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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re MATHEW V., a Person Coming  
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

H043289  
(Santa Clara County  
Super. Ct. No. 115-JD023140)

SANTA CLARA COUNTY  
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND  
CHILDREN'S SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MATHEW V. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

Appellant J.A. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's orders denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388<sup>1</sup> petition, dismissing the dependency proceedings with a custody order limiting her to supervised visits, giving appellant M.V. (father) sole physical custody of their child, Mathew V., and requiring father to pay the cost of mother's supervised visits. Mother contends that the dismissal of the dependency was premature, that the order that she have only supervised visits was an abuse of

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<sup>1</sup> Subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

discretion, and that her section 388 petition seeking additional services and more liberalized visitation should have been granted. Father also appeals and contends that the court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay the cost of mother's supervised visits. We affirm the juvenile court's orders.

### **I. Background**

Mathew was born in February 2014. Mother and father had no relationship; Mathew was the product of "a one-night stand."<sup>2</sup> Mother had a six-year old son who had lived with her estranged husband since 2014. Her mental health problems had first manifested when she was a teenager. She had been placed on psychiatric holds twice in 2009 when she was 18 years old and her older son was less than one year old. On the first occasion, "[s]he hallucinated that she would hurt someone," became "severely depressed," and was "rejecting the baby." On the second occasion, she had a "psychotic breakdown where she claimed to see the devil in her baby's eyes. She told her husband that she was going to scratch the devil out of the baby's eyes." He had to physically restrain her until law enforcement arrived. She was diagnosed with "psychosis, NOS, Major Depressive Disorder with psychotic features, schizoaffective disorder and bipolar disorder." Mother was noncompliant with the medications she was prescribed for her mental health issues.

Mathew was taken into protective custody on March 6, 2015, when he was one year old, after mother was placed on a section 5150 hold due to her combative and

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<sup>2</sup> Mother claimed that she had informed father when she became pregnant, and he had "cussed at [her]" and told her that he wanted nothing to do with the baby. Father asserted that mother had never contacted him after the one night they spent together and had never told him she was pregnant. The social worker credited father's assertions over mother's claims.

incoherent behavior in a store. Mathew was with mother when she became “agitated” and began engaging in bizarre behaviors, which led to her arrest. Mother was “confused and disoriented,” and she could not remember her name or Mathew’s name. During the arrest, she attempted to flee and almost tipped over Mathew’s stroller, into which he was “loosely strapped.”

Mother was diagnosed with “psychosis NOS.” She admitted that she took “pain killers” on a daily basis and mixed them with “hard alcohol.” She had a history of marijuana and methamphetamine abuse. Mother “could only answer simple questions” and became “frustrated” and “anxious” when asked further questions. She admitted: “I get really mad really quick.” A psychiatrist reported that mother “made bizarre statements and had odd mannerisms, seemed internally preoccupied and guarded, possibly hearing voices, mildly paranoid, no suicidal ideation.” Mother was living in “transitional housing” for a year, and her case manager reported that she had been increasingly confused for several months and became “easily frustrated.” He had referred her to counseling and mental health services, but she had failed to follow through on the referrals. The case manager had noticed that mother was “‘slow’” and “‘her cognitive skills are stunted.’” Mother was unemployed and had not worked in more than two years.

On March 10, 2015, the Department filed a dependency petition asking the court to take jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) [failure to protect]. Mother identified father as Mathew’s alleged father, but his whereabouts were unknown at that time. The court ordered Mathew detained. The social worker made contact with father on March 12. Father was initially incredulous about the news that he had a son. On March 26, father appeared in court and requested paternity testing to determine if he was Mathew’s father. Counsel was appointed to represent him. Father submitted to paternity testing on April 3.

Father lived in Fremont. He had joint custody of his three children with his estranged wife, twin daughters and a younger son, all under the age of five, and he had a one-year old child with his fiancée. Father and his fiancée had been together for two years. He had suffered two misdemeanor false imprisonment convictions arising from domestic violence against his estranged wife. A restraining order was currently in place protecting her.

