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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re M.C., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES
AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.L. et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

K.L.,

Objector and Appellant.

G052998

(Super. Ct. No. DP024889)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Gary Bischoff, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Law Offices of Vincent W. Davis & Associates and Stephanie M. Davis for
Objector and Appellant.

Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Debbie Torrez,
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.

No appearance for Minor.

* * *

INTRODUCTION

K.L. is the maternal grandmother of M.C., who was born and taken into protective custody in April 2014. K.L. appeals from the juvenile court's order denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388¹ to modify the court's prior order denying placement of M.C. with K.L. We conclude the juvenile court did not err by denying K.L.'s section 388 petition without a full evidentiary hearing because K.L. did not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances justifying placement of M.C. with her. We therefore affirm.

In a related appeal, case No. G053073, M.C.'s mother, T.L., appeals from the juvenile court's order denying her petition under section 388. We affirm that order by separate opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I.

Dependency Petition

T.L. (Mother) gave birth to M.C. in April 2014. Mother had a history of heroin and methadone use, and M.C. tested positive for methadone the day after she was born. A few weeks later, Mother was arrested on an outstanding warrant for forging narcotic prescriptions. When Mother was arrested, she tested positive for methamphetamine, opiates, and marijuana. M.C. was taken into protective custody.

¹ Code references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

On May 1, 2014, the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a juvenile dependency petition (the Dependency Petition) alleging failure to protect under section 300, subdivision (b). As amended by interlineation, the Dependency Petition alleged:

“b-1. On April 28, 2014, [M]other . . . was arrested for not reporting to probation, on the charge of forging narcotic prescriptions. [M]other also tested positive for opiates, methamphetamine, and marijuana. During the week of April 21, 2014, [M]other used marijuana while in a vehicle with the alleged father [M]other knowingly but not simultaneously abused drugs while breastfeeding the child, M[.C.].

“b-2. [M]other . . . has an unresolved substance abuse problem that includes, but may not be limited to, the abuse of opiates, methamphetamine, and marijuana. [M]other also has a long history of heroin abuse. [M]other has also been taking methadone.

“b-3. [M]other . . . exposed the newborn child, M[.C.] to drug abuse. [M]other and child were residing with the child’s maternal relatives who abuse marijuana regularly. The child’s home smelled of marijuana, and drug paraphernalia was in and around the home. After [M]other’s arrest, she left the child in the care of maternal relatives who are inappropriate caretakers. On April 30, 2014, the child M[.C.] was inconsolable while in the care of the maternal relatives. She exhibited a high[-]pitch[ed] cry, shaking, disturbed sleep, intermittent bouts of coughing, and she had diarrhea. The child had a severe diaper rash that was red, inflamed, and raw. The alleged father . . . knew that [M]other and the maternal relatives abuse drugs.

“b-4. The father . . . used substances includ[ing], but may not be limited to, the abuse of alcohol, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine. [The father] self-reports that during the week of April 21, 2014, he was with [M]other in a vehicle while she used marijuana. [¶] . . . [¶]

“b-6. [M]other . . . has a criminal history that includes arrests and/or convictions for: Business & Professions Code 4140—possess hypodermic needle/syringe; Health & Safety Code 11350(a)—possess narcotic controlled substance; Penal Code 460(b)—burglary: second degree; Health & Safety Code 11368—forge/alter narcotic prescription.”

The detention report noted that M.C.’s father, C.C. (Father), did not want M.C. placed with maternal relatives in the home in which she had been residing because “everyone living in the home smokes marijuana, and . . . drugs and drug paraphernalia were found throughout the house.” When taken into protective custody, M.C. was living in K.L.’s house. M.C. was found to have diarrhea and diaper rash so severe that “the baby’s entire bottom was red, inflamed, and raw as at least one layer of skin had sloughed off.” M.C. shook, emitted a high-pitched cry, was inconsolable, and had disturbed sleep.

