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**IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

**FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT**

**DIVISION TWO**

In re R.G., a Person Coming Under the  
Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY  
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.Z.,

Defendant and Appellant.

E063326

(Super.Ct.No. J257851)

O P I N I O N

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cheryl C. Kersey,  
Judge. Dismissed.

Law Offices of Vincent W. Davis & Associates and Stephanie M. Davis for  
Defendant and Appellant.

Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Jamila Bayati, Deputy County Counsel, for  
Plaintiff and Respondent.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant, A.Z. (Mother), appeals from the March 10, 2015, dispositional order removing her then eight-year-old son R.G. (minor) from her custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c).)<sup>1</sup> Mother claims there was no clear and convincing evidence of a substantial danger to minor if he were returned to her custody, and there were reasonable means by which his physical health, safety, and emotional well-being could have been protected without removing him. (*Id.*, subd. (c)(1).) Mother also claims the court erroneously excluded testimony from her fiancé, Z.F., at the contested dispositional hearing.

Mother does not challenge the court's jurisdictional findings, including that minor was a child described in section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm) and (b) (failure to protect), on the ground that both Mother and Z.F. spanked minor's buttocks, leaving them completely bruised. Z.F. is not a party to this appeal. Minor's father, R.G., who was incarcerated at the time minor was injured, is also not a party to this appeal.

For its part, plaintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), claims Mother's appeal is moot and must therefore be dismissed, because minor was returned to Mother's custody on June 17, 2015, pursuant to a family maintenance plan and, on August 31, 2015, the court dismissed the petition and terminated its jurisdiction, with Mother in sole physical and legal custody of minor.

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<sup>1</sup> All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

Thus, CFS claims this court cannot grant Mother any effective relief from the dispositional removal order, even if her claims on appeal have merit.

We agree that Mother's appeal is moot. Accordingly, we dismiss her appeal.

## II. BACKGROUND

### A. *The Spanking Incident and Initial Proceedings*

On Monday, December 8, 2014, minor, who was born in June 2006 and was then eight years of age, had stayed overnight at the home of his maternal grandmother (the MGM). Minor was taking a shower when the MGM noticed that minor had dark purple bruising on both of his buttocks. Minor lived in another home with Mother and Z.F. (the family home). The MGM asked minor what had happened, and minor said he had gotten into trouble at home for not helping put up Christmas decorations when he was visiting the home of Z.F.'s parents on Saturday, December 6. The MGM confronted Mother about the bruising, and Mother became defensive, saying she did not need someone telling her how to raise her son. The MGM reported the matter to CFS and the police.

Later on Monday morning, December 8, after Mother picked up minor at the MGM's home and before the police arrived, social worker Diana Bristow (SW Bristow) went to minor's elementary school to speak with him, but minor was not at school. Z.F. had come to the school and, according to the school principal, reported that minor would not be in school for a couple of days because he had a fever. SW Bristow, accompanied by a police officer, then went to the family home, but no one was at home. SW Bristow reached Mother by telephone, and Mother said that minor was with her and Z.F. at a

physician's office in San Dimas, where Mother and Z.F. were both employed. Mother agreed to meet SW Bristow at the physician's office.

SW Bristow went to the office and met with Dr. Willis, the physician for whom Mother and Z.F. worked. Dr. Willis said he had examined minor and had seen his bruising, and as a mandated reporter he had completed the necessary paperwork to report the incident. Dr. Willis also said Z.F. was his office manager and he had known Z.F. to be "a fine young man for many years."

SW Bristow then met with Mother who "launched into an explanation" regarding the MGM's "current mental wellbeing" and suggested it might have influenced the MGM's decision to report the matter. Mother explained that minor had spent Saturday at the home of Z.F.'s parents, and after he returned home Saturday evening, Mother asked him what he had been doing during the day. Minor said that instead of helping Z.F.'s parents put up Christmas decorations outside their home, he went inside the home to watch television.

