## Written Comments Received for
### August 26, 2011, Judicial Council Business Meeting

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"A court set up by the constitution has the power of self preservation and the power to remove all obstacles to its successful and convenient operation." See Cal. Jur. 3d, Courts, Section 23.

Across the United States, courts have found inherent power to order payment from public funds for necessary staff, including court clerks, research assistants, court reporters, bailiffs and SJOs, even in times of budget cuts, provided the usual means to obtain funding had been exhausted and access to justice was threatened. See, Inherent power of courts to compel appropriation or expenditure of funds for judicial purposes, 59 ALR 3d 569; Judicial Use of the Inherent Power Doctrine To Compel Adequate Judicial Funding, 46 La. L. Rev. 157 (1985).

Some recent options to restore funding:

1. Recently, the Chief Justice in Kansas used inherent powers to impose an emergency surcharge on court filings without legislative approval, which funds were used by the court. See attached article.

2. With NY state was on the verge of bankruptcy, Gov. Cuomo recommended a 10% reduction in the 1991-92 State Court budget requested by Chief Justice Wachtler as the minimum needed for administration of justice. Wachtler laid off 500 employees and filed suit against the Governor and legislature under the implied powers doctrine - the judicial branch as a constitutional co-equal branch of government had implied power of self preservation - to have enough funds to carry out its constitutionally mandated duties. Case was settled. Attached article written by one of Cuomo's staff members reviews the law and recommends against such suits.

3. In 2003 the ABA Committee on court funding prepared a report suggesting, among other things, having the Chief Justice request that every attorney in the state write the governor and legislature requesting them to restore court funding. (It also lists a Wachtler suit as an option).

4. Request the Attorney General to write an AG Opinion that a state budget which
severely under funds the third branch is unconstitutional.
The use of inherent judicial powers to make up budget shortfalls raises fundamental questions about judicial independence and the nature of the separation of powers.
Money lies at the root of many conflicts between the branches of government. It is at the heart of many policy disputes—as different interests, political parties, and government officials stake out divergent priorities in the raising and spending of public funds—and creates substantial institutional tensions within any system of separated powers. In such systems, the legislature rightfully holds the “power of the purse,” given the intimate connection between effective democratic representation and control over government taxation and spending. Indeed, the mother of all legislatures, the British Parliament, largely came into existence in order to expand and legitimate the flow of revenue into government coffers.

As the very example of the birth and growth of Parliament indicates, however, control over the treasury is a powerful political weapon that can be used against other government institutions. In controlling the purse strings, the legislature can reward or punish members of the executive and judicial branches, depending on how they conduct their offices. As James Madison noted in explaining the operation of constitutional checks and balances, “the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people.”

An effective power of the purse gives the legislature a powerful trump card when disagreements arise between it and the other branches of government, one that is so potent that it can threaten judicial independence. To limit this threat, the American founders wrote into the U.S. Constitution the guarantee that salaries of judges shall not be diminished during their time in office. (Although such a guarantee is common in American state constitutions and endorsed by the United Nations, worldwide it is one of the least-used constitutional provisions for securing judicial independence.) Though important to preserving the independence of individual judges to make controversial decisions, the guarantee of undiminished salaries remains fairly marginal to the central conflicts between courts and legislatures over money and the ability of the judiciary to serve as an effective and independent branch of government. In extreme cases, judges may be denied such basics as an office, an adequate supply of paper, and an up-to-date compendium of statutes. Fortunately, American judges are rarely faced with such deprivation, but the adequacy of resources provided by legislatures to handle judicial business continues to be a contentious issue—especially in the states.

The authors thank Ken Kersch, Howard Gillman, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

A new challenge is emerging in this recurrent struggle between legislatures and judiciaries over resources. During the past three decades, administrative and budget authority over state judicial systems have been concentrated in state supreme courts. As a consequence, tough budgeting decisions increasingly invite direct confrontations between the heads of the legislative and judicial branches of state governments. The possibility of a constitutional standoff now looms in the states as centralized judicial administrations combine their institutional muscle with the doctrine of inherent judicial powers to secure their own funding when state legislatures are either unable or unwilling to authorize adequate appropriations. This convergence of contemporary bureaucratic and fiscal reality with fundamental constitutional principle threatens to dilute traditional notions of the legislative power of the purse.

Kansas has recently provided a glimpse of this possibility. On March 14, 2002, Chief Justice Kay McFarland of the Kansas Supreme Court ordered an across-the-board increase in court fees in the state. This “emergency surcharge” was aimed at making up a $3.5 million shortfall in the judiciary’s fiscal year 2003 budget, which was itself dwarfed by the state’s broader projected deficit of $680 million for that fiscal year. The supreme court order establishing the surcharge relied upon the judiciary’s “inherent power to do that which is necessary to perform its mandated duties.” In an accompanying press release, Chief Justice McFarland explained that, “while there are things the people of Kansas may have to give up in these trying fiscal times, justice cannot and must not be one of them.”

This innovative use of inherent judicial powers raises fundamental questions about judicial independence and the nature of the separation of powers. This article examines the development over time, and its connection with the centralization of judicial administration. It then takes a closer look at events in Kansas and the broader constitutional questions they raised. It closes with some cautionary notes on the use of such tools to improve the conditions of the judicial branch.

**The expanding doctrine**

The doctrine of inherent judicial power licenses the courts to take necessary actions to fulfill their constitutional functions, even when those actions are not specifically authorized by either constitutional text or legislative statute. Inherent judicial power operates as an implicit “necessary and proper” clause to the establishment of the judiciary as an independent and equal branch of government. In its most minimal guise, the doctrine empowers judges to control and manage their own courtrooms—for example, by punishing contempt of court, excluding photographers from the courtroom, or appointing counsel for criminal defendants. In its more muscular form, the doctrine authorizes judges to protect themselves and their functions from the neglect or interference of the other branches of government. It thus operates both as an implication and guarantor of judicial independence.

It is in this more muscular form, as a positive safeguard of judicial independence, that the inherent power doctrine has been extended to budgetary matters. This budgetary power developed, however, from relatively modest efforts at courtroom management. When a trial judge ordered that a jury be sequestered during a murder trial and the county commissioners refused to pay for the jurors’ lodgings, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained in 1838 that the judge had the authority to draw directly on the public purse to cover such “contingent expenses of the court” and provide for “emergencies” that require “the prompt and efficient action of the court” without the usual deliberation and consent of the relevant legislative body.

Similarly, state supreme courts have backed judges who have claimed the authority to set the salaries of courthouse personnel or who have ordered other institutions to provide, or to provide funding for, temporary facilities for holding court after the regular courthouse was condemned, the operation of a courthouse elevator, chairs and carpeting for a courtroom, and courthouse air conditioning.

Such disputes have prompted state supreme courts to issue particularly high-flown paens to judicial independence. The Indiana Supreme Court observed in the elevator case, for example:

> Courts are an integral part of the government, and entirely independent; deriving their powers directly from the constitution, in so far as such powers are not inherent in the very nature of the judiciary. A court of general jurisdiction, whether named in the constitution or established in pursuance of the provisions of the constitution, can not be directed, controlled, or impeded in its functions by any of the other departments of the government. The security of human rights and the safety of free institutions require the absolute integrity and freedom of action of courts.

In explaining why county commissioners were required to pay clerical staff in the courthouse at a rate set by the judges rather than at the general rate established for comparable county employees, the Colorado Supreme Court quoted approvingly from the opinion of the trial court that the separation of powers

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6. See, e.g., State ex rel. Schneider v. Cunningham, 39 Mont. 165 (1900); Wichita County v. Griffin, 284 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. App. 1955); Bass v. County of Saline, 171 Neb. 538 (1960); Ex Parte Turner, 40 Ark. 548 (1883); Commissioners v. Stout, 136 Ind. 53 (1895); State ex rel. Kittenger v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373 (1902); Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953 (1984).

notable. The amounts at issue usually involve small contingencies rather than the central operation of the courts. The disputes usually begin with local officials. When neither the local judge nor the local fiscal authority relents in the standoff, the matter is appealed up the judicial authority. In such circumstances, supreme courts have the power to determine and compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry out its mandated responsibilities, and its powers and duties to administer judicial and court services was increasing across the board, judicial requests were to trump all others. “The deplorable financial conditions in Philadelphia must yield to the constitutional mandate that the judiciary shall be free and independent and able to provide an efficient and effective system of justice,” the court reasoned—including the creation of “[n]ew programs, techniques, facilities, and expanded personnel.” What was “reasonably necessary” to operate the city courts was not for the “efficient administration of justice.”

Cases such as Carroll did not become common, however, in part because many states altered their systems of funding the judicial branch so as to minimize the local conflicts from which the doctrine had emerged. Just as Carroll was being handed down, members of the American Bar Association’s Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration were arguing that constitutional propriety dictated

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9. This was obviously not true in the relatively few instances in which the state supreme court has itself been the initiator of the inherent judicial power claim, such as when the Wisconsin Supreme Court squared off against the state superintendent of public property over who had the authority to appoint and remove the court’s registrar. In re Janitor of the Supreme Court, 35 Wis. 410 (1874).


12. Id. at 56, 57.
that the “judiciary will always be subordinate to the legislature on significant matters of finance. It is for the legislature to determine which ‘essential services’ the government will provide and to decide the judiciary’s share of the common financial shortage.”

The better solution, they urged, was unitary budgeting, which would link administration and budgeting and allow for more centralized and efficient management of judicial expenditures.

This recommendation was widely accepted, and many state judiciaries shifted away from relying on local funding sources, such as county commissioners, in favor of consolidated budgets approved by state legislatures. Pointing to budget conflicts between county governments and local courts such as the one that gave rise to Carroll, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court even ordered the state legislature to take over funding of the state judiciary, though the state has taken few steps to comply with that order, partly out of concern over the tax implications. At the same time, state courts were given greater spending flexibility through lump-sum budgets rather than detailed, itemized budgets—allowing judges to buy their own carpeting without specific legislative approval. The growth of the inherent judicial power doctrine, however, created a “remote danger” that the judicial system might “try to secure its appropriations by mandamus,” to the likely “discredit” and embarrassment of both branches. This potential consequence suggested to some that the shift to unitary budgeting would render the inherent judicial powers doctrine “legally and politically impotent.”

The New York standoff

The “remote danger” was realized and the constitutional and institutional implications of these developments were made particularly evident in a 1991 funding dispute in the state of New York. In submitting his budget to the legislature, Governor Mario Cuomo recommended a 10 percent cut from Chief Judge Sol Wachtler’s $966.4 million request for the state judiciary. As legislators and the governor negotiated, the chief judge told the press, “as far as I’m concerned, that’s an unconstitutional budget,” because the governor had not passed on the judiciary’s full budget request. The legislature eventually compromised with an appropriation of $889.3 million for the judicial branch—more than the governor’s recommendation but substantially less than the chief judge’s request.

Chief Judge Wachtler reacted to the legislature’s action by filing a lawsuit in state court claiming that the judicial branch was entitled to the full amount of its request based on its inherent power to compel funds for its maintenance. Governor Cuomo countered by filing a federal lawsuit seeking to dismiss the chief judge’s suit, thereby preventing any change to the legislature’s version of the judicial budget. The federal district court demurred. After substantial public and political maneuvering, the chief judge largely relented and a settlement was reached that provided for only a very modest increase, restoring the judicial budget to 1990 levels, just days before the state case was set for argument.

Despite its inglorious end, Wachtler v. Cuomo represents an important turn in the development of inherent judicial power in the budget context. Of course, Wachtler involved amounts far exceeding anything previously contemplated in such cases. By involving nearly 9 percent of the consolidated budget of the entire state judiciary, the chief judge was no longer seeking to fill specific gaps in the judiciary’s budget but rather to provide for the judiciary’s general finances. Perhaps more ominously, absent federal intervention, the combination of unitary budgeting and the assertion of inherent judicial power left no place for the disputing institutions to go. The constitutional equality of the three coordinate branches of New York’s state government replaced the institutional inequality present in earlier inherent judicial power disputes. Unlike even the Carroll situation, all state courts were implicated in the New York suit, as the governor and the press were quick to point out. Constitutional deadlock and informal compromise were the only available options.

Fiscal autonomy in Kansas

The recent economic downturn and attendant budgetary pressures in many of the states have given renewed significance to these doctrinal and institutional developments. Recent fiscal relations between the judicial and legislative branches in Kansas parallel the conditions in Philadelphia and New York that led to their respective inherent-power showdowns. As in Pennsylvania and New York, the Kansas courts have faced serious financial neglect at the hands of their legislative peers. A government-wide funding crunch in Kansas in 2002 brought the situation between the two branches to a head, with fiscal and political stakes comparable to those raised in New York. The Kansas courts, however, adopted an innovative political strategy that proved more successful than that of their predecessors in New York—but that raises its own constitutional difficulties.

Developments in judicial administration and budgeting in Kansas during the past 30 years mirror national trends, including the adoption of state funding of the judiciary through unitary budgeting and the consolidation of administrative responsibility for the state’s judicial branch in its supreme court. In 1972, the state’s voters ratified a constitutional amendment making the legislature responsible for funding all

15. Hazard et al., supra n. 13, at 1300.
19. Id. at 130.
Kansas courts. Five years later, the legislature exercised some of that authority by placing all district courts under the administrative purview of the state supreme court and shifting financing of all court system personnel to the state. (The state has not yet assumed all non-salary operating expenses for the judiciary from the counties.) Since 1978, the judicial branch has been required to submit its budget to the executive branch Division of the Budget, which then produces a single state budget that is submitted to the legislature and becomes the basis for legislative deliberations.

Judicial complaints of inadequate funding by the state legislature have been common for years. In the years leading up to the 2002 confrontation, the executive routinely reduced the judiciary’s requested budget when compiling the state budget to submit to the legislature, imposing hiring freezes on the judiciary in eight of the ten years prior to 2002. (While case filings rose 54.6 percent between 1987 and 1999, the number of judges increased only 5.5 percent and nonjudicial employees only 9 percent during the same period.)

Insufficient funding in the regular budget led to a recurrent pattern of annual judicial service cutbacks, salary reductions and furloughs for nonjudicial employees, and supplemental appropriations from the legislature to carry the courts through each fiscal year. In fiscal year 2001, the legislature’s initial appropriations left a shortfall in the judiciary’s “maintenance budget” (the amount needed to maintain salaries and wages of existing employees) of $1.2 million; in fiscal year 2002, the shortfall increased to approximately $2 million.

The Kansas judiciary invoked its inherent judicial power in the midst of the budget process for fiscal year 2003. In spite of the judiciary’s expressed concerns about the shortfalls of previous years, the legislature cut the 2003 maintenance budget by $3.5 million. The state was projecting an overall revenue shortfall of $680 million, rendering any substantial improvement in the judicial budget unlikely. Instead, legislators urged Chief Justice McFarland to seek “innovative means of securing the necessary funding.” On March 8, 2002, the chief justice responded by ordering an “emergency surcharge” on existing court fees to be paid into an emergency fund separate from the state treasury and available “only for [judicial] branch expenditures” approved by the chief justice.

The chief justice followed form in justifying this exercise of inherent judicial powers. In an earlier 2002 State of the Judiciary message, she reviewed the courts’ recent fiscal woes and concluded, “The simple truth is the [judicial] branch cannot perform its constitutional and statutory duties with such a shortfall in funding,” even though the “courts are the last bulwark of freedom as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights . . . [and a] fully functioning court system is essential to the American way of life.” Though “there are things the people of Kansas may have to give up in this fiscal crisis, justice cannot and must not be one of them.”

This message also included a renewed call for a change in budget procedures so that the judiciary could submit its budget request directly to the legislature without executive intermediation. The chief justice’s justification for this proposal echoed Chief Judge Wachtler’s arguments in New York and similarly laid the implicit foundation for autonomous judicial action. A direct budget submission was necessary “to safeguard [the judiciary’s] constitutional position from invasion by the [executive] branch,” and though the legislature ultimately made the appropriations, the chief justice blamed the executive branch Division of the Budget for “many of the funding problems the [judiciary’s] branch faces each year” by making “drastic cuts before [the judiciary’s budget request] is even seen by the [legislature].” Indeed, given the thoroughness of the judiciary’s own budget review process, which ensures that “every request is necessary,” and the lack of “expertise . . . as to judicial operations and needs” in the executive branch, “all cuts made [were] arbitrary because there [were] no reasonable cuts left to be made.”

In issuing the “emergency surcharge” order, the chief justice did not provide elaborate authority for her action—the order itself made clear that the court relied on its inherent power. The review of the budget situation in the order and the chief justice’s other statements implicitly established the grounds for meeting the “reasonable necessity” standard outlined in earlier inherent judicial power cases. The

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23. Supra n. 20, at 10 (emphasis omitted), 15, 16.

24. Id. at 12.
Kansas Supreme Court had itself asserted more than a century before, “It can hardly be supposed that the action of the supreme court may be thwarted, impeded or embarrassed by the unwarranted intermeddling of others without any power in the supreme court to prevent it.”

Breaking new ground
In turning to the inherent power doctrine to resolve its budget dispute with the state executive and legislature, the Kansas courts followed in the footsteps of the New York courts from a decade before. The Kansas Court, however, broke new ground by invoking its inherent power in order to raise its own revenue rather than to mandate appropriations from the legislature. This unprecedented step created distinctive constitutional and political repercussions.

Although inherent power had been used to compel legislatures to provide judicially needed resources, judges had previously drawn a bright line between such actions and the raising of revenue. The Michigan Supreme Court, for example, used the taxation example to show why traditional uses of inherent judicial power did not create separation-of-powers problems: “This broad power to assess and declare the needs of the judicial fund, the surcharge is characterized as neither “a docket fee . . . service or operational charge” nor “a tax . . . deposited into the state general fund,” both of which are circumscribed by constitutional and statutory provisions. By withholding the collected funds from the state treasury, the court appears to want to avoid running afoul of the state constitutional requirement that “[n]o money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of a specific appropriation made by law.”

The Kansas judiciary does have some limited statutory authority to set docket fees. However, this would not seem to include the emergency surcharge, unless the statute is “read in light of the inherent authority possessed by the supreme court to take such action as is necessary to maintain its independence as a co-equal branch of government,” as the attorney general suggested. The chief justice herself has only ever pointed to the abstract inherent judicial power as the authority for her actions, not any legal context specific to Kansas. The Kansas court’s order gives previously un contemplated meaning to the concept of judicial fiscal independence.

Political implications
The political implications of the court’s move are equally groundbreaking. As Wachtler v. Cuomo demonstrated, a state judiciary’s effort to compel a state legislature to fully fund its budget request invites intrusiveness and puts the two co-equal branches at loggerheads. The very political and financial calculus that would lead a legislature to underfund the courts in the first place would also lead it to resist judicial efforts to claim a larger share of the state budget and crowd out other constituencies. While courts have been successful in claiming inherent judicial power to order (usually local) institutions to make discrete expenditures, they were notably unsuccessful in their one effort to trump the state legislative budget process.

The Kansas court has effectively sought the same outcome—to mandate its preferred judicial budget—but by means that do not impinge on the legislature’s ability to satisfy favored interests in its budgeting. Elected officials clearly risk paying a political price when either raising taxes or denying appropriations. The Kansas court absolved the legislature of facing either option by raising revenue on its own.

Chief Justice McFarland was well-positioned to take the initiative. In Kansas, the justices of the supreme court are chosen by merit selection and subject to periodic, non-competitive retention elections. Since that system was instituted, no justice has ever come close to losing a retention election, and McFarland herself had served on the high court for a quarter century. Although the governor’s proposed fiscal year 2003 budget had fallen short of the judiciary’s request, the courts were largely exempt from the deep cuts imposed by the governor and the legislature across the rest of the state government. Additional funding for the courts was included in separate budget items that were packaged with several proposed tax increases. More politically salient, and far more expensive,
The inherent judicial power doctrine was developed to be a defensive weapon to protect judges from subversion or obstruction by other officials.


Beyond Kansas

Few courts would be tempted to follow the lead of Judge Wachtler of New York and run headlong into a political struggle with the legislative and executive branches, though his actions followed naturally from the historic development of the inherent judicial powers doctrine when combined with unitary budgeting. Chief Justice McFarland has found what might prove to be a more tempting path, one that is constitutionally bolder but politically less hazardous. Indeed, the “emergency stopgap measure” was so politically successful that it was extended into the next fiscal year. When the Kansas legislature again failed to fully fund the court’s budget request, the chief justice reported that the judicial branch “was urged by many legislators to extend the emergency surcharge,” though the legislature itself did not take steps to authorize by statute or legislate directly the new court fees. (The executive and legislature did accept the court’s proposal to allow the judiciary to submit its budget requests directly to the legislature.)

