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**In The Supreme Court
of the
State of California**

LYNN GRANDE

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

EISENHOWER MEDICAL CENTER

Defendant and Appellant,

FLEXCARE, LLC

Intervener.

*On Review from the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District, Division Two
4th Civil No. E068730 and E068751*

*After an Appeal from the Superior Court of Riverside County
Honorable Hon. Sharon J. Waters, Judge
Case Number RIC1514281*

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS

Eisenhower Medical Center knows of no entity or person that must be disclosed under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.208(e).

DATED: March 16, 2020 SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER &
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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Eisenhower Medical Center (Eisenhower) presents the following question for review:

In a joint employer arrangement, can a class of workers bring a lawsuit against a staffing company, settle that lawsuit on a class-wide basis for substantial consideration, and then bring identical claims against the only company where they had been placed to work?

WHY THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW

The Court of Appeal in *Castillo v. Glenair, Inc.* (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 262 (*Castillo*) answered that question “no.” The Court of Appeal in this matter, *Grande v. Eisenhower Medical Center* (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1147, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 324 (*Grande*) answered the same question on identical relevant facts “yes.” The dissent in *Grande* recognized that the majority opinion creates a clear split in authority that will cause confusion for “parties on all sides” going forward. Further, it will create incentives to litigate the same claims multiple times in different courts. Because this petition raises an important issue as to which there is a conflict in the intermediate appellate courts, review should be granted.

The issue presented involves the fundamental relationship between a temporary staffing company FlexCare, LLC (FlexCare), its employee Lynn Grande, and its client company (Eisenhower). Grande was employed by FlexCare for just nine days, during which FlexCare assigned Grande exclusively to Eisenhower to work seven shifts. Eisenhower was authorized to and did review and report Grande’s time records to FlexCare so that FlexCare could pay Grande.

Prior to this case, Grande filed a class action against FlexCare that resulted in a final, court-approved settlement agreement. (*Erlandsen, et al.*

v. FlexCare, LLC, et al. (Super. Ct. Santa Barbara County (2013) No. 1309595 (*Erlandsen*)).) The *Erlandsen* settlement agreement contains a broad release barring settlement class members from asserting wage and hour claims against FlexCare and its agents, such as those alleged here. Grande was also a class representative in *Erlandsen* and received a \$20,000 enhancement as a class representative in addition to settlement amounts paid to her as a class member based solely on her assignment at Eisenhower. Grande did not work for any other entity other than Eisenhower through FlexCare.

Despite settling all her wage and hour claims with FlexCare, and after receiving her settlement payments in *Erlandsen*, Grande filed suit separately against Eisenhower. Grande's claims against Eisenhower involve precisely the same wage and hour claims, for the same work, covering the same period as the claims she settled against FlexCare. After a short bifurcated trial addressing Eisenhower's affirmative defenses and FlexCare's complaint in intervention, the trial court issued a statement of decision in favor of Grande.

FlexCare appealed and Eisenhower petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal (Fourth District, Division 3) consolidated both for decision. After initial briefing, a different Court of Appeal (Second District, Division 2) decided *Castillo* on identical facts in favor of the staffing company who employed the worker and its client. The Court of Appeal's tentative decision in *Grande* followed *Castillo*, but the majority reversed course in its final decision, rejecting the *Castillo* reasoning and holding.

The dissent in *Grande* succinctly frames the issues, stating that "on facts essentially identical to those here," *Castillo* held "that a settlement agreement between a staffing company and its employees barred those employees from asserting the same claims against the staffing company's

client. Specifically, it held that the client was the staffing company's agent, and therefore within the scope of the release that the employees had given. [Citation.] It also held, alternatively, that the staffing company and the client were in privity for purposes of res judicata." (*Grande, supra*, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 340 (Rameriz, P.J., Dissenting).) The dissent concluded: "I would follow *Castillo*, as a matter of stare decisis. *Castillo* at least has the virtue of stating clear rules on which parties on all sides can easily rely going forward. I do not find *Castillo* to be so plainly wrong as to justify creating a split of authority in this area." (*Ibid.*)

Review should be granted to resolve this clear split in authority between *Castillo* and *Grande* that impacts an important industry in California: temporary staffing companies and their clients. This Court's decision is necessary to secure uniformity of decision on this important question of law. (See Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.500(b)(1).)

BACKGROUND

A. Eisenhower's Relationship With FlexCare

Eisenhower and FlexCare have a long-running, cooperative business relationship. (See 2 PA 420 ¶¶3, 8.) In 2007, Eisenhower and FlexCare executed a Supplemental Staffing Agreement (Staffing Agreement), pursuant to which FlexCare selected and assigned its employees to perform work at Eisenhower under Eisenhower's direction. (2 PA 420-421 ¶¶3 and 11; 3 PA 595:20-596:17; 4 PA 898-910.) Eisenhower relied on FlexCare to assign competent, professional, and licensed health care workers consistent with Eisenhower's licensing and certification requirements. (3 PA 595:20-596:17, 637:9-638:5; 4 PA 898-903.) FlexCare was legally and contractually responsible to comply with all laws, including the obligation to fulfill its and Eisenhower's wage-hour obligations to all assigned employees. (3 PA 640:6-11; 4 PA 901 ¶5.2, 989-990.)

As set forth in the Staffing Agreement, Eisenhower paid a specific rate to FlexCare for each category of supplemental personnel. (4 PA 904 ¶7.1.1; 4 PA 909.) These rates were independent of and distinct from the pay rates FlexCare separately negotiated with its employees. (See 4 PA 904 ¶7.1.1, 909, 989-990.) The Staffing Agreement provides that FlexCare was the employer of all FlexCare employees who received assignments to perform work at Eisenhower. (4 PA 901 ¶¶5.1, 5.2.) Grande also agreed to look to FlexCare for payment of her wages as her employer. (See 4 PA 989-990.) As between FlexCare, Eisenhower, and FlexCare employees like Grande, FlexCare was responsible for fulfilling Eisenhower's obligations for compliance with and satisfaction of all payroll, wage-hour, overtime pay, premium pay, workers' compensation, and benefit obligations. (3 PA 597:3-15, 605:24-606:14, 640:6-11; 4 PA 901 ¶¶5.1, 5.2, 989-990.) As a result, the parties also agreed that FlexCare would indemnify Eisenhower "against any and all" legal claims asserted against Eisenhower that are predicated on any allegation that FlexCare employees are jointly or otherwise employed by FlexCare and Eisenhower. (2 PA 425 ¶44, 430-431; 4 PA 901 ¶5.3.)

B. FlexCare Assigned Grande to Work at Eisenhower

In February 2012, FlexCare assigned its employee Grande, an RN, to work in the Intensive Care Unit at Eisenhower on a temporary basis. (2 PA 420 ¶8; 4 PA 989-990, 1053:26-1054:4; 5 PA 1352:12-14.) Grande worked seven shifts at Eisenhower between February 6 and February 14, 2012, when her assignment ended. (4 PA 1054:16-22; 2 PA 420-421 ¶¶8 and 10.) Grande did not receive any other assignments from FlexCare and worked only at Eisenhower. (2 PA 421 ¶¶9-10; 5 PA 1352:12-14; 6 PA 1409:17-22.)

C. Grande Joined a Class Action Lawsuit Against FlexCare as a Named Plaintiff, Based Entirely on Her Work at Eisenhower, and the Lawsuit Settled

In 2012, Christina Erlandsen, a FlexCare employee, filed the *Erlandsen* action. (2 PA 421 ¶12; 5 PA 1084-1120.) A year later, Grande joined as a named plaintiff. (2 PA 421 ¶14.) In the third amended complaint, Grande asserted claims for (1) failure to pay compensation due for hours worked; (2) failure to pay meal period wages; (3) failure to pay rest period wages; (4) failure to pay waiting time wages; and (5) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17203. (4 PA 848-873.) All of Grande’s claims in *Erlandsen* were predicated solely on her seven-day assignment at Eisenhower, and Grande was represented by the same attorneys who represent her in the present action. (1 PA 17; 2 PA 421 ¶¶15-16, 849 ¶6 [complaint specifically alleged that Grande “was assigned to work at Eisenhower”], 848-873.)

On January 28, 2014, the *Erlandsen* class action settled. (2 PA 421 ¶19, 21; 4 PA 917-950.) The Stipulation and Settlement Agreement released

[A]ny and all claims, causes of action, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, guarantees or damages, in law or equity, tort or in contract, by statute, pursuant to case law, or otherwise, which have been or could have reasonably been asserted in the Action or in any other state or federal court, administrative tribunal, or in arbitration or similar proceeding, based upon, or arising out of, or related to the allegations in the Action during the Class Period.

(4 PA 921 ¶FF.) These claims were released against the “Released Parties,” a broadly defined term that included FlexCare and the other named defendants, as well as their “related or affiliated companies,” and “agents, principals.” (4 PA 921 ¶GG.) It did not exclude Eisenhower from its broad definition of Released Parties and all parties plainly understood

Grande's claims arose solely from her brief engagement at Eisenhower.
(*Id.*)

The Santa Barbara County Superior Court entered its Amended Final Judgment and Order in *Erlandsen* on April 8, 2015, approving the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement and finding it “fair, adequate and reasonable.” (2 PA 423 ¶¶27; 4 PA 911-916.) The Amended Final Judgment and Order further stated that it “shall have a *res judicata* effect and bar Class Members from bringing any action asserting Released Claims as that term is defined in the Agreement;” this effect was not limited to the Released Parties. (4 PA 915 ¶19.) In the settlement, Grande received \$20,000 for her role as a class representative, \$162.13 to resolve her individual claims related solely to her seven-shift assignment at Eisenhower, and \$300,000 in fees to her counsel. (2 PA 421 ¶¶10 and 15, 423 ¶28; 4 PA 914 ¶¶13 and 15, 915 ¶18; 6 PA 1397:6-19, 1398:18-1399:5, 1400:15-24.) FlexCare paid these sums, knowing it was obligated to indemnify Eisenhower for any wage-hour claims Grande could or might pursue against Eisenhower if they were unresolved by the settlement.