On April 29, 2014, the assigned social worker made an unannounced visit to K.L.’s home. The social worker confirmed there were marijuana and drug paraphernalia around the house, which smelled of marijuana. K.L. admitted she smoked marijuana the previous day and confirmed that every family member smoked marijuana on a regular basis. K.L. claimed she did not smoke marijuana in M.C.’s presence or in M.C.’s room. K.L. stated she did not have a medical marijuana card.

On May 2, 2014, the juvenile court ordered M.C. detained and removed her from parental custody. K.L. was denied placement. M.C. was placed in an emergency shelter home.

II.

Jurisdictional/Dispositional Hearing

In an interview with the assigned social worker, Mother reported she had a long history of heroin use and had been on methadone for the past seven years, including the period of time during which she was pregnant with M.C. Mother stated that on the

day before she was arrested, she used heroin and believed methamphetamine had become stuck to the heroin tar.

In the jurisdiction/disposition report, SSA recommended sustaining the Dependency Petition, declaring M.C. a dependent child of the court, and offering reunification services to Mother and Father. According to SSA, “[M]other reports that she is very motivated to become clean and reunify with her child.”

Trial was conducted on June 19, 2014. The juvenile court ordered the Dependency Petition amended by interlineation. Mother and Father pleaded no contest. The court found the allegations of the Dependency Petition true by a preponderance of the evidence and declared M.C. to be a dependent child of the court. Custody of M.C. was removed from Mother and Father and placed with SSA for suitable placement. The court approved the case plan recommended by SSA and ordered reunification services.

M.C. remained with the emergency placement until November 2014, when she was placed in the home of her paternal grandmother. At some point, K.L. sought to have M.C. placed with her, and SSA denied that request. That decision was overturned (apparently through SSA’s internal administrative appeal process), but K.L. withdrew her placement request.

In December 2014, SSA recommended the juvenile court terminate family reunification services as Mother had relapsed and Father was incarcerated. In January 2015, the court held a contested six-month review hearing. The court found that out-of-home placement was necessary, continued family reunification services for Mother and Father, and scheduled a 12-month review hearing for June 2015.

III.

Transfer to Riverside County; Caretaking Issues; Placement of M.C. in Foster Care

In February 2015, the juvenile court ordered the case transferred to Riverside County because of Mother’s and Father’s place of residence. Mother lived in

Riverside County with K.L., K.L.'s husband, Michael W.² (Michael), and Michael's elderly parents, who employed Mother and K.L. as their caregivers. Mother also participated in drug abuse treatment and drug testing in Riverside County. A few weeks later, the Riverside County Juvenile Court found that Mother and Father were residents of Riverside County and accepted the transfer from Orange County. The court authorized the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) to "liberalize" visits with Mother and Father, "contingent upon a suitable home evaluation and the parents making the child available to the [DPSS]."

DPSS reported that K.L., M.C.'s maternal great-grandmother, the paternal grandmother, and M.C.'s babysitter, Vicky S. (Vicky), were authorized to monitor the visitation. The visits were to take place in Orange County and no visits were to take place at K.L.'s home in Riverside County.

On March 17, 2015, DPSS received a report that Mother and Father were living with M.C. and the paternal grandmother, were caring for M.C. while the paternal grandmother was at work, and appeared to be under the influence of drugs. On the same date, SSA conducted an unannounced visit at the home of the paternal grandmother. M.C. was not home, and her crib was stacked with blankets. The paternal grandmother claimed that K.L. had taken M.C. to the maternal great-grandmother's home, which was 10 minutes away. K.L. was told to return M.C., but delayed 40 minutes in returning. The paternal grandmother was reminded that M.C. was not allowed to be taken to K.L.'s home.

DPSS was concerned that background checks had not been completed for the visitation monitors and M.C. was being transported by people who had not been authorized for unsupervised time. DPSS requested that only the paternal grandmother and Vicky monitor visits until other family members could be cleared.

² Michael W. is referred to variously in the record as K.L.'s husband, fiancé, and boyfriend.