Kansas was hardly alone in its fiscal struggles—state courts elsewhere have been facing similar pressures in recent years. A special district judge in Oklahoma used his unofficial website to publicize the “Kansas surcharge” solution and urged his colleagues to follow McFarland’s “fiscal leadership,” although the chief justice of the Oklahoma Supreme Court declined to take such unilateral

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eral action.40 Budget battles in Illinois led to an initial standoff, followed by more extended litigation, over judicial pay.41 State courts, often spared the budget ax in the past, have recently had to deal with significant cuts; the events in Kansas could easily recur.42

The American system of separation of powers runs the inherent risk of gridlock. While this is a danger, it can also be regarded as a virtue. By denying any single branch of government the power to act unilaterally, this constitutional framework requires government officials to win the cooperation of others in order to take effective action.

The inherent judicial power doctrine was developed to be a defensive weapon to protect judges from subversion or obstruction by other officials. It has not traditionally been used to place the courts on an independent financial footing or to shelter them from the regular budgetary process. The rhetoric of judicial independence accompanying earlier uses of inherent judicial power harkened back to a pure theory of separation of powers, in which each branch was left free to exercise its own functions without encroachment from the other branches, but the judicial dependence on the legislature for its financing was a reflection of checks and balances that necessarily impinged on this separation of powers.

The situation in Kansas can be placed on a scale of possible budgetary conflicts between courts and legislatures. The gravest fiscal threats to judicial independence may come when governors and legislatures use budgetary tools to attempt to influence judicial decisions. The use of inherent judicial powers as a safeguard to judicial independence may be most justified in such cases, which fortunately are rare. A less extreme, but more common, threat to judicial independence arises from the competition for limited resources. Chronic budget scarcity, such as arose in Kansas, may pose less of a threat to judicial independence per se than to judicial effectiveness. In such situations, the use of inherent judicial powers may be harder to justify.

To the extent that such fiscal starvation impinges on positive constitutional obligations that a state maintain an effective system of justice, school finance litigation may provide the more appropriate model for judicial action. When finding that states have failed to provide functioning educational systems as required by their constitutions, courts have mandated that legislatures fix the problem but have generally avoided specifying the ultimate solution. In that model, courts have played an important role in holding legislators’ feet to the fire to meet their constitutional responsibilities, but have left the problem of how best to raise and distribute adequate revenue to the legislature. Such a process tends to be slow and incremental, but it arguably preserves the respective constitutional responsibilities of the various branches of government while maintaining legislative accountability for budgeting. The requirement of a finding that the states have actually violated constitutional provisions for maintaining a functioning judicial system may also set a higher and more publicly sustainable threshold for judicial action than does the reasonable necessity standard of inherent judicial power cases such as Carroll.

The boldness of the rhetoric accompanying traditional invocations of inherent judicial power has been tempered sub silencio by the modesty of its practical claims and its effective submission to the checks and balances of the judicial hierarchy and state political institutions. Although relatively small in fiscal terms and understandable in a political context, the innovation in Kansas of using the power to independently raise revenue to fund judicial expenses threatens to undo those historic checks on judicial power. After the Illinois justices ordered the government to pay state judges the salary increases that had been vetoed by the governor, the state comptroller remarked, “I wouldn’t say that this is a constitutional crisis. But it is a constitutional clash.”43 Precisely by avoiding an institutional clash, the “Kansas solution” is all the more corrosive of the state’s vital constitutional balance. 44

42. Budget battles also gave rise to the highly unusual order by the Nevada Supreme Court that the legislature raise taxes under simple-majority rule, despite a state constitutional requirement of a two-thirds majority. Guinn v. Legislature, 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2005).

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Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent Power

Howard B. Glaser
Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent Power

Howard B. Glaser*

"We are faced with the paradox that litigation designed to solve a problem makes its solution less likely."1

I. Introduction

On December 31, 1990, New York Governor Mario M. Cuomo entered the paneled chambers of the state Court of Appeals, where he began his legal career thirty years earlier as a law clerk, and stepped-up to face Chief Judge Sol Wachtler.2 The Governor and the Chief Judge were long-time friends and some-time rivals: the Democratic Governor had appointed the Republican jurist Chief Judge in 1985.3 Governor Cuomo had asked Chief Judge Wachtler to preside over the ceremony marking the Governor's third inauguration. As the Chief Judge administered the oath of office to the Governor, neither man could anticipate that in the coming year they would face each other again in a New York courtroom, not to celebrate democracy, but to test it in the most severe constitutional crisis in New York State's history. The confrontation was spawned by New York's grim fiscal condition, when the Governor, four weeks after his swearing in, announced unprecedented budget cutbacks throughout state government, including the court system.4 The Chief Judge responded with a lawsuit, which asserted that the judiciary had "inherent power" to compel the executive and leg-

4. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
islative branches to fund the state court system at a judicially mandated level of almost $1 billion.\(^5\)

The doctrine of inherent powers is one which asserts that the very existence of the courts implies their authority to exercise powers reasonably necessary to the performance of judicial functions.\(^6\) Though the doctrine has been employed by American courts for various purposes since the beginning of the nineteenth century, \textit{Wachtler v. Cuomo}\(^7\) was significant in several ways. It marked the first substantial use of the doctrine by a state's highest court against an equal branch of government.\(^8\) The budget at the center of the conflict approached $1 billion, dwarfing previous inherent power conflicts.\(^9\) The lawsuit represented an unprecedented application of inherent powers to lump-sum funding, as opposed to the discrete line-item expenditures at issue in prior cases.\(^10\) Due to the involvement of New York's Chief Judge and Governor, the case received wide media coverage.\(^11\) The controversy focused public attention on constitutional questions usually covered in the classroom or the courtroom rather than by the newsroom.\(^12\)

Although the legal issues in \textit{Wachtler v. Cuomo} never came to trial, the lawsuit and the controversy it created are worth analyzing for the lessons they provide about the nature and limits of the inherent powers doctrine. It is particularly important to consider the implications of \textit{Wachtler v. Cuomo} at a time when state court budgets around the country are tightly squeezed by fiscal pressures, tempting besieged judges and

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5. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
6. For a collection of definitions appearing in case law and commentary, see JOHN C. CRATSLEY, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS 19 (1980). For a discussion of the conceptual basis of the doctrine, see infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
10. See cases cited infra notes 14-26.
court administrators into increased use of inherent powers to address chronic budget shortfalls.\textsuperscript{13}

The objective of this Article is to assess the viability of applying the inherent powers doctrine in the context of a state budget conflict. Centering on a case study of \textit{Wachtler v. Cuomo}, this Article will place this exercise of inherent powers in historical perspective by analyzing the theoretical, precedential, doctrinal, and political implications of the use of the doctrine as a tool to compel funding for a state court system. Part II discusses the historic roots and gradual expansion of the inherent powers doctrine. The judicially created doctrinal limitations imposed on the use of the expanding doctrine are introduced in Part III. Part IV presents a detailed review of the political, legal and fiscal developments surrounding Judge Wachtler's lawsuit. In Part V, \textit{Wachtler v. Cuomo} is analyzed in light of the legal, political, and conceptual justifications offered for the exercise of inherent power. Part VI concludes that although the doctrine of inherent powers may retain its vitality as a tool to protect politically vulnerable local courts from local government incursions into the judicial sphere of power, \textit{Wachtler v. Cuomo} demonstrates that its expansion into the statewide budget process is untenable.

II. The Historical Expansion of the Inherent Powers Doctrine

A. Early Uses of the Doctrine

The courts have long recognized the use of inherent powers to assert judicial independence. The early applications of the doctrine involved the courts' attempts to exercise control over courthouse facilities and personnel,\textsuperscript{14} and over the judicial pro-


\textsuperscript{14} See Scott v. Minnehaha County, 152 N.W. 699 (S.D. 1915) (preparation of court calendars); \textit{State ex rel. Kitzmeyer v. Davis}, 68 P. 689 (Nev. 1902) (court can order new furniture and carpet); \textit{Board of Comm'rs v. Stout}, 35 N.E. 683 (Ind. 1893) (control of courthouse elevator belongs to court); \textit{State ex rel. S. Howard v. Smith, Auditor}, 15 Mo. App. 412, 424 (1884) (power to appoint janitor); \textit{In re Janitor of Supreme Court}, 35 Wis. 410 (1874) (power to appoint janitor); \textit{McCalmont v. County of Allegheny}, 29 Pa. 417 (1857) (ordering office space for court clerk, ordering forms and stationery within inherent powers).
cess itself, most notably through the power of contempt. From these limited beginnings, the use of the doctrine evolved to keep pace with new developments and challenges affecting the management of the courts. During the 20th century, the courts have frequently exercised the power to issue rules of practice and procedure, rules governing the practice of law, rules of courtroom decorum, protective orders against the press, provisions for jury expenses, and appointments of counsel for criminal defendants. These exercises of inherent power were largely limited to judicial housekeeping or to assert control over adjudicative proceedings and administration, posing neither threats to a coordinate branch nor any serious fiscal consequences. None of these applications of inherent power were particularly objectionable on constitutional or political grounds.

15. See In re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253, 257 (1858). "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the nature and constitution of a court. It is a power not derived from any statute but arising from necessity; implied, because it is necessary to the existence of all the powers." Id. See also United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (dictum). In Hudson, the Court commented that "inherent powers are those which cannot be dispensed with in a court because they are necessary to the exercise of all others . . . . [O]ur courts no doubt possess powers not immediately derived from statute . . . ." Id.


20. Rose v. Palm Beach City, 361 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978).


22. See, e.g., O'Coins, Inc. v. Treasurer of Worcester, 287 N.E.2d 608, 611 (Mass. 1972) (Court's authority "is not limited to adjudication, but includes certain ancillary functions, such as rulemaking and judicial administration, which are essential if the courts are to carry out their constitutional mandate."); see also Geoffrey Hazard, Jr. et al., Court Finance and Unitary Budgeting, 81 YALE L.J. 1286, 1288 (1972) ("Most of the reported decisions have involved marginal appropriations for ancillary personnel and facilities rather than basic fiscal under-writing.").
B. Modern Expansion of the Doctrine to Court Funding

During the last thirty years, the doctrine has been extended into areas of more significant fiscal consequence, and the conflict between the branches has sharpened. The typical modern dispute has involved the power of the courts to fill support positions and to compel the local legislature to fund them at adequate salaries.\(^{23}\) The rhetoric of the cases justified these exercises of inherent power as necessary to preserve the independence of the judicial branch. The judiciary, observed one court, "is the only branch excluded from participation in the formulation and adoption of the government budget. Such exclusion makes the courts vulnerable to improper checks in the form of reward or retaliation."\(^{24}\) Thus, the judiciary must "be able to ensure its own survival when insufficient funds are provided by other branches."\(^{25}\)

The application of the doctrine in these cases was not as broad as its language suggests. The actual court orders compelled funding for fairly small, discrete, line-item expenditures such as salaries and equipment.\(^{26}\) Notwithstanding the dicta, the doctrine was not being used as a basic budget mechanism in this line of cases. Furthermore, in virtually every reported case since the 19th century the doctrine was being asserted by a state court against a local government body. The interbranch conflict was played out between a superior and inferior division of government, and did not represent the confrontation between equals as was implied by the expansive verbiage of the opinions.

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\(^{23}\) See, e.g., Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 172 N.W.2d 436 (Mich. 1969) (power to set salaries of a group of probation officers and law clerks), modified on reh'g, 190 N.W.2d 228 (Mich. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972) (power to set salaries of a group of probation officers and law clerks); Smith v. Miller, 384 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1963) (judicial authority to set salaries of court clerks); Noble County Council v. State, 125 N.E.2d 709 (Ind. 1955) (power to appoint probation officer).

\(^{24}\) In re Salary of the Juvenile Director, 552 P.2d 163, 170 (Wash. 1976).

\(^{25}\) Id. at 171; see also Smith, 384 P.2d at 741 ("It is abhorrent to the principles of our legal system and to our form of government that courts, being a coordinate department of government should be compelled to depend upon the vagaries of an extrinsic will." (quoting conclusion of trial court)).

\(^{26}\) Juvenile Director, 552 P.2d 163 (Wash. 1976) ($125 per month increase in salary for director of juvenile services); O'Coins, Inc. v. City of Worcester, 287 N.E.2d 608 (Mass. 1972) ($86 for tape recorder and tapes); State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court, 105 N.W.2d 876 (Wis. 1960) ($250 for an air conditioner).
C. The Outer Bounds of the Doctrine: Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate

The furthest expansion of the doctrine occurred in Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate. The dispute in Tate concerned the 1970-71 budget request submitted by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. The Mayor trimmed a number of items from the $19.7 million request, reducing it to $16.5 million, and the city council approved the reduced amount. The court sought mandamus to compel the payment of the additional funds. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in affirming (with modifications) a lower court opinion ordering restoration of approximately $2.5 million to the budget, argued that fiscal autonomy was a requisite for judicial independence:

[T]he Judiciary must possess the inherent power to determine and compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry out its mandated responsibilities, and its powers and duties to administer Justice, if it is to be in reality a co-equal, independent Branch of our Government.

In determining whether the exercise of inherent power to compel funding was justified, the court rejected consideration of the fiscal condition of the locality as a factor.

Tate was significant for two reasons. First, it marked an expansion of the inherent powers doctrine into broader fiscal matters than in previous cases. Substantial budget items for an entire municipal court system were in dispute, rather than the isolated expenditures of a particular judge, which had typified prior inherent powers cases. Second, the traditional exercises of inherent power served to protect the institutional control of the court, but not at the expense of a coordinate branch. Although some of the earlier cases required specific outlays, the expenditure of a few dollars for a janitor or court stenographer did not seriously impinge upon the institutional taxing or

28. Id. at 195.
29. Id. at 193; see also Comment, State Court Assertion of Power to Determine and Demand Its Own Budget, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1187 (1972) for a discussion of the case.
30. Carroll, 274 A.2d at 197.
31. Id. at 199.
spending power of the legislative or executive branches. By contrast, Tate's decision to allocate a significant amount of public resources to the courts went to the heart of the city council's institutional power. Thus, Tate marked the first "offensive" use of inherent power; its exercise preserved the status of the courts by diminishing the power of the legislature.

In spite of the distinctions, there were two fundamental ways in which Tate was consistent with prior and subsequent inherent powers case law which arguably made this "offensive" use acceptable. First, as in virtually every other inherent powers case, the ultimate confrontation in Tate occurred not between coequal partners in state government, but between a state supreme court and a local government unit. Tate and the inherent powers case law should thus be viewed as a power struggle between state and local government, rather than as a true separation of powers conflict.

Second, the offense in Tate, which spurred the use of inherent powers, was that the legislature had eliminated specific expenditure items from the court's budget. The gravamen of Tate and its progeny was judicial resentment at being told how to spend the courts' money, rather than discontent over how much total spending was to be allocated.

III. Controlling the Expansion of Inherent Powers: Judicial Limitations and the Growth of State Financing

In the wake of Tate, commentators predicted (with varying degrees of approval) that courts, which had traditionally been more of a spectator than a player, had found a tool by which they could circumvent the budget process. At a time of in-

32. See Hazard et al., supra note 22, at 1288, for a discussion of this point.
33. See cases cited supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
34. See Hazard et al., supra note 22, at 1288.
creasing fiscal difficulties for municipalities around the country, the use of inherent powers as a negotiating instrument or legal weapon could prove to be a tempting way to address chronic, broad-based budget problems. However, until Wachtler v. Cuomo, inherent powers disputes actually remained confined to discrete budget items rather than to broad budget-making; and to state-local government conflicts rather than to primal clashes between coequal branches at the state level.

There are several reasons why it took twenty years before there was an attempt to expand the doctrine to the next level. First, as the post-Tate case law developed and top-level court administrators reacted to Tate, the courts placed a series of self-imposed limitations on the exercise of inherent powers. These doctrinal limits include a requirement of prior approval, the standard of reasonable necessity, the exhaustion of established procedures, and, in some cases, appointment of an outside judge. As state supreme courts recognized ever broader applications of the doctrine, they sought to impose these limits as a means by which to regulate the exercise of inherent power by the lower courts. Second, the development of unitary financing and lump-sum budgeting reduced the opportunities for inherent powers conflicts at the local level.

A. Judicially Imposed Doctrinal Limitations on Inherent Powers

1. The Requirement of Prior Approval

An important limitation imposed on a court seeking to exercise its inherent power is the prior approval of either a state court administrator, or the supreme court itself, as a prerequisite to the exercise. Several states have embodied this requirement in an administrative order or court rule.

36. See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., MASS. SUP. JD. CT. R. 1:05 (requiring approval of chief judge); MICH. SUP. CT. ADMIN. ORDER no. 1971-6, 386 Mich. xxix (1971) ("[N]o judge of a subordinate court may . . . order the expenditure of public funds for any judicially required purpose until such judge has submitted his proposed writ or order to the constitutional office of Court Administrator, and has obtained due approval . . . ").
Prior approval has two important consequences. First, it gives the state supreme court ultimate control over the exercise of inherent powers. Second, the approval requirement helps facilitate solutions between the court units and the local legislative units by placing the state court administrator in a position to mediate the dispute outside of the judicial process.\textsuperscript{41} Removing the dispute from the heated arena of local politics helps cool the passions that might otherwise lead to an injudicious use of the expanded doctrine.

2. \textit{The Reasonable and Necessary Standard}

The second doctrinal requirement is that the funding sought should be "reasonably necessary" to the functioning of the court.\textsuperscript{42} This vague, verbal formula is subject to manipulation and is incapable of a precise definition.\textsuperscript{43} Despite its drawbacks, this formula functioned as a minimum, uniform guideline for budget development. Local judges and legislators brought ad hoc standards and varying degrees of skill to the budget making process; the decentralization of the budget process simply did not lend itself to expert budget development. By imposing the "reasonable and necessary" standard, the supreme courts created a makeshift surrogate for the uniform standards of a centralized finance system.\textsuperscript{44}

A related purpose of the standard was to force the court seeking to exercise inherent powers to document its needs in order to add credibility to its action and reduce the chance that

\textsuperscript{41} See CRATSLEY, \textit{supra} note 6, at 8 (citing CARL BARR, \textsc{Judicial Activism in State Courts: The Inherent Powers Doctrine}).

\textsuperscript{42} Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 199 (Pa. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971) (A court's "wants and needs must be proved by it to be reasonably necessary for its proper functioning and administration.").

\textsuperscript{43} Clerk of Court's Compensation v. Lyon County Comm'rs, 241 N.W.2d 781, 782 (Minn. 1976) ("The test is not relative needs or judicial wants, but practical necessity in performing judicial functions."); \textit{In re Salary of the Juvenile Director}, 552 P.2d 163, 174 (Wash. 1976) (setting a strict standard of "clear, cogent, and convincing proof" to show reasonable necessity).

\textsuperscript{44} It is clear from the inclusion in supreme court administrative rules of the reasonable and necessary standard that the standard was aimed at imposing some uniformity on local court budget activity. \textit{See infra} note 53 and accompanying text. The concern over inconsistent local approaches to court budget policies has been one of the driving forces behind court unification. \textit{See generally} NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE RESEARCH REPORT, \textsc{Structuring Justice: The Implications of Court Unification Reforms} (1984).
the exercise of inherent powers would be viewed as arbitrary.\textsuperscript{45} Although the cases rarely acknowledge that the exercise of inherent powers may implicate public trust in the judiciary, the "reasonably necessary" requirement seems motivated in part by such considerations.\textsuperscript{46}

3. The Requirement of Administrative Exhaustion

One of the most basic of the court-imposed limits is the requirement that inherent powers may only be used when established means for fulfilling a court's needs have failed.\textsuperscript{47} Therefore, invoking inherent powers is an act of last resort. Courts must, at a minimum, follow prescribed procedures for legislative approval of budget items and cannot simply substitute inherent powers for the normal legislative budget process.

4. Appointment of an Outside Judge

The appearance of judicial impartiality is threatened when the judge who issues a funding order under the mantle of inherent powers then reviews his own order in a subsequent legal action. As a result, courts will sometimes require that a judge who is unaffected by the inherent powers order hear the challenge to the order.\textsuperscript{48}

B. The Growth of Modern Finance Mechanisms

Several nonjudicial developments have also affected the use of inherent powers. First, with the advent of the modern expansion of inherent powers that limited the budgetary discretion of local governments, localities began to support state take-

\textsuperscript{45} See Juvenile Director, 552 P.2d at 174 (discussing the proper standard). In that case, the court stated that "it is incumbent upon the courts, when they must use their inherent power to compel funding, to do so in a manner which clearly communicates and demonstrates to the public the grounds for the court's action." Id.