D. Grande Filed This Proposed Class Action Lawsuit Against Eisenhower, and the Trial Court Ruled Against Eisenhower and FlexCare; the Court of Appeal Affirmed

On December 3, 2015, less than two months after FlexCare satisfied the final judgment in *Erlandsen* and Grande accepted the payments, Grande filed this lawsuit against Eisenhower based only on her assignment at Eisenhower through FlexCare. (1 PA 17-32; 2 PA 357-367, 425 ¶43; 3 PA 613:20-28.) Grande contends that Eisenhower violated Business and Professions Code section 17200, *et seq.*, by failing to pay her for all hours worked and by failing to pay meal period and rest break premiums. (1 PA 17-32.) These are the same claims she made in *Erlandsen* based entirely on

the same seven days of work at Eisenhower. (4 PA 848-873; 1 PA 19 ¶6; 2 PA 421 ¶15; 4 PA 849 ¶6.)

The trial court granted FlexCare's motion for leave to intervene. (1 PA 51-55.) FlexCare's complaint in intervention, like Eisenhower's affirmative defenses, alleged that Grande was barred by the preclusive effect of the class action settlement agreement and judgment in *Erlandsen*. (1 PA 50 ¶23.) Thereafter, the trial court granted Eisenhower's motion for a bifurcated trial as to its waiver/release and res judicata affirmative defenses and FlexCare's motion for a bifurcated trial as to its complaint in intervention. (1 PA 61-64.) After conducting a brief trial, the trial court ruled against FlexCare and Eisenhower, and issued its statement of decision. (7 PA 1664-1690.)

As expressed in the statement of decision, the trial court concluded that Grande's claims are not barred by res judicata as a result of the *Erlandsen* judgment. (7 PA 1671:9-1674:6.) The trial court concluded that the controlling issue was whether FlexCare and Eisenhower were in privity, and that they were not in privity because they were jointly and severally liable and their liability was not derivative. (7 PA 1671:9-1674:6.) The trial court also concluded that Grande's claims are not barred by the settlement agreement in *Erlandsen* because Eisenhower was not a "Released Party" within the meaning of the settlement agreement as it was not FlexCare's agent. (7 PA 1674:23-1683:4.)

The trial court entered judgment against FlexCare, and FlexCare appealed. (7 PA 1747-1754; 7 PA 1761-1763.) Because the bifurcated trial as to Eisenhower was only as to its affirmative defenses, Eisenhower had no immediate right of appeal. However, at Eisenhower's request, the trial court certified its statement of decision as appropriate for writ review (Code Civ. Proc., § 166.1) and Eisenhower filed a petition for writ of mandate. After consolidating the appeal with the writ proceeding, the Court of

Appeal affirmed the judgment as to FlexCare and denied Eisenhower's petition. (*Grande, supra*, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 327.) Choosing not to follow *Castillo*, the Court of Appeal held "Eisenhower and FlexCare were not in privity, preventing Eisenhower from blocking Grande's claims under the doctrine of res judicata, and Eisenhower was not a released party under the settlement agreement." (*Ibid.*)

**REVIEW IS NECESSARY TO
SETTLE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF LAW AND
RESOLVE CONFLICTING APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS**

A. Contrary to the Decision in *Grande, Castillo* Held a Staffing Company and Its Client Company Are in Privity and Agents of Each Other Regarding Wage and Hour Claims

While briefing was underway in the writ proceeding and appeal in this case, the Second District Court of Appeal issued its decision in *Castillo*, addressing the identical issue raised by this petition for review. In fact, the issue presented for review above is taken almost verbatim from *Castillo*. (See *Castillo, supra*, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 266.)

The material facts in *Castillo* are virtually identical to those here. Like here, in *Castillo* a wage and hour class action lawsuit was filed against a temporary staffing company, GCA Services Group, Inc. (the *Gomez* class action). (*Ibid.*) The plaintiffs were employed and paid by GCA to work on site at Glenair, Inc. They characterized GCA and Glenair as "joint employers." (*Ibid.*) The *Gomez* class action against the staffing company GCA settled and the court approved the settlement agreement. Like in this case, the settlement agreement from the *Gomez* class action contained "a broad release barring settlement class members from asserting wage and hour claims . . . against GCA and its agents." (*Id.* at pp. 266-267.) Nonetheless, a new class action lawsuit was filed (*Castillo*) against Glenair, involving "the same wage and hour claims, for the same work done,

covering the same time period as the claims” asserted against the staffing company and settled and released in *Gomez*. (*Id.* at p. 267.) The trial court in *Castillo* entered summary judgment in favor of Glenair based on res judicata and separately because it found Glenair was the agent of GCA for wage and hour purposes and thus released by the *Gomez* settlement. (*Id.* at p. 281.) The Court of Appeal affirmed. (*Ibid.*)

1. The *Castillo* Court’s analysis of res judicata applies equally here

As to the elements of res judicata, the *Castillo* court found the *Gomez* settlement was final and on the merits, and also that the causes of action before it were the same as those at issue in *Gomez*. (See *id.* at pp. 276-278, citing *Villacres v. ABM Industries, Inc.* (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 577 [stating the elements of res judicata].) Thus, the Court found, “[t]he dispute then centers on the third and final element of res judicata, namely whether the undisputed material facts demonstrate Glenair was either a party or in privity with a party in *Gomez*.” (*Id.* at pp. 278-279.) The Court concluded Glenair was in privity with GCA with respect to the subject matter of the litigation. (*Id.* at p. 279.)

In addressing privity, the Court quoted from this Court’s opinion in *DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 826 (*DKN Holdings*):

“As applied to questions of preclusion, privity requires the sharing of ‘an identity or community of interest,’ with ‘adequate representation’ of that interest in the first suit, and circumstances such that the non-party ‘should reasonably have expected to be bound’ by the first suit. [Citation.] A nonparty alleged to be in privity must have an interest so similar to the party’s interest that the party acted as the nonparty’s “ ‘virtual representative’ ” in the first action.”

(*Castillo, supra*, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.)

Thus, the *Castillo* Court reasoned, “for purposes of privity, ‘ ‘ ‘[t]he emphasis is not on a concept of identity of parties, but on the practical situation. The question is whether the non-party is sufficiently close to the original case to afford application of the principle of preclusion.’ ’ ’ ” (*Ibid.*, citing *Alvarez v. May Dept. Stores Co.* (2005) 143 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1236-1237.) Quoting from *Cal Sierra Development, Inc. v. George Reed, Inc.* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 663, 674 (*Cal Sierra*), decided after *DKN Holdings*, the *Castillo* Court concluded: “Put another way, privity, ‘ ‘as used in the context of res judicata or collateral estoppel, does not embrace relationships between persons or entities, but rather it deals with a person’s relationship *to the subject matter of the litigation.*” ’ ’ ” (*Castillo, supra*, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.)

Applying this law to the facts, the *Castillo* Court looked to the analysis in *Cal Sierra* for determining the necessary relationship between the parties and the subject matter of the litigation in order to establish privity. (*Id.* at p. 279.) In *Cal Sierra*, Cal Sierra first obtained an arbitration award against a mining company and then tried to sue the mining company’s licensee based on the same facts and the same or similar causes of action as raised in the arbitration. (*Cal Sierra, supra*, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 668.) The Court of Appeal in *Cal Sierra* explained that although the mining company and its licensee were separate companies and only in a contractual licensor-licensee relationship, they could still be in privity for claim preclusion purposes. (*Id.* at p. 673.) It was enough that the “*subject matter of the litigation . . . was the same as that at the center of the arbitration dispute: the placement of the asphalt plant and whether it infringed on Cal Sierra’s mining rights.*” (*Id.* at p. 674, italics added.) The Court found the mining company and its licensee “had an identical interest” *as to that issue* and were “adversely and similarly impacted by [it]. (*Ibid.*; see also *Castillo, supra*, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 279 [relying on *Cal Sierra*].)

Thus, the Court found privity existed and res judicata applied. (*Cal Sierra, supra*, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 674; see also *Castillo, supra*, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 279.)

Applying the same reasoning as the Court in *Cal Sierra*, the *Castillo* Court concluded that Glenair was in privity with GCA with respect to the subject matter of the litigation. (*Castillo, supra*, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 279-281.) The Court found (1) “both cases involve the same wage and hour causes of action arising from the same work performed by the same GCA employees . . . at GCA’s client company Glenair”; (2) both “Glenair and GCA share the same relationship to the Castillos’ claims” because both “were involved in and responsible for payment of the Castillos’ wages”¹; and (3) “by virtue of the ‘Gomez’ settlement, the Castillos were compensated for any errors made in the payment of their wages.” (*Id.* at p. 280.) The *Castillo* Court held: “Thus, with respect to the Castillos’ wage and hour causes of action, the interests of Glenair and GCA are so intertwined as to put Glenair and GCA in the same relationship to the litigation here. Accordingly, we conclude they are in privity for purposes of the instant litigation.”² (*Ibid.*) Because they were in privity, res judicata applied. (*Id.* at p. 281.)

Castillo is on all fours with this case, as the dissent in the Court of Appeal makes clear. The facts in this case cannot be distinguished from the

¹ The Court in *Castillo* found that “Glenair was authorized by GCA and responsible for recording, reviewing and transmitting the Castillos’ time records to GCA” and “GCA paid the Castillos based on those time records.” (*Id.* at p. 280.) These contractual responsibilities mirror the responsibilities of FlexCare and Eisenhower here.