On March 31, 2015, mother was again placed on a section 5150 hold when she went to “mental health urgent care” and appeared disoriented. She was hospitalized for a week and “released with psychotropic medication.”

An amended petition was filed in April 2015 adding allegations that father had a history of domestic violence against his estranged wife. On April 14, paternity test results established that father was Mathew’s biological father. Father was notified of the results on April 22, and he immediately sought visitation with Mathew and services. On April 24, he sought placement of Mathew with him. On May 1, the court found that father was Mathew’s biological father and authorized weekly visits between father and Mathew. They began visiting on May 1. On May 21, the court authorized an increase in father’s visits to three times a week. On June 12, the court authorized the social worker to allow father to have extended and overnight visits.

Mother had supervised visits once a week for two hours, and the Department provided transportation for her to the visits. She had difficulty engaging with Mathew and was “easily distracted.” Her visits required coaching and support. In June 2015, mother, who lived in Gilroy, told the Department that she planned to move to Sonoma County. Her transitional housing program was scheduled to end at the end of June. She said that “she needs the child in her care to have housing.” Mother was continuing to have difficulty having “age appropriate interactions” with Mathew during their visits.

Father told the Department that he was planning to have a nanny care for Mathew in his home for a few months in order to minimize Mathew’s anxiety about being in a

new environment. Both he and his fiancée worked fulltime. By early June, father's visits had transitioned to unsupervised. Mathew was bonding well with father.

In June 2015, the Department recommended that mother not be granted reunification services. It recommended that Mathew be placed with father with family maintenance services. At the July 9 jurisdictional hearing, mother and father submitted the matter on the social worker's report. The court found the petition true, took jurisdiction over Mathew, and placed Mathew in father's custody with family maintenance services. Father's case plan consisted of a parent orientation class, a 16-week parenting without violence class, and monthly attendance at a "mental health support group for families with mental illness." Mother was granted supervised therapeutic visitation once a week for two hours. Her case plan, which was solely to "enhance visitation," required a parent orientation class, a parenting class, psychotherapy, medication compliance, drug and alcohol testing, a domestic violence victims' support group, and monthly attendance at a "mental health support group . . . ." A family maintenance review hearing was set for December 2015.

In August 2015, the social worker reported that father was supportive of mother's visitation with Mathew and had worked with mother to set a visitation schedule. In November, the social worker recommended that at the December hearing the court dismiss the case "with custody orders, joint legal custody with physical custody to the father." Father supported dismissal of the case. Mother then filed a section 388 petition in which she alleged that her mental health had stabilized and sought a return of Mathew to her custody or expanded nontherapeutic visitation with social worker discretion to permit unsupervised and overnight visits. She also sought "joint facilitated meetings" with father and his fiancée to discuss coparenting issues. Father and the social worker did not oppose nontherapeutic supervised visitation for mother, but they opposed mother's other requests.

Father worked fulltime on weekdays and occasionally on weekends. He was also attending college three nights a week. His fiancée also worked fulltime. He was now caring for his three older children fulltime in addition to Mathew and his child with his fiancée. Mathew was attending “organized daycare.” Mathew was thriving in father’s care. Father’s childcare responsibilities made it “impossible” for him to complete his case plan. Nevertheless, the Department had no concerns about his parenting of Mathew. Father had “been able to demonstrate through daily care with his children the ability to meet their needs, know age appropriate expectations, proper discipline and milestones for the kids.” “He’s very organized, very attentive” and “very hands-on, loving, and affectionate.” The social worker had determined that there was no domestic violence in father’s home.

Father and his fiancée reported that they found it very difficult to talk to mother and had had “hostile interactions” with her. As an alternative, they had provided an e-mail address for her to use to communicate with them, but mother had not used it. Father had transported Mathew to his visits with mother even though it had been difficult to schedule in light of his responsibilities to his other four children, his fulltime job, and his fulltime college classes. When the visits were in San Jose, it had taken 45 minutes each way to transport Mathew to and from the visits. After the visits were moved to Fremont, it took only five minutes each way.