Mother said that minor was aware of the importance of spending time with family, and Mother and Z.F. had had a problem with minor watching too much television, so she spanked him once "for not listening." When Z.F. overheard Mother spanking minor, he came into the room, and Mother told him to "take over" because she had a "weak hand" due a prior injury, and Z.F. spanked minor two more times. When asked whether the spanking was over or under minor's clothes, Mother said she usually spanked minor on his bare bottom and Z.F. usually spanked him over his clothes. When asked whether she

felt the spanking was “appropriate discipline” for minor for watching television with the permission of Z.F.’s parents, Mother responded that it was.

SW Bristow then met separately with minor, who presented as “a healthy, appropriate 8-year old.” Minor said it had been “hard” helping with the Christmas decorations so he went inside to watch television. When asked how he was usually disciplined at home, he said he was “restricted or hit,” and confirmed he had been spanked, over his clothes, for not listening after he returned home on Saturday evening. He did not “really know” why he was not in school that day. When asked who had spanked him, he hesitated and said it was “hard to say.” He denied any domestic violence between Mother and Z.F.

SW Bristow then asked Mother to return to the room and show her minor’s bruises, and Mother did so. Mother did not show concern or emotion regarding the extent of the bruises, and did not respond to SW Bristow’s suggestion that the spanking was “pretty harsh punishment” for watching television. Mother said minor loved his “dad,” Z.F., and Z.F. was a good father to minor. SW Bristow then met with Z.F., who presented as “quite nonchalant about the situation,” and confirmed Mother’s account of the spanking. Z.F. explained that he and Mother had had problems with minor not participating in family activities, and minor should have known it was wrong to go inside and watch television. When told of the extent of the bruising, Z.F. said it “was just a mistake” and perhaps he had hit minor too hard, but, like Mother, he showed no “remorse or regret” about the extent of the bruising.

SW Bristow told Mother and Z.F. that the Ontario Police Department would be contacting the family to determine whether a crime had been committed. Later on Monday, December 8, Mother, Z.F., and minor met with SW Bristow at CFS offices after they left Dr. Willis's office, and after SW Bristow had discussed the case with her supervisor. SW Bristow advised Mother that, in order to avoid the risk of minor being removed from her custody, Z.F. should move out of the family home until he had participated in some services. Mother became "extremely tearful," but Z.F. said he would move out. Mother and Z.F. said they had planned to take Tuesday off work to take minor to Disneyland, but SW Bristow told them that would not be possible.

On Tuesday morning, December 9, SW Bristow contacted Mother to learn the outcome of the police investigation. Mother said the police had come to her home on Monday evening, the police had found no problem and said they would be taking no further action in the matter. The officers said the family home was "clearly an appropriate and loving home." SW Bristow later discovered that the police had not taken any photographs of minor's bruises, and agreed with Mother that the officers would return to the home later on Tuesday to take photographs. When she was contacted by the police on Tuesday about the need to take photographs, Mother told the police that the family was at Disneyland and would not be home until late Tuesday evening.

Because Mother and Z.F. took minor to Disneyland against her recommendation and safety plan for minor, SW Bristow obtained a detention warrant to remove minor from Mother's custody. SW Bristow intended to serve the warrant, with the assistance of

the police, at the Ontario Police Department at 10:00 p.m. on Tuesday, because Mother and Z.F. said they would be there with minor to have the photographs taken. The family did not come to the police department on Tuesday evening, as Mother said they would, and minor was still absent from school on Wednesday, December 10. SW Bristow did not find the family at home or at Dr. Willis's office on December 10, but received a telephone message from an attorney retained by Mother, asking for a return call and information concerning how Mother could cooperate with CFS. SW Bristow believed Mother and Z.F. were trying to avoid having photographs taken of minor's bruises until the bruises had time to fade.

On Thursday, December 11, CFS filed a petition alleging minor was described in section 300, subdivision (a) (serious physical harm) based on Mother's and Z.F.'s acts of striking minor, and subdivision (b) (failure to protect), based on Mother's act of allowing Z.F. to strike minor, "resulting in significant purple bruising to both buttocks, covering the entire area." The petition also alleged minor was described in section 300, subdivision (g) (no provision for support), because the whereabouts of his biological father, R.G., were unknown, and R.G. was unable to provide for or parent minor.