² The Court did not find Glenair and GCA were in privity for all purposes, but only where, in the case before it, “the subject matter of the litigation directly implicates the interdependent and close relationship of Glenair and GCA with respect to payment of wages.” (*Ibid.*)

facts in *Castillo*: (1) both the *Erlandsen* case and this case involve the same wage and hour causes of action arising from the same work performed by the same FlexCare employee (Grande) at FlexCare’s client company Eisenhower, which directly supervised the employee; (2) both FlexCare and Eisenhower were involved in and responsible for the payment of Grande’s wages—Eisenhower was authorized by FlexCare and responsible for recording, reviewing and transmitting Grande’s time records to FlexCare and FlexCare paid Grande based on those time records; and (3) by virtue of the *Erlandsen* settlement, Grande was compensated for any errors made in the payment of her wages (and also paid a \$20,000 enhancement). Thus, the analysis and holding in *Castillo* with regard to res judicata applies equally here.

2. The *Castillo* Court’s analysis of agency applies equally here

Although the *Castillo* Court found the elements of res judicata were satisfied, so that summary judgment was proper, the Court separately addressed whether “Glenair was an agent for GCA with respect to GCA’s payment of its employees, such as the Castillos.” (*Id.* at p. 281.) The Court was sure in its conclusion: “We conclude a reasonable trier of fact could not find otherwise. Accordingly, Glenair was a released party under the *Gomez* settlement agreement.” (*Ibid.*)

The undisputed facts that the *Castillo* Court found conclusive parallel the facts here, “namely that Glenair was an agent of GCA for the purpose of collecting, reviewing, and providing GCA’s employee time records to GCA so that GCA could properly pay its employees.” (*Ibid.*) The Court continued: “The evidence is undisputed that GCA authorized Glenair to collect, review, and transmit GCA employee time records to GCA. Thus, Glenair was authorized to represent, and did represent, GCA in its dealings with third parties, specifically GCA’s payment of wages to

its employees placed at Glenair.” (*Ibid.*, citing Civ. Code, § 2295; *Borders Online v. State Bd. of Equalization* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1187; *Garcia v. Pexco, LLC* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 782, 788 [in ordering case to arbitration, Court concluded staffing company and its client company were “agents of each other in their dealings with” the plaintiff].)

These same undisputed and conclusive facts are present here, between FlexCare as the staffing company and Eisenhower as its client company. Just as in *Castillo*, Eisenhower was an agent of FlexCare with regard to the payment of its employees, and therefore Grande released all of her claims against Eisenhower when she signed the settlement agreement and release in the *Erlandsen* case.

In *Castillo*, the Court of Appeal rejected the Castillos’ argument that there could be no agency because GCA did not generally control Glenair. The Court stated, “[i]t need not be shown that GCA generally controlled Glenair. Rather, it must be shown that GCA had the right to control Glenair with respect to the specific agency at issue, namely Glenair’s role in collecting, reviewing, and providing time records to GCA.” (*Castillo*, *supra*, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 282.)

Castillo’s analysis and holding with regard to agency applies equally and forcefully here. The majority opinion in *Grande* is at odds with *Castillo* and incorrect if either *Castillo*’s res judicata or agency conclusion is sound.

B. The Majority Court of Appeal Opinion Expressly Disregards the Reasoning and Holding in *Castillo*

The majority opinion in *Grande* attempts to distinguish the reasoning and holding in *Castillo*, but in the end, simply disagrees with it. It thus states that it is not bound by it. (See *Grande*, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 335-336.)

To start, before discussing privity the majority discusses the holding of *DKN Holdings* that, “a plaintiff may sue parties separately, whether they are independently liable or jointly and severally liable” (see *id.* at p. 333)—a holding which is not at issue in this appeal. Indeed, the majority acknowledges that res judicata may still apply even where parties may be jointly and severally liable. (*Ibid.*) The majority opinion goes on to quote the “basic test for privity” articulated by the Supreme Court in *DKN Holdings, supra*, 61 Cal.4th at p. 826, which test the *Castillo* Court also quoted and relied on. (*Ibid.*; see also *Castillo, supra*, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.)

But then *Grande* parts company with *Castillo*, concluding that because joint and several liability is not enough to create privity, therefore there was no privity between FlexCare and Eisenhower. The majority states its “departure from *Castillo* is justified because the court failed to apply the test for privity articulated in *DKN [Holdings]*.” (*Grande, supra*, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 336.) The problem with the majority’s reasoning is that not only does the *Castillo* opinion apply the test for privity articulated in *DKN Holdings* (see *Castillo, supra*, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 277), it also directly addresses the majority’s conclusion and rejects it. The *Castillo* Court reasoned:

Relying on *DKN Holdings, supra*, 61 Cal.4th 813, [citation], the Castillos contend that, “where parties were jointly and severally liable on an obligation, a judgment against one of such parties will not act as res judicata as to claims against the other party.” The Castillos overstate the reasoning in *DKN Holdings*. In *DKN Holdings*, our Supreme Court explained that “[j]oint and several liability *alone* does not create such a closely aligned interest between co-obligors.” (*Id.* at p. 826 [citations], italics added.) This case is distinguishable because, assuming Glenair and GCA are jointly and severally liable, our finding of privity does not rely on any such relationship. Rather, as explained above, Glenair and GCA are in privity for present purposes based

both on their interdependent relationship with respect to payment of the Castillos' wages as well as on the fact that this litigation revolves around alleged errors in the payment of the Castillos' wages. *DKN Holdings* does not preclude our conclusion here.

(*Castillo, supra*, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 280.)³

The majority also relies on *Serrano v. Aerotek, Inc.* (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 773 (*Serrano*) to explain why its conclusion that FlexCare and Eisenhower are joint and several obligors and yet not in privity "is the proper holding and why it should control this case." (*Grande, supra*, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 333-334.) But as the *Castillo* Court noted, "*Serrano* is procedurally, factually and legally distinct from the instant case." (*Castillo, supra*, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 286.) First, *Serrano* is fundamentally different: it only addresses agency, not privity, and it was not a res judicata case. (*Id.* at p. 285.) Second, the plaintiff in *Serrano* sued both the staffing company and client company together in the same lawsuit, alleging that the staffing company was directly liable for its clients' meal period violations. (*Id.* at p. 286.) Third, *Serrano* did not involve a pre-existing settlement and release that was approved by a court in a final judgment that released exactly the same claims alleged in the *Serrano* complaint. (*Ibid.*) The same factors that distinguish *Castillo* from *Serrano* also distinguish this case from *Serrano*. The majority was wrong to rely on *Serrano* rather than *Castillo*.

³In responding to the Castillos' petition for rehearing, the *Castillo* Court reiterated that *DKN Holdings* did not preclude its conclusion. The Court stated, "[a]gain, assuming Glenair and GCA are jointly and severally liable, we do not read *DKN Holdings* as creating an absolute bar against finding privity amongst parties who are also jointly and severally liable on a contract or as tortfeasors. Moreover, unlike *DKN Holdings*, this case does not involve a joint obligation on a contract, nor does it involve joint tortfeasors. (*Castillo, supra*, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 287.)

Finally, the majority was wrong to conclude that because it could not be shown that FlexCare generally controlled Eisenhower, there could be no agency relationship between them. (See *Grande*, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 339.) Again, as discussed above, *Castillo* addressed this argument on similar facts and rejected it. General agency is not required where specific agency can be shown as to the issue being litigated. The *Castillo* Court concluded: “Thus, because the undisputed facts demonstrate Glenair was an agent of GCA—specifically an agent with respect to GCA’s payment of wages to its employees—Glenair was a released party under the *Gomez* settlement agreement. Accordingly, the Castillos’ complaint against Glenair is barred and summary judgment was proper.” (*Castillo*, *supra*, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 282.) For this same reason, *Grande*’s complaint against Eisenhower is barred and the trial court should have entered judgment in favor of Eisenhower and FlexCare.

C. *Castillo* Was Correctly Decided, and the Court Should Grant Review to Resolve the Conflict Between the Districts

As shown above and as the dissent also stated, the majority should have followed *Castillo* as a matter of stare decisis. It states “clear rules on which parties on all sides can easily rely going forward.” (*Grande*, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 340, Ramirez, P.J., Dissenting.) *Castillo* is not “so plainly wrong as to justify creating a split of authority in this area.” (*Ibid.*)

The *Castillo* Court laid out the numerous public policy interests favoring the application of res judicata on the facts here:

[I]f the Castillos were permitted to pursue their causes of action here, they would undermine the finality of the bargained-for and court-approved *Gomez* settlement, waste judicial resources, and potentially obtain a double recovery on their already-settled claims. In addition, Glenair indicates that, if the Castillos were successful on their underlying claims, Glenair could seek indemnification from GCA, thus

reopening the same wage and hour claims GCA settled in *Gomez*. Although the Castillos correctly note the *Gomez* settlement did not award the plaintiffs there (including the Castillos) the full value of their claims and the court here could offset any potential double recovery in this case, their position overlooks the significance of the *Gomez* parties' bargained-for finality of the settlement agreement. Thus, in our view, "two fundamental policy considerations— promotion of judicial economy and protection of litigants from unnecessary litigation—are furthered by imposing res judicata as a bar to [the Castillos'] present action."

(*Castillo, supra*, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 286-287; see also *Kim v. Reins International California, Inc.* (Cal. March 12, 2020) Case No. S246911, Slip Op. at 19, quoting *Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co.* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896 [recognizing that the doctrine of res judicata " 'promotes judicial economy' because 'all claims based on the same cause of action must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be raised at a later date.' "].) Review should be granted to protect these public policy interests.