\textsuperscript{46} Id.

\textsuperscript{47} See, e.g., Clerk of Court's Compensation v. Lyon County Comm'rs, 241 N.W.2d 781 (Minn. 1976) (inherent power could not be exercised to establish clerk's salary where clerk failed to appeal figure set by county as required); Leahy v. Farrell, 66 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1949) (inherent power not justified where lower court failed to submit salary increase to county board as required by statute); Hillis v. Sullivan, 137 P. 932 (Mont. 1913).

overs of court financing. As the use of unitary budgeting expanded, the battleground for local, inherent powers disputes contracted. In addition, the introduction of lump-sum budgeting gave judges and court administrators greater flexibility in creating and managing their budgets. Under lump-sum budgeting, there is no longer a need for a judge to go hat in hand to a legislative body for a tape recorder or an air-conditioner.

C. The Implications of Centralizing Financing and State Supreme Court Control of the Doctrine: Setting the Stage for Wachtler v. Cuomo

Taken together, the court-imposed limitations and the budget innovations have largely removed inherent powers disputes from the province of local government and have encouraged reconciliation of conflicts. As this process progressed, some commentators predicted that inherent powers would become less important as a budgeting tool for the courts. A few observers recognized that the removal of the budgeting process to the state level and the assumption by the state's highest courts of the role of guardian of the inherent power may have raised the stakes of an inherent powers conflict even while reducing the incidence of disputes.


50. In New York State, for example, the 1962 consolidation of the court system meant that the local courts were no longer dependent on the 62 county governments, thus reducing a significant number of potential fiscal flash points — or at least shifting the battleground to the state level. See infra notes 54, 184 and accompanying text.


52. State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court, 105 N.W.2d 876 (Wis. 1960).

53. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 49, at 146.

54. A group of prescient commentators who recognized the implications of these events was Geoffrey Hazard and his co-authors, who wrote 20 years before Wachtler v. Cuomo that:

a remote danger in unitary budgeting, but one which cannot be ignored, is that the judicial system will take the inherent powers doctrine seriously and try to secure its appropriation by mandamus. At this level the legislature would find its vital interests and prerogatives threatened . . . . [T]he ultimate outcome of such a conflict is impossible to predict but certainly it would discredit both branches of government and embarrass judicial financing for some time.

Hazard et al., supra note 22, at 1300.
Prior to Wachtler v. Cuomo, there were no significant inherent power conflicts between coequal state branches of government. As the fiscal problems of the cities during the 1960s and 1970s (which spawned the modern expansion of the inherent powers doctrine) became the burden of the states in the 1980s, the locus of inherent power conflicts shifted. With both the budget process and control of inherent powers residing at the state level, an attempt to expand the doctrine beyond its previous bounds in a direct confrontation between constitutionally equal branches of state government was inevitable.

IV. Wachtler v. Cuomo: A Chronicle of Constitutional Crisis

A. Judicial Funding and the New York Budget Process

The majority of states treat the judicial branch like any other state agency in the preparation of the budget: judiciary budget requests are submitted to executive budget officials who review and revise the requests, and incorporate the revised requests into the final budget submitted to the legislature. The remaining states either permit the judiciary to submit its budget request directly to the legislature, or require the judiciary to submit its request to the executive branch, which must then transmit the request to the legislature without revision but subject to the recommendations of the executive. New York follows the latter procedure in which the executive acts as a "conduit" for the judicial budget request; New York is fairly unusual in that the conduit procedure is mandated by a consti-

55. There were several cases involving insignificant sums, none of which precipitated any head-to-head conflict between the branches over fundamental powers. See In re Appointment of Clerk of Court of Appeals, 297 S.W.2d 764 (Ky. 1957) (power to appoint clerk); State ex rel. Cunningham, 101 P. 962 (Mont. 1909) (power to set stenographer's salary); State ex rel. Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 68 P. 689, 690 (Nev. 1902) (power to order new furniture and carpet for supreme court); In re Janitor of Supreme Court, 35 Wis. 410 (1874).

In 1978, the West Virginia Legislature decreased funding for the judicial budget several times. The Supreme Court of Appeals ordered the full budget reinstated. The case did not involve inherent powers; it turned on a constitutional provision prohibiting the legislature from decreasing judicial budget items. State ex rel. Bagley v. Blankenship, 246 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va. 1978).


57. Id.

58. Id. at 29.
tutional provision. The constitution further provides that the legislature may strike, reduce, or add items to the judiciary budget request subject to the veto of the Governor.

Pursuant to its constitutional powers, the New York State Legislature had in fact consistently reduced the judiciary request in each of the fiscal years from 1982-1990 by between $10 and $50 million, even while the actual level of appropriations rose by over $400 million. The Governor’s acquiescence in these reductions in the judiciary budget request became an increasing source of tension between the Chief Judge and the Governor to the point that observers looked to “their annual squabble over the state judiciary budget” as a way to “enliven Albany’s dreary year end political scene.”

In 1982, the year Cuomo took office, the appropriation for the judiciary was $480.1 million. This figure increased by $415 million or 86% during the following nine fiscal years. Yet, the judiciary still found its resources stretched with these increases falling an average of 4% short of its own budget requests. Since 1985, the year when “crack cocaine” first began to appear in New York, the number of felony indictments and superior court informations in Supreme and County Courts statewide increased by 57%. Felony filings in the criminal terms of New York County supreme courts increased by 73% Municipal

59. N.Y. Const. art. VII, § 1 provides that:
Itemized estimates of the financial needs of the legislature, certified by the presiding officer of each house, and of the judiciary, approved by the court of appeals and certified by the chief judge of the court of appeals, shall be transmitted to the Governor not later than the first day of December in each year for inclusion in the budget without revision but with such recommendations as he may deem proper. Copies of the itemized estimates of the financial needs of the judiciary also shall forthwith be transmitted to the appropriate committees of the legislature.

Id.

60. Id. § 4.


63. Wachtler, at 12.

64. Id.

65. Id. at 14.

66. Id.
courts around the state were experiencing similar increases.\textsuperscript{67} New York City Criminal Court calendars commonly contained 250 cases daily, as approximately 330,000 cases were filed in 1989.\textsuperscript{68} Noncriminal cases also surged during the late 1980s, including a 223\% increase in family court cases in New York City, and civil filings increasing 25\%.\textsuperscript{69} As caseloads rose swiftly, judicial staffing resources increased only minimally, and nonjudicial personnel remained understaffed, particularly in the trial courts where 850 positions remained unfilled due to budget constraints entering the 1991-92 fiscal year.\textsuperscript{70} The Chief Judge had repeatedly pressed the legislature and the Governor for more money over the years, characterizing court funding as a "bones and sinew budget,"\textsuperscript{71} and privately complaining of cavalier treatment by the Governor.\textsuperscript{72} The resulting backlogs and delays set the stage as the Office of Court Administration began planning for the 1991-92 budget process in the fall of 1990.

B. The 1991-92 Executive Budget Proposal

On December 1, 1990, the Chief Judge transmitted to the Governor and legislature a judiciary budget request for $966.4 million, an increase of $70 million, or 8\% over the previous year's appropriation.\textsuperscript{73} The Governor incorporated this request in his Executive Budget without revision on January 31st\textsuperscript{74} and included the entire request within the appropriations bill submitted to the legislature.\textsuperscript{75} However, in the Governor's financial plan, which contained the Governor's recommended levels of expenditures and revenues, the Governor recommended a reduction of 10\% from the judiciary's request, resulting in a $25

\textsuperscript{67} Id.
\textsuperscript{68} Id.
\textsuperscript{69} Id. at 15.
\textsuperscript{70} Id. at 13.
\textsuperscript{71} William Glaberson, Cuomo Urged to Increase Court Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1990, at B1.
\textsuperscript{72} Frank Lynn, Cuomo's Fiscal Battle With Judge Pits Dollars and Dignity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1990, at B3.
\textsuperscript{73} Wachtler, at 7, 13.
\textsuperscript{74} 1991-92 N.Y.S. Executive Budget at 555-83.
\textsuperscript{75} S. 1751, A. 3051; Wachtler, at 12.
million (2.8%) proposed reduction from the previous year's appropriation.\textsuperscript{76}

The Governor's 2.8% proposed reduction in the judiciary budget was in line with other spending cuts compelled by what the Governor characterized as the state's worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.\textsuperscript{77} The 1991-92 Executive Budget anticipated a $6 billion gap between revenue forecasts and spending projections.\textsuperscript{78} The $29.15 billion state spending plan included proposals for the largest spending cuts and tax increases in the state's history.\textsuperscript{79} The cuts went to the heart of some of the state's most powerful political constituencies. Governor Cuomo acknowledged that the budget would generate "a lot of complaining and a lot of screaming" from interest groups but insisted that the state's basic strengths would remain intact.\textsuperscript{80} One of the first to respond was Chief Judge Wachtler, who warned the Governor that "what you recommend will not leave this state strong—it will leave it vulnerable in a very fundamental way."\textsuperscript{81}

C. The Chief Judge Drops a Bombshell

Although the New York State Constitution imposes an April 1 deadline for the approval of the state budget, the fiscal crisis of the late 1980s complicated negotiations between the Governor and legislature over spending cuts and revenue increases, resulting in a series of missed budget deadlines.\textsuperscript{82} By the time the April 1 deadline had passed in 1991, negotiators still had not resolved major budget issues.

\textsuperscript{76} Wachtler, at 11. This distinction between the Executive Budget and financial plan would later form one focal point of the confrontation and intertwine with the inherent powers arguments.


\textsuperscript{78} Id.

\textsuperscript{79} Including a $1 billion cut in school aid, a 50% cut in aid to localities, the abolishment of dozens of state agencies, the elimination of 18,000 state jobs (10% of the work force), a $400 million loss in aid to New York City, and a host of new taxes, including a 50% increase in tuition at state and city universities. Id.

\textsuperscript{80} Id.

\textsuperscript{81} Id.

\textsuperscript{82} Sarah Lyall, Budget in Albany is Political Pact, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1993, at B1.
The question of the judiciary budget remained a background issue until mid-April when Chief Judge Wachtler, in a Manhattan speech, dropped his first bombshell. Noting that the Governor had failed to include the judiciary's own budget estimate in his financial plan, the Chief Judge announced, "[a]s far as I'm concerned, that's an unconstitutional budget." By including a revised estimate in the financial plan, the Chief Judge charged that the Governor was not just "fiddling with the financial plan – he's fiddling with the Constitution." The Chief Judge noted that several other court systems had successfully sued their states to force them to fully finance the judiciary, which was the first indication that he thought the Governor's actions might come within the inherent powers doctrine.

Off the record, judiciary officials were "hinting darkly" about lawsuits. Governor Cuomo remained unperturbed by the Chief Judge's remarks. "I have no doubts as to [the budget's] constitutionality despite the Chief Judge's opinions," the Governor, who takes pride in his own legal acumen, told the New York Times. Seizing on a theme that would recur throughout the confrontation, the Governor tried to cast the Chief Judge as the voice of just one more special interest group vying for a bigger slice of a shrinking budget pie. "He's like all the other people who speak in their political capacity. He's trying to get as much as he can for his particular segment."

The Chief Judge's approach was met with an equally cool reception in the legislature, where the Chair of the Assembly Judiciary Committee dismissed the constitutional accusations as a "sort of 'how many angels can dance on the head of a pin' kind of argument. The fact of the matter is the court system is

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84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. After graduating at the top of his St. John's law school class in 1956, Cuomo clerked for the Court of Appeals for two years. Prior to embarking on a career in politics, Cuomo developed a reputation as a tough litigator and creative appellate attorney. See generally ROBERT S. MCELVAINE, MARIO CUOMO - A BIOGRAPHY, 133-46, 167-92 (1988).
88. Kolbert, supra note 83, at B5.
not going to get the total budget they requested, and I think they realize that.\footnote{89}

In the court of public opinion, the editorial writers awarded round one of the budget battle to the Governor.\footnote{90} The New York Times accused Wachtler of "picking a constitutional fight" which "foment[ed] needless turmoil," and suggested that fears of collapse in the justice system were "overstated," involving consequences to public convenience, not safety.\footnote{91} These responses did nothing to improve the Chief Judge's negotiating position, and he was to suffer a more damaging loss in the next round.

D. A Budget Is Approved

On May 31, 1991, the state legislature approved a final appropriation for the judicial branch of $889.3 million.\footnote{92} The amount represented a decrease of $77 million from the judiciary's original budget request, and an increase over the Governor's recommendation by $19 million. Compared to the previous year's appropriation, the judiciary absorbed an actual decrease of about $6.5 million, or .7% of the 1990 budget.\footnote{93} In response, the Chief Judge again raised the possibility of an inherent powers lawsuit, suggesting that the "enormity" of the cuts would justify legal action. "Courts throughout the country have consistently held that the legislative and executive branches have the obligation of adequately funding the courts."\footnote{94} Chief Judge Wachtler emphasized that an inherent powers suit was "something that must be exercised with enormous restraint. But we should not confuse judicial restraint with judicial abdication."\footnote{95}

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{89} Id.
\item \footnote{90} This Court Crisis Isn't Necessary, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1991, at A16.
\item \footnote{91} Id.
\item \footnote{92} Wachtler, at 10.
\item \footnote{93} The 1990-91 appropriation for the judiciary was $895.8 million. Wachtler, at 12.
\item \footnote{94} Gary Spencer, Legislature Appropriates $899 Million For Judiciary, N.Y. L.J., June 4, 1991, at 1.
\item \footnote{95} Id.
\end{itemize}
The situation remained quiet until September 1991 when the Chief Judge made good on his threat and filed a lawsuit against the Governor and legislative leaders in the New York State Supreme Court. Chief Judge Wachtler charged that the Governor had violated his constitutional obligation to incorporate the judiciary budget request in the Executive Budget, and that the Governor and legislature had failed to fund the courts adequately. He preceded the filing of the suit with an announcement that the budget would require 500 layoffs in the court system and a cutback in the hours of operation of small claims courts.

Chief Judge Wachtler accompanied these announcements with a release of a letter to the Governor and the legislative leaders complaining about the budget's treatment of the court system. It appeared that the reaction to his April comments had convinced the Chief Judge that his constitutional argument and inherent powers exercise would be met with skepticism unless he could win the hearts and minds of the public (and the media) by pointing to the dramatic effects of the budget shortfall. Thus, he ordered the cutbacks, and publicly released the letter on September 5, 1991, announced the lawsuit on September 25, fired the 500 court workers the following day, and filed the lawsuit the day after the layoffs, all of which was accompanied by press conferences and releases.

The lawsuit took Albany observers by surprise. They had viewed the Chief Judge's threats primarily as a bargaining tactic designed to maximize his leverage during the spring budget negotiations. In fact, the Chief Judge may actually have been looking ahead to the next budget cycle when he filed the lawsuit; in comments to reporters he conceded that he decided to file the suit after receiving warnings from the Governor's

98. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
100. Id.
budget office that the upcoming budget would contain no judiciary increase.\textsuperscript{101}

The Governor responded with a public relations offensive of his own, returning to the themes that had worked earlier in the year.\textsuperscript{102} In a statement released on the day the lawsuit was filed, Governor Cuomo again accused the judiciary of looking out for its own interests while turning a blind eye to other needs in the state. He made the point that the state's limited resources meant that any increase for the courts would have to come out of someone else's pocket: "[By] this complaint, the judges of our State say that they are entitled to whatever they feel they need for themselves and their courts, no matter whose taxes go up; no matter what poor people, sick people or children are denied; no matter who is laid off."\textsuperscript{103}

The day after the suit was filed, Governor Cuomo and Chief Judge Wachtler continued their "take no prisoners" brand of public relations warfare. The Governor held a press conference to sharply criticize the suit. He labeled it "zany," and said it set a "dangerous precedent."\textsuperscript{104} He questioned the objectivity of judges hearing a case in which their own interests were at stake: "Having sat at the table of accusation, after they finish making the charge, they jump up, leap on the bench, turn around and say 'I was right.' Fascinating, even for New York."\textsuperscript{105}

Chief Judge Wachtler returned fire, charging the Governor with a "total unfamiliarity with the law" and suggested that the Governor should "spend more time governing, more time finding ways to properly fund the courts, and spend less time holding press conferences."\textsuperscript{106}

The editorial writers were dismayed by the confrontation. The New York Times ran an editorial captioned "Wachtler v. Cuomo = Two Losers," and took both men to task for the level of

\textsuperscript{101} Id.
\textsuperscript{102} See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{103} Judge Wachtler Files his Suit to Get Courts More Money, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1991, at B3.
\textsuperscript{104} Kevin Sack, Cuomo Denounces Judge's Lawsuit on Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1991, at 22.
\textsuperscript{105} Id.
\textsuperscript{106} Id.
bitterness marking the conflict. On the merits of the issue, the Times saw no change from its earlier conclusion that the legal issues were beside the point; the real question was the "judiciary's fair share" in a time of "plunging revenues and rising needs" throughout the state. The Times remained skeptical that a few million dollars from a budget of $900 million would make the difference between survival and collapse of the court system. Picking up on a point that the Governor was emphasizing, the Times suggested that the suit raised "disturbing conflict of interest questions" for the courts. Even if the Chief Judge recused himself, should the case come before the Court of Appeals, "how could any other New York judge credibly try a case whose outcome would determine resources available for his own courtroom?" None of the commentary in the major papers gave any serious recognition to the inherent powers doctrine or precedent.

While the two men continued to lob daily volleys in the public relations battle, the Governor opened up a second front in the legal conflict with a countersuit filed before Federal Judge Jack Weinstein in the Eastern District of New York. The Governor sought dismissal of the state court suit, relying on Civil War era civil rights provisions to argue that voters would be disenfranchised if their elected officials' budget making decisions could be overridden by unelected judges. The complaint also repeated the Governor's public argument that the state courts could not fairly decide a case in which they had a strong institutional interest.

Judge Weinstein declined to dismiss the suit, but suggested in a written opinion that the courtroom was not the best place

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
112. Gary Spencer, New Cuts Sought from Court Budget, Cuomo Cites Need to Close Latest Deficit, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 1, 1991, at 2. The theory of Cuomo's suit was that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1443, Wachtler's suit had the effect of denying New Yorkers their vote for legislators who had adopted the budget and that the Wachtler suit violated the Equal Protection Clause by elevating judicial desires "over the demands of all other people of the state." Id.
113. Sack, supra note 104, at 22.
to resolve the budget dispute. He admonished the two “titans of New York” to avoid “an unseemly conflict” by negotiating a resolution.\(^\text{114}\) "Is it not time now, at the threshold, to stop, to reason, to withdraw from what will become a public spectacle with no benefit to the people whom both the talented Governor and the learned Chief Judge so desperately want to serve?,”\(^\text{115}\) questioned Weinstein. "We are faced with the paradox that litigation designed to solve a problem makes its solution less likely.”\(^\text{116}\)

To help achieve an out-of-court resolution, Weinstein asked former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to mediate the dispute.\(^\text{117}\) Vance found negotiating this conflict to be as frustrating as his efforts to bring peace to the Balkans,\(^\text{118}\) for as soon as court recessed, the war of words began anew. The Governor tried to “remind the world that ["the unseemly conflict"]\(^\text{119}\) was started by the Chief Judge”:

It was the judges who charged into court, using their power and their forum as a giant sledgehammer to demand from the rest of the society that they be accommodated above all other people as though they weren't just judges, they were some kind of Brahmins [sic] who were specially selected.\(^\text{120}\)

After being told by a reporter of the Governor's comments, the Chief Judge reportedly reacted with an obscenity before responding that the “conflict was started when [the Governor] submitted our budget in an unconstitutional fashion, causing the closing of our courts.”\(^\text{121}\) The Chief Judge dismissed the Governor's comments as “populist rhetoric” and announced that he would accept the mediation effort.\(^\text{122}\) However, the Governor rejected Vance's mediation effort, suggesting that neither the

\(^\text{115}\) Id. at 4.
\(^\text{116}\) Id.
\(^\text{117}\) Id.
\(^\text{118}\) See David Binder, Vance, Leaving Sees Hope for Bosnia Plan Despite Fighting, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1993, at A8.
\(^\text{119}\) Sack, supra note 111, at B1.
\(^\text{120}\) Id.
\(^\text{121}\) Id.
\(^\text{122}\) Id.
constitution nor the state's fiscal condition were amenable to negotiation.123

The Weinstein comments provided fresh ammunition for the editorial writers who caricatured the Governor and the Chief Judge as "schoolyard gladiators," and repeated the contention that "this dispute simply doesn't belong in court."124 The Times dismissed the legal arguments and insisted again that "the dispute remains more political than legal."125

As work on the legal briefs continued in October 1991 (with the Governor telling reporters he was up late every night researching the law for his countersuit)126 the out-of-court maneuvering intensified, with both sides threatening investigations of the other's spending practices. By the end of October, it appeared that the Chief Judge was wavering in his resolve to continue the lawsuit.127 He reportedly was willing to accept as little as $11 million in increased funding along with a "pledge" that the courts may directly submit their budget request to the legislature.128 However, he stood firm on the principle driving the suit, contending that even if he lost the lawsuit, "I would have made the point that we are not another state agency — we are a separate and co-equal branch of government."129

F. New York's Fiscal Picture Darkens

In November 1991, the pressure on the Chief Judge to agree to a settlement increased sharply when state budget officials announced their estimate of a mid-year budget gap of nearly $700 million.130 The Governor moved to drop his federal countersuit and to abandon his effort to remove the primary suit to federal court, citing the need for expedited discovery of judicial spending in the state case in order to propose additional cuts in the current year and in the spending plan for the 1992-

123. Id.
125. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
The Governor undoubtedly calculated that opening the judiciary’s books to public scrutiny would be a more potent weapon to force dismissal than the federal countersuit. Judiciary officials attempted to turn the strategy around by suggesting that they were equally eager to begin discovery of spending in the Governor’s office. By late November 1991, however, the Governor’s budget office announced that the mid-year budget gap had risen to $875 million. Governor Cuomo ordered additional deep cuts throughout state government including a further cut of $26 million in the current-year budget for the judiciary.

