SUPREME COURT COPY

SUPREME COURT

OCT 4 - 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Frederick K. Ohlrich Clerk

DEBUTY

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

V.

KARL HOLMES, HERBERT McCLAIN, AND LORENZO NEWBORN,

Defendants and Appellants.

AUTOMATIC APPEAL

Supreme Ct. No. S058734

Los Angeles County Superior Ct. No. BA 092268

APPELLANT McCLAIN'S OPENING BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Hon. J.D. Smith, Judge Presiding

> DEBRA S. SABAH PRESS State Bar No. 202053 1442A Walnut Street #311 Berkeley, CA 94709-1405 Telephone: (510) 528-3688

Attorney for Appellant Herbert McClain

DEATH PENALTY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF .	AUTH	ORITIE	ES	xxiv
INTRODUC	TION			
STATEMEN	NT OF A	APPEA	LABII	LITY 7
STATEMEN	NT OF	ГНЕ С	ASE .	
STATEMEN	VT OF	FACTS		14
A.	GUIL	Т РНА	SE	
	1.	The P	rice Ca	se14
	2.	The H	Iallowe	en Case
		a.	The sl	nootings
		b.	The e	arlier Hodges killing
		c.	Inform	nant Evidence
			i.	Mario Stevens 20
			ii.	James Carpenter
			iii.	Troy Welcome
			iv.	Derrick Tate
		d.	Eyew	itness Evidence
			i.	Gabriel Pina30
			ii.	Lillian Gonzales
			iii.	Kathy Pezdek
		e.	Evide	ence of Flight
			i.	Tonja Underwood
			ii.	James J. Thomas
			iii.	Derrick Tate
			iv.	Troy Welcome

		f.	Physical Evidence
		g.	Testimony of Herbert McClain 40
В.	PEN	ALTY	RETRIAL 44
	1.	Evid	ence in Aggravation
		a.	Evidence Related to the Halloween Crime 44
		b.	Robert Price Crime Evidence 50
		c.	Graffiti
		d.	Prior Felony Convictions 51
		e.	Car Robbery Allegation 51
		f.	Felon in Possession of a Firearm Allegation . 52
		g.	Chain Snatching Allegation 53
		h.	Shank Allegation 53
		i.	Witness Threat Allegation 54
		j.	Threatening a Deputy Allegation 54
		k.	Victim Impact Evidence
			i. Kenneth Coats
			ii. Deborah Bush 57
			iii. Stephen Coats, Sr
			iv. Florence Crawford
			v. Colett Evans
	2.	Evic	dence in Mitigation
		a.	Clarence Jones
		b.	Earlean Shamburger
		0	Doris Russell 66

ARG	UMEN	ΙΤ							
Ĭ.	CLAIMS JOINED FROM APPELLANT NEWBORN'S OPENING BRIEF								
	A.	Guil	t Phase						
		1.	Appellant Was Deprived of Due Process, Equal Protection, and a Representative Jury in Violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by the Trial Court's Error in Refusing to Remedy the Prosecutor's Improper Exercise of Peremptory Challenges Based on Race and Sex 67						
		2.	Appellant Was Deprived of Due Process and a Representative Jury by the Erroneous Excusal of Juror #126 for Cause						
		3.	Appellant Was Deprived of Due Process, a Fair Trial, and His Right of Confrontation in Violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by the Trial Court's Excessive Restrictions on Cross-examination of DeSean Holmes.						
		4.	Appellant Was Deprived of Due Process and a Fair Trial in Violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Form of Flagrant Appeals to the Jury's Passion and Prejudice During Closing Argument						
	В.	Pena	alty Phase						
		1.	Appellant Was Deprived of Due Process and a Fair Trial in Violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by the Trial Court's Error in Admitting Evidence of Holding Cell Graffiti in the Absence of						

			Proof of Appellant's Authorship or rement of the Writing.	68
GAB WHI	RIEL I	PINA'S ESULTE	RT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS UNRELIABLE EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY ED FROM HIGHLY SUGGESTIVE PRE- IRES	
A.	Proc	eedings	Below	69
	1.	Motio	ons and Rulings	69
	2.		ence Before the Trial Court at the Suppression	70
	3.		s Trial Testimony and Statements to Law recement	73
		a.	The incident	73
		b.	Pina's contacts with law enforcement and the prosecution	75
		c.	Pina's trial testimony regarding his identification of McClain	. 78
		d.	Pina's inability to identify McClain at trial without help from the prosecution	. 78
		e.	Testimony of Kathy Pezdek	. 79
B.	App	licable l	Law	. 79
	1.	Due l	Process	. 79
	2.	Eight	th Amendment Reliability	. 79
	3.	sugge	's identification, the product of unnecessarily estive pre-trial procedures was irreparably	81

