fetching it”; (2) a picture of the minor holding her own bottle in January 2014; (3) a picture of the minor after the maternal grandmother dropped mother off at work on the day in question but before the injuries occurred; and (4) a picture of the minor holding her bottle at the hospital on the night of the incident.

Based on these and other relevant facts, the jurisdiction/disposition report expressed “concerns that the mother believes the maternal grandmother’s explanation and minimizes the injuries [the minor] suffered while in her care.” In addition, mother indicated a willingness to “do whatever [DPSS] and the Court ask of her” in order to keep

the minor in her care, but she also stated that she did not need any services from DPSS because she was not present when the injuries occurred. DPSS concluded that mother would benefit from services designed to help her understand how to better protect the minor and why DPSS intervention was necessary. It recommended that mother retain physical custody of the minor, subject to DPSS supervision, and compliance with mother's case plan. Mother's case plan prohibited the maternal grandmother from having unsupervised contact with the minor and required mother, among other things, to closely monitor the minor when the latter was holding her own bottle. DPSS also required mother to participate in an anger management program and a parenting program, as well as to be assessed for mental health services.

On April 11, 2014, DPSS filed an addendum report in which it noted that mother had refused an offer of participation in family maintenance voluntary services. This would have "allow[ed] continued services and monitoring by [DPSS] without court involvement or adjudication of the child." Mother repeated that she did not require services since she did nothing wrong. She indicated she would wait for the contested hearing because "the Court [wa]s on her side." Mother also indicated she wanted to move back into the maternal grandmother's home. DPSS advised her of its "concern[] that she [wa]s minimizing her involvement in the situation and that she [wa]s not willing to take the steps to prevent this from reoccurring in the future unless it is ordered by the Court." The addendum report, like the jurisdiction/disposition report, recommended that the minor remain in mother's custody, with DPSS to provide family maintenance services

to mother. DPSS also asked the court to continue the order that the maternal grandmother was not to be left alone with the minor.

Before the presentation of any evidence at the combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the trial court and counsel discussed the possible application of section 355.1, subdivision (a). This provision reads: “Where the court finds, based upon competent professional evidence, that an injury, injuries, or detrimental condition sustained by a minor is of a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained except as the result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of either parent, the guardian, or other person who has the care or custody of the minor, that finding shall be prima facie evidence that the minor is a person described by subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of Section 300.” (§ 355.1, subd. (a) (§ 355.1(a)).) After hearing arguments from mother’s counsel that section 355.1(a) could not apply in this case, the trial court ruled that it could.<sup>3</sup>

The maternal grandmother testified that she returned home with the minor after dropping mother off at work; she kept the minor in her car seat so she could prepare a bottle. After the maternal grandmother prepared the bottle, she placed the minor, who was still in her car seat, on her bed. The minor grabbed the bottle and started drinking, so the maternal grandmother let her have the bottle while she got ready to remove her from the car seat for a feeding. Next, the maternal grandmother sat down next to the minor

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<sup>3</sup> What the trial court said was that “355 is applicable.” However, this statement came at the end of a conversation about the applicability of section 355.1, not section 355. We therefore consider the trial court to have made a ruling about section 355.1 rather than section 355.

and turned away briefly to plug in her cell phone. Her sitting down on the bed did not create any instability for the car seat.

Then, “all of a sudden, very quick, the bottle came kind of flying over and hit the ground.” The maternal grandmother became “concerned” after seeing a red mark on the minor’s forehead when she returned the bottle, so she asked her boyfriend to drive her and the minor to the hospital. She told the emergency room doctor that she did not see what happened, but she assumed that the minor had either hit herself in the head with the bottle or thrown the bottle into the air and been struck by it when it fell. The injury did not occur because the minor fell or had something fall on her.