The Chief Judge responded by announcing that the additional cuts would force the closing of all civil courts and half of the state’s criminal courts by January 1, 1992. The rhetoric reached a fever pitch. In a statement, Chief Judge Wachtler predicted that “the closing of so many criminal courts would lead unavoidably to the release of hundreds, even thousands, of criminal defendants because of jail overcrowding and speedy trial mandates.” The Chief Judge went on to accuse the governor of “vindictiveness” because of the lawsuit. The Governor’s press secretary responded that it was “absurd” to suggest that a 3.4% cut would cause the closure of most of the state’s courts: “Perhaps there’s new management needed in the courts if they can’t manage a 3% cut.”

Two days later the Office of Court Administration released its budget request for the upcoming fiscal year. The request proposed a $61 million increase over current (1991-92) court funding, which was enough to restore most of the previous cuts including the lay-offs and add sixteen judges. The request was significant because it actually sought less money for the

132. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
next fiscal year (1992-93) than the Chief Judge was seeking for
the current (1991-92) fiscal year through the lawsuit. In a de-
parture from previous years, the budget request presented the
legislature with a variety of cost-saving and fee options to pay
for the increase. The proposals included a 1% levy on civil judg-
ments and a fifty dollar fee for filing motions.140

Representatives of the legal community, usually staunch
opponents of such proposals, reflected the depth of concern over
the current budget gridlock by acknowledging that the fees
might be necessary to get the courts moving again.141 The new
budget request thus seemed to represent a tacit acknowledge-
ment that the legal and political battle over the 1991-92 budget
was draining the court's institutional effectiveness and damag-
ing its credibility, and was a harbinger of the settlement to
come.

The judiciary's reputation suffered one more blow when
Chief Judge Wachtler, in a December 13, 1991 letter to the
state's judges, told them that he intended to seek pay increases
for the 1,100 state judges despite the budget cuts and layoffs.142
This split the court's own constituency when the politically pow-
erful Court Officers' Association denounced the move.143
Although the letter seemed to be nothing more than a morale
booster for the judges, because it made no mention of when the
Chief Judge would seek the increase, the Governor's spokesper-
son was quick to pounce on the misstep. "His startling request
for raises for judges at this time of hardship for the hardwork-
ing people of the middle class, and those in poverty, does more
to impair his credibility than we ever could."144 On the legal
front, the Governor chose to file his motion to dismiss Chief
Judge Wachtler's lawsuit arguing that the New York State Con-
stitution precluded the use of inherent powers to compel a state
judicial budget.145

140. Id.
141. Id. The representatives included the New York State Bar Association. Id.
142. Robert D. McFadden, Wachtler in Letter Vows to Seek Raises for Judges,
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Motion to Dismiss, Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 6034/91 (Sup. Ct. Albany
G. Settlement

With the 1992-93 budget release just weeks away, intense negotiations over the 1992-93 judiciary budget were being brokered by legislative staff. The Governor was prepared to propose significant new cuts in the judiciary spending plan for the new year.\footnote{146}{The proposed cuts were in excess of $130 million. Gary Spencer, \textit{Wachtler, Cuomo Settle Funding Suit}, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 17, 1992, at 2.} The combination of pressures created by budget realities, the upcoming hearing on the motion to dismiss, and the constant battering in the press finally moved the Chief Judge to cut both his fiscal and public relation losses ending the year-long conflict.

At 4:30 p.m. on January 16, 1992, the Chief Judge called the Governor with an offer to resolve the crisis.\footnote{147}{Id.} The Chief Judge proposed that if the Governor would agree to restore the judiciary budget for the upcoming fiscal year to the expenditure level of the previous fiscal year, he would drop the suit and open his books to an outside auditor.\footnote{148}{Id. at 1.} An hour later, the Governor called back and told the Chief Judge, “It’s done.”\footnote{149}{Id. at 2.} A year of political and legal skirmishes came to an end just days prior to the first arguments on the merits of the case and the release of the 1992-93 budget plan.\footnote{150}{For an evaluation of the settlement, see \textit{infra} notes 187-92 and accompanying text.}

V. Analysis of \textit{Wachtler v. Cuomo}

\textit{Wachtler v. Cuomo} broke new ground in the development of the inherent powers doctrine. The suit represents the only attempt to date to test the doctrine’s viability in a direct confrontation between coequal branches of state government over the lump-sum budget of a state judiciary. To evaluate the efficacy of this or similar attempts, this section will address the theoretical, doctrinal, precedential and political implications of \textit{Wachtler v. Cuomo}.
A. Wachtler v. Cuomo and the Theoretical Justification for Inherent Power

The doctrine of inherent powers holds that a branch of government may exercise the power necessary to protect itself in the performance of its institutional duties. The source of the power is said to be neither constitutional nor statutory; it is an intrinsic characteristic of the institution. The doctrine finds its primary theoretical basis in the separation of powers. The functional differentiation between the branches of government is designed, in Madison's words, to prevent "the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands," for this concentration would be "the very definition of tyranny." This separation is enforced by the concept of checks and balances which provides "great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department [by] giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others." By permitting one branch to "resist encroachments" by the other branches, the inherent powers doctrine serves as a balancing mechanism of the constitutional framework.

The paradox of the inherent powers doctrine is that the very exercise of inherent power by a branch of government violates the separation of powers in order to preserve the branch's status as an equal and independent unit of government. When, for example, a court compels funding for the salary of a clerk or legal secretary, it is exercising the appropriation power which belongs to the legislative branch. This violation is not

151. See Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971); see generally CRATsLEY & CARRIGAN, supra note 6, at 18, and cases therein.

152. See, e.g., In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 275 N.W. 265, 267 (Neb. 1937) ("The term 'inherent power of the judiciary' means that [power] which is essential to the existence, dignity, and functions of the court from the very fact that it is a court."); In re Surcharge of County Comm'rs, 12 Pa. D. & C. 471, 477 (Lackawanna County Comm. Pl 1928). In this case, the court held: "Such powers from both their nature and their ancient exercise, must be regarded as inherent. They do not depend upon express constitutional grant nor in any sense upon legislative will." Id.

153. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).

154. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).

155. See Ferguson, supra note 35, at 986-87 for a discussion of this point.
troublesome for several reasons. First, it has been recognized since Madison's time that the separation of powers is not a rigid demarcation, but one which tends to blur at the edges. The branches of government are not meant to be "wholly unconnected with each other." The branches should be "connected and blended as to give each a constitutional control over the other." There is no fundamental objection where the exercise by one branch of another branch's powers helps to protect the constitutional status of each. This is the essence of checks and balances.

Second, this kind of action, while protecting the judicial capacity to carry out institutional functions, does not strike at the power of a coordinate branch in any vital way. Simply because the judiciary's power is augmented does not mean that the legislature's power is correspondingly diminished. Where the exercise of the power is by a superior governmental unit, as in the typical case in which a state supreme court compels funding from a locality, the concern over a separation of powers violation by the judiciary is remote. The concern underlying the concept of separation of powers is concentration of power in one source. This concern is simply not implicated in any real way when a court exercises its inherent power to protect itself without diminishing the sphere of a coordinate and equal branch.

Conversely, the point at which the exercise of the power can no longer be characterized as an action which merely protects one branch but instead diminishes the rights and powers of a coordinate and equal branch marks the conceptual boundary of inherent power. It is at this point where the judiciary ceases to act as a check on the other branches and begins to encroach on their dominion. When the exercise of inherent powers crosses this line it becomes a cure that does more damage to the separation of powers doctrine than the malady it was intended to address.

_Wachtler v. Cuomo_ is on the wrong side of this line. The power to tax and the power to appropriate are vested in the legislature. Financial support for the courts can only come from

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156. _The Federalist_ No. 48 (James Madison).
157. _Id._
158. Though the wording and provisions of state constitutions differ, all state legislatures possess these powers, subject only to constitutional limitations such as
tax revenues in the form of an allocation of appropriations.\textsuperscript{159} When a state court compels a state legislature to fund the judiciary at a level beyond that which the legislature has determined can be supported by the fisc, the court, in essence, is mandating either an exercise of the taxing power or a reallocation of appropriations, or both. This exercise of inherent power would redress the injury to the judiciary only by upsetting the fundamental alignment of the branches, and thus is neither an acceptable nor legitimate use of the inherent powers doctrine. Chief Judge Wachtler's attempt to compel \$77 million in additional funding from an already balanced budget usurped core taxing and appropriation powers of the legislature. The suit thus cannot be justified as an exercise of inherent power because it would do far more to damage than to preserve the separation of powers.\textsuperscript{160}

B. Wachtler v. Cuomo and the Doctrinal Limitations on Inherent Power

1. The Requirement of Prior Approval

Courts have developed a number of doctrinal limitations on the exercise of inherent power even as they have broadened its scope.\textsuperscript{161} The most important of these is the requirement that a lower court receive the prior approval of the state supreme court or central court administrator for any inherent power exercise.\textsuperscript{162} The review process results in a more objective evaluation of the proposed action when the decision to invoke inherent powers is removed from the local judge, who stands to gain the executive veto. For the provisions of specific constitutions, see generally \textsc{Legislative Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University, Constitutions of the United States, National and State} (1983).

\textsuperscript{159} See id.

\textsuperscript{160} Some of the cases are beginning to explicitly recognize this danger. See McCorkle v. Judges of the Superior Court, 392 S.E.2d 707, 708 (Ga. 1990). Inherent power:

\begin{flushright}
does not give the judicial branch the right to invade the province of another branch of government. As a principle flowing from the separation of powers doctrine, it arms the judicial branch with authority to prevent another branch from invading the province. The inherent power is not a sword but a shield.\textsuperscript{163}
\end{flushright}

\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{161} See \textit{supra} notes 40-48 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{162} See \textit{supra} notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
most from the exercise, and from the arena of local politics. This tends to screen out injudicious use of the power and to encourage conciliation between the local parties. These constraints are lost when the supreme court itself chooses to exercise its inherent power. There is no disinterested entity to review the high court’s decision. Without this escape valve the decision is mired in the highly charged context of an inter-branch budget battle, an environment unlikely to produce an objective evaluation of the exercise of inherent power.163 Thus, in a situation like Wachtler v. Cuomo where the state’s highest court is involved in a significant inter-branch conflict, the most important of the safeguards imposed by the state’s highest courts to control the use of inherent power is rendered meaningless. This is exacerbated in a state like New York where inherent powers precedent is sparse,164 and which has no guidelines or court rules to regulate the initiation of inherent power suits.

2. The Reasonable and Necessary Standard

The second doctrinal limitation that has emerged in the case law is the requirement that the funding sought by the exercise of inherent power is “reasonable and necessary” for the functioning of the court.165 This somewhat murky standard has been used to evaluate whether specific line-item expenditures are important enough to compel their funding. It responds to the problem of local judges who make their own budgets without the oversight or expertise of professional budget experts, sometimes resulting in questionable budget requests.166 The standard served, in effect, as surrogate for professional budgeting guidelines. It was not designed for and has never been ap-
plied to a lump-sum appropriation request developed by court administration experts through a rigorous budget process. Presumably, modern court administrators in a unified system would not submit any request which was not demonstrably reasonable and necessary according to established fiscal standards. The court request developed in the modern budget process is, by definition, reasonable and necessary or the court would not have made the request.

The reasonable and necessary standard is thus no help as a device to screen out improper uses of inherent powers. At the level of sophisticated statewide budgeting it has the opposite effect of turning every budget request into one which would provide grounds for an exercise of inherent power. Where, as in New York, the state constitution explicitly recognizes the legislature's right to reduce the judiciary's budget, conflict is almost guaranteed by the use of the "reasonable and necessary" standard. If a lump-sum budget request by the state judiciary can always be defended as reasonable and necessary and the legislature exercises its constitutional power to reduce that request, then the use of inherent powers is always justified. What began as a standard designed to limit the use of inherent powers becomes, under the Wachtler v. Cuomo scenario, a device which encourages separation of powers conflicts.

3. The Requirement of Administrative Exhaustion

The third limitation imposed by case law is that the established means of seeking funding must be utilized before a court can exercise its inherent power. This fundamental constraint is designed to ensure that courts do not substitute inherent powers for statutory procedures. However, as with the other restrictions, it has little bite at the state level where the budget process is statutorily or constitutionally mandated. If the established budgetary procedures that fail to produce the desired funding are constitutionally mandated, as in New York, then the exercise of inherent power not only presents a clash with a coordinate and coequal branch over the force of a statute, but

168. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
also creates significant tension with the constitution itself. Since the ultimate goal of the inherent powers doctrine is to re-
dress imbalances in the framework of separation of powers, a
use of the doctrine which engenders constitutional discord un-
dermines the purpose of inherent powers.

4. Appointment of an Outside Judge

A fourth and final device is utilized by state supreme courts
to regulate inherent powers cases. Although not a formal part
of the doctrine, it has been the practice of state supreme courts
to appoint a judge from outside the local judicial district where
the dispute arose to hear the case at the trial level. Like the
prior approval mechanism, this practice brings a disinterested
decision-maker into the dispute providing a more objective re-
view of the case and increasing public confidence in the process.
These constraints are sacrificed in a state budget conflict. The
specter of a judge hearing a case in which he or she has a direct
interest in the result is not easily masked when every judge in
the court system has a stake in the outcome of an inherent pow-
ers conflict over global funding for the judiciary. Furthermore,
it is entirely likely that the case will wind its way up to
the state's high court—the same court whose Chief Judge has
brought the case. The difficulties with the real or apparent con-
flicts of interest point up the unsuitability of utilizing inherent
power as a judicial financing tool at the state level, as Wachtler
v. Cuomo attempted to do.

C. Wachtler v. Cuomo and Inherent Powers Precedent

1. The National Case Law

Wachtler v. Cuomo marks a departure from inherent pow-
ners precedent in a number of ways. Most significantly, it was
the first serious inherent powers challenge between coequal

170. See supra notes 59-60; see infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 48 and accompanying text; see also Ferguson, supra note 35, at 564 n.16 and Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Fund-
ing, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 Md. L. Rev. 217, 231, nn.86-96 (1993) for a
discussion and cases on the impartiality problem in judicial review of funding
orders.
172. See Governor Cuomo's comments, supra note 105 and accompanying
text; editorial comments, supra note 110 and accompanying text; and general dis-
cussion of public confidence, infra notes 193-215 and accompanying text.
branches of state government as opposed to the state-local conflicts that have characterized the cases thus far.\textsuperscript{173} Additionally, it is the first case to assert an inherent power to overturn a lump-sum budget rather than specific expenditures.\textsuperscript{174} Finally, the magnitude of the budget at issue — approaching $1 billion — sets \textit{Wachtler v. Cuomo} apart from previous exercises of inherent power, which tended to be limited to small expenditures.\textsuperscript{175} Thus, although the dicta of inherent powers cases is sweeping, the holdings have in fact been quite narrow and do not provide firm support for expansion of the doctrine to conflict on the level of \textit{Wachtler v. Cuomo}.

2. \textit{The New York Case Law on Inherent Power}

The history of the use of inherent powers in New York is less developed than in many jurisdictions. No major inherent powers case has come out of New York; the majority of the inherent powers cases in New York involve court control of the adjudicatory process.\textsuperscript{176} The few New York cases involving the power to compel funding are limited in their reach. The strongest case is \textit{In re McCoy v. Mayor of the City of New York}.\textsuperscript{177} In \textit{McCoy}, the city of New York refused to provide any funding for a newly created housing part of the civil court. The local court administrators sued the city to compel funding. The court held that the city had to provide the requested funds.\textsuperscript{178} However, the holding appeared to rest on the fact that the state legislature had authorized the creation of the housing part and that the city by refusing to fund it was "flout[ing] a legislative mandate."\textsuperscript{179} There was no significant discussion of inherent powers

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{173} See cases cited supra notes 14-26; see supra notes 27-55.
\item \textsuperscript{174} See cases cited supra notes 14-26; see supra notes 27-55.
\item \textsuperscript{175} See cases cited supra notes 14-26; see supra notes 27-55.
\item \textsuperscript{176} See, e.g., \textit{In re Bar Ass'n of N.Y.}, 222 A.D. 580, 227 N.Y.S. 1 (1st Dep't 1928) (power to conduct investigation); Benjamin Franklin Fed. Sav. Ass'n v. PJT Enters., Inc., 149 Misc. 2d 688, 566 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct. Cortland County 1991) (power to punish for contempt); Bankers Trust Co. v. Braten, 101 Misc. 2d 227, 420 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979) (power to assign cases); People v. Bell, 95 Misc. 2d 360, 407 N.Y.S.2d 944 (Crim. Ct. Queens County 1978) (power to control calendar).
\item \textsuperscript{177} 73 Misc. 2d 508, 347 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), \textit{modified and aff'd}, 41 A.D.2d 929, 344 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1st Dep't 1973).
\item \textsuperscript{178} \textit{Id.} at 513, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
\item \textsuperscript{179} \textit{Id.} at 510, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
\end{itemize}
doctrine in this or any other New York case, thus leaving the status of the doctrine uncertain at best. 180

3. Inherent Powers and the New York Constitution

In addition to the indefinite recognition of inherent powers in New York case law, the New York Constitution implicitly rejects the use of judicial inherent power to compel funding when the funding is the result of constitutional procedure:

Insofar as the expense of the courts is borne by the state or paid by the state in the first instance, the final determination of the itemized estimates of the annual financial needs of the courts shall be made by the legislature and the governor [in accordance with the prescribed procedures]. 181

Taken in concert with the procedures that permit the legislature to alter the judiciary budget 182 and the Governor to veto that budget in whole or in part, 183 the constitution explicitly contemplates reduction of the state judiciary budget without judicial recourse. 184 A line of New York cases subsequent to the reorganization of the courts under these provisions recognizes that the existence of explicitly governing statutory or constitutional provisions preempts judicial intervention in matters involving the appropriation power. 185 Thus, it is not clear whether

180. A comprehensive review of the development and status of inherent powers doctrine in New York is beyond the scope of this paper. There is extraordinarily little attention in either the cases or the commentary to inherent powers in New York. The topic is ripe for further research. The only point sought to be made here is that the doctrine is simply not well established in New York.

181. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 29 (emphasis added). In addition, article VII, § 7 provides that "[n]o money shall ever be paid out of the state treasury... except in pursuance of an appropriation by law..." N.Y. Const. art. VII, § 7. For a detailed description of constitutional procedures, see infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.


183. N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 7.

184. See N.Y. Leg. Doc. Nos. 36, 24 (1958). The Temporary Commission on the Courts, which drafted article VI, said of § 29 that "all budget requests are as the name implies requests and will be finally determined by the appropriating agencies as, in their wisdom, they deem right. No court is to continue to have mandate power over its own budget" (emphasis in original). See also Joint Legis. Comm'n on Court Reorg., Ninth Interim Report, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 46 at 17-18 (1964) ("paramount" authority over the Judiciary's budget rests with the Governor and legislature).