On March 24, 2015, DPSS learned that M.C. was with K.L. at her home in Riverside County. A DPSS social worker made an unannounced visit to K.L.'s home and found M.C. there. K.L. claimed that she was caring for M.C. in place of the paternal grandmother. Earlier that day, Mother and Michael had taken M.C. to the pharmacy. The paternal grandmother confirmed she had left M.C. at the maternal great-grandmother's home, but claimed she did not know that M.C. was transported to Riverside County.

DPSS removed M.C. from the paternal grandmother's care and placed her in a confidential foster home. K.L. admitted that she allowed Mother and M.C. into her home but claimed she was authorized to do so, despite information to the contrary. DPSS began assessing K.L.'s home for placement of M.C.

IV.

K.L.'s First Section 388 Petition and Motion for De Facto Parent Status

In an addendum report dated April 13, 2015, DPSS recommended transferring the case back to Orange County based on reports that Mother was living with relatives in Newport Beach and Father was living with his grandmother in Glendora (which DPSS mistakenly believed to be in Orange County). Attached to the addendum report was a letter, dated December 16, 2014, from K.L. asking that M.C. be placed in her home. The letter stated: "I have been close with M[C.] since birth and visited her regularly in foster care. We just want to get her back with family. M[C.] is very well adjusted with me and feels safe and secure." The court denied the motion to transfer and scheduled the 12-month review hearing to be held in Riverside County. M.C. remained in the confidential foster home.

In May 2015, K.L. filed a petition under section 388 requesting the court place M.C. in her care or grant her unsupervised weekend and overnight visits (K.L.'s First Section 388 Petition). K.L.'s First Section 388 Petition alleged that M.C.'s removal

from the paternal grandmother's care and placement in a foster home constituted changed circumstances.

In a declaration presented with K.L.'s First Section 388 Petition, K.L. stated that she had "provided for the daily physical and emotional needs of M[C.] from November 2014 to March 24, 2015" and "was responsible for establishing M[C.]'s routine, feeding her, putting her down for naps and bathing her." K.L. claimed that since being placed in foster care, M.C. was "in distress and unhappy," was "confused," and "acts out." K.L. acknowledged her criminal history included three charges for being under the influence of and/or in possession of drugs. K.L. stated her last drug charge was 12 years ago, and, at the time of the criminal charges, she was in the process of getting a divorce and made bad decisions.

K.L. also filed a request for de facto parent status.³ The juvenile court set a hearing on K.L.'s First Section 388 Petition and request for de facto parent status for June 16, 2015 at the same time as the 12-month review hearing.

According to the June 16, 2015 status review report, on June 1, 2015, during a visit with M.C., Mother and Father threatened to bomb the DPSS building. Law enforcement responded and evacuated the building for two hours. Mother and Father also threatened DPSS social workers and office staff. Due to the threats, Mother, Father, and K.L. were not allowed to visit M.C. at the DPSS office.

Mother claimed that she had moved because she wanted M.C. placed with K.L. Mother continued to work at K.L.'s home.

In the status review report dated June 16, 2015 and addendum reports, DPSS recommended that the court terminate the family reunification services for both

³ "De facto parent" means a person who has been found by the court to have assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of parent, fulfilling both the child's physical and psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.502(10).)

Mother and Father. Mother and Father continued to abuse drugs, and they failed to participate in drug treatment programs. Mother also appeared to be under the influence of drugs at some visits as her speech was slurred and she fell asleep while speaking. Mother and Father had not been forthcoming about their living situation and participation in their case plan, and had failed to participate in random drug tests. The June 16 status review report stated: “[M]other has made some strides towards stabilizing her life but she has not yet completed her case plan services and there is concern that . . . although she reports she is in services, there is no proof that she is currently participating.”

DPSS reported that M.C. was doing well in her foster home. The foster parents were nurturing, they provided for M.C.’s emotional, educational, and physical needs, and she was thriving in the home. M.C. was adjusting well and appeared to have bonded with the foster parents and their children.