Looking back at the incident in hindsight, the maternal grandmother might have avoided the injury by making sure that she never let go of the bottle while the minor was feeding from it. Also, she would hold the minor instead of leaving her in her car seat if she had things to do over again. However, the maternal grandmother stated she was “unsure” if she wanted to babysit anymore. This is because she took it personally that she had been accused of wrongdoing. Nonetheless, the maternal grandmother and mother were “still talking about” whether mother and the minor would return to living with the maternal grandmother.

According to the maternal grandmother’s testimony, the minor had been able to hold a bottle on her own for two weeks to a month before the incident. As proof, the maternal grandmother mentioned the photographs and Facebook post she had given to DPSS, each of which was attached to the jurisdiction/disposition report. In addition, and

at mother's counsel's request, the trial court held a bottle like the one the maternal grandmother used on the day of the incident, which had been filled with the same amount of formula the maternal grandmother had used. The trial court concluded that the bottle was "rather heavy."

Mother also testified at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. She emphasized that the maternal grandmother never gave her cause to doubt the quality of the caretaking she provided to the minor. Mother stated she believed the maternal grandmother's explanation that the bottle caused the injury because her "mom ha[d] never given [her] any reason to believe that she would lie about what happened." In fact, mother testified that she did not believe the maternal grandmother "neglected [the minor] in any way." Although mother said she did not think she was going to move back in with the maternal grandmother, this was only because the maternal grandmother was no longer comfortable with their previous arrangement. Mother herself "would be comfortable living" with the maternal grandmother. She was also confident that a similar injury would not recur because the maternal grandmother would start holding the minor for feedings. Mother claimed to have already made that change, and she also said she had stopped allowing the minor to hold her bottle by herself.

At the close of testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence the detention report, the jurisdiction/disposition report, and the addendum thereto. The court emphasized that two different doctors found the maternal grandmother's explanation to be inconsistent with the minor's injuries. Consequently, the trial court found that section

355.1(a) applied. It also found the maternal grandmother's testimony was not credible. This was because her story appeared to have changed. At the hospital, the maternal grandmother made no mention of turning away to plug in her cell phone, and, on the witness stand, she retreated from her statements at the hospital that the injury occurred because the minor had thrown her bottle up into the air. The trial court examined the photographs the maternal grandmother provided of the minor holding her bottle. However, it found them of little value, because in each the bottle was different from or less full than the one the court held. In addition, the bottles in the photographs appeared to be propped up by something.

Based on the evidence described above, the trial court sustained the petition as to the b-1 allegation.<sup>4</sup> The court found the e-1 allegation not true. In addition, the trial court ordered mother to comply with DPSS recommendations, which required her to participate in individual counseling. The court noted mother had assaulted the DPSS social worker and two law enforcement officers at the emergency room. Therefore, the court ordered mother to address her "anger issues . . . through individual counseling." Mother made no objection to any of the dispositional orders. Her counsel stated mother denied hitting anyone. They planned to have witnesses to prove this fact, but they did not call them. The court responded that it "ha[d] the reports that are admitted into evidence and no other evidence."

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<sup>4</sup> The court also found the b-2, b-3, and g-1 allegations true. However, these pertain to father, not to mother. Since father is not a party to this appeal, we do not discuss any specific findings with respect to the b-2, b-3, or g-1 allegations.

## ANALYSIS

Mother argues no substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional finding for two reasons. First, she contends she cannot have been negligent in leaving the minor with a woman who gave no sign that she would injure the minor. Second, mother asserts the injury cannot now recur because mother and the minor now live with the paternal grandmother. We reject these contentions because we view the evidence more broadly than mother, but also because mother fails to account for the operation of section 355.1. Mother also challenges certain dispositional terms. Rejecting mother's other claim on appeal, we also find substantial evidence supports the dispositional orders.

### 1. *Substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional finding*

“In reviewing [a dependency court's] jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court's determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” (*In re Heather A.* (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.)