New York constitutional law or case law supports the use of inherent power as asserted in Wachtler v. Cuomo.186

D. A Political Evaluation of Wachtler v. Cuomo

The weakness of the theoretical justifications for Wachtler v. Cuomo and the paucity of New York law on the issue of inherent powers suggest that the suit may primarily have been a political tool to leverage additional funding in future budget negotiations. It is not clear that the suit was successful even on these terms. Furthermore, to the extent that the handling of the suit undermined public confidence in the judiciary and injured the judiciary’s relationships with the other branches the damage resulting from Wachtler v. Cuomo may have outweighed any potential gains.

1. The Settlement and the Fiscal Outcome for the Courts

The stated objectives of the suit were to alter the way in which the Governor submitted the judiciary’s budget to the leg-

186. Unsurprisingly, the legal memoranda of the Chief Judge rely heavily on cases from other jurisdictions. See Plaintiff’s Mem. of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss at 10-14, Wachtler v. Cuomo No. 6034/91 (Sup. Ct. Albany County filed Sept. 27, 1991) (citing 14 non-New York inherent power cases, and just four New York inherent power funding cases).
islature, and to compel an additional $77 million in funding for the judiciary. 187 Neither goal was achieved by the settlement proposed and agreed to by the Chief Judge. The Governor did not change the way in which the budget was submitted. Furthermore, the courts did not receive the additional funding they sought to compel, and, in fact, received a substantial further cut in funding due to the mid-1991 budget deficit. 188

The courts did receive a small increase for the 1992-93 fiscal year, but only enough to restore the budget to the 1990 level. 189 This amount was still $55 million less than the Office of Court Administration had estimated it would need for the 1992-93 fiscal year. 190 In addition, the court system would now be subject to an outside audit, a move the Chief Judge had resisted. 191 Although judicial officials sought to put the best face on the settlement, 192 the reality was that the courts ended 1991 worse off than they started and would be no better off in the next budget year.

2. The Effect of Wachtler v. Cuomo on Public Confidence in the Courts

a. Publicizing the Plight of the Courts

From the commencement of Wachtler v. Cuomo it was clear that the Chief Judge was making his case on behalf of the courts not only in a legal setting, but to the public at large. 193 Even the complaint read much like a press release, detailing the alleged mistreatment of the courts at the hands of the legislature and the Governor, recounting “the ever-increasing workload of the Judicial Branch” and describing its effects on the administration of justice. 194 Articles by court officials and prominent New York lawyers appeared in the legal press echoing the message and explaining why the use of inherent powers

188. Spencer, supra note 146, at 2.
189. Id.
190. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
192. Id.
193. See supra notes 94-95, 136 and accompanying text.
194. Wachtler, at 24.
was an appropriate legal exercise. The major papers ran features on the deteriorating conditions of the courts as part of their overall coverage of the dispute. The lawsuit presented the Chief Judge with an unparalleled opportunity to place the plight of the courts in the public eye, in the hopes of building support for enhancement of the judicial budget.

Although Wachtler v. Cuomo was successful in publicizing the difficulties faced by the courts, there is no evidence that the campaign mounted by the Chief Judge translated into public support for the judiciary. There are several reasons why public confidence in the courts may actually have eroded in the wake of the suit. It is a political axiom that the greater the number of interests injured by fiscal constraints, the smaller the likelihood that any particular budget cut will be perceived by the public as unfair. When the "pain" is spread more or less evenly, the public will perceive the entire budget plan as a fair and necessary, albeit unwelcome exercise. For the executive faced with the unpleasant task of selling the public on a budget which slashes services, the spectacle of various interest groups each clamoring for a larger piece of a shrinking budget pie actually helps implement the overall budget strategy by persuading the public of the fairness of the plan. When the Chief Judge mounted his campaign to restore a judiciary cut of less than one percent, he handed the Governor a better opportunity to advance this strategy than the Governor could have created himself. This explains the zeal with which the Governor seemed to welcome the chance to engage the Chief Judge over the law-


197. This strategy was evident in President Clinton's first budget proposal. David E. Rosenbaum, Clinton's Hope: Hostility; Oddly Enough If Everybody Finds Fault In The Deficit Plan, The Better Its Chances, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1993, § 1, at 1 ("Representative Dan Rostenkowski, the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, has told the White House that it is politically crucial to create such a large universe of sacrifice that it is difficult for people to say they should be outside of it.").

198. Id.

199. Id.
suit, and is one reason why public sympathy for the courts did not materialize.

b. Diminishing the Stature of the Courts and the Political Leadership

The judiciary's authority is uniquely dependent on public confidence. The image painted by the news reports and editorials of a judiciary demanding priority allocations of scarce budget resources ahead of competing social needs, cannot help but diminish the stature of the courts in the public mind. Furthermore, when a court determines that its needs are paramount to other social concerns, and then orders the executive to meet its needs it undermines the quality of impartiality upon which public trust in the courts is based. The editorials expressed particular dismay over the potential conflict, indicating that the image of a court acting as prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner struck a deep nerve.

It may also be hard for the public to accept particular arguments made to justify the exercise of inherent powers. For example, it is often asserted that the courts are a virtually helpless bystander in the budget negotiation process. Can this be true today, when the bar associations and court employee unions — which have a direct stake in the judicial budget — are among the most powerful players in the political arena? And since the overwhelming majority of legislators are

200. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 90, 107-108, 124-25 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The Court's authority — possessed of neither the purse nor the sword — ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction."); see also Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814 (1992). In Casey the Supreme Court noted that the Court "cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy . . . ."
203. See supra notes 90, 107-08, 125 and accompanying text.
204. See In re Salary of the Juvenile Director, 552 P.2d 165, 172 (Wash. 1976) ("The unreasoned assertion of power to determine and demand their own budget is a threat to the image of and public support for the courts.").
205. Id. at 173 ("By in effect initiating and trying its own lawsuits, the judiciary's image of impartiality and the concomitant willingness of the public to accept its decisions as those of a fair and disinterested tribunal may be severely damaged.").
206. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
practicing attorneys,\textsuperscript{208} it cannot be argued that the legislature fails to understand the needs of the courts. One might suppose that lawyers lobbying other lawyers on the needs of the courts would evoke more sympathy than would lobbying on subjects further removed from their experience. The legislature's decision to reduce funding for the courts may well have a special aura of credibility with the public \textit{precisely} because of the legislators' familiarity with and understanding of the court system.

The primary factual argument made by Chief Judge Wachtler could not withstand public scrutiny. The Chief Judge repeatedly claimed that the judiciary budget had been consistently cut by the Governor and the legislature.\textsuperscript{209} In fact, the budget had increased by $415 million (86\%) since the Governor assumed office, and the actual cut at issue in the lawsuit was under 1\%.\textsuperscript{210} Only the judiciary's requests had been trimmed, as the legislature was constitutionally entitled to do.\textsuperscript{211}

It was not just the courts that suffered a loss of public confidence as a result of \textit{Wachtler v. Cuomo}. The credibility of the political leadership as a whole suffered when the executive branch called on the entire state to make sacrifices in the name of fiscal recovery,\textsuperscript{212} while the judicial branch engaged in extraordinary conduct to avoid such sacrifices.

c. \textit{The Dangers of Success}

Had the suit ultimately been successful in compelling the funding of the judiciary budget, the negative effect on public confidence in the courts could have been greater. The court is ill-equipped to make broad judgments about the allocation of resources to competing interests; its success in compelling funding undermines rational budget decisions by a representative body.\textsuperscript{213} Furthermore, if the court's action results in a tax in-


\textsuperscript{209} See \textit{Wachtler}, at 10-13.

\textsuperscript{210} See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{211} See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{212} See supra notes 103, 113, 144 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{213} See \textit{In re Salary of the Juvenile Director}, 552 P.2d 163, 172 (Wash. 1976) ("By its nature litigation based on inherent judicial power to finance its own func-
crease or cuts in other programs in order to raise the level of judicial funding, active public animosity toward the judiciary would surely emerge. The damage to public confidence is further exacerbated if the executive or legislature refuses to enforce the order to compel funding. The court's essential dependence on the other branches would be revealed, perhaps crippling the court's authority in a substantial way. Thus, whether the court wins, loses or settles the case, but perhaps especially if it is won, the court seeking to exercise its inherent power at the state level may be risking much more in terms of public confidence than it stands to gain by adding a few — or even a great many — dollars to its budget. The loss of public trust and the increase in inter-branch tension may impair the functioning of the court in a more fundamental way than a lean budget appropriation. The budget money will rise and ebb with the currents of the economy; the public trust, once lost, is not so easily regained. Wachtler v. Cuomo suggests that a court considering the exercise of inherent power must think hard about the effects of its action on its relationship with the public, for such concerns may be more determinative of the efficacy of the exercise than a carefully parsed legal and theoretical analysis.

VI. Conclusion: The Implications of Wachtler v. Cuomo for the Future of Inherent Powers

Wachtler v. Cuomo provides evidence for the conclusion that the doctrine of inherent power cannot and should not be pushed beyond its conceptual, precedential, and practical limits. As a conceptual matter, a use of the doctrine that undermines rather than strengthens the separation of powers is unsupportable.

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214. Id. ("[S]uch actions may threaten, rather than strengthen, judicial independence since involvement in the budgetary process imposes upon the courts at least partial responsibility for increased taxes and diminished funding of other public services.").

215. The executive might indeed relish the opportunity to display the court's impotence after a bruising interbranch conflict; as President Jackson is reputed to have said of one disagreeable Supreme Court holding, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it." E. Corwin, John Marshall and the Constitution 194 (1919).
Viewed in historical perspective, the critical use of the doctrine as applied to funding is when court budgeting lay in the hands of local legislators and judges with little expertise in modern court management. It serves as a useful tool for local courts to protect themselves from becoming overly subservient to local politicians. But when unitary financing and lump-sum budgeting replace a fragmented process of line-item appropriations, the doctrine of inherent powers outlives its usefulness. Furthermore, the judicially created limitations on inherent powers that control the use of the power by local courts are ineffective when the doctrine is applied by a state supreme court in a conflict with its constitutional partners. Finally, by using inherent power as a weapon to coerce a co-equal branch of government to fund the courts at a judicially mandated level, the courts undermine the public confidence and interbranch cooperation on which they ultimately depend.

All of the significant boundaries of the doctrine are violated by the judiciary's use of inherent power as an alternative to the state budget process. The attempt by Wachtler v. Cuomo to assert inherent power as a response to chronic budget problems at the state level ignores the roots and limits of the doctrine. The traditional use of the doctrine as a means of protecting the sovereignty of local courts against attacks by other local government entities will survive Wachtler. Although attempts to assert the doctrine beyond its historical and theoretical borders will undoubtedly persist as long as the states are pressed by tight fiscal constraints, it is unlikely that these exercises will be successful. Even the court which wins funding through an inherent power suit stands to lose power, prestige, and effectiveness while inflicting damage on its coordinate branches and creating a substantively irrational state budget. The ultimate implication of Wachtler v. Cuomo is that all parties emerge as losers in an inherent powers conflict of this nature, no matter what the legal outcome of the exercise.
COURT FUNDING

Prepared for the American Bar Association Standing Committee
On Judicial Independence

by

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INTRODUCTION

While courts account for only very small percentages of the total state and federal budgets, they do constitute significant expenditures. Like other aspects of our federal system of government, there is a great deal of variability across state and local jurisdictions in the sources of funding, the budgeting process, and the amounts expended. In addition, comparisons of court appropriations across jurisdictions can be misleading because some expenses, such as indigent defense, may not be included in the court budget. It is also important to keep in mind that court funding is only one part of funding the justice system. In 1990 it was estimated that courts accounted for only 12% of state and local justice system expenditures, which also include expenses for police, prosecutors, public defenders and corrections. However, while budgeted independently, the courts’ workload can be seriously affected by budgetary increases granted to other parts of the justice system, such as prosecutors and police.

There is significant potential for court funding to affect judicial independence in a variety of ways. The amount of money granted, the budget process, the flexibility allowed in expensing the budget, and even the withholding of appropriations in response to court decisions are all legitimate concerns for those committed to the rule of law and an independent judiciary on which it depends. In times of economic crisis, the very operation of the courts and access to justice may be threatened.

The American Bar Association has devoted significant attention to court funding. The 1988 Dash report on “Criminal Justice in Crisis” noted a need for increased resources and the Special Committee on Funding the Justice System published the findings of several surveys of funding in the states. These have included “Funding the Justice System – A Call to Action (1992), “Saving Our System: A National Overview of the Crisis in America’s System of Justice
(1993), “Striving for Solutions. An Overview of Crisis Points in America’s System of Justice” (1995) and “Agenda for Justice – ABA Perspectives on Criminal and Civil Justice Issues” (1996), which concluded that there would be funding problems for the foreseeable future. In addition, a number of ABA entities have focused on the funding needs for specific areas such as the Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants. The American Bar Association was also one of three co-sponsors (along with the National Center for State Courts and the National Conference of State Legislators) of the 1995 National Interbranch Conference on Funding the Courts. An earlier version of this overview of state court funding was prepared to provide background information to the Standing Committee on Judicial Independence and the ABA Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary. The paper will cover the basics of court funding, outside influences on court expenses, alternative revenue sources, state fiscal crisis and the courts, judicial independence and accountability, and the potential for reform.

THE BASICS OF COURT FUNDING

In the last half of the twentieth century courts became large institutions. While they are estimated to constitute less than 3-4% of state budgets (with variability among the states) and two-tenths of one percent of the federal budget, they still account for the expenditure of considerable public dollars. State court expenses are estimated to be $12-$15 billion dollars. Large urban trial courts can have operating budgets of around $100 million, with the typical trial court costing several million dollars annually. Remembering that these budgets often exclude important expenditures critical to the operation of the courts (e.g. indigent defense), and that 70-90% of expenses are estimated to be attributable to personnel-related expenses (most of it
judicial salaries), it should not be surprising that court budgets have become the focus of some legislative and executive attention, particularly in times of economic strain.

Courts in the states are funded from state, county and municipal governments, depending on the state. While appellate courts have been state funded, traditionally trial courts were funded locally. Over the years, however, there has been a trend toward state funding for the trials courts as well; the American Bar Association called for state financing of trial courts in its 1974 Standards of Judicial Administration. In most states, trial courts are currently funded from a combination of state and local funds, with judicial salaries the most likely expense to be funded at the state level.

As part of the court unification movement, reformers pushed for state funding as a way to equalize justice within the states and to improve efficiency by simplifying and centralizing budgeting. It was also seen as a way to relieve local pressure to raise funds and thereby avoid the appearance of improper influence on judicial decisions. Opponents argued that a decrease in local control would result in a decline in responsiveness and would stifle innovation. However, towards the end of the twentieth century local jurisdictions were themselves increasingly supportive of state funding as costs increased and local revenues came under pressure. The actual effects of state level funding appear to be limited, with the arguments of neither the proponents nor opponents being fully realized. Overall funding does not appear to increase with state funding, though the flexibility to move funds across jurisdictions has improved. It is likely that funding for the courts in most states will remain a shared responsibility between state and local governments.

As of the end of 2001, state funding of trial courts was limited to judicial salaries in twelve states; in nine states the state government covered 90 – 100% of trial court expenses. In
the remaining 60% of the states, the role of state funding increases with the level of court (with
general jurisdiction most likely to be funded), or expense item (with judicial salaries and
automation as examples of items most likely to be state funded). The item least likely to be state
funded is facilities, which are often shared with other state agencies. There is also variability as
to the items covered by the judicial branch budget. For example, indigent defense may be the
responsibility of the judicial or executive branch or a combination of both. Federalism is alive
and well when it comes to the funding of state courts.

As a separate and co-equal branch of government, the judiciary might expect significant
control over their own budget. Here too, however, there is considerable variability among the
states as to the degree to which the court budget is subject to the legislature’s power of the purse
and the executive’s control over the state budget. Such division of budgetary control tends to
contribute to tension between the branches. Similar conflicts can develop at the local level
where the county board or city council controls funding and where the clerk’s responsibilities are
to both judicial and legislative functions.

At the state level, governors can amend the judicial branch budget in eighteen states, and
with few exceptions this is done routinely. In only fourteen states is the judicial appropriations
bill filed as a separate bill. But it remains subject to alteration by the legislature in all states.
While courts generally do receive some consideration as a separate branch of government, there
has been increased pressure to treat the judicial budget as that of a state agency competing for the
same scarce resources. Budgetary independence for the courts ranges from pro forma acceptance
of the court budget to domination by the other branches. The level of restriction also varies.
Some court budgets prepared by the executive branch include detailed line items and limit
transferability of funds among the items. Thus in many states it is not just the total dollars for
which courts depend on other branches. At the same time, it should be noted that “a frequent observation [at the national conference on funding the state courts] was that the judiciary demands resources without really clarifying their operational needs or adequately explaining what appear to many as arcane procedures.” A recent survey confirms the importance of providing such information. Court administrators, executive budget officers and legislative budget officers all agree that “providing supporting documentation” is the most effective strategy for courts to use during the appropriations process.

INFLUENCES ON COURT EXPENSES

It has often been noted that courts do not have control over their own workload, being constitutionally required to accept cases brought to them. But those cases are themselves influenced by a number of diverse sources. Of course there are simply the variations in the amount of criminal behavior and lawsuits, both of which are affected by general economic conditions and a host of social variables. In addition, however, there are decisions made by all the branches of the state and federal governments that also directly affect the work of the courts and their resultant funding needs.

As more behaviors are defined as criminal, more cases come to court. And the standards for criminal or civil liability may change. For example, as legislatures decrease the alcohol level that defines driving under the influence, cases of drunk driving are likely to increase. There are also unfunded mandates such as turning child support enforcement over to the courts. In addition, as federal dollars flow to the states to increase the number of police, and in some cases prosecutors, in the ever-popular omnibus crime bills, courts are the recipients of increased cases with no match in funding. Appellate courts also impose burdens on trial courts, such as requiring

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interpreters for increasing numbers of immigrants, or lawyers for indigent defendants even if a suspended sentence is imposed and imprisonment is a remote possibility, as recently determined by the United States Supreme Court (Alabama v Shelton 535 U.S. 654, 2002).

In recent years courts have also taken on a host of new services, either voluntarily or by legislative mandate. These include alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, pro se options, alternatives to incarceration, and social service delivery and treatment programs. All of these have been developed to provide justice in a changing society. But they also all entail additional costs. It is particularly in family and juvenile courts that the post-adjudication role of the courts has been increasing rapidly into social service areas that raise costs at the same time that their expanded role may put the courts in conflict with social service agencies of the executive branch. It should be noted, however, that such increased court expenditures might also result in broad savings for the state budget as a whole. For example, two studies by the California Judicial Council concluded that specialized drug courts have saved millions of dollars for the state by reducing incarceration and recidivism.

ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF REVENUE

Funds for courts come predominantly from the general fund via direct appropriations. Fines and fees for court costs provide additional sources of revenues. However, the monies generated from both fees and fines return to the general fund, and are not directly available to the courts for their use. Pressure on the courts to raise revenues through fines and fees generate their own problems. As a source of revenue, fines entail problems of collection, particularly from those with limited means, and they may skew sentencing in a way that raises concerns about the fairness of the courts. Fees, while attributing costs to those who use the courts, may have the
unintended consequence of limiting access to justice. In addition, courts do not typically have the power to assess fees or fines, which is within the purview of the state legislature (or more local legislative body). The current state economic crisis is exerting pressure to increase fees and fines; in some states increases are already being implemented.

Some courts have been making creative use of volunteers to fill needs without expense, and others have obtained private and public grants for particular projects or improvements. Limited federal funding is also available for selected programs, although it tends to focus on innovations and, while beneficial, is not applicable to continuing expenses.

THE ECONOMY AND THE COURTS

The general state of the economy affects government revenues and therefore the funds that are available to all branches of government. As a result of the continuing economic downturn, state revenues have declined dramatically from the boom years of the late 1990’s when personal consumption and capital gains boosted state revenues. In addition, many states are being forced to operate within the limits imposed by the permanent tax cuts enacted in response to the temporary revenue gains of the mid to late 1990’s. Cost overruns, especially for Medicaid, have only exacerbated the situation, as have unfunded federal mandates such as “No Child Left Behind” and homeland security. According to the National Governors Association, states currently face their worst budget crisis since World War II.