In the June 16 status review report and addendum reports, DPSS expressed concern about K.L.’s ability to protect M.C. because she had been found in K.L.’s home while Mother was living there. M.C. had been exposed to K.L.’s drug use, and that of the relatives who also abused drugs in K.L.’s home. K.L. had not complied with visitation orders, had discussed the case with Mother, and had made “negative comments” about DPSS during visits. K.L. had a criminal history that required an exemption for home placement. In the home, there was another adult with a criminal history requiring an exemption, and that person’s fingerprints had twice been rejected by the FBI.

DPSS opposed K.L.’s request for de facto parent status. M.C. was living in K.L.’s home at the time she was detained. K.L. abused marijuana, her home smelled of marijuana, and drug paraphernalia was found in the home. K.L. never had custody of M.C., was not protective of her, and had not produced evidence that M.C. was psychologically bonded with her. K.L. had not been cooperative or forthcoming with DPSS.

On June 16, 2015, the juvenile court granted K.L.'s First Section 388 Petition in part by authorizing K.L. weekly supervised visits. The court denied her request for placement, overnight visits, and weekend visits. The court continued the 12-month review hearing and K.L.'s request for de facto parent status to July 23, 2015.

V.

Twelve-month Review Hearing

In an addendum report dated July 23, 2015, DPSS reported that K.L. began weekly scheduled visits with M.C. on June 25. K.L. arrived on time to each visit and interacted appropriately with M.C., although, during one visit, K.L. responded to text messages. DPSS had recently been notified that K.L.'s live-in boyfriend, Michael, had been denied an exemption because of his criminal record. DPSS remained concerned about K.L.'s ability to adequately protect M.C. "due to the part [K.L.] may have played to the contribution of M[C.]'s current dependency." DPSS also expressed concern that K.L. would not pass an adoption evaluation.

The July 23 report related an interview, conducted on June 25, 2015, between the assigned social worker and the paternal grandmother. During the interview, the paternal grandmother stated that placing M.C. in the care of maternal relatives would be a "huge mistake" because "[t]he whole family is toxic." The paternal grandmother stated the maternal relatives would lie and manipulate to get what they want.

At the 12-month review hearing on July 23, 2015, the juvenile court found that returning M.C. to the custody of either parent would create a substantial risk of detriment to M.C., and that M.C.'s current placement was appropriate. The court ordered Mother and Father to participate in psychological evaluations and ordered DPSS to file a motion to transfer the case back to Orange County because Mother had provided an address in Orange County. The court ordered continued family reunification services, scheduled an 18-month review hearing, and scheduled a hearing to transfer the case back to Orange County. The court authorized increased visits for K.L., Mother, and Father,

and denied K.L.'s request for de facto parent status. The court also denied the foster parents' request for de facto parent status.

VI.

Transfer Back to Orange County; Mother's Motion to Have M.C. Placed with K.L.; K.L.'s Second Section 388 Petition

In August 2015, the case was transferred to Orange County Juvenile Court. In September, the juvenile court adopted a case plan for Mother and Father and ordered SSA to assess M.C.'s maternal cousins for placement. An 18-month review hearing was scheduled for October 30, 2015.

Mother filed a motion to have M.C. placed with K.L. The motion asserted, "[M.C.] has a very strong bond with [K.L.] and [K.L.] has played an active role in the child's life since she was born." The motion claimed that DPSS had certified K.L.'s home and found it to be satisfactory. In an interim review report dated September 17, 2015, SSA clarified that K.L.'s home had not been approved for placement because it was the home of K.L.'s husband, Michael, and he was living there. Also, Michael had a criminal record that could not be exempted. K.L. had a history of substance abuse which, SSA reported, was another reason for not placing M.C. in her care. The juvenile court denied Mother's motion without prejudice.

In October 2015, K.L. filed a second petition under section 388 requesting that M.C. be placed with her (K.L.'s Second Section 388 Petition). K.L. contended she had been approved for placement by DPSS. In a status review report dated October 30, 2015, SSA reported that an evaluation of K.L.'s home for possible placement was underway.