#### *B. The Detention Hearing*

At the detention hearing on December 12, CFS asked the court to order minor detained in CFS custody and maintained with the MGM, and claimed that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent minor's removal from Mother. Mother and Z.F. appeared at the detention hearing, along with Mother's retained counsel, the MGM, a

maternal uncle, Z.F.'s sister, and Dr. Willis.<sup>2</sup> Mother brought minor to court, and he was in the court playroom.

Mother's counsel reported that Mother and Z.F. were already enrolled in parenting classes, and Mother was willing to have Z.F. move out of the home and "do everything in her power to make sure" that minor remained with her. County counsel and minor's counsel argued that minor should be detained in CFS custody based on the extent of his injuries and because Mother and Z.F. had hidden him from CFS.

The court ordered minor detained and granted Mother weekly, one-hour supervised visits with minor, but authorized CFS to liberalize the frequency and duration of the visits pending the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing. Z.F. was ordered not to have any contact with minor. The jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was set for January 5, 2015, but was continued to February 9 so that minor's biological father, R.G., could be transported to court from the California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi.

### *C. The Jurisdictional Hearing*

At the jurisdictional hearing on February 9, Mother waived her right to a trial on jurisdiction and submitted to the court's jurisdiction over minor, based on the allegations of the petition. After the section 300, subdivision (g) allegation was amended to strike the allegation that R.G.'s whereabouts were unknown and state that he had a criminal history and was incarcerated, the court found all of the allegations of the petition true,

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<sup>2</sup> After county counsel and minor's counsel objected to their presence at the detention hearing, the court directed Z.F, his sister, and Dr. Willis to wait outside the courtroom because they were not relatives of minor.

and declared that minor was a child described in subdivisions (a), (b), and (g) of section 300.

#### *D. The Dispositional Hearing*

At Mother's request, the contested dispositional hearing was continued from February 9 to March 10. On March 10, minor was still with the MGM. Mother asked the court to return minor to her custody and order family maintenance services. Minor's counsel objected to returning minor to Mother. Likewise, CFS continued to recommend minor's removal from Mother's custody and reunification services for Mother. Z.F. did not seek presumed father status or any CFS-provided services, but he participated in parenting classes and counseling on his own.

##### 1. The CFS Reports

A jurisdiction/disposition report (J/D report), dated January 5, 2015, and prepared by social worker Mallory Flores (SW Flores), stated that Mother, Z.F. and minor each gave consistent accounts of the spanking incident to the Ontario police on Monday, December 8. A copy of the police report, attached to the J/D report, indicated the officers knew CFS was recommending that Z.F. move out of the family home. Minor told the officers he did not fear Mother or Z.F. and he did not want Z.F. to leave the family home. The police officers did not believe minor was in any danger in the family home and that the case did not warrant a criminal arrest.

Mother declined to be interviewed for the J/D report, on the ground she needed to speak with her attorney. SW Flores concluded in the report that Mother needed to learn

alternative methods of disciplining minor, and to protect minor from “harm and abuse of others.” SW Flores was concerned that neither Mother nor Z.F. had expressed concern or regret for the physical injury they inflicted on minor.

In an addendum report dated February 9, SW Flores reported that minor underwent a medical examination at the Children’s Assessment Center (CAC) on December 12. During his medical examination, minor reported that Z.F. struck him on the left side of his face during the spanking incident. Minor also said Mother and Z.F. told him that SW Bristow was “bad” and “will take him away from his whole family.” During a forensic interview at the CAC on February 2, 2015, minor’s report of the spanking was consistent with his previous reports.

Copies of the CAC medical report and forensic interview report were attached to the addendum report. At some point, apparently on Friday, December 12, the Ontario police took photographs of the bruises on minor’s buttocks, and copies of those photographs were attached to the addendum report. All of the CFS reports and attachments, including the detention report, were admitted into evidence at the dispositional hearing.

## 2. SW Flores’s Testimony

As her first witness, Mother called SW Flores. SW Flores continued to recommend removing minor from Mother’s custody, reunification services, and supervised, weekly visits for Mother, because she still believed Mother had “a lot . . . to work on in terms of parenting” and the physical abuse that underlay minor’s dependency.