The National Conference of State Legislators reports that in FY2003, revenues failed to meet projections in 37 states. By July 2003, 43 of the 49 states with balanced budget requirements had met that obligation. In addition to spending cuts and fee increases, states have drawn heavily on their reserves. There are now simply fewer dollars available to fund public
services, including the courts. Looking to FY 2004, 41 states face a cumulative budget gap of $78.4 billion. This follows three years of budget shortfalls that resulted in a cumulative budget gap of $200 billion.

In previous economic downturns, states have decreased spending and raised taxes, but this time around it appears there is a reluctance to raise taxes, and in some cases, such as Oregon, a rejection by voters. Rather states have relied on increased taxes on items such as cigarettes, alcohol, health insurance premiums and telephone service. While these raise some revenues in the short term, they are likely to depress consumption and thus revenues in the long term. Add to this the fact that in 44 of the 45 states with personal or corporate income taxes, state tax revenues are tied to federal tax law. Recent changes in the federal tax laws will have a negative impact on state tax revenues unless states move to “decouple” the state codes from the new federal law.

Since state fiscal recovery lags behind economic recovery by a year or more, the state fiscal crisis appears to be a long-term problem. Unlike the federal government, which can borrow to pay for current expenditures, states are required to have balanced budgets. With a hesitancy to raise taxes, the thrust has been to decrease spending. To meet balanced budget requirements, states are taking severe measures. For example, Oregon is shortening their school year and Kentucky is implementing early release for non-violent offenders. In Arizona a severe cut in probation officer positions coupled with a requirement of a 60-1 ratio of offenders to officers, has resulted in sending more offenders to prison, some of them living in tents.

Although the courts account for only a very small proportion of the state budgets, and did not share in the burst of increased spending in the 90’s that went largely to education, healthcare and corrections, the courts are being forced to share in the cutbacks and to compete with other
essential services for scarce resources. While the courts’ status as a co-equal branch of
government may have served as a buffer from cuts in the past, such is no longer the case.

A November 2001 survey of state court administrators by the Council of State Court
Administrators (COSCA) suggested that overall court budgets had not yet been dramatically
affected. State court administrators (including those from Puerto Rico and Guam) were asked
about the adequacy of their current budgets and whether they expected budget changes that year
and the next. Of the 38 respondents, 11 (29%) described their budgets as inadequate and only 4
expected budget restrictions of more than 5% that year (20 expected no change or an increase)
and only 2 expected more than a 5% decrease the next year (with 18 expecting no change or an
increase). Projected budget reductions were expected to have its greatest impact on funding for
court staff, administrative staff, training and technology. Subsequent experience confirms the
accuracy of those predictions.

In June 2002 COSCA distributed a follow-up survey asking about expectations for FY
2002-2004, what actions administrators had taken in response to current cuts, and what they
contemplate for the future. In addition, the court administrators were asked to report what
consequences budget restrictions/reductions have had in terms of the operation of the courts.
The results of this survey demonstrate a worsening condition and expectations of increasingly
inadequate resources. 36% of the state court administrators rate their FY2002 appropriations
inadequate and 45% expect inadequate funding in FY2003. Although 60% of the states report
increased court appropriations from FY2001 to FY2002, only 38% expect an increase for
FY2003 and 45% of the states expect budget restrictions in FY2003. Due to cuts in funding,
62% of the states have imposed hiring freezes or delays in hiring for FY2003. A majority of the
states have also cut purchases (60%), enhancement of electronic communications (57%), and out
of state travel for training programs (69%). 43% of the jurisdictions also report the imposition of new court fees. Their concerns were clearly justified as FY 2003 has required severe measures by the courts.

States have variously been forced to halt civil trials, suspend jury trials, eliminate drug treatment courts, condense jurisdictions, force unpaid furloughs on court employees, leave judicial positions unfilled, suspend pay for counsel for the indigent, close courthouses and cut staff, in some cases dramatically. In addition, some courts are seeking to increase filing fees in both trial and appellate courts. These measures have the potential to significantly affect the quality of justice and its availability to the public.

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

There is a special concern that the state of the economy will provide legislators and governors with an excuse to decrease funding to the courts in reaction to judicial decisions. Legislative use of appropriations to express disapproval of court decisions is not a new phenomenon. The most extreme example in recent years (later rescinded) was the California legislature slashing the court budget after the California Supreme Court upheld the imposition of terms limits on state legislators.

In recent years there have been newsworthy examples of actual and threatened cuts in court budgets in Alabama, Massachusetts and North Carolina. In May 2002, Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore suspended civil and criminal trials, although the order was rescinded when emergency funds were made available. The moratorium became national news when it resulted in a delay in the trial of the last defendant in the 1963 Birmingham church bombing case. Tension with the other branches provided the context for particularly bitter exchanges between
the courts and the other branches. The Alabama chief justice had been feuding with the governor and the legislature had demanded documentation for how the courts spend their money. There has also been continuing conflict over funding for public schools, an issue that has been a source of conflict in numerous states as courts have determined that equal funding of public schools is constitutionally required and legislatures have balked at the increased costs. It was this issue that provided the subtext for the judicial impeachment proceedings in New Hampshire in 2001 as well.

In 2001 the Massachusetts courts received $40 million less than requested and were told to expect more cuts the next year. In addition to continuing conflicts over patronage appointments, legislators opposed the Supreme Judicial Court’s ruling that the Clean Elections Law (passed by the voters) must be funded. Threats to the budget became so extreme that the Massachusetts Bar Association organized a “Court Funding Lobby Day” at the legislature to protect funding for interpreters, court reporters and guardians ad litem. There has also been an effort to limit the length of terms the justices serve.

In North Carolina a partisan conflict over the drawing of legislative districts erupted with the courts (whose judges were elected on partisan ballots) at the center of the quarrel. A judge rejected the legislative map drawn by the Democratically controlled legislature and oversaw the drawing of a new map deemed more amenable to the Republican party. The North Carolina Supreme Court, with a majority of Republican members, affirmed his decisions. The Senate responded by decreasing the number of supreme court clerks and eliminating some judicial districts, including the one in which the offending judge sits, thereby requiring him to travel around the state holding court. At least one Democratic Senator acknowledged that the cuts were related to the judge’s decision in the redistricting case when he was quoted as saying
There are still some feelings that this is one branch of government that tried to take over another branch. I don’t think it’s retaliation, but there was a feeling that we needed to stand up and not get rolled over (June 2002).

In none of these cases were decreases in funding the only tool employed by legislatures to punish the courts whose behavior they found unacceptable. However, the appropriation of funds is a legislative obligation and it can be and on occasion has been used to react to court behavior. In times of economic difficulty, when decreased funding is faced by all public agencies, courts may be particularly vulnerable.

The courts can of course use their inherent powers to respond to funding shortfalls that affect their ability to function. The most publicized example of such an effort was the lawsuit filed by New York Chief Judge Wachtler in 1991 challenging Governor Cuomo’s reduction of the court budget by 10%. The case was eventually settled with no additional funds provided to the courts. In practice inherent power actions are usually directed against local rather than state governments.

In some states special procedures have been adopted to resolve such disputes. For example, Missouri has a judicial finance commission, which is empowered to resolve budget disputes between the circuit courts and their county governing bodies. The judicial finance commission, which includes judges and county officials, receives petitions for review from the governing body if it deems the circuit court’s budget estimate to be unreasonable. Commission decisions are subject to review by the Missouri Supreme Court upon petition (Missouri Revised Statutes 50.640, 50.641, 50.642, and 477.600).

All too often judicial salaries are the focus of conflicts among the branches of government, even without a budget crisis. Current efforts by states to balance their budgets have
brought this item into focus. In Illinois, as part of a budget balancing effort, the governor vetoed a cost-of-living increase for the state’s legislators, judges and leaders of the executive. Relying on a 1990 legislative resolution establishing annual cost-of-living increases, and the constitutional prohibition on diminishing judicial salaries during their terms of office, judges filed a lawsuit to force payment. In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court ordered the comptroller to pay the judges their cost-of-living increases and threatened him with contempt if he did not comply. Although the supreme court vacated its order, allowing the case in court to proceed, the considerable negative publicity about the issue did not disappear. When there were only rumors of a lawsuit circulating, an Illinois legislator was quoted as stating that “I don’t think that would be a wise move on their part. Those folks in the General Assembly will tend to remember that.” Only time will tell what the short and long-term outcome of this conflict will be. But it already serves as an example of how the state of the economy and state fiscal health can directly affect relations between the judiciary and the other branches of government.

The checks and balances built into our constitutional framework make conflicts between the branches of government inevitable. The budget process, with its division of responsibility, is particularly ripe for interbranch tension, and courts are not immune to the pressure on all public agencies to be accountable for the expenditure of tax dollars. Courts are understandably protective of their independence, but they also have a responsibility to demonstrate that they are operating in the best interests of the public. At the National Interbranch Conference on Funding the Courts it was charged that courts “rely too much on their independence and too little on what they are doing to manage more effectively and efficiently.”

Courts have a responsibility to accompany requests for funding with reasonable arguments supporting their needs. They can also be expected to manage their funds effectively.
Fiscal management is a year round activity and should not be limited to budget time. It is also reasonable to expect courts to establish performance standards to which they hold themselves accountable.

With the professionalization of court administration, many courts have made strides in improving their cost-effectiveness. For example, the application of Total Quality Management (TQM) to courts has resulted in continuous review of procedures. Still, it must be recognized that the professional managers and enhanced automation that improve efficiency have also resulted in increased expenditures.

Still pressures for the courts to increase revenues have negative implications. In response to Massachusetts Governor Romney’s proposal that “judges’ fees and fine collections be tied to the money in their operating budgets,” Chief Justice Marshall asserted the need to maintain judicial independence noting that tying the courts finances to judges’ sentencing determinations would raise serious concerns. While judicial accountability is appropriate, vigilance will be required to insure that it does not come at the expense of the judicial independence that is central to the rule of law.

POTENTIAL REFORMS AND FUTURE ACTION

The judicial branch and the bar can both play a role in insuring adequate funding for the courts. Virtually every serious discussion of the tensions involved in court funding make reference to the need for enhancing relations between the courts and the other branches of government. Continuing communications between the branches is regularly cited as extremely important to avoiding major conflicts over court funding. At the same time, that very communication has been judged to be seriously inadequate. The ABA Standing Committee on
Judicial Independence has continued to assert the benefits of improved interbranch communication and to urge the adoption of programs designed for that purpose. “Justice in Jeopardy,” the Report of the American Bar Association Commission on the 21st Century, similarly affirms the importance of enhancing interbranch relations.

Courts can also be more effective in their requests for additional funds. It is important that such requests are tied to clearly defined objectives and that in any given year such requests are limited to the highest priority projects. In addition, courts can support their requests by demonstrating that they have been fiscally responsible in the management of funds that have been allocated to them. In response to an inquiry about the best strategies for courts to adopt in the appropriations process, officials from all three branches of government point to “supporting documentation” as the most effective approach and recognize it as consistent with appropriate efforts by the judiciary to remain “above politics.”

Bar associations and courts can both seek changes that will improve court funding in a variety of ways. For example, they can seek to establish “lump-sum” rather than “line-item” allocation of funds to courts. The former allows the courts the flexibility to allocate funds internally as needs evolve during the budget cycle. In addition, it would be an incentive to good fiscal management for courts to be allowed to carry over some unspent funds across fiscal years. In states where the court budget must first be submitted to the executive branch, where it is subject to revision, it would be beneficial to seek direct submission to the legislature.

Bar associations and courts may also want to consider the value and feasibility of establishing a formal mechanism to resolve budgetary disputes along the lines of the Missouri model. To avoid the conflicts that continue to emerge over judicial salaries, and to promote an independent and qualified judiciary, twenty states have judicial salary commissions, half of them
advisory. In nine states, the recommendations of the commission are legally binding unless rejected or modified by the legislature. In Washington State the judicial compensation commission’s decisions are determinative. The ABA commission report recommends the creation of judicial salary commissions and the Standing Committee on Judicial Independence is proposing that states establish independent commissions to determine judicial salaries. An ancillary benefit of such commissions is the removal of judicial salaries from consideration of the court budget in the appropriations process.

Bar associations can also be vigilant in making clear to legislatures that increased allocations for enforcement, both civil and criminal, will increase the work of courts and thereby may require some increased funding. Courts and bar associations should also regularly monitor legislative developments that directly affect the courts, making clear that merely defining more behaviors as criminal or subject to civil liability will inevitably put greater pressures on the courts and may require additional funding. That would lay the ground work for determining whether it would be appropriate to pursue the kind of action undertaken by the Massachusetts Bar Association with its Court Funding Lobbying Day.

The chief justice of the Florida Supreme Court recently asked every lawyer to contact their state legislators to seek the restoration of cuts to the judiciary’s budget. Direct action by the chief justice may in fact be effective in other ways as well. In a study of the court appropriations process, legislative, executive and judicial officials all agree that the chief justice personally lobbying the governor and individual legislators is the courts’ most effective budget strategy. Court administrators are seen as effective in lobbying legislative committees for court funding. Such direct efforts may be particularly important in an era in which there is significant turnover among state officeholders. The largest turnover in forty years occurred in the 2000 state
legislative elections, with 24% of the seats won by newcomers. In addition, almost half the states (24) elected new governors in 2000. As the ones responsible for drafting budget proposals and approving and authorizing expenditures in the context of a fiscal crisis, it is reasonable to assume that they would benefit from learning about the needs of the judicial branch of government.

CONCLUSION

Like so many aspects of our government, the existing pattern of court funding reflects both support for local control and the variability inherent in a federal system. While the core issues in court funding cut across jurisdictions, the precise practices vary greatly. It is likely that court funding will remain a shared responsibility of state and local institutions of government and that courts will be expected to justify the funds that they request. While the current economic crisis poses particular threats to the state courts, the need for arguing the case for sufficient funding and support for the courts will remain on-going.
ADDITIONAL READING


State Budget & Tax Actions 2003, National Conference of State Legislators.

State Budget Update: April 2003, National Conference of State Legislators.


“Striving for Solutions: An Overview of Crisis Points in American’s System of Justice,” A Report by the ABA Special Committee on Funding the Justice System, September 1994.

August 22, 2011

Judicial Council of California
455 Golden Gate Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102

via email and US Mail

Re: Request for Supplemental Funding

Dear Madame Chief Justice and Members of the Judicial Council:

As you know, the San Francisco Superior Court is facing a dire budget catastrophe, which compels us to seek $20.4 million in emergency funding to be allocated over the next three years. As a result of three years of unsustainable state budget cuts, our Court is faced with a huge cumulative deficit. The magnitude of this crisis has left us with no alternative but to lay off 177 employees and close 25 civil courtrooms. Our Court’s financial condition compels us to pursue a course of action that shuns one-time fixes in favor of a sound strategy that will help us avoid yet another significant reduction in service to our constituents before June 30, 2014.

While the Court is proceeding with plans to dismantle the Civil Division and lay off nearly 40 percent of our staff on September 30, 2011, I write to implore the Council to utilize its existing authority, and obtain any necessary new or additional authority, from the Legislature and Governor to redirect judicial branch funds to help the San Francisco Superior Court, and other courts that require an emergency infusion, keep courtrooms open and adequately staffed.

The San Francisco Superior Court faces an especially harsh solution to our deficit this year precisely because we mistakenly followed the AOC’s guidance last year. In May 2010, we were poised to lay off 122 employees. The very day we were scheduled to deliver those notices, AOC leaders called upon us not to issue those layoff notices. These leaders claimed the delivery of layoff notices would jeopardize a pending $230 million legislative package of new revenues and redirection of branch funds intended to backfill prior cuts. AOC leaders were certain that this deal would be fully enacted. We acquiesced to the AOC’s direction and relied upon their representations. However, the AOC’s confidence in its bargain with Sacramento was misplaced. In fact, the branch lost $55 million, after lawmakers cut an additional $30 million and the Governor line-item vetoed another $25 million from funding restorations. Even more detrimental to our Court was the resulting consequence of the delay in the implementation of our restructuring plan. This delay alone now forces us to lay off 80 more employees than we would have had to lay off last year. Had the Court not relied on the AOC’s representations, and proceeded with its restructuring plan last year, we would have ended FY 2010-11 with a $15 million reserve, which would have solved our current year’s deficit and made this very request unnecessary.
It is incumbent on the Judicial Council to pursue every possible remedy that could help the San Francisco Superior Court avoid a catastrophic elimination of public service and access to justice. Just three years ago, the Court had 591 employees and a $90 million budget. With the adoption of a hiring freeze in April 2009, the Court has a vacancy rate of 18 percent, which equates to 484 employees. After next month’s layoffs, the Court will reorganize and begin operations with a staff of just 307 employees. Specifically, the Court will either lay off or separate:

- 11 Subordinate Judicial Officers;
- 15 Management Staff;
- 24 Court Reporters;
- 88 Deputy Court Clerks;
- 18 Legal Researchers or Attorneys;
- 5 Family Court Mediators;
- 3 Probate Investigators;
- 1 Probate Examiner; and
- 12 Administrative Support Staff.

Through disciplined fiscal management, our Court was able to rebuild its reserves last fiscal year from $280,000 to $4.6 million. However, as you know, the Judicial Council’s policy requires the Court to maintain a fund balance of $3.2 million, leaving just $1.4 million in discretionary funds. The Court remains in a perilous fiscal condition. Despite the size of our budget, we have one of the lowest reserve percentages of the state’s 58 trial courts.

There is no doubt that the judicial branch will sustain additional cuts in the next two fiscal years. This creates a three-year problem for our Court. Expenditure of the Court’s reserves is part of our long-term solution, but not our short-term solution. The Court’s reduction in force in 2011 will save a total of $17 million over the next two fiscal years. This will result in an increase of our reserves to $11.5 million. With these reserves and continuation of our budget austerity measures, we must manage a projected cumulative $20.4 million deficit. This deficit will force us to spend all but $2.06 million of our reserves by the end of FY 2013-2014.

The Court has shared these budget projections with AOC staff on more than one occasion. We have received no indication from anyone at the AOC that the financial picture we present is flawed in any way. In fact, it is based on the AOC’s own budget projections. The Court has also shared with the AOC all of our efforts to reduce spending and increase revenues over the past three years, which include:

- A hiring freeze since April 2009;
- Staff furloughs in 2009 and 2010, saving $2.6 million;
- Limited Service Days and staff furloughs in 2011, saving $1.1 million;
- Operations changes, including the elimination of an overnight bail office, saving $800,000;
- Renegotiated contracts for janitorial and document storage services, saving $1.2 million;
- Installation of a VoIP telephone system, saving $1.6 million;
- Recovery of $566,000 in indigent defense and Civil Grand Jury costs from the City and County of San Francisco;
- Recovery of $350,000 in transcript costs from the City and County of San Francisco; and
Adoption of revenue measures, including an escheatment program and increased collections of civil assessment fees, generating $1.6 million.

The Court and its employees have done all we can in the past three years to avoid what awaits us on October 3, 2011, which is the near total cessation of our civil operation and the dispatch of 177 of our employees to the end of California’s lengthening unemployment lines. We know that judicial branch cuts will not abate in Sacramento, given the lack of support for adequate trial court funding. We also firmly believe that there are funds available within the branch which could be allocated to our Court if only there was the will to do so. To date, we have received no offer of financial assistance from the AOC. Therefore, we must urgently implore the Judicial Council to reallocate substantial branch resources to the financially troubled trial courts, including the Court that is your next-door neighbor.

Sincerely,

Katherine Feinstein
Presiding Judge

cc: Hon. Cynthia Ming-mei Lee, Assistant Presiding Judge, Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco
Mr. T. Michael Yuen, Court Executive Officer, Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco
Judicial Council of California
455 Golden Gate Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102-3688
Attention: Nancy E. Spero.