CONCLUSION

The majority opinion in *Grande* directly conflicts with the holding in *Castillo* on identical facts, as forcefully expressed by the dissent. Further, the majority opinion would inevitably lead to multiple lawsuits in different courts to litigate the same disputes that have been settled once. Because *Grande* creates a clear conflict in the law on a significant legal issue for employers and employees alike, Eisenhower urges the Court to grant this petition and resolve the important question of law it presents.

DATED: March 16, 2020

SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER &
HAMPTON LLP
A Limited Liability Partnership
Including Professional Corporations

By: /s/ Richard J. Simmons
RICHARD J. SIMMONS
KARIN DOUGAN VOGEL
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
EISENHOWER MEDICAL CENTER

**CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
(Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.504(d))**

The text of this Petition for Review consists of 5,165 words,
including all footnotes, as counted by the computer program used to
generate this petition.

DATED: March 16, 2020

SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER &
HAMPTON LLP
A Limited Liability Partnership
Including Professional Corporations

By: /s/ Richard J. Simmons
RICHARD J. SIMMONS
KARIN DOUGAN VOGEL
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
EISENHOWER MEDICAL
CENTER

PROOF OF SERVICE

Lynn Grande v. Eisenhower Medical Center

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and **not a party to this action**. I am employed in the County of San Diego, State of California. My business address is 501 West Broadway, 19th Floor, San Diego, CA 92101-3598.

On March 16, 2020, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as **PETITION FOR REVIEW** on the interested parties in this action as follows:

SERVICE LIST

Peter R. Dion-Kindem #95267 The Dion-Kindem Law Firm 21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 900 Woodland Hills, CA 91367	Attorneys for Respondent Lynne Grande
Lonnie Clifford Blanchard #93530 Blanchard Law Group, APC 3311 E. Pico Blvd. Los Angeles, CA 90023	Attorneys for Respondent Lynne Grande
Cassandra M. Ferrannini #204277 Bradley C. Carroll #300658 Downey Brand LLP 621 Capitol Mall, 18th Floor Sacramento, CA 95814	Attorneys for Intervenor Flexcare, LLC
California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division Two 3389 12 th Street Riverside, CA 92501	Superior Court of California County of Riverside 4050 Main Street Riverside, CA 92501-3704

BY MAIL: I enclosed the document(s) in a sealed envelope or package addressed to the persons at the addresses listed in the Service List and placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary

business practices. I am readily familiar with the firm's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid. I am a resident or employed in the county where the mailing occurred.

BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by e-mail or electronic transmission via Court's Electronic Filing System (EFS) operated by ImageSoft TrueFiling (TrueFiling), I provided the document(s) listed above electronically on the TRUE FILING Website to the parties on the Service List maintained on the TRUE FILING Website for this case, or on the attached Service List. TRUE FILING is the on-line e-service provider designated in this case. Participants in the case who are not registered TRUE FILING users will be served by mail or by other means permitted by the court rules.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on March 16, 2020, at San Diego, California.



Pamela Parker

OPINION

44 Cal.App.5th 1147
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Lynn GRANDE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
EISENHOWER MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant;
Flexcare, LLC, Intervener and Appellant.
Eisenhower Medical Center, Petitioner,
v.
The Superior Court of
Riverside County, Respondent;
Lynn Grande, Real Party in Interest.

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Filed 02/06/2020

Synopsis

Background: Nurse assigned to work at medical center by temporary staffing agency brought putative class action against medical center, asserting claims for wage and hour violations. Staffing agency intervened, asserting that nurse could not bring separate lawsuit against medical center because she had settled claims against them in prior class action against agency. Following bench trial on medical center's res judicata and waiver defenses, the Superior Court, Riverside County, No. RIC1514281, [Sharon J. Waters, J.](#), entered order based on its ruling that medical center was not a released party under settlement agreement for the previous class action and could not avail itself of doctrine of res judicata. Medical center appealed and filed petition for writ of mandate.

Holdings: The Court of Appeal, [Slough, J.](#), held that:

[1] res judicata did not bar the action, and

[2] medical center was not a released party under settlement agreement for previous lawsuit.

Affirmed; petition denied.

[Ramirez](#), Presiding Justice, filed dissenting opinion.

Procedural Posture(s): On Appeal; Judgment.

West Headnotes (17)

[1] **Appeal and Error**

🔑 De novo review

Appeal and Error

🔑 Judge as factfinder below

In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, Court of Appeal reviews questions of law de novo, and reviews the trial court's findings of fact for substantial evidence.

[2] **Appeal and Error**

🔑 Judge as factfinder below in general

In reviewing judgment based upon statement of decision following bench trial, Court of Appeal liberally construes findings of fact to support the judgment and considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings.

[3] **Parties**

🔑 Persons Who May Be Joined

Parties who are jointly and severally liable on an obligation, whether resulting from tort, breach of contract, or other obligation, may be sued in separate actions.

[4] **Judgment**

🔑 Nature and requisites of former recovery as bar in general

Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits in a prior litigation may prevent relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.

[5] **Judgment**

🔑 What constitutes privity in general

As applied to questions of issue and claim preclusion, privity requires the sharing of an identity or community of interest, with adequate representation of that interest in the first suit, and circumstances such that the nonparty should reasonably have expected to be bound by the first suit.

[6] Judgment

🔑 **What constitutes privity in general**

A nonparty alleged to be in privity, for res judicata purposes, must have an interest so similar to the party's interest that the party acted as the nonparty's virtual representative in the first action.

[7] Judgment

🔑 **Persons Not Parties or Privies**

Temporary nurse staffing agency and its client were not in privity, and thus, res judicata did not bar nurse's putative class action lawsuit, asserting claims for wage and hour violations that occurred during her employment at client's medical center, which were same claims that were asserted in previous suit against agency, since agency's and client's interests were not so close to identical that client should have reasonably been expected to be bound by the first suit.

[8] Judgment

🔑 **What constitutes privity in general**

What courts are required to ask in determining whether a party and nonparty are in privity for res judicata purposes is whether they shared an identity or community of interest, with adequate representation of that interest in the first suit, under circumstances where the nonparty should reasonably have expected to be bound by the first suit.

[9] Judgment

🔑 **Necessity in general**

First step in deciding whether res judicata, or claim preclusion, applies is to determine whether

the prior and current lawsuits involve the same causes of action, and it is only after court answers that question affirmatively that it gets to question of parties' relationship to the claim.

[10] Compromise and Settlement

🔑 **Construction of Agreement**

Settlement agreements incorporated into a judgment are construed under the rules governing the interpretations of contracts generally.

[11] Contracts

🔑 **Intention of Parties**

Basic goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties' mutual intent at the time of contracting.

[12] Contracts

🔑 **Language of contract**

When a contract is reduced to writing, the parties' intention is determined from the writing alone, if possible.

[13] Appeal and Error

🔑 **Construction, interpretation, and application in general**

When no extrinsic evidence is introduced, or when the competent extrinsic evidence is not in conflict, the appellate court independently construes the contract.

[14] Appeal and Error

🔑 **Construction, interpretation, and application in general**

When the competent extrinsic evidence is in conflict, and thus requires resolution of credibility issues, any reasonable construction of a contract following a trial will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence.

[15] Release

🔑 [Release of specific indebtedness or liability in general](#)

Temporary nurse staffing agency's client, a medical center, was not a "released party" under settlement agreement in which nurses released class wage and hour claims against agency and other categories of people and entities, as would preclude nurses' putative class action against client from proceeding in trial court where settlement's long list of "released parties," which included people and entities based on their relation to agency, such as affiliates, affiliated companies, and employees, could not reasonably be read to include clients, joint employers, joint obligors, or other similar language which could reasonably be read to include hospitals to which nurses had been assigned.

[16] Contracts

🔑 [Presumptions and burden of proof](#)

Where words in an agreement have a definite legal meaning, court presumes the parties intended them to have their ordinary legal meaning, unless a contrary intent appears in the instrument.

[17] Corporations and Business Organizations

🔑 [Related corporations in general](#)

Terms "affiliate" and "affiliated company" refer to a relationship that is closer than a mere arm's length contractual relationship.

Witkin Library Reference: 7 [Witkin, Cal. Procedure \(5th ed. 2008\) Judgment, § 457](#) [Test: Whether Party Is "Sufficiently Close."]

*326 APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. [Sharon J. Waters](#), Judge. Affirmed. (Super.Ct.No. RIC1514281)
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. [Sharon J. Waters](#), Judge. Petition denied.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Downey Brand, [Cassandra M. Ferrannini](#), and [Bradley C. Carroll](#), Sacramento, for Intervener and Appellant.

The Dion-Kindem Law Firm and [Peter R. Dion-Kindem](#), Woodland Hills; The Blanchard Law Group and [Lonnie C. Blanchard, III](#), for Plaintiff, Respondent, and Real Party in Interest.

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, [Richard J. Simmons](#), and [Ruben D. Escalante](#), Los Angeles, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Petitioner Eisenhower Medical Center.

No appearance for Respondent.

OPINION

SLOUGH, J.

*327 FlexCare, LLC (FlexCare), a temporary staffing agency, assigned Lynn Grande to work as a nurse at Eisenhower Medical Center (Eisenhower). According to Grande, during her employment at Eisenhower, FlexCare and Eisenhower failed to ensure she received her required meal and rest breaks, wages for certain periods she worked, and overtime wages.

Grande was a named plaintiff in a class action lawsuit against FlexCare brought on behalf of FlexCare employees assigned to hospitals throughout California. Her own claims were based solely on her work on assignment at Eisenhower. FlexCare settled with the class, including Grande, and Grande received \$162.13 for her injuries, plus a class representative incentive bonus of \$20,000. Grande executed a release of claims, and the trial court entered a judgment incorporating the settlement agreement.