SW Flores knew that Mother had completed a 10-week parenting class and six counseling sessions by the time of the hearing, but she could not explain why she did not submit a copy of Mother's parenting class completion certificate or her counseling progress report to the court, prior to the hearing.

SW Flores believed Mother needed to continue with services and "show stability and consistency," because Mother failed to follow SW Bristow's safety plan, including having Z.F. move out of the family home and not take minor to Disneyland after the physical abuse was discovered and CFS initially allowed minor to stay with Mother. Mother also failed to promptly meet with the police a second time so they could photograph minor's injuries, and she kept minor out of school the entire week of December 8, 2014, after the physical abuse was reported to the police and CFS.

### 3. Sharon Sanchez (Mother's Therapist)

Mother's therapist, Sharon Sanchez, confirmed that Mother had completed six of her 12 allotted therapy sessions and was "very engaged" in her treatment. Ms. Sanchez did not believe Mother was a danger to minor. The spanking was "an isolated incident, which was severe," but Mother was "very caring," had a "great deal of parenting skill and capability," and looked out for minor's emotional well-being. Mother had also shown remorse for the physical abuse minor had suffered.

Ms. Sanchez admitted she was unqualified to assess risk and danger to children; she was a licensed clinician, not a social worker. She had relied on what Mother told her, and she had not reviewed any of the CFS reports, nor had she seen the photographs of

minor's injuries. She believed Mother needed further counseling to address how to appropriately discipline minor. Mother did not tell Ms. Sanchez that she asked Z.F. to finish spanking minor because her hand hurt and had previously been injured. Rather, Mother told Ms. Sanchez that, when Z.F. entered the room, "the decision was made" that Z.F. should be involved in disciplining minor.

#### 4. Shirley Alvarez (Mother's Parenting Class Instructor)

Shirley Alvarez was Mother's parenting class instructor and had taught parenting classes for 18 years. She confirmed that Mother completed a 10-week parenting course, which focused on teaching alternatives to spanking. Mother was "very devoted" to the course and completed all of her goals.

#### 5. Mother's Testimony

Mother testified she would never physically discipline minor again because she had learned it was wrong and other methods of discipline were better for minor's confidence and self-esteem. Mother said the spanking incident was a "huge mistake," but it was "a one-time incident," and she would never spank minor again or allow Z.F. to spank him. She would make sure minor was safe in her care. Mother and Z.F. had each spanked minor "a handful" of times before the December 2014 spanking incident. Mother denied telling minor that SW Bristow was "a bad person," and denied that Z.F. had slapped minor in the face. She said Z.F. "tapped [minor] on the head" to get his attention, but he did "not smack him or strike him," and minor "misunderstood" what had happened.

## 6. Additional Evidence

The court admitted into evidence a 35-page packet submitted by Mother, including her parenting class completion certificate and her counseling progress letter from Ms. Sanchez. The court did not allow Z.F. to testify, but admitted a copy of his parenting class certificate, counseling letter, and family photographs showing Mother and Z.F. with minor. The records indicated that Z.F. was a very good student in his parenting class. The records also showed that Z.F. and Mother had attended seven therapy sessions with Maher M. Selim, Ph.D., MFT. Ms. Selim opined that Mother and Z.F. had accepted full responsibility for physically abusing minor. The family photographs confirmed that Mother and Z.F. had been together and Z.F. had been a part of minor's life for several years.

## 7. Argument

Mother's counsel argued CFS had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was a substantial danger to minor, and that there were no means of protecting him short of removing him from Mother's custody. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Counsel emphasized that minor was suffering because he was not with Mother, and at the very least Mother should be allowed to visit minor as often and for as long as possible at the MGM's home, with the MGM supervising the visits.

The court then invited minor's counsel to comment on visitation. Minor's counsel did not object to increasing the frequency and duration of Mother's visits, but noted that Mother's relationship with the MGM was "strained," and Mother did not want minor

placed with the MGM at the time of the detention hearing. Thus, minor's counsel did not see how the MGM could supervise frequent visits between Mother and minor. The MGM was present in court, and confirmed she was willing to supervise Mother's visits, even on a daily basis because she was "home all the time."