A child falling within subdivision (b) of section 300 is one who “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child's parent or guardian to

adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's or guardian's mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) To support a true finding under section 300, subdivision (b), DPSS needed to prove the following three things: “(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the minor, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” (*In re Rocco M.* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.) To adequately prove the third element, DPSS also needed to offer proof that, at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, the minor was “at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur).” (*In re Savannah M.* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1396.) For this reason, “*‘previous acts of neglect, standing alone, do not establish a substantial risk of harm; there must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe they will reoccur.*” [Citations.]’ (*In re Ricardo L.* [(2003)] 109 Cal.App.4th [552] at p. 565, italics added.)” (*Id.* at p. 1394.)

When deciding whether a single instance of conduct that causes injury to a minor can support a finding of dependency jurisdiction, a court is to consider the totality of the circumstances. (*In re John M.* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 410, 418.) Relevant factors “might include, among other things, evidence of the parent’s current understanding of

and attitude toward the past conduct that endangered a child, or participation in educational programs, or other steps taken, by the parent to address the problematic conduct in the interim, and probationary support and supervision already being provided through the criminal courts that would help a parent avoid a recurrence of such an incident.” (*Id.* at pp. 418-419.) The court’s task is to determine whether there is “a basis to conclude there is a substantial risk the parent’s endangering behavior will recur.” (*Id.* at p. 419.)

In this case, it is undisputed that the minor sustained bruising to her face after mother left her in the care of the maternal grandmother. Mother asserts she had no knowledge that the minor was likely to come to harm in the maternal grandmother’s care, such that she cannot have behaved negligently toward the minor just by asking the maternal grandmother to provide daycare on the day of the injury. (See § 300, subd. (b) [requiring failure or inability to protect the child on the part of a parent or guardian].) In so arguing, mother focuses too narrowly on the circumstances preceding DPSS intervention. For the following reasons, substantial evidence supports DPSS’s conclusion that mother “[wa]s minimizing her involvement in the situation and . . . [wa]s not willing to take the steps to prevent this from reoccurring in the future unless it is ordered by the Court.”

First, the two DPSS social workers who examined the minor concluded that she was either “unable to fully control the bottle due to her young age” or that she could only “drink out of it for a few seconds before the bottle started to tip backwards.” This is

proof that mother and the maternal grandmother had both been allowing the minor to engage in an activity that could be dangerous, given her level of development. Yet, even on the night she learned that DPSS was investigating child abuse because of something that happened in the maternal grandmother's care, mother ran down the hospital hallway yelling, "I want my mother." That she sought the assistance of the woman who may have lied about how the injury occurred indicates mother was unwilling to put the minor's needs above her own. Mother also refused to express any suspicion or doubt about the maternal grandmother's story, either in interviews with DPSS or at trial.

Moreover, mother's reaction when she learned that DPSS intended to detain the minor was to lash out in multiple acts of physical violence. She also refused offers of voluntary participation in services, which would have removed the need for court involvement. In short, mother's well-documented uncooperative approach indicates the minor is likely to suffer additional harm because mother is unwilling to educate herself or change her style of parenting. (Cf. *In re Savannah M.*, *supra*, 131 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1390, 1397 [no substantial evidence of future risk to minor who was sexually assaulted by friend of parents because parents immediately called police and stated they would never again allow anyone else to babysit].)

In any event, the trial court in this case also relied on section 355.1(a), which mother does not address or even cite in her briefs on appeal. As indicated above, that statute creates a rebuttable presumption that a minor is a person described by subdivisions (a), (b), or (d) of section 300 when "the court finds, based upon competent

professional evidence, that an injury, injuries, or detrimental condition sustained by a minor is of a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained except as the result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of either parent, the guardian, or other person who has the care or custody of the minor.” (§ 355.1(a).) Here, the trial court accepted into evidence a report from Dr. Sheridan stating that the large bruises on the minor were not consistent with the history the maternal grandmother gave. This shifted to mother the burden of presenting evidence regarding how the injury occurred.

(§ 355.1(a); *In re D.P.* (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 898, 903.)