Mother had moved to San Jose, where she was living with an older male friend. She had transportation so that she could drive to visits with Mathew in Fremont. Mother had “essentially completed” her case plan, but she reported that she had difficulty understanding the parenting class. She was “[n]ot really” able to articulate what she had learned from her classes. Mother’s visits with Mathew had improved, but she still had trouble reading his “cues” and needed some “basic coaching.” She was “angry” that father wanted her to communicate with him only by e-mail. She accused him of lying. Mother wanted to be able to meet with father face-to-face and call him on the telephone.

The social worker continued to recommend that the case be dismissed. She requested that the court's custody order provide that mother's supervised visits would occur close to Mathew's residence and be "paid for by the mother." The social worker opposed mother's petition because "the mother has not demonstrated her ability to care for and interact with Mathew outside of the therapeutic setting." The social worker believed that unsupervised visits would not be in Mathew's best interest due to his young age and mother's need for guidance in her interactions with him. Mother had "some unrealistic ideas of child development such as believing Mathew should already be potty trained and able to read," and her "unrealistic expectations of the child may place the child at risk of harm in her care." During a December 2015 meeting between the social worker and mother, mother became "very agitated," and the social worker "ended the meeting due to safety concerns."

At the scheduled December 2015 hearing, the parties agreed to continue the matter to January 2016 for the court to determine whether to set a contested hearing on the section 388 petition. In January 2016, the court ordered a hearing on mother's section 388 petition, and the family maintenance review hearing was continued to be heard at the same time as mother's petition on February 11. In the interim, the court gave the social worker discretion to allow nontherapeutic supervised visitation.

At the February 11, 2016 hearing, mother's psychotherapist testified that mother's current diagnosis was major depressive disorder. Mother had been showing "an improvement" in that she would "isolate less" and had "more motivation, more energy." Father testified that Mathew had gone from being "very scared and timid" to being "a happy, outgoing child." Father lacked confidence in mother's ability to adequately supervise Mathew. He acknowledged that he had "no communication" with mother because she was often "agitated" and always "aggressive" and "accusatory" when he tried to speak to her. Father was willing to communicate with mother by e-mail and at exchanges. The social worker testified that mother had "unrealistic ideas" about

Mathew's development, such as that he should be reading and potty-trained before the age of two. The social worker was also concerned about mother's history of medication noncompliance.

After all of the evidence had been presented on all matters at the February 11, 2016 hearing, the court first entertained argument on whether the case should be dismissed. The Department argued that the case should be dismissed under section 364 because father was providing appropriate care for Mathew. Mathew's attorney and father's attorney agreed with the Department. They noted that mother could "seek a modification of the family court orders in the future should she become appropriate for more liberal visitation." Mother argued that the case should not be dismissed because father had not completed his case plan. She contended that there was a risk of harm to Mathew due to the lack of communication between father and mother. Mother asserted that "it's in the child's best interest to keep this case open longer to allow the natural development of these relationships . . . ."

Following argument on the dismissal issue, the court stated: "So here's where we are. I think it's time to dismiss the case. I think that dad has substantially complied with the case plan. I think the child is in a safe home. I think he's a good father. [¶] However, I still need to make a decision about the whole issue of visitation. To do so I need to read all of the [visitation] logs, which are now part of the evidence. And I have to be honest, folks, I can't do that this afternoon. I've run out of steam. I'm not feeling well, so I would like to put it over to next week and be able to read those and then get additional argument on visitation before I make any decisions." All three matters were then continued for further hearing to February 22, 2016.

At the commencement of the February 22, 2016 hearing, the court asked mother's attorney to explain what she was seeking. Mother's attorney began by arguing: "[T]he mother is on a fixed income. She receives Social Security income. She has very limited funds to be able to pay for a supervised visitation center. She's visited Mathew

consistently, and the visits have gone well. So we're asking that the visits be liberalized from the Department's recommendations. The mother would like more visits and not at a supervised visitation center where she would to have bear the cost." When the court sought clarification, mother's attorney stated that mother was seeking unsupervised visits or "[i]n the alternative" visits "where it doesn't cost money." The Department pointed out that the social worker had repeatedly asked mother and her attorney to "name a visitation supervisor in the community," which was the Department's preference, but neither mother nor her attorney had been able to name anyone. The Department did not believe that unsupervised visits would be "safe." Father agreed with the Department and was "open to a nonprofessional supervising those visits." However, mother had not proposed anyone, and he believed it would not be "in the child's best interest" for him to supervise mother's visits. He had no relatives available to provide such supervision.