			a.	Pina had limited opportunity to view the driver of the lead car 84
			b.	Pina repeatedly stated over time that he did not pay attention to the driver of the lead car 87
			c.	Pina could not describe the driver of the lead car in his earliest contacts with police and his descriptions were inconsistent over time 87
			d.	Pina was uncertain of his identification of McClain until detectives showed him an individual photograph 89
			e.	Pina did not attempt to identify the driver of the lead car until 59 days after the homicides 91
		4.		factors contributing to the unreliable fication
			a.	Pina did not identify McClain in the courtroom until he conferred with prosecutors 92
			b.	Cross-racial identifications are unreliable 93
	C.	Inclus	sion of	Pina's Identification Requires Reversal 94
III.	McCl	LAIN'S	S CON	WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT VICTIONS OF CONSPIRACY, FIRST R, AND ATTEMPTED MURDER
	A.	Introd	duction	95
	B.	Appli	icable I	Law97
		1.	The I	Halloween Crimes99
			a.	Evidence of an Agreement
			b.	Halloween homicides

		c.	Inform	mant testimony
			i.	Mario Stevens
			ii.	James Carpenter 107
			iii.	Troy Welcome
			iv.	Derrick Tate
		d.	Gabri	el Pina's Purported Identification 117
			i.	Pina did not come forward to identify the driver of the lead car until a reward was offered
			ii.	Pina's descriptions of the cars over time118
			iii.	Lilian Gonzales who was with Pina when he made his observations, undercut a critical element of his testimony 119
	C.			egally Insufficient to Sustain McClain's Halloween Case
	D.			rently Unreliable Testimony is Insufficient's Convictions in the Price Case 122
IV.	UNAL BOW MISC THE	DJUDICATE EN FOR GUI CONDUCT IN TRIAL COU	D ARR N POS I ARGI RT'S E	VIDENCE OF McCLAIN'S REST WITH SEVERED CODEFENDANT SESSION, THE PROSECUTOR'S UING UNCHARGED CONDUCT, AND RRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS UDICED McCLAIN
	A.	Proceedings	Below	,
	В.			olated McClain's State Law and Federal ats When it Erroneously Admitted

			ant to Evidence Code Section 1101
		1.	Legal Standards Governing the Admissibility of "Uncharged Misconduct" Evidence
		2.	The Evidence of McClain's Arrest for Unlawful Gun Possession Was Not Relevant to Prove His Identity as a Conspirator or Aider and Abettor in the Halloween Murders or to Prove Any Other Disputed Issue 130
	•	3.	Even If Gun Possession Were Relevant, the Trial Court Should Have Excluded it under Evidence Code Section 352
		4.	Admission of Evidence of McClain's Prior Arrest for Unlawful Gun Possession Violated His State and Federal Constitutional Rights
	C.	The P	rosecutor's Misconduct in Closing Argument 145
		1.	Proceedings Below
		2.	The Prosecutor Misstated Material Facts, Argued Facts Not in Evidence, and Misstated the Law 145
	D.	The E	Frors Taken Separately or Together Require Reversal
V.	CON	FRONT EN IT P	COURT VIOLATED McCLAIN'S RIGHT TO I WITNESSES, DUE PROCESS, AND A FAIR TRIAL REVENTED HIM FROM TESTING ON CROSS-
			TION THE VERACITY OF PRICE'S CLAIMED OR TESTIFYING154
	A.	Introd	luction
	В.	Proce	edings Below

	C.	exam Mino the Pa	rial Court Abused its Discretion in Preventing Cross- ination of Price on His Arrest for Lewd Conduct on a r under the Age of 14, after Allowing Him to Testify for rosecution That He Was Testifying out of Concern for amilies of the Murdered Children
		1.	The Trial Court Failed to Exercise the Discretion Required by Evidence Code Section 352 158
		2.	If the Trial Court Did Exercise its Discretion, it Abused it
	D.		Frial Court Violated McClain's Right to Confront a al Witness Against Him
	E.		usion of McClain's Proffered Impeachment Evidence Not Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 166
VI.	PRO BEC	SECUT AUSE	TLT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS AND THE CORS' MISCONDUCT, McCLAIN WAS CONVICTED HE WAS A GANG MEMBER, NOT BECAUSE HE ED THE CHARGED CRIMES
	A.	Inclu than Mem	Trial Court Erroneously Admitted Gang Evidence Which ded Evidence of Threats to Witnesses by Persons Other Defendants and Evidence of Indicia of Gang bership, All of Which Was More Prejudicial than ative
		1.	Evidence of threats/fear of testifying 170
			a. DeSean Holmes
		•	b. Johnny Brown
			c. Derrick Tate
			d. Willie McFee
		2.	Gang photographs, identification, and history 175

•			a.	Police	Detective Derrick Carter 175
		. '	b.	Deput	y Chris Keeling177
		3.	Legal	Standa	rds177
		4.			ial Effect of the Evidence Far its Minimal Probative Value 180
	В.	Argur Gang	ment W Eviden	hich Ex	nmitted Misconduct in Examination and xacerbated the Error of the Admission of Urged the Jury to Convict on Improper t in Evidence
		1.	Proce	edings	Below
		2.	Legal	Standa	ards193
			a.	Impro	oper closing arguments
				i.	Asking the jury to solve social problems and appealing to jurors' fears 193
				ii.	Misstating evidence and arguing evidence that the trial court had stricken
				iii.	Shifting the burden of proof 197
			b.		al to fear of gangs and guilt by iation in opening statement 198
			c.	The p	prosecution's treatment of witnesses 199
	C.	The 1	Errors S	Separat	ely or Together Require Reversal 200
VII.	HAL	LOWE	EEN CO	DUNTS	AILURE TO SEVER THE PRICE AND S VIOLATED McCLAIN'S RIGHT TO 205