Mother’s only attempt to meet this burden was to offer testimony from the maternal grandmother, who repeated her story that the minor injured herself with her own bottle. The trial court made an explicit finding that this testimony was not credible, which left nothing in the record below to rebut the section 355.1(a) presumption. We may not substitute our views about credibility for those of the trial court, which means our record, too, is devoid of evidence proving that the minor’s injuries occurred as the maternal grandmother said they did. (*In re Heather A.*, *supra*, 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193 [“issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court”].)

For these reasons, we find substantial evidence supports the trial court’s jurisdictional order. Even if mother’s troubling actions after DPSS entered the scene provided too little in the way of evidence, the operation of section 355.1(a) filled that gap.

Mother's only remaining argument on appeal is that no evidence supports the need for continuing DPSS jurisdiction because the minor is now living at the paternal grandmother's house with mother. The problem with this contention is the evidence supporting it is equivocal, at best. It is undisputed that mother moved into the paternal grandmother's residence after DPSS made her relocation a condition of mother's regaining custody of the minor. However, the addendum report indicated in two places that mother told DPSS she wished to return to the maternal grandmother's home. This was the last report DPSS filed before the hearing, and mother has presented no reason why the trial court could not find it more credible than the testimony mother and the maternal grandmother provided.

This is especially true because, the testimony on this point was not terribly convincing. The maternal grandmother said she had no present intention to have mother and the minor move back in with her, but she admitted she and mother were "still talking about it." Mother admitted she would be "comfortable" moving back in with the maternal grandmother; the only reason she said she did not think she would move back there was her mother's discomfort. Given the obviously close connection between mother, the maternal grandmother, and the minor, we see no reason why the trial court could not assign more weight to the statements in the addendum report than to the ones made on the stand. Because the record contains evidence that mother hoped to return to where the injury occurred, the jurisdictional order is not rendered unsupported by the fact

that mother has relocated to the paternal grandmother's home for some unknown period of time.

2. *The dispositional terms are sufficiently tailored to the circumstances of this case*

Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to participate in counseling, mental health services, and a parenting program. She complains no evidence suggests she needed any of these services.

“ ‘The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child's interests and to fashion a dispositional order accordingly. On appeal, this determination cannot be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.’ ” (*In re A.E.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1, 4.) However, orders that a parent attend counseling or participate in other programs or services “must be ‘reasonable’ and ‘designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court's finding that the child is a person described by Section 300.’ ” (*In re Nolan W.* (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1229; see *In re Basilio T.* (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 172-173 [reversing requirement that parents attend substance abuse counseling due to lack of evidence showing either parent had a substance abuse issues].)

A parent who has an opportunity to object to a dependency court's dispositional orders at the trial court level but fails to do so forfeits any challenge to such orders on appeal. (*In re A.E.*, *supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 5.) Here, DPSS argues mother forfeited the right to challenge dispositional orders by making no objection to them in the trial court. We agree that mother herself made no such objections. However, immediately after the trial court ordered mother to address her anger issues in individual counseling

because it was concerned about her assault on three people at the emergency room, mother's counsel told the court mother denied striking anyone. Having been presented with no authority requiring mother or her counsel to object to dispositional terms using specific language, we interpret mother's counsel's comments as an objection to the orders that mother participate in services.

We find the orders requiring mother to participate in counseling and a parenting program were designed to ameliorate the conditions that led to the injury. As we have noted, DPSS expressed concern that mother failed to understand child development because she insisted the minor could hold her own bottle at an inappropriately young age. A parenting class would provide mother with information about what behaviors are to be expected at what ages. In addition, the trial court was correct that the only evidence before it showed mother had attacked three people at the emergency room on the day of the injury. Moreover, she was holding the minor when she began striking the DPSS social worker. Requiring mother to attend counseling is an appropriate way of providing a forum for her to address her anger issues so they cannot cause injury to the minor in the future.

DISPOSITION

The trial court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.

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RAMIREZ  
P. J.

We concur:

HOLLENHORST  
J.

McKINSTER  
J.