The court noted that it was "really trying to struggle with" whether supervision was necessary to keep Mathew safe. The Department argued, and father's and Mathew's counsel agreed, that mother's mental health history and her prior medication noncompliance raised safety issues. At this point, the court asked: "What about dad paying for the supervised visitation?" Father's attorney pointed out that father was "raising five children," "working full time and in school," and "has limited resources as well." She suggested that some visitation centers had "a sliding scale fee" and might be "willing to work with parents to come up with an amount that is feasible." The court inquired as to how much supervised visitation would cost. Mother's attorney responded: "Effectively, there will be no visitation for the mother until she's able to find a facility, arrange payment, and we have no idea right now. It could be \$100 a visit; it could \$5 a visit." The Department's attorney told the court that the social worker had identified a visitation center near father's home, but mother's attorney complained that she did not know if that center was accepting new clients or what the fees would be. Mathew's attorney pointed out that the social worker had actually provided to all parties a list of

seven different visitation centers in Alameda County. Mother's attorney responded that mother had told her that she had not contacted any of those centers because she "would not be able to afford anything at this time. That she has to take into account the cost of gas and the expenses related to the car, which is how she would get there . . . ."

The court asked if there were any "final comments," and none of the parties offered any. It then ruled that it would adopt the Department's recommendations with one exception: "I am going to require father to bear the costs. I know that there's no equity involved here, but I think that at the end of the day, I don't think anything is going to happen if we don't have somebody that would pay for it." The court declined to permit "third party" supervision as an alternative. Father did not raise any objection to the court's order that he pay for supervision. Indeed, his attorney stated that he "will contact these agencies and hopefully be able to negotiate a fair rate with one of them. He'll do it as soon as possible. He understands that this order is effective immediately."

The court then terminated jurisdiction, dismissed the dependency, and denied mother's section 388 petition. Father and mother were awarded joint legal custody, and father was awarded sole physical custody. The court's custody order provided that mother would have supervised visits once a week for two hours. It further provided: "Visitation shall be at a supervised visitation center in the county where the child resides. Father shall bear the cost of visitation. Mother shall email the father one week in advance of each visit to confirm the date, time and location of the visit. [¶] The mother's visitation is supervised due to her history of mental health problems and her inability to understand or meet the needs of a small child out[side] of a supervised setting." Both father and mother timely filed notices of appeal.

## **II. Mother's Appeal**

### **A. Dismissal of Dependency**

Mother contends that the court's dismissal of the dependency was not supported by substantial evidence.

Mother asserts that the court's dismissal determination was governed by section 364. Section 364 requires a court to "terminate its jurisdiction unless the social worker or his or her department establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the conditions still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under Section 300, or that those conditions are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn." (§ 364, subd. (c).) It further provides that "[f]ailure of the parent or guardian to participate regularly in any court ordered treatment program shall constitute prima facie evidence that the conditions which justified initial assumption of jurisdiction still exist and that continued supervision is necessary." (§ 364, subd. (c).)

Section 364 did not apply here. Mathew was placed in father's custody under section 361.2, subdivision (b). When a child is placed with a previously noncustodial parent, the court "may order that services be provided solely to the parent who is assuming physical custody in order to allow that parent to retain later custody without court supervision . . . ." (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(3).) "[B]ecause section 364 applies only when a child has 'not [been] removed from the physical custody of his or her parent' (§ 364, subd. (a)), the statute is inapplicable when, as here, a child has been removed from one parent and placed with the other under section 361.2, subdivision (a)." (*In re Maya L.* (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 100.)