In the October 30 report, SSA recommended the termination of reunification services and scheduling a hearing under section 366.26. Mother had not resolved her drug problem and declined an inpatient drug abuse treatment program. Her

cooperation with the case plan and efforts and progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating court involvement had been minimal. Father's cooperation and efforts were described as "none" (capitalization omitted). Nonetheless, SSA increased Mother's visitation from two hours to three hours each visit. M.C. continued to thrive in her foster home and was meeting all of her developmental milestones.

The 18-month review hearing was conducted on November 4, 2015. K.L. withdrew K.L.'s Second Section 388 Petition. The juvenile court terminated family reunification services to Mother and Father and set a hearing under section 366.26. The court found that returning M.C. to the custody of Mother or Father would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, and physical or emotional well-being of M.C., and that reasonable services had been provided. The court ordered continued funding for Mother's drug testing, increased Mother's visitation to 12 hours of supervised visits, and allowed K.L. to supervise six hours of Mother's visits. K.L. was to provide SSA with an update of Mother's visits every Monday.

VII.

K.L.'s December 2015 Section 388 Petition

In December 2015, K.L. filed another petition under section 388 (K.L.'s December 2015 Section 388 Petition) to change a court order. K.L. again requested that M.C. be placed with her. In a supporting declaration, K.L. stated: "I have been supervising visitation at my home for the last six weeks every Sunday for six hours and I also spend an additional six hours' visitation at [SSA]. M[C.] is right at home and cries when she has to leave me. She turns away from the foster Mom to stay with me. [¶] . . . I am having fencing installed on December 9th around my pool through [SSA] for Relative Placement." K.L. again claimed that DPSS had approved her home for placement on July 10, 2015.

On December 17, 2015, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on K.L.'s December 2015 Section 388 Petition. M.C.'s and SSA's counsel opposed the request and argued circumstances had not changed since the last time K.L. brought a request under section 388. K.L. spoke. She stated that recently when she took M.C. to a petting zoo, M.C. screamed and cried when placed in the car. K.L. asserted M.C. did so because she thought she was being returned to the foster parents. K.L. stated that M.C. cried when being returned to the foster home and had to be bribed with food to get her into the car with the foster parents. K.L. asserted that M.C. was not happy with the foster parents and "[woul]d rather be with us."

The juvenile court denied K.L.'s December 2015 Section 388 Petition on the grounds that K.L. had not shown a change in circumstances and that changing M.C.'s placement would not be in M.C.'s best interest. The court noted that M.C.'s counsel opposed the request and had no concerns about the foster home in which M.C. had been placed. The court stated it had reviewed the court file and the comments by the Riverside County Juvenile Court judge who, in June 2015, had denied K.L.'s request for placement. The court also stated: "You were not previously approved and the child has already been in placement for a very long period of time now and there is no reason to change that placement at this time and the evidence that you've presented is not sufficient for a hearing."

K.L. timely filed a notice of appeal from the order denying K.L.'s December 2015 Section 388 Petition.

DISCUSSION

I.

Relevant Law and Standard of Review

"A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set aside under section 388 if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new

evidence or changed circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A parent need only make a prima facie showing of these elements to trigger the right to a hearing on a section 388 petition and the petition should be liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing to consider the parent's request. [Citation.]" (*In re Zachary G.* (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806.)

"However, if the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child, the court need not order a hearing on the petition. [Citations.] The prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition. [Citation.]" (*In re Zachary G., supra*, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 806.) In determining whether the petition makes a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, the court may consider the case's "entire factual and procedural history." (*In re Jackson W.* (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258.)

We review the juvenile court's summary denial of a section 388 petition under the abuse of discretion standard, not the de novo standard, as K.L. contends. (*In re D.R.* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1513; *In re C.J.W.* (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1079; *In re Anthony W.* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.)

II.

