

# SUPREME COURT COPY

No. S138052

## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TUPOUTOE MATAELE,

Defendant and Appellant.

Orange County Superior Court

Case No. 00NF1347

Hon. James A. Stotler, Judge

On Automatic Appeal From A  
Judgment and Sentence of Death

SUPREME COURT  
**FILED**

**Appellant Tupoutoe Mataele's Opening Brief**

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# DEATH PENALTY

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