Instead, section 366.21, subdivision (e)(6) governed the juvenile court's actions at the review hearing after it had placed Mathew in father's custody under section 361.2, subdivision (b). "If the child had been placed under court supervision with a previously noncustodial parent pursuant to Section 361.2, the court shall determine whether supervision is still necessary. The court may terminate supervision and transfer

permanent custody to that parent, as provided for by paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 361.2.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(6).) Section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1) permits the court to “[o]rder that the [previously noncustodial] parent become legal and physical custodian of the child. The court may also provide reasonable visitation by the noncustodial parent. The court shall then terminate its jurisdiction over the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1).)

The sole issue before the juvenile court under section 366.21, subdivision (e)(6) was “whether supervision is still necessary.” As section 364 did not apply, father’s failure to complete his case plan did not create a presumption that supervision remained necessary. Our review of the juvenile court’s decision to terminate jurisdiction is limited to deciding whether it was supported by substantial evidence. (*In re Marcus G.* (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014.) Mother claims that juvenile court supervision remained necessary because she and father had no “co-parenting” relationship, which was not in Mathew’s best interest. While it would be ideal if every child had parents with a good coparenting relationship, there was no evidence that Mathew was at risk of harm due to the lack of such a relationship between his parents. Father had full physical custody, and mother was limited to supervised visits. They shared legal custody, but there was no immediate prospect that they would be unable to adequately cooperate to make any necessary joint decisions concerning two-year-old Mathew. Any future conflict in that regard could be properly addressed by the family court.

The juvenile court did not err in concluding that supervision was no longer necessary. Mathew was safe, healthy, happy, and thriving in father’s care. Father had demonstrated that he was fully able to safely parent Mathew. The court’s decision to

dismiss the dependency case and terminate jurisdiction was well supported by these facts.<sup>3</sup>

### **B. Supervised Visitation**

Mother contends that the juvenile court's decision to require that her visitation be supervised rather than unsupervised is not supported by substantial evidence.

When the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a dependent child, it may issue an order "determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child." (§ 362.4; *In re Armando L.* (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 606, 616 (*Armando*)). We review the juvenile court's visitation order for abuse of discretion. (*In re Brittany C.* (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356; cf. *In re Chantal S.* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 214.)

The juvenile court explained precisely why it was ordering that mother have only supervised visitation. "The mother's visitation is supervised due to her history of mental health problems and her inability to understand or meet the needs of a small child out[side] of a supervised setting." This explanation is quite reasonable. Mother suffered from long-term mental health problems. She had repeatedly been held on section 5150 holds and showed little understanding of the risks that her mental health breakdowns posed to a small child. Mother had a history of medication noncompliance, and there was

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<sup>3</sup> Mother claims that the court erroneously failed to "stat[e] on the record or in writing the factual basis for the order" terminating jurisdiction. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.708(k).) Not true. The court expressly stated on the record its reasons for terminating jurisdiction: "I think the child is in a safe home. I think he's a good father." Mother's contention that the court was required to state its reasons for requiring supervised, rather than unsupervised, visitation finds no support in the only authority she cites, rule 5.708(k). In any case, the court did expressly identify its reasons for requiring supervised, rather than unsupervised, visitation: "The mother's visitation is supervised due to her history of mental health problems and her inability to understand or meet the needs of a small child out[side] of a supervised setting."

no way of assuring that little Mathew could be safe in her unsupervised care. Her completion of her case plan did not alleviate these concerns as she continued to lack a realistic understanding of Mathew's developmental stage and quickly became hostile, agitated, and aggressive. Under these circumstances, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in limiting her to supervised visits with two-year-old Mathew.<sup>4</sup>

### **C. Denial of Mother's Section 388 Petition**

Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition.

“Any parent or other person having an interest in a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court . . . to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made . . . .” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) “If it appears that the best interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed change of order, . . . the court shall order that a hearing be held . . . .” (§ 388, subd. (d).)