The Juvenile Court Did Not Err by Denying K.L.'s December 2015 Section 388 Petition.

K.L.'s December 2015 Section 388 Petition requested that M.C. be placed immediately with K.L. K.L.'s First Section 388 Petition, which the juvenile court denied, and K.L.'s Second Section 388 Petition, which K.L. withdrew, made the same request. What had changed since those earlier petitions? Liberally construed, K.L.'s December 2015 Section 388 Petition identified these circumstances to justify her request: (1) K.L.

had been supervising visitation with M.C. at K.L.'s home for six hours every Sunday and visited M.C. six hours at SSA; (2) M.C. was unhappy in her foster home; (3) in July 2015, DPSS had approved K.L. for home placement; and (4) K.L. had a fence built around her swimming pool, as approved by SSA.

Of these alleged changed circumstances, No. (3)—approval of K.L. for home placement—was disproven by the factual and procedural history presented to the juvenile court. In an interim review report dated September 17, 2015, SSA clarified that DPSS had not approved K.L.'s home for placement because it was the home of K.L.'s husband, Michael, he was living in it, and he had a criminal record that could not be exempted. In addition, K.L. had a history of substance abuse which, SSA reported, was another reason for not placing M.C. in her care. When K.L. filed K.L.'s December 2015 Section 388 Petition, SSA had authorized an evaluation of K.L.'s home, but the evaluation had not been completed.

The second alleged changed circumstance—that M.C. was unhappy in foster care—was based entirely on K.L.'s interpretation and perception of M.C.'s behavior while being placed in a car. K.L. asserted that M.C. was not happy with the foster parents and “[woul]d rather be with us.” K.L. did not allege she had inspected the foster home or watched M.C. interact with the foster parents. K.L.'s allegation that M.C. was unhappy in her foster home is the type of “general, conclusory allegation[]” that does not warrant an evidentiary hearing. (*In re Edward H.* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.) Also, the juvenile court had before it reports from DPSS and SSA, showing that M.C. was happy and thriving in foster care.

As for the first alleged changed circumstance, the DPSS reports confirmed that, since June 2015, K.L. had supervised visits with M.C. and K.L. interacted appropriately with M.C. during the visits. We accept as true the allegation that K.L. had built a fence around the swimming pool at her home, the final alleged changed circumstance. K.L.'s December 2015 Section 388 Petition did not, however, make a

prima facie showing that these circumstances justified a change in M.C.'s home placement and that such a change would promote M.C.'s best interests. K.L. did not allege or explain how her increased visitation with M.C., though successful, addressed concerns over K.L.'s ability to be M.C.'s caregiver. Those concerns included K.L.'s own history of drug use, inability to care for M.C., disregard of visitation orders, and living with a man having a nonexemptible criminal history.

K.L. therefore did not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances. In addition, the changed circumstances alleged by K.L., if supported by evidence, would not sustain a favorable decision on K.L.'s December 2015 Section 388 Petition. (*In re Zachary G.*, *supra*, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 806.) To succeed on K.L.'s December 2015 Section 388 Petition, K.L. had to establish that the proposed change—placing M.C. in K.L.'s care—would promote M.C.'s best interests. M.C. had been placed with foster parents who loved her, cared for her, and met her emotional, educational, and physical needs. M.C. was in a stable placement and was happy, thriving, and meeting her development goals in her foster home. In contrast, the factual and procedural history before the juvenile court showed that M.C. had been found in K.L.'s home while Mother was living there, M.C. had been exposed to K.L.'s drug use, and that of the relatives who also abused drugs in K.L.'s home, and K.L. was married to (or living with) a man having a nonexemptible criminal record. K.L. did not make a prima facie showing that “[M.C.]’s need for permanency and stability would be advanced by an order returning [M.C.] to her care.” (*In re J.C.* (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 526.)

DISPOSITION

The order denying K.L.'s December 2015 Section 388 Petition is affirmed.

FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:

ARONSON, ACTING P. J.

IKOLA, J