#### 8. The Dispositional Order

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court declared minor a dependent and ordered him removed from Mother's custody based on "[c]lear and convincing evidence" of "a substantial danger" to minor's physical health, safety, and emotional well-being if he were returned to Mother at the time of the hearing. The court also found that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for minor's removal. The court increased the frequency and duration of Mother's visits, from one day each week to a minimum of four days each week for two hours, to be supervised by the MGM or another CFS delegate.

Noting that Mother had completed her parenting class and that counseling was the only part of her case plan she had yet to complete, the court ordered Mother to return to court in 60 days, after she had completed her six remaining counseling sessions, to check on her progress and whether Ms. Sanchez was recommending additional counseling sessions. CFS was authorized to allow Mother unsupervised visits, within the 60-day period, after Mother completed six more counseling sessions.

### III. DISCUSSION

In its respondent's brief, CFS claims Mother's appeal is moot and must therefore be dismissed. CFS argues that Mother's appeal does not raise a justiciable issue and this court cannot grant her any effective relief, because minor has since been returned to Mother's custody, and the juvenile court has since terminated its jurisdiction, leaving Mother with full legal and physical custody of minor. Mother has not filed a reply brief and has not otherwise responded to CFS's claim that her appeal is moot. For the reasons we explain, we agree that Mother's appeal is moot, and we dismiss the appeal.

#### *A. CFS's Request for Judicial Notice is Granted*

In support of its mootness claim, CFS has requested that we take judicial notice of three certified minute orders of the juvenile court, generated after the March 10, 2015, dispositional order. Mother does not oppose the request, and we grant it. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).) We take judicial notice of the following court orders:

(1) A May 11, 2015, minute order, reflecting that, at an appearance review hearing on that date, the court continued minor in CFS custody with the MGM, but ordered Mother to have unsupervised visits and Z.F. to have once weekly, unsupervised visits. The social worker was authorized to return minor to Mother under a family maintenance plan, by approval packet, with the social worker to address minor's relationship with Z.F. The order also indicates that Mother completed her counseling sessions and the court read and considered Mother's counseling progress report.

(2) A June 17, 2015, minute order, ordering minor returned to Mother pursuant to a family maintenance plan. The court found that returning minor to Mother “would not create a substantial risk of detriment.”

(3) An August 31, 2015, minute order, discharging minor as a dependent, dismissing the petition, granting Mother sole physical and legal custody of minor, terminating the courts’ jurisdiction, and directing that the order be filed in the family court. This order also terminated reunification services for minor’s father, R.G.

*B. Mother’s Appeal is Moot*

Generally, an appeal will be dismissed as “moot” when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant any effective relief. (*Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541; *In re Anna S.* (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498.)

The rationale underlying a mootness dismissal is that courts only decide actual controversies, or justiciable issues, and will not normally render advisory opinions on abstract propositions that can have no practical impact or that cannot provide the parties with effective relief. (*In re I.A.* (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489-1490 [“It is a fundamental principle of appellate practice that an appeal will not be entertained unless it presents a justiciable issue.”].)

Notwithstanding the general rule a moot appeal must be dismissed, “a reviewing court may exercise its inherent discretion to resolve an issue rendered moot by subsequent events if the question to be decided is of continuing public importance and is

a question capable of repetition, yet evading review. [Citations.] We decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether our decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding. [Citations.]” (*In re Yvonne W.* (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404.)

Here, Mother’s appeal raises no issues of continuing public importance, and we agree with CFS that Mother’s appeal is moot. Because minor was returned to Mother’s care in June 2015, and the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction in August 2015, with an exit order granting Mother full legal and physical custody of minor (see § 362.4), we cannot grant Mother any effective relief from the March 10, 2015, dispositional order.