About a year later, Grande brought a second class action alleging the same labor law violations, this time against Eisenhower, who was not a party to the previous lawsuit. FlexCare intervened in the action asserting Grande could not bring the separate lawsuit against Eisenhower because she had settled her claims against them in the prior class action. The trial court held a trial limited to questions as to the propriety of the lawsuit, and ruled Eisenhower was not a released party under the settlement agreement and could not avail itself of the doctrine of res judicata because the hospital

was neither a party to the prior litigation nor in privity with FlexCare.

Eisenhower filed a petition for a writ of mandate and FlexCare appealed the trial court's interlocutory order. We affirm the trial court and deny the petition because Eisenhower and FlexCare were not in privity, preventing Eisenhower from blocking Grande's claims under the doctrine of *res judicata*, and Eisenhower was not a released party under the settlement agreement.

I

FACTS

A. *The Parties and the Lawsuits*

FlexCare is a temporary nurse staffing agency which employs nurses and assigns them to work on a temporary basis as supplemental staff at California hospitals. FlexCare serves nearly 200 hospitals in California, and Eisenhower was one of those clients. FlexCare employed Grande and assigned her to Eisenhower, where she worked from February 6 to February 14, 2012.

FlexCare and Eisenhower defined their respective relationships to the temporary nurses in a contract called a staffing agreement. According to the agreement, nurses were employees of FlexCare and not employees of the hospital. The agreement gave FlexCare “exclusive and total legal responsibility as the employer of Staff ... includ[ing], but not ... limited to, the obligation to ensure full compliance *328 with and satisfaction of (1) all state and federal payroll, income and unemployment tax requirements, (2) all state and federal wage and hour requirements, (3) all workers' compensation insurance requirements, (4) overtime, premium pay and all employee benefits, and (5) all other applicable state and federal employment law requirements arising from [FlexCare's] employment of Staff, the assignment of Staff to [Eisenhower] and/or the actual work of Staff at [Eisenhower].” FlexCare was also responsible for screening candidates for placement and ensuring they met certain minimum standards.

However, Eisenhower maintained control over the temporary nurses in the performance of their jobs. The hospital assessed their competency during an orientation program. The hospital also could require nurses to take its medication and clinical skills test. It also retained discretion to make decisions

about the nurses' assignments and to terminate nurses for poor performance. Finally, the agreement required nurses to conform with hospital policies and procedures.

Under the staffing agreement, Eisenhower paid FlexCare based on the hours the temporary nurses worked. FlexCare in turn paid nurses under their separate travel nurse agreements. The staffing agreement required temporary nurses to use the hospital's time and attendance system. The travel nurse agreement required Grande to report her hours worked to FlexCare after obtaining approval from Eisenhower. Specifically, the contract said she must “accurately report actual hours worked and fax or e-mail time sheet weekly with appropriate facility representative and Consultant signature.”

The rate schedule attached to the staffing agreement provided Eisenhower would pay FlexCare \$71 per hour for registered nurses, plus overtime of \$20 per hour for hours worked in excess of 12 hours in a day. Under the travel nurse's agreement, FlexCare would pay Grande a base rate of \$26.40 per hour, \$39.60 per hour for hours worked over 40 hours in a week, and \$50 per hour after working 48 hours in a week. She was also to receive a \$497 weekly meals and incidentals per diem and a weekly housing per diem of \$805. Her per diem payments could be reduced if she failed to work at least 48 hours per week.

The staffing agreement also purported to define the relationship between FlexCare and Eisenhower. First, it stipulated there was no agency relationship between the parties. “[FlexCare] is performing the services and duties hereunder as an independent contractor and not as an employee, agent, partner or joint venture with Hospital. Hospital retains professional and administrative responsibility for the services rendered.” Second, the agreement required FlexCare to indemnify Eisenhower under certain circumstances—for claims and losses in connection with any FlexCare breach of the agreement or violation of statute or regulation, except those resulting from FlexCare's negligence,¹ as well as for claims and losses predicated on a finding temporary nurses were joint employees of FlexCare and Eisenhower.

¹ The provision is not a paragon of contractual draftsmanship. It says FlexCare agrees “to indemnify and hold harmless Hospital ... from any and all claims, losses, demands, fees, attorneys fees or expenses, causes of action, costs, damages, and expenses ... resulting from or arising in connection

with any breach by [FlexCare] of any provision of this Agreement, the violation of any statute, rule, regulation, or order or an intentional, reckless, or negligent act or omission by [FlexCare], other than [those] that arise out of or are attributable to the negligent act or omission of [FlexCare].”

After her assignment with Eisenhower ended, Grande brought claims for wage *329 and hour violations, first against FlexCare, and later—separately—against Eisenhower. In both cases, she alleged failures on the part of the defendants to pay wages earned, to provide lawful meal and rest periods, to pay wages for meal and rest periods, to pay waiting time wages, and to provide required itemized wage statements. Both complaints alleged violations of various provisions of the Labor Code and violations of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) with the labor violations as predicates.

Both cases were purported class actions. In the first, filed in Santa Barbara County Superior Court by a coplaintiff on January 30, 2012, the named plaintiffs purported to represent all persons who were nonexempt nursing employees of FlexCare beginning January 30, 2008. The class consisted of all nurses FlexCare employed and assigned to work at any health care facility in California. The original named plaintiff was employed by FlexCare and assigned to work at the Lompoc Valley Medical Center, and based her claims on her treatment during that assignment. The complaint in the Santa Barbara action was amended to add Grande as a named plaintiff, and her allegations were based on her employment at Eisenhower. But Eisenhower didn't intervene and was never made a defendant in the Santa Barbara case.

In December 2015, Grande filed a second putative class action in Riverside County Superior Court, this time alleging claims against Eisenhower. In the Riverside case, Grande purported to represent all persons who were “non-exempt employees who were staffed by [Eisenhower] through third party registries, temporary employment services, temporary employment agencies, staffing agencies and services, or other employment agencies.” Thus, in contrast to the Santa Barbara case, the class consisted of all nurses *any staffing agency* employed and assigned to work specifically *at Eisenhower*. The class period differed too; in the Riverside case it covered claims arising from December 2011 to the date of trial. Like the Santa Barbara case, however, Grande's individual claims were based on her work at Eisenhower from February 6 to February 14, 2012, and asserted a UCL claim based on the

same predicate wage and hour violations. Neither FlexCare nor any other staffing agency was named as a defendant.

B. *Settlement of the Santa Barbara Case*

The Santa Barbara case settled before the Riverside case commenced. In January 2014, the parties entered an agreement under which FlexCare agreed to pay up to \$750,000 to the class. The settlement included a stipulation that Grande and her coplaintiff represented a certified class of “[a]ll persons who at any time from or after January 30, 2008 through the date of Preliminary Approval were non-exempt nursing employees of FlexCare, LLC employed in California.” After the claims administration process, FlexCare paid approximately \$700,000. Grande signed the settlement agreement and received \$20,000 as a representative incentive award plus \$162.13 (net of taxes) as a class member. The settlement was incorporated into a final judgment on April 8, 2015.

The final judgment ordered “the Released Claims of each and every Class member and Settlement Class Member, respectively, are and shall be deemed to be conclusively released as against the Released Parties,” and “All Class members, as of the Effective Date, are hereby forever barred and enjoined from prosecuting Released Claims against the Released Parties.” The agreement defines the “Released Claims” as “any and all claims ... which have been or could have reasonably *330 been asserted in the [Santa Barbara] Action or in any other state or federal court, administrative tribunal, or in arbitration or similar proceeding, based upon, or arising out of, or related to the allegations in the [Santa Barbara] Action during the Class Period.”

The settlement named as “Released Parties” FlexCare and the other named defendants, who were affiliates and officers of FlexCare. The settlement also included standard language releasing the named defendants’ “present and former subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, related or affiliated companies, parent companies, franchisors, franchisees, shareholders, and attorneys, and their respective successors and predecessors in interest, all of their respective officers, directors, employees, administrators, fiduciaries, trustees and agents, and each of their past, present and future officers, directors, shareholders, employees, agents, principals, heirs, representatives, accountants, auditors, consultants, insurers and reinsurers, and their counsel of record.” The settlement did not release Eisenhower or any other client of FlexCare by name, nor did it release the category of FlexCare's clients.

An attorney for the Santa Barbara plaintiffs later testified FlexCare's potential liability in the Santa Barbara action was "in excess of \$10 million" and said FlexCare's counsel provided evidence to plaintiffs' counsel showing "they would not have the ability to pay any large judgment substantially in excess of the settlement amount." The plaintiffs agreed to the lesser settlement amount of \$750,000, based on FlexCare's "financial viability." The settlement contains a statement that, in addition to the standard concerns about the expense, duration, and uncertainty of litigation, the "Named Plaintiffs and Class Counsel also have taken into account ... the difficulties and delays inherent in such litigation, including the financial ability of the Defendants to respond to any judgment that may be obtained against them if the claims are successful." An attorney for the Santa Barbara plaintiffs later testified his clients did not intend to release Eisenhower. However, a FlexCare representative testified he did intend the release to extend to Eisenhower. He said the release was intended to mean FlexCare was "done with this ... done with all of it for everybody."

C. The Dispute Over the Effect of the Santa Barbara Settlement on this Case

A month after Grande filed this case, Eisenhower demanded FlexCare indemnify it against her claims. Eisenhower's counsel sent FlexCare a letter along with the complaint and the staffing agreement between the two companies. They pointed out FlexCare "expressly agreed to 'hold [Eisenhower] harmless, pay the entire cost of [Eisenhower's] legal defense, and fully indemnify [Eisenhower] against any and all legal claims asserted against [Eisenhower] or [Eisenhower's] employees, and/or liability imposed against [Eisenhower] or [Eisenhower's] employees that are predicated in any matter [*sic*] on a finding by any court, enforcement agency, government entity, arbitrator or other adjudicator that Staff are joint employees of [FlexCare] and [Eisenhower].'" Eisenhower asserted Grande's claims were based on both companies' "alleged failure to fulfill its obligations under the Labor Code as Plaintiff's and other proposed class members' joint employers," and therefore "request[ed] that FlexCare indemnify and hold Eisenhower harmless for the claims made against it by Plaintiff, including the payment of its defense costs," under the terms of their staffing agreement.

