

SUPREME COURT COPY

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CALVIN LAMONT PARKER,

Defendant and Appellant.

CAPITAL CASE

No. S113962

SUPREME COURT
FILED

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APPELLANT CALVIN LAMONT PARKER'S OPENING BRIEF

Frank A. McGuire Clerk

Deputy

Appeal from the Judgment of the Superior Court
San Diego County, State of California
No. 154640

HONORABLE MICHAEL D. WILLINGTON, TRIAL JUDGE

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