We review the juvenile court's order for abuse of discretion. (*In re Angel B.* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 460.) “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.” (*In re Stephanie M.* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)

Mother's petition sought a return of Mathew to her custody or expanded nontherapeutic visitation with social worker discretion to permit unsupervised and

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<sup>4</sup> Mother suggests that the juvenile court should have permitted nonprofessional supervision of her visits. Since neither she nor father was able to identify any nonprofessional who would be willing to supervise mother's visitation, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this unavailable option.

overnight visits. She also sought “joint facilitated meetings” with father and his fiancée to discuss coparenting issues.

Her petition was primarily reiterative of the issues that were before the juvenile court in connection with the Department’s request for termination of jurisdiction and a custody and visitation order. The court’s reasoning for requiring supervised visitation necessarily rejected mother’s contention that it was in Mathew’s best interest for him to be returned to her custody or to have unsupervised visits with her. As we have already upheld the court’s decision in that regard, we need not reiterate our analysis. She also contends on appeal that the court should have granted her petition due to the alleged need to continue family maintenance services so as to enhance “co-parenting.” The juvenile court was authorized to terminate services so long as Mathew was safe in father’s custody. We have already determined that substantial evidence supported such a finding. The juvenile court could have reasonably concluded that it was not “necessary” to retain dependency jurisdiction solely to attempt to enhance the parties’ “co-parenting skills.” The court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s section 388 petition.

### **III. Father’s Appeal**

Father challenges the juvenile court’s decision to require him to pay the cost of supervision for mother’s visits with Mathew. He claims that the court abused its discretion by failing to consider Mathew’s best interests and “the part[ies]’ respective abilities to pay those costs.”

Father maintains that the juvenile court’s visitation order was governed by the Family Code because, in his view, it was entered after the termination of jurisdiction. Although at the February 11, 2016 hearing the court expressed its intent to dismiss the dependency proceeding, it did not actually terminate dependency jurisdiction until the end of the February 22 hearing, when it simultaneously terminated jurisdiction and issued the custody and visitation order. Since the dependency proceedings were not terminated

prior to the custody and visitation order, the Family Code did not govern the custody and visitation order.

“In making its order, the juvenile court is not governed by the Family Code. Due to the separate and distinct purposes of the juvenile and family courts, many Family Code provisions do not apply to dependency proceedings. . . . It is inconsistent with the purposes of the dependency system’s protection of children who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected to require the juvenile court to apply statutory procedures meant for use in family court.” (*Armando, supra*, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 616.) Consequently, there was no statutory requirement that the court make findings regarding the parties’ respective abilities to pay the costs of supervision.

Father argues that the court abused its discretion in failing to require mother to pay the supervision costs because “Mother created the need for supervised visitation.” He erroneously focuses on the reason why supervision was needed rather than on Mathew’s best interest. “When the juvenile court makes custody or visitation orders as it terminates dependency jurisdiction, it does so as a court with ‘a special responsibility to the child as *parens patriae* and [it] must look to the totality of a child’s circumstances when making decisions regarding the child.’ [Citation.] This remains true in the juvenile court’s final orders issued before the court terminates jurisdiction.” (*In re J.T.* (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 953, 963.) The juvenile court properly focused on Mathew’s best interest in deciding that father should pay the cost of supervision. It was in Mathew’s best interest to maintain his established relationship with his mother. The court recognized that mother, a mentally disabled, unemployed person, simply would not be able to pay supervision costs, while father, a fully employed person, had at least some funds available that could be used to pay supervision costs. Since someone had to pay the costs, the court made the reasonable choice to require the only employed person to do so. There was no question that the allocation of some of father’s financial resources to pay for supervision costs would reduce the financial resources father had available to pay for

the cost of raising his five children. Yet the court could reasonably conclude that the importance of maintaining Mathew's relationship with his mother justified this sacrifice. We find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court's decision to require father to bear the cost of supervision for mother's visits with Mathew.

#### **IV. Disposition**

The juvenile court's orders are affirmed.

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Mihara, J.

WE CONCUR:

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Elia, Acting P. J.

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Bamattre-Manoukian, J.

In re Mathew V.  
H043289