*331 FlexCare intervened in the Riverside case and sought a declaration that (1) Eisenhower was a released party under the Santa Barbara settlement and (2) the judgment in Santa Barbara precludes Grande's causes of action against Eisenhower in Riverside. On Eisenhower's motion, the trial

court bifurcated the released party and res judicata issues from all other issues and held a limited bench trial.

After trial, the court ruled Eisenhower was not a released party. The court reached that conclusion based on the language of the settlement, which did not mention Eisenhower or the category of FlexCare's hospital clients. Instead, the settlement named FlexCare, its officers and a corporate alter ego, and then added standard settlement language to release general categories of people and groups, like affiliated companies, principals or agents of FlexCare. The court held Eisenhower didn't fit any of these categories; most pertinent to this appeal, the court concluded Eisenhower was not a "related or affiliated company" or an "agent" of FlexCare under the Released Parties clause of the settlement.

The court also ruled Grande's claims against Eisenhower were not barred by res judicata because Eisenhower was not in privity with FlexCare. It noted the complaint alleged the two companies were joint employers, who typically are jointly and severally liable. The agreement also indicates independent, but joint and several liability. Since the Supreme Court had recently held joint and several obligors are not considered to be in privity for purposes of res judicata, the court concluded FlexCare and Eisenhower weren't in privity and res judicata didn't preclude Grande's second lawsuit against Eisenhower. The court therefore entered judgment in favor of Grande and against FlexCare on FlexCare's complaint in intervention.

FlexCare appealed. At Eisenhower's request, the trial court certified its statement of decision as appropriate for writ review. (*Code Civ. Proc.*, § 166.1.) Eisenhower filed a petition for writ of mandate. This court stayed proceedings in the trial court and consolidated the appeal with the writ proceeding.

II

ANALYSIS

FlexCare and Eisenhower found their arguments for reversal on the claim that the trial court erred in concluding Eisenhower was neither an affiliated company nor an agent of FlexCare. They argue the companies' relationship establishes both that Eisenhower was a released party under the agreement and that the parties were in privity. They argue that means the judgment in the Santa Barbara case both bars (under the settlement) and precludes (under res judicata) Grande's claims against Eisenhower in this case.

[1] [2] “In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo, and we review the trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence.” (*Durante v. County of Santa Clara* (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 839, 842, 240 Cal.Rptr.3d 302.) We liberally construe findings of fact “to support the judgment and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings.” (*Ibid.*)

A. Res Judicata Does Not Apply Because the Companies Are Not in Privity

According to the Restatement Second of Judgments, a “judgment against one person liable for a loss does not terminate a claim that the injured party may have *332 against another person who may be liable therefor.” (Rest.2d Judg., § 49.) “When the claimant thus brings consecutive actions against different persons liable for the same harm, the rendition of the judgment in the first action does not terminate the claims against other persons who may be liable for the loss in question. The judgment itself has the effect of officially confirming the defendant’s obligation to make redress, an obligation which under the substantive law co-exists with that of the other obligor. No reason suggests itself why the legal confirmation of one obligation should limit or extinguish the other.” (*Id.*, com. a.)

[3] Our Supreme Court recently recognized this as “a bedrock principle of contract law.” (*DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 818, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809, 352 P.3d 378 (*DKN*)). “Parties who are jointly and severally liable on an obligation may be sued in separate actions.” (*Ibid.*) “It has long been settled that contracting parties who are severally liable, or subject to joint and several liability, may be sued in the same action or in separate actions at the plaintiff’s option. [Citations.] The plaintiff ‘does not lose the right to the several liability of a several obligor until the obligation is fully satisfied,’ notwithstanding that he may have obtained a judgment against other severally liable obligors.” (*Id.* at p. 820, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809, 352 P.3d 378.) The rule is not limited to contract claims. “The rule that there are separate claims against each obligor applies whether the obligation results from a tort, a breach of contract, or other obligation.” (Rest.2d Judg., § 49, com. a.)

As the Supreme Court explained in *DKN*, the rule used to be different. “At common law, when multiple parties promised the same performance, they were presumed to be jointly

obligated absent a clear indication otherwise. [Citation.] Parties who are jointly liable are each responsible for their share of a total obligation. When enforcement was sought, the common law rule required that *all* jointly liable parties be joined in a single suit that would determine the total amount of their shared liability.” (*DKN, supra*, 61 Cal.4th at p. 820, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809, 352 P.3d 378.) However, the old compulsory joinder rule had unwanted results, most notably that some plaintiffs couldn’t obtain relief because they couldn’t reach all the jointly liable parties. (*Ibid.*) “California and nearly all other states have passed statutes to ameliorate the harshness of the common law’s compulsory joinder rule. [Citation.] The typical solution was to convert ‘joint’ obligations into ‘joint and several’ obligations.” (*Ibid.*)

As the Restatement explains, the older rules under which “rendition of judgment against one of several obligors sometimes had the effect of extinguishing a claim against another ... [were] based on the notion that a ‘joint’ obligation could be enforced only through a single action, and so an action against one of the obligors was deemed to result in merger of the claim in the judgment. Other rules having like effect were expressed in terms of requiring an ‘election of remedies.’ Both types of rules were often justified as a means of preventing double recovery for the loss involved. These rules are now obsolete. Double recovery is foreclosed by the rule that only one satisfaction may be obtained for a loss that is the subject of two or more judgments. [Citation.] Requiring that a single action be brought or that the injured party make an election of remedies also formerly had justification insofar as it precluded relitigation of matters previously adjudicated, particularly the issue of the amount of damages sustained. This objective is now accomplished by the modern rule that a claimant may not relitigate *333 issues determined adversely to him in a prior action against another adversary, including issues relating to the damage he has sustained.” (Rest.2d Judg., § 49, com. a.) California has adopted these modern rules against double recovery and relitigation of issues decided adversely against a party. (E.g., *Milicevich v. Sacramento Medical Center* (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 997, 1001-1003, 202 Cal.Rptr. 484; *Vandenberg v. Superior Court* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 828, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 366, 982 P.2d 229.)

[4] Thus, the general rule is a plaintiff may sue parties separately, whether they are independently liable or jointly and severally liable. Under the doctrine of res judicata, however, a final judgment on the merits in a prior litigation may “prevent[] relitigation of the same cause of action in

a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.” (*Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co.* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 51 P.3d 297.) Thus, a defendant not party to a prior lawsuit may bar subsequent litigation of a claim already decided in the prior case against another defendant. Such preclusion is appropriate only where the two defendants are in “privity.”

[5] [6] The Supreme Court articulated the basic test for privity in *DKN*. “As applied to questions of preclusion, privity requires the sharing of ‘an identity or community of interest,’ with ‘adequate representation’ of that interest in the first suit, and circumstances such that the nonparty ‘should reasonably have expected to be bound’ by the first suit. [Citation.] A nonparty alleged to be in privity must have an interest so similar to the party’s interest that the party acted as the nonparty’s ‘ ‘virtual representative’ ’ in the first action.” (*DKN, supra*, 61 Cal.4th at p. 826, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809, 352 P.3d 378.) We conclude FlexCare and Eisenhower don’t stand in that kind of relationship.

For starters, the Supreme Court held in *DKN* the fact that two parties are joint and several obligors is not enough to put them in privity for purposes of issue or claim preclusion. (*DKN, supra*, 61 Cal.4th at p. 826, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809, 352 P.3d 378.) That is so because “[t]he liability of each joint and several obligor is separate and independent, not vicarious or derivative.” (*Ibid.*) This holding is binding on us.

The recent decision in *Serrano v. Aerotek, Inc.* (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 773, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 802 (*Serrano*) explains why this is the proper holding and why it should control this case. In *Serrano*, Aerotek was a staffing agency and placed temporary employees, like Serrano, with clients, like Bay Bread. Aerotek had in place an employee handbook, which set out, among other things, the agency’s meal break policy for the temporary employees it placed with Bay Bread and other employers. Bay Bread had its own meal break policy for its own employees, which differed. In practice, Bay Bread required Aerotek employees to follow Bay Bread’s policy, with the result that the plaintiff and others did not receive meal breaks consistent with California employment law. Serrano filed a class action lawsuit against Aerotek and Bay Bread alleging meal break violations. (*Id.* at p. 778, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 802.) The trial court granted summary judgment in Aerotek’s favor based on the undisputed evidence it “provided Serrano with compliant meal periods, based on evidence that it ‘adopted a lawful meal period policy’ ” which Serrano had received and Serrano’s statement that she was

“unaware of any actions taken by Aerotek to prevent her from taking meal periods.” (*Id.* at p. 780, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 802.) The undisputed evidence also showed Aerotek’s contract with Bay Bread required the client company to comply with applicable laws and Aerotek trained its temporary *334 employees on meal breaks and required them to notify it if they were being prevented from taking meal breaks. The court concluded nothing more is required of staffing agencies when they provide temporary employees to other companies, so it granted summary judgment for Aerotek. (*Id.* at pp. 780-781, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 802.)