Request to Make Public Comment at August 2011 Judicial Council Meeting
Regarding a matter affecting judicial administration or an item on this agenda

The speaker’s name: HI&RH Prince William-Bullock III: Stewart, B.S., M.S.
occupation: Secured Party (Private Banker), Political Scientist
name of the entity that the speaker represents: generally California Homeowners

The speaker’s email address: protectingmyrights@yahoo.com
telephone number: 408.830-4936
mailing address: POB 694, San Jose, CA 95106

The agenda item on which the speaker wishes to comment is accompanied by the
email attachment, a 10 slide powerpoint presentation.
The matter that the requester wants to speak on can qualify for presentation under
one of the following categories:

1. The presentation is regarding a matter generally affecting judicial administration:
the routine fraudulent use of Judicial Council form UD-100 by bank attorneys to deny
home owners their due process rights to unlimited jurisdiction cross complaint and
discovery after sale, since 99 percent of all foreclosures in this state are done without
standing in the first place by the banks, with explanation of why this is so, codes
violated, and what the REMIC is

2. The presentation is regarding an item on this agenda because it involves policy in
the use of the Judicial Council form UD-100, and the Policy Coordination and Liaison
Committee Hon. Marvin R. Baxter, Chair is presenting on the agenda

3. The presentation is regarding an item on this agenda because it involves Rules
cited on the UD-100 Judicial Council form, and the Rules and Projects Committee
Hon. Harry E. Hull, Jr., Chair is presenting on the agenda
Judicial Council UD-100 Form
Intent v. Use

By
HI&RH Prince William-Bullock III: Stewart, B.S., M.S.
Presenter Background

• In Proper Persona litigant in State and Federal Cases, continuously and full time since 2007
• Secured Creditor: Member of group of 23 creditors who filed Wells Fargo Bank president into involuntary chapter 7 bankruptcy in his private capacity for $3.2 Billion USD
• Incorporator for numerous “C” corporations, and a biomedical non-profit
• Former Consultant to over 50 Silicon Valley High Tech Companies: Telecommunications, Semiconductor, Database, Commercial End User Software, Developer Tools, Peripheral Devices, Handheld Devices
• Author: over 200 books
• Former member: Hollywood Chap., Screen Actors Guild
• Physicist: Nuclear, Space, High Energy, requested by name by first Chief Scientist, David Israel, to work on SDI Program
• Bioengineer: Designer of Automated Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Pump
• Occupied Pentagon Lt. Colonel position under Asst. Sec. of the Army for RD&A, responsible for briefing House and Senate committees on funding of specific projects and labs under President Ronald Reagan’s Star Wars Project, now the Missile Defense Program.
Outline

• Lawsuit Complaint
• Unlawful Detainer Complaint
• Legislative Report
• Judicial Council Intent
• Current Use By Attorneys for Banks
• Judges Fail to Implement UD Complaint Intent Against Home Owners
• UD Complaint Denies Civil Rights to Due Process
Lawsuit Complaint

- Lawsuits are required by law to be used only after administrative remedies are exhausted by a party whose rights have been violated.
- Unlimited jurisdiction lawsuits have three full rounds of discovery prior to trial setting, and at least full round of discovery after trial setting but before trial.
- Allow a cross complaint, that must be heard prior to the complaint, and that cannot be dismissed, pursuant to the maxims of law.
Unlawful Detainer Complaint

- Does not allow for a cross complaint
- Is ‘Fast Tracked’
- Does not allow for full discovery
- Operates under the presumption that the Plaintiff has standing to file the UD Complaint
- Does not allow challenge of ownership and standing of the Plaintiff trying to get control of the property
Senate Bill Report

SB 6060
As Reported By Senate Committee On:
Judiciary, February 04, 2008

Title: An act relating to unlawful detainer action proceedings and notice for nonpayment of rent.

Brief Description: Regarding unlawful detainer action proceedings and notice for nonpayment of rent.

Sponsors: Senator Kline.

Brief History:
Committee Activity: Judiciary: 2/28/07, 2/01/08, 2/04/08 [DPS].

Senate Committee on Judiciary
Majority Report: That Substitute Senate Bill No. 6060 be substituted therefor, and the substitute bill do pass.

Signed by Senators Kline, Chair; Tom, Vice Chair; McCaslin, Ranking Minority Member; Carrell, McDermott, Roach and Weinstein.

Staff: Lidia Mori (786-7755)

Background: An unlawful detainer action occurs when a tenant of real property continues in possession after a default in the payment of rent, notice in writing has been served on the tenant requiring the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises, and the person has remained for three days after service. A writ of restitution restores to the plaintiff the property described in the complaint.
Judicial Council Intent

• Statement on bottom of page 1 of UD-100 Judicial Council Form

“* Note: Do not use this form for evictions after sale (Code Civ. Proc. 1161a).”
Current Use By Banks

- The purpose of the unlawful detainer is for use in eviction of ‘renters’ delinquent on payment of rent or misusing of property.
- The UD-100 Form used in the unlawful detainer complaint states that it is not to be used after sale.
- Banks routinely misuse the Unlawful Detainer complaint to evict real property owners after the bank forecloses and sells the property to itself, to expedite transfer. 99% of foreclosures currently done in California are fraudulent.
Judges Failure to Implement Intent

- Unlawful Detainer courtrooms in any superior court in California routinely ignore the intent and the law regarding the use of Unlawful Detainer complaints against property owners after sale.
- Case law does not permit property owners victimized by fraudulent foreclosure to challenge of the standing of the Plaintiff in a UD complaint, nor to file a cross complaint, nor perform full discovery.
- The right to due process is denied by the UD complaint, thus it does not conform to Code Civ. Proc. 1161a
Denial of Civil Rights/Due Process

• UD Complaint form UD-100 Denies Civil Rights to Due Process for home owners in and after foreclosure
• Judges routinely deny the changing of jurisdiction to Unlimited with Cross-Complaint, because they have both attitudinal and financial conflicts of interest, with the Banks.
• 99 percent of all foreclosures are done in fraud, in violation of UCC 3-305(b) and Cal. Civ. Code 2932.5, 2934, because the Promissory Note is sealed in plastic sheaf in a 30 year ‘REMIC’, that cannot be opened in less than 30 years without the bank incurring taxes & penalties on all the approximately $3.6 Billion USD in each REMIC. By Law the banks can never legally foreclose without the original Note; 99 percent of the time the bank never had possession of the note because it is sealed in a plastic sheaf in some vault. Further, the note was separated from the Deed of Trust, which makes the Note unenforceable per Cal. Civ. Code 2932.5. See analysis by US Bankruptcy Court Judge Samuel Bufford, UCC Committee member for UCC 3-305.
Public Comment to Agenda Item 6
JUDICIAL BRANCH CONTRACTING MANUAL -- ACTION REQUIRED
Judicial Council Business Meeting
Friday August 26, 2011

Presented By: Sigfredo “Fred” Cabrera
Occupation: Judicial Branch employee
Representing: California Taxpayers
Phone: (916) 709-6265 (cell);
Address: 8909 Springhurst Drive, Elk Grove, CA 95624
Email: iamfrede@frontiernet.net.

Action Requested

Action One: It is respectfully requested that the Judicial Council NOT adopt the Judicial Branch Contracting Manual (JBCM) being proposed by the Administrative Office of the Courts.

Action Two: It is respectfully requested that the Judicial Council conduct legal research as to the constitutionality of the Judicial Branch Contracting Law (SB 78) which mandated AOC’s creation of the JBCM. Legal Issue: Does SB 78 violate the separation of powers doctrine? That is, does the Legislature have the constitutional authority to impose executive branch procurement procedures on the judicial branch, which operates under procurement rules that are far more efficient and cost effective than those followed by the executive branch?

Justification for Requested Action

Introduced by the Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review on January 10, 2011 and signed by the governor on March 24, SB 78 created California’s first ever “Judicial Branch Contract Law.” The legislation, whose substantive provisions take effect October 1, 2011, requires every trial court, appellate court, the state Supreme Court, and the Judicial Council to comply with the same provisions of the Public Contract Code that are applicable to executive branch departments and agencies for procuring goods and services.

As revealed in a sobering California Performance Review (CPR) report published in 2007, the executive branch’s procurement process is costly, complicated, time consuming and unable to ensure that quality goods and services are timely received. “Developed in piecemeal fashion over the years, California’s complex maze of statutes are inconsistent, conflicting, and require tremendous effort to manage,” the CPR report stated. “This translates into a costly and lengthy process to acquire even the simplest of goods and services.”
Ironically, the JBCM supersedes the more efficient and cost-effective procurement provisions of the judicial branch’s own *Trial Court Financial Policies and Procedures*, now in its 7th edition. This momentous policy shift will be very costly for courts facing unprecedented budget cuts and staff layoffs.

An article published in the August 9, 2011 edition of the *S.F. and L.A. Daily Journals*, -- entitled “New Judicial Branch Procurement Law Will Hamper Courts And Cost Taxpayers a Bundle” -- expresses grave concerns over the adverse impact SB 78 will have on the State’s judicial branch.

As stated in the article (see below), courts can expect to spend more--not less--for goods and services under the new Judicial Branch Contracting Law. Furthermore, they can expect to incur delays in the implementation of needed service contracts as they struggle to comply with the same procedural and administrative red tape that has hindered the executive branch for years. With $350 million less to work with and staff layoffs certain for many in the judicial branch, SB 78 (and the JBCM which resulted from it) will only make matters worse.

Respectfully Submitted

SC

(See *Daily Journal Article* next page.)
Judicial branch contract law is costly and inefficient

Guest column: Fred Cabrera is a procurement manager in the Sacramento County Superior Court.

As the state Judicial Council and judicial branch administrators grapple over how a $350 million budget cut will be absorbed, courts across the state are bracing for yet another fiscal blow - mandated compliance with new costly and inefficient procurement rules.

Introduced by the Legislature's Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review on Jan. 10, 2011 and signed by the governor on March 24, Senate Bill 78 created California's first "judicial branch contract law." The legislation, whose substantive provisions take effect on October 1, requires every trial court, appellate court, the state Supreme Court, and the Judicial Council to comply with the same provisions of the Public Contract Code that are applicable to executive branch departments and agencies for procuring goods and services.

The law further requires the Judicial Council to adopt a judicial branch contracting manual incorporating procurement policies and procedures that are "substantially similar" to the outmoded state contracting manual and state administrative manual of the Department of General Services. The manual, which will be voted on by the Judicial Council at its August 26 meeting, supersedes the more efficient and costeffective procurement provisions of the judicial branch's own "Trial Court Financial Policies and Procedures." This momentous policy shift will be very costly for courts facing unprecedented budget cuts and staff layoffs.

As revealed in a sobering California Performance Review (CPR) report published in 2007, the executive branch's procurement process is costly, complicated, time consuming and unable to ensure that quality goods and services are timely received. Indeed, the report's indictment of the executive branch procurement process belie the express purposes of the new judicial branch contract law.

There is an old adage worth embracing here - If it's not broken, don't 'fix' it.
For instance, one stated purpose for imposing executive branch procurement rules on the judicial branch is to "clarify the law with respect to competitive bidding requirements." Anyone who has worked for state government knows that acquiring goods and services is a nightmare. "Developed in piecemeal fashion over the years, California's complex maze of statutes are inconsistent, conflicting, and require tremendous effort to manage," the CPR report stated. "This translates into a costly and lengthy process to acquire even the simplest of goods and services."

Another stated purpose of the new law is to prevent the "misuse of public funds."

Yet, according to the CPR report, the "labyrinth of codes and statutes no longer facilitates a system that ensures quality products are obtained in the most efficient and cost effective manner.... The state's purchasing system remains fragmented, subject to delays and unable to deliver cost effective purchases."

The new law is further intended to "provide all qualified bidders with a "fair opportunity to enter the bidding process" and to "eliminate favoritism." Any merchant who has done business with the state can vouch for the system's lack of fairness in many areas. According to the CPR report, executive branch procurement procedures are so taxing that "the cost of providing bids discourages suppliers from doing business with the state."

For instance, under the manual, courts must "require vendors to certify in writing, under penalty of perjury," the percentage of recycled content in the products, materials, goods, or supplies offered or sold to the court, even if the product contains no recycled material." It is hardly arguable that serving as an environmental cop is an appropriate role for the judicial branch. Furthermore, vendors unwilling to "certify" this claim "under penalty of perjury" are likely to withdraw their bids, limiting the pool of competitors.

Moreover, courts will have to ensure that at least 50 percent of their purchases are "recycled products," including office supplies. No question that there are environmental benefits from recycling, and many courts are doing their part through paper and cardboard waste, and used battery recycling programs. However, while the market for recycled office products is steadily increasing, and recent supply and demand have brought down costs for "green" products, they still cost between 5 to 20 percent more than those made from virgin material. With the judicial branch facing unprecedented budget shortfalls and staff reductions, it is neither economically prudent nor morally justified to spend more tax dollars when less costly alternatives are readily available.

As to the intended purpose of "eliminating favoritism," the judicial branch contract law does just the opposite. It requires courts to implement procurement "goals" that give preferential treatment to business enterprises that meet various socioeconomic and environmental certification criteria.

For example, all courts are expected to adopt rules and procedures to implement the Disabled Veterans Business Enterprise Program (DVBE) requirements of Military and Veterans Code Section 999 and Public Contract Code Sections 10115 et seq. Those
requirements include implementing program "incentives" - i.e., giving a prescribed percentage reduction in a participating firm's bid price where a court is selecting a bidder using the "lowest responsible bidder" methodology, or the addition of a prescribed number of points to a firm's proposal score where a court is using the "highest scoring bidder" approach.

No question, California's judicial branch recognizes and honors the sacrifices of Californians who were disabled during military service. The objective of the state's DVBE program to increase business opportunities for disabled veteran businesses is certainly laudable. It is only right that judicial branch procurement officers reach out to DVBE owners, along with other qualified vendors, when seeking the lowest responsible bid for goods and services. But for the judicial branch - struggling to keep doors open with $350 million less to work with and staff reductions certain for many - it is economically impractical to "meet or exceed" DVBE participation goals and to implement the extensive administrative and record-keeping requirements associated with a formal DVBE procurement program.

The 2007 CPR report contains a litany of recommendations to reduce costs and improve the business climate for suppliers seeking the state's business. Yet, the state contracting manual is "current" only as of October 2005 - which begs the question: Why did the Legislature's Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review impose a costly and inefficient executive branch procurement system on the judicial branch whose own procurement process has been governed by policies and procedures that were specifically tailored for the courts?

Under the Judicial Council's "Trial Court Policies and Procedures," now in its 7th edition, the procurement of goods and services must be "conducted economically and expeditiously, under fair and open competition, and in accordance with sound procurement practices." Judicial branch procurement actions are administered under procurement rules that are clear and concise for the courts. Furthermore, under existing rules, judicial branch employees who are authorized to commit public funds are held to a high level of accountability. They are expected to conduct themselves with integrity, objectivity, and fairness. This has been the judicial branch's standard for years, and it has served the public well.

There is an old adage worth embracing here - if it's not broken, don't "fix" it. Unfortunately, courts can expect to spend more - not less - for goods and services under the "new" judicial branch contracting law. Furthermore, they can expect to incur delays in the implementation of needed service contracts as they struggle to comply with the same procedural and administrative red tape that has hindered the executive branch for years. This is not progress but a step backwards for California's courts.

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8/24/11

Re: Request to Speak at 8/26/11 Council Meeting

Dear Ms. Spero:

What follows is a statement, the substance of which the Alliance of California Judges wishes to make to the Council at the 8/26/11 meeting. We intend to have either Judge Kevin McCormick of the Sacramento Superior Court, or Judge Steve White, the Presiding Judge of the Sacramento Superior Court deliver our remarks. Both are Directors of the Alliance of California Judges. Scheduling difficulties for both judges make it impossible to predict with certainty which will appear, but we will do our best to have one of the judges present.

Thank you.
Chuck Horan
Alliance of California Judges

Madame Chief Justice and Members of the Council:

I address you today in my capacity as one of the Directors of the 400 member Alliance of California Judges.

The President of the Alliance, Judge David Lampe, addressed you at the July meeting to ask that you fully mitigate the impact of the $350 million dollar budget cuts to the trial courts this year. He explained at that time that there was approximately $82 million dollars of additional mitigation available to the Council under the authority granted it in this years budget bill. We asked you to find these funds in the CCMS budget, and AOC operating budget, and utilize them to keep our trial courts open, as the Chief Justice, and many of your, have promised is your
absolute first priority.

We were not the only ones who made this request. The California Judges Association likewise asked for full mitigation. Thus, two groups that between them represent virtually every judge in the state were in agreement.

San Francisco Presiding Judge Katherine Feinstein made a very strong case for this position as well, pointing out the folly of continuing to fund a controversial and untested computer system and bloated bureaucracy, while forcing trial courts to close, and depriving citizens of their constitutional right to their day in court.

We need not remind this Council that in fact, Californians have such rights, under both the California and United States Constitution. We do ask you to be mindful that by failing to utilize your lawful authority to see to it that our courts are kept open, many of our citizens will be deprived of that right as surely as if it did not exist at all.

The choice before you last month was clear: Cut the AOC's budget and suspend funding for CCMS, or deprive our citizens of their ability to access their courts. Judge Westley and Judge Pines voted to follow the course suggested by the Alliance of California Judges, Judge Feinstein, and many others. Unfortunately, these were the only two members of the Council to come down on the side of our courts and constituents, the rest acceding to the AOC's allocation proposal.

The Alliance was warned this Council for the past two years that we would reach a point where courts could not provide adequate services unless AOC spending was curtailed. The Council has failed to do this. Now, rather than rectify this error, you have compounded it by once again choosing computers over courts, and bureaucrats over our citizens' ability to access our courts.

No one should be mistaken here: The plight of our courts is not solely the result of a failing economy. It is equally the result of choices made by the Council over the last several years, and the choice made last month by this body. Courts that have followed the advice of the AOC, such as the San Francisco Superior Court, now realize that they have been misled, and that had they acted to reduce staff last year, they would have at least been able to glide to the runway, rather than coming in for a crash landing. Judge Feinstein has made that point to you in writing—the representations made to Judge Feinstein by AOC leadership were absolutely incorrect, much in the same way that the AOC's early representations as to the cost of the CCMS project have proven to be erroneous by a factor of 8.

At the last Council meeting, the AOC interim director stated that he "would not attack the courts", but we are now seeing just that. AOC surrogates, this time in the form of various trial lawyers, have authored editorials blaming Judge Feinstein for her court's situation, and asking her to spend her last reserves. We are in at least a three year cycle of poverty. Things will not get better for at least that long. Asking Judge Feinstein to spend down her court's scant reserve fund now is akin to asking shipwreck survivors on a desert island to eat all of their meager rations on the first day, on the off chance that a passing ship might arrive the next. There is no rescue ship on our horizon.
These attacks on Judge Feinstein mirror AOC attacks on Los Angeles' then presiding Judge Tim McCoy last year, when he was called "Chicken Little" by the AOC director for correctly predicting this year's situation. These sort of attacks must cease. The Council should consider it its duty to make sure that they stop. The practice of pitting one court against another, and one judge against another, is not tolerable, though the AOC has a long history of using this tactic to its advantage.

We ask you to reverse your vote of last month. We ask you to find the additional available $82 million in the coffers of the AOC and in the funds already allocated for CCMS. If you do that, you can all but guarantee that no court will be forced to close for the foreseeable future.

Thank you.
August 18, 2011

MEMORANDUM

To: The Honorable Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice, California Supreme Court, Beth Jay, Principal Attorney to Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye, and Mary Roberts, General Counsel, Administrative Office of the Courts

From: The Bar Association of San Francisco (BASF); Priya S. Sanger, BASF President, Wells Fargo Bank, Legal Department; Kelly M. Dermody, BASF President-Elect, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP; Christopher Kearney, BASF Treasurer, Keker & Van Nest LLP; Stephanie Skaff, BASF Secretary, Farello Braun + Martel LLP; Merri Baldwin, BASF Director, Chapman, Popik & White LLP; Daniel Burkhardt, BASF Executive Director; Stuart Gordon, Gordon & Rees LLP; Therese Stewart, San Francisco City Attorney’s Office; Blanca Young, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP

Re: Trial Court Funding

Subject: Request for Approval of Certificate of Appearance for Complex Case Management Appearance, Pursuant to Government Code Section 70631

San Francisco Superior Court (“SFSC”) is facing a budget crisis that, absent immediate additional funding, will require significant reductions in court services available to civil litigants. SFSC has announced that on October 3, 2011, it will be forced to:

- Lay off 200 employees, leaving only 280 of 591 authorized positions;
- Lay off all 11 of the commissioners and hearing officers who currently handle probate, child support, juvenile dependency, traffic and criminal proceedings;
- Indefinitely close 25 civil courtrooms, and 14 of the 17 current civil trial departments, including its 2 highly regarded complex litigation departments.

San Francisco may be the first California court to have to make such drastic cuts, but others are not far behind. We are requesting the Judicial Council’s assistance to address the fiscal emergency facing our courts. In particular, we ask the Judicial Council to act pursuant to its mandate to ensure access to justice, and within its existing statutory authority under Government Code Section 70631, to amend CRC 10.815 to authorize a new fee for appearances in connection with complex civil case...
management hearings. Authorizing this new fee is squarely within the Judicial Council’s power, and appears to be the only mechanism available to meet SFSC’s and other similarly situated courts’ critical short-term need to raise revenue so that their courts can remain open to civil litigants. This proposal has been thoroughly vetted and has broad support in the Bay Area legal and business community.