Indeed, even if we were to conclude, as Mother claims, that there was insufficient evidence before the juvenile court of “a substantial danger” to minor if he were returned to Mother on March 10, and there were reasonable, alternative means of protecting him short of his removal (§ 361, subd. (c)(1)), the juvenile court has since terminated its jurisdiction, leaving Mother in full legal and physical custody of minor. Thus, it would be pointless to reverse the dispositional removal order. Pursuant to the order terminating the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, or exit order, any future disputes concerning custody and visitation of minor must be adjudicated in the family court. (§ 362.4.)

*In re Michelle M.* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326 is on point. There, the father appealed from “jurisdictional and dispositional orders” finding his daughter a dependent child and limiting his contact with his daughter except under specified circumstances. (*Id.* at pp. 327-328.) While the father’s appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated its

jurisdiction over the child and, as the juvenile court did here, transferred its custody and visitation order to the superior court under section 362.4. (*In re Michelle M.*, *supra*, at p. 328.) Then, as now, section 362.4 provides that when the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction and no action concerning custody of the child is pending, the juvenile court's termination order, or "exit order," may be used to open a file in the superior court, and the parents may seek modification of the exit order in the family court. (§ 362.4.)

Because juvenile court jurisdiction had been terminated, the *In re Michelle M.* court concluded that it could not grant the father any effective relief from the previous dispositional order limiting his contact with his child, and his appeal from that order was therefore moot and had to be dismissed. (*In re Michelle M.*, *supra*, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 330.) The court also found no issues of continuing public interest that would affect future proceedings in other cases. (*Id.* at p. 329.) The court emphasized that the father's remedy was to attack the juvenile court's order terminating its jurisdiction, but the father had not appealed from the termination order. (*Id.* at p. 330.)

Here, as in *In re Michelle M.*, Mother has not appealed from the August 31, 2015, order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction. Thus, this court can grant Mother no effective relief from the dispositional removal order. Mother's appeal also raises no issues of continuing public interest. Thus, Mother's appeal must be dismissed. (Cf. *In re Anna S.*, *supra*, 180 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1498-1499 [dismissing dependency appeal as moot but deciding question of continuing public interest].)

We are aware of *In re C.C.* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 (C.C.), but it is distinguishable and, for this reason, we decline to follow it. There, the mother appealed from a dispositional order denying her visitation and conjoint therapy with her dependent son. (*Id.* at p. 1483.) While the mother’s appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction and issued a family law exit order (§ 362.4), granting the father sole legal and physical custody of the boy, but granting the mother monitored visits, the very relief the mother sought by her appeal (*C.C.*, *supra*, at pp. 1483, 1488). The mother asked the appellate court not to dismiss her appeal as moot, because the disposition order “creat[ed] the possibility of prejudice [to her] in subsequent family law proceedings.” (*Id.* at p. 1489.)

Though the *C.C.* court found the mother’s concern about future prejudice “highly speculative,” it considered the merits of her appeal “in an abundance of caution.” (*C.C.*, *supra*, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1489.) The *C.C.* court concluded that the juvenile court used an incorrect standard in denying the mother visitation because, though the court found the visitation would be detrimental to the child in a broad sense, it did not find that the mother’s visitation would jeopardize the child’s *safety*. (*Id.* at pp. 1488-1492; § 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B) [“No visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child”].) “[T]o eliminate even the remote possibility of prejudice” to the mother in subsequent family court proceedings, “arising from the adverse finding based on the incorrect standard,” the *C.C.* court reversed the dispositional order, but did not remand the matter to the juvenile court for further proceedings. (*C.C.*, *supra*, at pp. 1492-1493.)

Unlike the mother in *C.C.*, who at least *claimed* that the erroneous dispositional order denying her visitation *may have prejudiced her* in future family court proceedings, Mother has not responded to CFS’s claim that her appeal is moot. Thus, Mother does not claim that the order removing minor from her custody will or may have adverse collateral consequences to her in subsequent family court proceedings. On this basis, we find *C.C.* distinguishable, decline to follow it, and dismiss Mother’s appeal as moot.

#### IV. DISPOSITION

Mother’s appeal from the March 10, 2015, dispositional order is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON  
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ  
P. J.

SLOUGH  
J.