Serrano argued the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because Aerotek could be vicariously liable for Bay Bread’s separate violations. (*Serrano, supra*, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 782, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 802.) The Court of Appeal assumed, without deciding, that the two companies were joint employers, but concluded “whether an employer is liable for a coemployer’s violations depends on the scope of the employer’s own duty under the relevant statutes, not ‘principles of agency or joint and several liability.’ ” (*Id.* at p. 784, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 802.) The court therefore concluded Aerotek could be liable only for its own breach of duty, not vicariously based on a joint employer’s liability.

Serrano teaches that joint employers are not vicariously liable for each other’s Labor Code violations, but liable for their own conduct. One result here, as in *Serrano*, is that staffing agencies and their clients are likely to have very different interests in defending against wage and hour claims. One joint employer can escape liability by pursuing a factual defense even though that defense leaves the other joint employer exposed to liability. The difference in incentives precludes finding the companies are adequate representatives for privity purposes. Here, FlexCare could have gone to trial in the Santa Barbara case defending itself on the theory that Eisenhower committed the wage and hour violations, while it had fulfilled its own duties to its employees. Eisenhower could not be bound by such a finding under the doctrine of issue preclusion precisely because the two companies’ legal interests diverged. In other words, FlexCare and Eisenhower were not closely enough aligned to be in privity. (*DKN, supra*, 61 Cal.4th at p. 826, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809, 352 P.3d 378.)

[7] The fact that the staffing agreement requires FlexCare to indemnify Eisenhower under some circumstances does not change the analysis. Those provisions of the staffing agreement put FlexCare and Eisenhower at legal odds with each other as much as they bring them together. Eisenhower

has telegraphed its intent to argue in this case that FlexCare must indemnify it against any liability based on a finding that the two parties were joint employers. FlexCare's incentive is to establish Eisenhower is liable under a theory that doesn't implicate the indemnity clause. Ultimately, FlexCare may fail to do so, but it is clear the two companies have disparate legal interests in the case and cannot act as each other's virtual representatives.

Res judicata may bar a claim brought against an indemnitee where the same claim has already been pursued against the indemnitor. However, that rule applies only “when the indemnitor is, in the first action, acting *in its capacity as indemnitor*. If the indemnitor is sued for its own actions and is not sued as an indemnitor for the acts of another, the rationale favoring preclusion no longer holds.” (*F.T.C. v. Garvey* (9th Cir. 2004) 383 F.3d 891, 898.) Here Grande sued FlexCare based on labor law violations FlexCare committed on its own. She didn't allege it was derivatively or vicariously liable as Eisenhower's indemnitor.

FlexCare and Eisenhower argue we should find them in privity with each other because their status as joint employers means they are agents of each other. They rely for this position on *335 *Garcia v. Pexco* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 782, 788, 217 Cal.Rptr.3d 793 (*Garcia*), but the case is inapposite. *Garcia* involved an attempt by a nonparty to enforce an arbitration clause in an employment agreement. The Court of Appeal recognized an exception to the general rule against allowing such nonparty enforcement “when a plaintiff *alleges* a defendant acted as an agent of a party to an arbitration agreement.” (*Ibid.*, italics added.) In *Garcia*, the plaintiff affirmatively alleged the party and the nonparty were “acting as agents of one another.” (*Ibid.*) Here, Grande's pleadings don't allege the companies stand in an agency relationship. Moreover, because we are reviewing a judgment after a bench trial rather than interpreting an arbitration agreement, we're not concerned with the pleadings, but the actual relationship of the two companies. (*Durante v. County of Santa Clara*, *supra*, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 842, 240 Cal.Rptr.3d 302.) Thus, the limited holding of *Garcia* has no bearing on the issue presented in this case.

As to the actual relationship of the companies, the trial court found, in the context of interpreting the settlement agreement, that neither FlexCare nor Eisenhower was an agent of the other. As the court noted, “ “[W]hether an agency relationship has been created or exists is determined by the relation of the parties as they in fact exist by

agreement or acts [citation], and the primary right of control is particularly persuasive.” ’ ’ (Statement of Decision, p. 17, quoting *Jackson v. AEG Live, LLC* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1184, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 394.) Here, FlexCare and Eisenhower affirmatively disavowed any agency relationship in their contract, which says FlexCare “is performing the services and duties hereunder as an independent contractor and not as an employee, agent, partner or joint venture with Hospital.” The contract notes specifically “[Eisenhower] retains professional and administrative responsibility for the services rendered.” Moreover, as the trial court noted, there was no evidence Eisenhower ever acted as FlexCare's agent or vice versa. On the contrary, Eisenhower maintained control over the temporary nurses in the performance of their jobs. It assessed their competency during an orientation program, could require nurses to take its medication and clinical skills test, and retained discretion to make decisions about the nurses' assignments and to terminate nurses for poor performance. In addition, the staffing agreement made clear nurses were required to conform with hospital's policies and procedures. These facts show FlexCare and Eisenhower operated independently, and constitute substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding that neither company was an agent of the other.

Finally, FlexCare and Eisenhower argue we should follow the recent decision of *Castillo v. Glenair, Inc.* (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 262, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 844 (*Castillo*). There, the Second District, Division Two held a class of workers cannot “bring a lawsuit against a staffing company, settle that lawsuit, and then bring identical claims against the company where they had been placed to work.” (*Id.* at p. 266, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 844.) The Second District concluded the staffing agency and the client were in privity with each other for purposes of the wage and hour claims. (*Ibid.*)

We are not bound by the decision of the Second District. (*The MEGA Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Superior Court* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1529, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 399; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 498, pp. 558-559.) However, because stare decisis serves the important interests of stability in the law and predictability of decisions, we ordinarily follow the decisions of other districts, unless *336 we have good reason to disagree. (*Ibid.*) In this case, departure from *Castillo* is justified because the court failed to apply the test for privity articulated in *DKN*. As a result, its conclusion that the staffing agency and its client were in privity is not supported.

[8] What courts are required to ask in determining whether a party and nonparty are in privity is whether they shared “ ‘an identity or community of interest,’ with ‘adequate representation’ of that interest in the first suit,” under circumstances where the nonparty “ ‘should reasonably have expected to be bound’ by the first suit.” (*DKN, supra*, 61 Cal.4th at p. 826, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809, 352 P.3d 378.) The *Castillo* court didn't ask that question. Instead, following *Cal Sierra Development, Inc. v. George Reed, Inc.* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 663, 223 Cal.Rptr.3d 506, the court asked whether the “subject matter of the litigation ... was the same as that at the center of the [prior] dispute” and whether the party and the nonparty “shared the same relationship to the subject matter.”² (*Castillo, supra*, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 279, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 844.) Employing that standard, the court concluded the two companies were in privity because “[t]he subject matter of this litigation is the same as the subject matter of the [prior, settled] *Gomez* litigation—namely, both cases involve the same wage and hour causes of action arising from the same work performed by the same [staffing agency] employees (the Castillos) at [the staffing agency's] client company” (*id.* at pp. 279-280, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 844) and both the client and the staffing agency “were involved in and responsible for payment of the Castillos' wages.” (*Id.* at p. 280, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 844.)

² The test *Castillo* applies traces to an aside in a South Carolina Supreme Court case. (See *Cal Sierra Development, Inc. v. George Reed, Inc., supra*, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 674, 223 Cal.Rptr.3d 506, citing *Manning v. South Carolina Dept. of Highway and Public Transportation* (4th Cir. 1990) 914 F.2d 44, 48.) But the test isn't properly a test for privity even in South Carolina. That state's Supreme Court wrote, “The term ‘privity,’ when applied to a judgment or decree, means one so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right. One in privity is one whose legal interests were litigated in the former proceeding.” (*Richburg v. Baughman* (1986) 290 S.C. 431, 351 S.E.2d 164, 166.) The language certain courts have plucked from *Richburg* emphasized that privity “does not embrace relationships between persons or entities, but rather it deals with a person's relationship to the subject matter of the litigation” only in response to the litigants' argument that a parent and child were

in privity with each other just by virtue of their relationship to each other. (*Ibid.*)

[9] Respectfully, this is not the correct analysis. The first step in deciding whether res judicata (claim preclusion) applies is to determine whether the prior and current lawsuits involve the same causes of action. (*Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., supra*, 28 Cal.4th at p. 896, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 51 P.3d 297.) It's only after we answer that question affirmatively, that we get to the question of the parties' relationship to the claim. If the person or entity seeking preclusive effect was not a party to the first litigation, we must then focus on their relationship to the party and the subject matter of the litigation, asking whether their interests are *so close to identical* that the nonparty should have reasonably expected to be bound by the prior judgment even though not a party. By focusing overmuch on whether the subject matter of the litigation is the same, the *Castillo* court nearly collapses the second element (same parties) into the first (same claims). The court then justified finding a sufficiently close relationship on the fact that both companies were involved in paying the plaintiffs their wages. That's simply not a *337 sufficient basis for finding a client and staffing agency to be in privity. As the court explained in *Serrano*, a staffing agency and a client may both be “involved in” the payment of wages, yet be independently liable for wage and hour violations. We therefore depart from the reasoning in *Castillo*, conclude FlexCare and Eisenhower were not in privity, and affirm the trial court.

B. Eisenhower is Not a Released Party under the Settlement Agreement

Eisenhower and FlexCare also argue the trial court erred by determining Eisenhower was not a released party under the settlement agreement.

[10] [11] [12] [13] [14] Settlement agreements incorporated into a judgment are construed under the rules governing the interpretations of contracts generally. (*In re Marriage of Iberti* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 766.) “The basic goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties' mutual intent at the time of contracting. [Citations.] When a contract is reduced to writing, the parties' intention is determined from the writing alone, if possible.” (*Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc.* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 955, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505.) “When no extrinsic evidence is introduced, or when the competent extrinsic evidence is not in conflict, the appellate court

independently construes the contract. [Citations.] When the competent extrinsic evidence is in conflict, and thus requires resolution of credibility issues, any reasonable construction [following a trial] will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence.” (*Iqbal v. Ziadah* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1, 8, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 684 (*Iqbal*).