The Judicial Council has the Power and Obligation to Address the Fiscal Crisis Facing California’s Courts

Immediate and decisive action by the Judicial Council is necessary to avoid cutting off critical services to civil litigants and to ensure equal access to justice in San Francisco’s courts, as well as in other courts similarly situated. The likely effect of the measures SFSC has announced will be to impose disproportionate hardship on those in California (anyone but the most wealthy) unable to bypass a backlogged civil court system by paying for private judges, and deny due process and justice to individuals and small businesses whose cases will not be heard in time to avoid or mitigate serious hardship. Absent immediate action, the civil litigation system will grind to a halt, stalling the development of new legal precedent, leaving commercial disputes unresolved, and further crippling California’s already fragile economy.

The Judicial Council has the power—and indeed the obligation—to address this emergency. The Judicial Council is charged with “improving the quality of justice and advancing the consistent, independent, and accessible administration of justice by the judicial branch for the benefit of the public.” It counts among its “fundamental goals” and “responsibilities” “promoting public access to the justice system” and “taking all appropriate steps to develop and establish the judicial branch’s fiscal priorities,” including by “secur[ing] appropriate funding for the judicial branch.”

Consistent with these goals and responsibilities, the Government Code grants the Judicial Council broad powers to “regulate the budget and fiscal management of the trial courts” “notwithstanding any other law.” Although the Judicial Council does not appear to have the authority under this

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1 Long delays in resolution of disputes about such matters as child custody, elder abuse, discrimination, wrongful termination of employment, negligently caused personal injuries, police misconduct, unfair competition and others can effectively deny justice altogether as children grow up, elders and people injured in accidents die, individuals are unable to support themselves and their families, and small businesses fail because of wrongs that go unremedied.

2 CRC 10.1 (emphasis added).


4 CRC Appx. D., Judicial Council Governance Policies § I.A.2.d

5 Id.

6 Government Code Section 77206(a) provides:
provision to raise existing fees set by the Uniform Civil Fees Act or by other statutory or regulatory mandate,\(^7\) it does have the power to authorize new fees not already covered by a statute or rule. Under Section 70631 of the Uniform Civil Fees Act:

In the absence of a statute or rule authorizing or prohibiting a fee by the superior court for a particular service or product, the court may charge a reasonable fee not to exceed the costs of providing the service or product, if the Judicial Council approves the fee. The fee shall be distributed to the court in which it was collected.

The Judicial Council has already exercised its power under Section 70631 to identify certain “approved fees” that it “authorizes courts to charge” for products and services not already addressed by an existing statute or rule.\(^8\) Under CRC 10.815, courts are pre-authorized by the Judicial Council to charge fees for a number of different products and services including forms, packages of forms, information materials, publications, CD, DVDs, audio- and videotapes, microfiches, envelopes, postage, shipping, off-site retrieval of documents, direct fax filing, returning file-stamped copies of documents by fax, training programs for attorneys serving as temporary judges, and other training programs and events.

By amending CRC 10.815 to authorize a new fee for appearances at complex civil case management hearings, the Judicial Council can help to “secure appropriate funding”\(^9\) for the courts by providing SFSC—and other superior courts—a means of raising revenue to address their critical financial needs. As discussed below, this amendment can be adopted on an expedited basis to address the time-sensitive needs of the courts and those who use them.

Notwithstanding any other law, the Judicial Council may regulate the budget and fiscal management of the trial courts. The Judicial Council, in consultation with the Controller, shall maintain appropriate regulations for recordkeeping and accounting by the courts. The Judicial Council shall seek to ensure, by these provisions, both of the following:

(1) That the fiscal affairs of the trial courts are managed efficiently, effectively, and responsibly.

(2) That all moneys collected by the courts, including filing fees, fines, forfeitures, and penalties, and all revenues and expenditures relating to court operations are known.

The Judicial Council may delegate its authority under this section, when appropriate, to the Administrative Director of the Courts.

\(^7\) See Gov. Code § 68502.5(a)(10) (Judicial Council “as part of its budget process” may review “the level of fees charged for various services and prepare recommended adjustments for forwarding to the legislature”); Gov. Code § 70602 (imposing a moratorium on increases in filing fees until July 1, 2013); Gov. Code § 70603(a) (Fee covered by the Uniform Fee Act “are intended to be uniform statewide and to be the only allowable fees for those services and filings”).

\(^8\) CRC 10.815

\(^9\) CRC Appx. D., Judicial Council Governance Policies § 1.A.2.d
**Authorizing a New Fee May Be the Only Immediate Way to Address The Current Financial Emergency**

Although the Judicial Council bears responsibility for ensuring that courts are adequately funded and that citizens have equal access to the justice system in California, it has few options available to address financial emergencies like that facing SFSC.

The Uniform Civil Fees Act imposes a moratorium on all fee increases, which can only be lifted by the legislature. Further, subject to a few narrow exceptions that do not include fee increases to address fiscal emergencies, the Act provides that fees charged for filings and services “under this chapter are intended to be uniform statewide and to be the only allowable fees for those services and filings.” Accordingly, courts (and the Judicial Council) are powerless to impose or authorize additional fees for the many filings and services already covered by the Act. Authorizing a new fee for a service not addressed by an existing statute or rule appears to be the only way the Judicial Council can act to raise revenue through court fees under the existing statutory scheme.

The Judicial Council of course has the power to allocate funds among the individual trial courts, and the allocation scheme must “assure that all trial courts receive funding for the minimum operating and staffing standards before funding operating and staffing requests above the minimum standards.” Additionally, the Judicial Council may “reallocate[c] ... funds during the course of the fiscal year to ensure equal access to the trial courts by the public, to improve trial court operations, and to meet trial court emergencies.” But reallocating an already greatly reduced court budget may be difficult given the budgetary challenges facing all of California’s trial courts.

Nor is a legislative solution capable of addressing the problem in the short term. The legislative process takes time and will not provide the immediate relief the courts need. The Judicial Council is in the best position to help generate immediate, additional revenue for the courts by authorizing a new fee under Government Code Section 70631.

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10 Gov Code § 70602
11 Gov. Code § 70603(a)
12 For a complete list of authorized and prohibited civil fees in California, see the 2011 Statewide Civil Fee Schedule, available at: http://www.imperial.courts.ca.gov/PDFDocs/Civil_Fee_Schedule_20110101.pdf
13 Gov. Code § 77200(c)
14 Gov. Code § 68502.5(a)(4); see also CRC 10.105
15 Gov. Code § 68502.5(a)(5)
A New Fee for Appearances at Civil Case Management Conferences is Reasonable and Necessary

SFSC therefore requests that the Judicial Council exercise its existing statutory authority to approve, pursuant to Government Code Section 70631, an additional fee for the significant service provided to litigants and counsel by the complex case management conference hearing.

The case management services provided in complex cases are significantly more extensive than those regularly provided in connection with non-complex civil matters. They also provide great benefits to litigants and courts. Very often, complex case management services result in streamlined discovery, narrowing of issues, and coordination with other litigation, increasing efficiency and conserving scarce court resources. Charging litigants a fee for these valuable services is reasonable and justified.

We recognize that an additional court fee will make civil litigation more expensive for those involved in complex cases. But the modest additional cost the fee will add to complex litigation is far preferable to a complex litigation system that simply does not exist. And with the pending closure of both of SFSC’s complex litigation departments, the disappearance of court resources devoted to complex litigation is not theoretical.

Our discussions with practitioners from both sides of the bar strongly suggest that the imposition of an additional fee in connection with complex civil case management conferences is viewed as justified and reasonable.

SFSC is in the process of determining the reasonable fee for appearance for counsel appearing in connection with complex case management hearings, and will provide it to the Judicial Council as soon as the analysis is completed.

SFSC’s Proposal for Implementing the New Fee

Given the time pressures facing SFSC, we believe the fastest and most efficient way to implement the proposed fee increase would be for the Judicial Council to amend CRC 10.815 to add the following to the list of “approved fees” under Government Code Section 70631 currently set out under CRC 10.815: Appearance Fee for counsel appearing in connection with complex case management hearings.

Once amendment was approved by the Judicial Council, the addition of the new appearance fee could be adopted by SFSC and other courts pursuant to local rule under CRC 10.613. This new fee would be collected in connection with issuing a certificate of appearance at complex case management hearings.

Because of the incredible time pressure now facing SFSC, and because of the direct involvement by the local bar in the crafting of this proposal, we also request that the Judicial Council waive or shorten the existing time period for comment to allow for early adoption of the proposed new appearance fee under both 10.815 and as a local rule under CRC 10.613.
Although a long-term legislative solution to chronic underfunding of the judiciary is absolutely critical, it will take time to achieve. The crisis facing our courts is immediate, and requires a short-term solution that will generate revenue necessary to keep civil courtrooms open to all citizens. Under its broad authority to regulate the budget and fiscal management of the trial courts, the Judicial Council has the power to implement such a short term solution, and it can do so without reallocating any of the scarce resources budgeted to the courts. By amending CRC 10.815 to approve a new fee for appearances at civil case management hearings, and allowing courts like SFSC to adopt such a fee on an expedited basis, the Judicial Council can meet its responsibility to ensure that trial courts are adequately funded and that the civil justice system remains accessible to all litigants.
August 22, 2011

MEMORANDUM

To: Curtis L. Child, Director, Office of Governmental Affairs, Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC); Ronald G. Overholt, Chief Deputy Director, AOC; Mary Roberts, General Counsel, AOC

From: The Bar Association of San Francisco (BASF); Priya S. Sanger, BASF President, Wells Fargo Bank, Legal Department; Kelly M. Dermody, BASF President-Elect, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP; Christopher Kearney, BASF Treasurer, Keber & Van Nest LLP; Stephanie Skaff, BASF Secretary, Farella Braun + Martel LLP; Merri Baldwin, BASF Director, Chapman, Popik & White LLP; Daniel Burkhardt, BASF Executive Director; Stuart Gordon, Gordon & Rees LLP; Therese Stewart, San Francisco City Attorney’s Office; Blanca Young, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP

Re: Trial Court Funding

Subject: Response to August 18, 2011 Memorandum from the General Counsel’s Office of the Administrative Office of the Courts

We write in response to the August 18, 2011 memorandum from the Administrative Office of the Courts’ Office of General Counsel analyzing whether the Judicial Council has the power to authorize an appearance fee for case management conferences in complex civil cases (the “Memo”). Given the emergency facing our courts, we appreciate the prompt response from the General Counsel’s Office. However, we respectfully disagree with the Memo’s conclusion that the Judicial Council “probably cannot approve the proposed fee.”1 Although, as the Memo points out, the legislature can and should play a significant role in assisting San Francisco Superior Court and other courts in financial distress, the Judicial Council is both empowered and obligated to ensure funding for and access to the State’s courts. As detailed below, we continue to believe that it is well within the Judicial Council’s authority to approve the proposed fee, and we urge the Judicial Council to do so without delay. Access to justice will be denied to countless civil litigants unless the Judicial Council acts to implement a stop-gap measure to help the courts meet critical short-term needs while a legislative solution is being pursued.

1 Memo, at p. 6
Government Code Section 70631 Empowers the Judicial Council to Approve Fees Not Prohibited or Authorized by an Existing Statute or Rule

The Memo acknowledges that under Government Code Section 70631, an appearance fee for case management conferences in a complex case could be charged “in the absence of a statute or rule authorizing or prohibiting” such a fee. The Memo concludes, however, that the Judicial Council “probably cannot approve the proposed fee” because the legislature “addressed the subject of complex case fees in Sections 70630(a)(1) and 70616,” and prohibited a filing fee for case management conference statements in Section 70617(b)(3).

Respectfully, these provisions pose no barrier to the Judicial Council’s authority. Under Section 70631, the Judicial Council may not authorize a fee if an existing statute or rule (1) “authorize[s]” (2) or “prohibit[s]” (3) a fee by the superior court for the “particular service or product” in question. The Judicial Council’s power to authorize a fee for a “particular service or product” related to complex cases, such as appearances at case management conferences, is not constrained simply because the legislature “has addressed the subject of complex case fees” generally in the Act. Nor is it limited just because the legislature has prohibited a fee for a “closely related” but distinct—service. The legislature must have authorized or prohibited a fee for the “particular service” at issue.

The legislature has not authorized or prohibited a fee for appearing at case management conferences in a complex case, including in either of the two provisions cited in the Memo: Government Code Section 70603(a)(1) and Government Code Section 706017(b)(3). We discuss each in turn below.

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2 Gov. Code § 70631; Memo, at p. 3
3 Memo, at p.6
4 Memo, at p. 4
5 Gov. Code § 70631 (emphasis added). Section 70631 provides in full:
In the absence of a statute or rule authorizing or prohibiting a fee by the superior court for a particular service or product, the court may charge a reasonable fee not to exceed the costs of providing the service or product, if the Judicial Council approves the fee. The fee shall be distributed to the court in which it was collected.
6 Memo, at p. 4
7 Memo, at p. 6
8 Gov. Code. 70631
Government Code Section 70603(a)(1) Does Not Prohibit Additional Fees In Complex Cases

Section 70603(a) provides, in full:

(a) Except as provided in this section, the fees charged for filings and services under this chapter are intended to be uniform statewide and to be the only allowable fees for those services and filings. The only charges that may be added to the fees in this chapter are the following:

(1) In a complex case, the fee provided for in Section 70616 may be added to the first paper and first responsive paper filing fees in Sections 70611, 70612, 70613, and 70614.

(2) In an unlawful detainer action subject to Section 1161.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a charge of fifteen dollars ($15) as provided under that section may be added to the fee in Section 70613 for filing a first appearance by a plaintiff.

(3) In Riverside County, a surcharge as provided in Section 70622 may be added to the first paper and first responsive paper filing fees in Sections 70611, 70612, 70613, 70614, 70650, 70651, 70652, 70653, 70655, and 70670.

(4) In San Bernardino County, a surcharge as provided in Section 70624 may be added to the first paper and first responsive paper filing fees in Sections 70611, 70612, 70613, 70614, 70650, 70651, 70652, 70653, 70655, and 70670. This paragraph applies to fees collected under Sections 70611, 70612, 70613, 70614, 70650, 70651, 70652, 70653, 70655, and 70670, beginning January 1, 2006.

(5) In the City and County of San Francisco, a surcharge as provided in Section 70625 may be added to the first paper and first responsive paper filing fees in Sections 70611, 70612, 70613, 70614, 70650, 70651, 70652, 70653, 70655, and 70670.\(^9\)

The Memo interprets Government Code Section 70603(a)(1) to mean that “unless another fee is authorized in the [Uniform Civil Fees Act],” “the only additional fee that may be charged in a complex case is the fee authorized by Section 70616,”\(^9\) which allows a complex case fee to be added to the filing fees for first papers applicable to all civil cases.

\(^9\) Gov. Code § 7063(a) (emphasis added)

\(^{10}\) Memo, at p. 3 (emphasis added)
Section 70603(a)(1), however, simply limits the charges that can be added to first paper and first responsive paper filing fees (set forth in Sections 70611, 70612, 70613, and 70614) in a complex case. As the plain language and the overall statutory scheme reflect, Section 70603(a)(1) does not prohibit fees for other filings and services in complex cases, such as appearances at case management conferences.

Section 70603(a) does two things. First, it sets forth a general rule that the fees in the Uniform Civil Fee Act are “uniform” and exclusive, i.e. “the only allowable fees for those services and filings.” Second, it carves out exceptions to those rules in the numbered sub-sections, which allow certain specified fees to be “added to” the fees authorized “in this chapter.”

Section 70603(a)(1) creates such an exception “in complex cases,” for which it authorizes an initial complex case fee, set forth in Section 70616, to be “added to” the usual first paper and first response paper filing fees charged in all civil cases under the Act. All Sections 70603(a)(1) and 70616 do, in other words, is authorize higher filing fees for the first paper a party files in a complex case. Neither provision says anything about charging fees in a complex case for services and filings other than those related to the first papers filed with the court. They certainly do not impose a blanket prohibition on all additional fees in complex cases. As the statutory scheme makes clear, Section 70603(a)(1) is an “except[ion]” that expands—rather than limits—the fees that may be charged in complex cases.

**Government Code Section 70617(b)(3) Prohibits Only Filing, Not Appearance Fees for Case Management Conferences**

Like Section 70603(a)(1), Section 70617(b)(3) also does not prohibit (or authorize) a fee for the “particular service”\(^\text{10}\) that is the subject of the proposed fee. It provides that “there shall be no fee … for filing … a civil case management statement,”\(^\text{11}\) but says nothing about charging fees for appearing at a case management hearing. If the legislature intended to prohibit fees for appearances at case management hearings, it could easily have done so explicitly.

The Memo worries that to draw a distinction between filing fees and appearance fees “would elevate form over substance.”\(^\text{12}\) But there are real and meaningful differences between filing a civil case management statement and appearing for a civil case management conference, especially in a complex case. The case management statement is filed jointly by the parties for the benefit of the court, to apprise the court of the status of the case and provide an outline of subjects to be covered at the conference.\(^\text{13}\) Because filing the case management statement is a service that benefits the court, it makes sense that the Legislature would prohibit a fee for filing,

\(^\text{10}\) Government Code 70631

\(^\text{11}\) Government Code § 70617(b)(3)

\(^\text{12}\) Memo, at p. 6

\(^\text{13}\) See CRC 3.725 (requirements for case management statements); form CM-110 (form required for case management statements); CRC 3.727 (subjects to be considered at the case management conference).
the statement without prohibiting a fee for appearances at the conference itself, which is held for the benefit of the parties.

Indeed, case management conferences are often scheduled at the request of one or more parties, and in a complex case are frequently used by litigants to address developments as complex litigation unfolds, to advocate for structuring the litigation in a manner most advantageous to their cause, and to enlist the judge’s help in moving the case toward settlement, among other things.

In short, nothing in Section 70617(b)(3) explicitly or implicitly prohibits a fee for appearances at case management conferences in complex cases.

**Authorizing the Proposed Fee is Reasonable and Appropriate in Light of the Emergency Facing Our Courts**

Nothing in the case law, either, supports the conclusion that the Judicial Council would be acting outside its authority by approving the proposed fee. Indeed, the cases cited in the Memo affirm that it is reasonable and appropriate to charge civil fees in order to subsidize the general operation and administration of the trial courts. See *People v. Superior Court (Laff)* (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 703, 727 (“in civil cases litigants properly may be required to pay fixed, incidental court fees that indirectly subsidize a portion of the cost of the judicial system”); *Towzen v. County of El Dorado* (1998) 64 Cal. App. 4th 1350, 1359 (a proper purpose of court fees in civil cases is to “offset the costs of services related to the administration of the superior courts”).

This is especially true in the face of a fiscal emergency, when the Judicial Council is obligated to ensure that the trial courts remain adequately funded and accessible to all citizens. CRC Rule 10.815(d), which implements Government Code Section 70631, explains that the reasonableness of a proposed fee depends on “the benefits to the court and the public from providing the product or service and the effects of charging the fee on public access to the courts.” The proposed appearance fee is inherently reasonable since without it, public access to the courts will effectively be denied for most civil litigants in the city and county of San Francisco (and in other areas facing similar crises). Requiring a fee for a valuable service provided in the litigation of complex cases can and should be used to ensure that the courts remain accessible to all civil litigants.

**The Courts Require the Judicial Council’s Immediate Assistance To Address The Current Fiscal Emergency**

As we emphasized in our memorandum of August 18, 2011, the San Francisco superior courts desperately need short-term relief that will allow them to raise revenue while a legislative solution is being pursued.

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15 Memo, at p. 5
We appreciate the prompt attention that the Judicial Council and its staff have given this matter, and hope that the Council will approve the proposed fee after all of the details of the proposal—such as the amount and duration of the proposed fee—are fully formulated and presented. For example, we believe that any concerns about the proposed fee court be addressed by (1) limiting complex appearance fees only for courts that certify need, and (2) requiring the fee to sunset after three years, during which the parties would jointly seek a permanent rule change from the legislature in connection with broader court funding reforms.

Our hope is that the Council will engage with us in a dialogue about tailoring the proposal so that it can be adopted, consistent with the Council’s authority, to provide immediate assistance to courts in need while furthering our mutual objective of achieving a long term legislative solution to the court funding crisis.