Under these familiar standards, the question we must decide is whether the language of the release shows the parties intended to release Eisenhower and other hospital clients of FlexCare. The settlement release clause says the “Class Members release the Released Parties from the Released Claims. Class Members agree not to sue or otherwise make a claim against any of the Released Parties that is in any way related to the Released Claims.” If the settlement defined “Released Party” by naming Eisenhower, as it named FlexCare and several other individual parties, we would have to conclude Grande had settled her claims against the hospital. But the definition of “Released Parties” doesn’t do that. It names “FlexCare, LLC, Vantus, LLC, Christopher Truxal, Travis Mannon, Michael Kenji Fields, and Nathan Porter” as the parties subject to the release.

[15] The settlement includes a long list of categories of people and entities who also fall within the definition of “Released Parties” based on their relationship to the named parties. Also released are “all present and former subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, related or affiliated companies, parent companies, franchisors, franchisees, shareholders, and attorneys, and their respective successors and predecessors in interest, all of their respective officers, directors, employees, administrators, fiduciaries, trustees and agents, and each of their past, present and future officers, directors, shareholders, employees, agents, principals, heirs, representatives, accountants, auditors, consultants, insurers and reinsurers, and their counsel of record.” Despite the broad language, none of the categories appears broad enough to encompass FlexCare’s clients as a group.

The list does not include words such as clients, joint employers, joint obligors, or other similar language which could reasonably be read to include the hospitals to which the plaintiff class members had been assigned. As Grande points out, if FlexCare *338 and the class representatives had intended to release Eisenhower, they could have included as a Released Party, “any client of FlexCare as to whom any class member may have provided services through FlexCare.” The fact that they did not do so weighs in favor of finding Eisenhower was not released. (*Hess v. Ford Motor Co.* (2002)

27 Cal.4th 516, 527, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 220, 41 P.3d 46 [“The failure of the Release to specifically name Ford even though the signatories to the Release had counsel and were aware of [plaintiff’s] claims against Ford also suggests that the Release did not cover those claims”].)

FlexCare and Eisenhower argue the definition of Released Parties does include Eisenhower—and presumably the other hospital clients—because it releases FlexCare’s “related or affiliated companies.” They argue Eisenhower was a related or affiliated company because they were “connected” in some way, namely in that FlexCare provided temporary nursing staff to Eisenhower under a contract. Under settled principles of contractual interpretation, Eisenhower would be protected against liability under the release only if Grande and FlexCare intended to cover Eisenhower as one of the parties’ affiliates. (*Iqbal, supra*, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 9, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 684.)

[16] [17] Where words have a definite legal meaning, we presume the parties intended them to have their ordinary legal meaning, unless a contrary intent appears in the instrument. (*Weinreich Estate Co. v. A.J. Johnston Co.* (1915) 28 Cal.App. 144, 146, 151 P. 667 [“legal terms are to be given their legal meaning unless obviously used in a different sense”].) The term “affiliate company” is known to mean a “[c]ompany effectively controlled by another company. A branch, division, or subsidiary.” (Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) p. 58.) Other sources confirm the same meaning for the term “affiliate.” (See *Iqbal, supra*, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 9, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 684 [collecting sources which “indicate the common meaning of an affiliate generally is one who is dependent upon, subordinate to, an agent of, or part of a larger or more established organization or group”].) We conclude the terms “affiliate” and “affiliated company” are unambiguous and “refer[] to a relationship that is closer than a mere arm’s length contractual relationship.” (*Ibid.*; see also *Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2009) 569 F.3d 946, 955 [“The plain and ordinary meaning of ‘affiliate’ supports this definition as ‘a company effectively controlled by another or associated with others under common ownership or control’”].)

There is no indication in the settlement agreement or otherwise that the parties had some other meaning in mind. It is plain from the staffing agreement, the stipulation, and other extrinsic evidence that the two companies are not related or affiliated in this sense. Indeed, the parties stipulated specifically that Eisenhower was not a division, subsidiary, parent, franchisor, franchisee, or shareholder of the named

released parties. Under the uncontested facts of the case, then, Eisenhower and FlexCare are not affiliated companies as a matter of law.

Nor can the inclusion of the term “related,” in the category “related or affiliated company” expand the meaning of the phrase to include the relationship FlexCare and Eisenhower did have—a contractual relationship for the supply of temporary workers. “Related company” means essentially the same thing as “affiliated company.” (Cambridge Business English Dictionary [defining “related company” as “a company that controls or is controlled by another company, often one that is in the same business group”].)

***339** FlexCare and Eisenhower also argue Eisenhower was a released party because it was a principal or agent of FlexCare. They base their argument largely on the assertion that the trial court assumed they were joint employers and the court in *Garcia, supra*, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 788, 217 Cal.Rptr.3d 793, held joint employers are necessarily agents of each other. As we discussed above, this argument is not persuasive. *Garcia* does not stand for the proposition that joint employers are agents of each other as a matter of law.

It's important to read all these terms in the context of the entire list of released parties. Courts should adopt a restrictive meaning of a listed item if acceptance of a broader meaning would make the item markedly dissimilar to the other items in the list. (*People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 307, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855, 926 P.2d 1042.) A corollary holds “ ‘ “[w]here general words follow the enumeration of particular kinds or classes of persons or things, the general words will, unless a contrary intent is manifested, be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those specifically enumerated.” ’ ” (*Huverserian v. Catalina Scuba Luv, Inc.* (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1468-1469, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 112.) Here, the release begins by listing specific entities and persons. Besides FlexCare, it specifically releases the company's corporate parent as well as partners and officers of the company. The general terms that follow—subsidiaries, divisions, parent companies, shareholders, attorneys, officers, directors, employees, administrators, fiduciaries, and trustees—identify categories of persons or entities who, like the specifically named parties, either exercise control over FlexCare or act on their behalf. Thus, construing the terms “affiliate,” “related or affiliated companies,” and “agents” more broadly than their standard legal sense is inconsistent with the definition of Released Party as a whole.

The trial evidence also weighs against concluding the parties were in a principal-agent relationship. “Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” (*Rest.3d Agency, § 1.01.*) The trial court concluded there was no evidence Eisenhower ever acted as FlexCare's agent or vice versa. Eisenhower maintained control over the temporary nurses in the performance of their jobs. It assessed their competency during an orientation program, retained discretion to require nurses to take its medication and clinical skills test, and had authority under the contract to make decisions about the nurses' assignments, including whether to terminate them for poor performance. In addition, the staffing agreement made clear nurses were required to conform with the hospital's policies and procedures and use the hospital's time and attendance system. In addition, the travel nurse agreement required Grande to report her hours worked to FlexCare after obtaining approval from Eisenhower. Finally, FlexCare's corporate representative testified FlexCare did not control Eisenhower and said he didn't know whether Eisenhower exercised control over FlexCare. These facts support the trial court's finding that FlexCare and Eisenhower did not exercise control over each other, and provide sufficient support for the trial court's finding that neither company was an agent of the other.³ (*Iqbal, supra*, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 8, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 684.)

3 Though a representative of FlexCare did testify he understood the settlement to release Eisenhower, there's no evidence he expressed this intention to anyone, and undisclosed, subjective intent is irrelevant to interpreting the release's language objectively. (*Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc., supra*, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 955, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505.)

***340** We're left with the fact that the staffing agreement between FlexCare and Eisenhower disavows any agency relationship between them. “[FlexCare] is performing the services and duties hereunder as an independent contractor and not as an employee, agent, partner of or joint venture with Hospital. Hospital retains professional and administrative responsibility for the services rendered.” That provision, while not dispositive of the relationship, is the best evidence

we have regarding whether the parties understood the companies to be in a principal-agent relationship, and strongly counsels against overruling the trial court and reading into the agreement a release of Eisenhower.

For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court's determination that Eisenhower is not a released party under the terms of the settlement agreement and allow the Riverside putative class action to proceed in the trial court.

III

DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court's judgment against FlexCare and deny Eisenhower's petition for a writ of mandate. Our previous stay order will be dissolved when this opinion becomes final. Eisenhower and FlexCare shall bear Grande's costs.

I concur:

[RAPHAEL, J.](#)

[Ramirez, P.J.](#), Dissenting

Recently, [Castillo v. Glenair, Inc.](#) (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 262, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 844 held — on facts essentially identical to those here — that a settlement agreement between a staffing company and its employees barred those employees from asserting the same claims against the staffing company's

client. Specifically, it held that the client was the staffing company's agent, and therefore within the scope of the release that the employees had given. (*Id.* at pp. 281-282, 285-286, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 844.) It also held, alternatively, that the staffing company and the client were in privity for purposes of res judicata. (*Id.* at pp. 278-282, 286-287, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 844.)

The majority deems [Castillo](#) to be irreconcilable with *DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809, 352 P.3d 378. (Maj. opn. at pp. 331-33, 334-35, 335-36.) [Castillo](#) itself, however, considered this very argument (and reconsidered it on rehearing), but rejected it. ([Castillo v. Glenair, Inc.](#), *supra*, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 280, 287, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 844.) Likewise, the majority relies on *Serrano v. Aerotek, Inc.* (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 773, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 802. (Maj. opn. at pp. 333-34, 336-37.) [Castillo](#), however, concluded that “*Serrano* is procedurally, factually and legally distinct” ([Castillo v. Glenair, Inc.](#), *supra*, at p. 286, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 844; see also *id.* at pp. 285-286, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 844.)

I would follow [Castillo](#), as a matter of stare decisis. [Castillo](#) at least has the virtue of stating clear rules on which parties on all sides can easily rely going forward. I do not find [Castillo](#) to be so plainly wrong as to justify creating a split of authority in this area.

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