A.	Intro	duction	
В.	Proce	edings	Below
	1.	Proce	edural History
	2.	The I	Price Case
	3.	The I	Halloween Case
C.	Unfa	irness,	ne Price and Halloween Counts Resulted in Gross Depriving McClain of His Right to Due Process
	1.	The A	Applicable Law
	2.	motio	ying an inflexible policy to McClain's severance on, the trial court failed to exercise its discretion, McClain is entitled to a new trial 213
	3.	discr	assuming that the trial court exercised its etion, the denial of McClain's severance motion an abuse of that discretion
		a.	The evidence on the separate charges was not cross-admissible
		b.	There were no significant common elements between the Price and Halloween cases and the motive for the Halloween killings was uncontested
		c.	As the Price and Halloween cases were not connected, each lacked independent significance to the other
		d.	The prejudicial effect of joinder outweighed any potential benefits
		e.	Inflammatory evidence

			f. The spillover effect of joinder 229
	 		g. The Halloween case was a capitally charged offense
		4.	The impermissible prejudice to McClain far overshadowed any minimal benefits of joinder 234
		5.	McClain is entitled to a new trial because joinder of the Price and Halloween cases rendered his trial fundamentally unfair
		6.	Conclusion
VIII.	DEFE HIS S	ENDAI SIXTH	COURT'S FAILURE TO SEVER McCLAIN FROM NTS NEWBORN AND HOLMES DEPRIVED HIM OF AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO CESS AND A FAIR TRIAL
	A.	Proce	eedings Below
		1.	Pretrial motions
		2.	Motions, Rulings, Testimony, and Argument Pertaining to DeSean Holmes
	В.	Code Impr	Trial Court's Failure to Sever McClain from efendants Newborn and Holmes Left the Jury with the ression That McClain Had Committed Other Crimes Which He Was Not Involved
	C.	Resu	Trial Court's Denial of McClain's Severance Motion alted in Testimony Which Erroneously Suggested to the That McClain Committed Other Violent Crimes Requires ersal
IX.	PRES CON	SENT IFRON	L COURT DEPRIVED McCLAIN OF HIS RIGHT TO A DEFENSE, DUE PROCESS OF LAW, ITATION, AND A FAIR TRIAL BY FAILING TO ALJIC 2.06 TO THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE 249

	A.	The Trial Court Failed to Determine Whether There Was an Evidentiary Basis for the Conduct Listed in the Instruction and to Appropriately Modify the Instruction
	В.	The Consciousness-of-guilt Instructions Were Unfairly Partisan and Argumentative
	C.	The Consciousness-of-Guilt Instructions Permitted the Jury to Draw Irrational Permissive Inferences about McClain's Guilt
	D.	The Trial Court Deprived Mcclain of the Rights to Present a Defense, a Fair Trial, and Due Process of Law and Lessened the Prosecutor's Burden of Proof
	E.	Prejudice
X.		TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS ARDING OTHER CRIMES REQUIRE REVERSAL 261
	Α.	Proceedings Below
	В.	Legal Standards
		1. The Instructions Lessened the Prosecutor's Burden of Proof
		2. The Instructions Confused the Jury by Failing to Specify Which "Other Crimes" it Could Consider 268
		3. The Instructions Did Not Include Any Guidance as to Which Charges the Other Crimes Evidence Applied
	C.	The Instructions on Other Crimes Require Reversal of McClain's Convictions
XI.		E INSTRUCTIONS ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED THE Y TO FIND GUILT BASED UPON MOTIVE ALONE 277

	A.	On Motive Alone			
	В.	The Instruction Impermissibly Lessened The Prosecutor's Burden Of Proof And Violated Due Process 280			
	C.	The Instruction Shifted the Burden of Proof to Imply That McClain Had to Prove Innocence			
	D.	Reversal is Required			
XII.	TRIA FOU CON AND	McCLAIN WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR FRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BY THE ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AS TO THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE FINDINGS			
XIII.	THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED McCLAIN OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT HIS PENALTY RETRIAL				
	A.	Introduction			
	В.	Proceedings Below			
	C.	The Trial Court's Denial of McClain's Original Counsel's Reasonable Request for a Continuance Violated McClain's Right to the Assistance of Counsel at His Penalty Retrial . 296			
		1. The trial court's denial of counsel's continuance request for a 60-day continuance, which was supported by health-related good cause, arbitrarily delayed the penalty retrial for nearly six months 296			
		2. The trial court failed to balance its discretion against McClain's right to counsel			
	D.	The Trial Court's Denial of McClain's <i>Marsden</i> Motion Without a Hearing Denied Him a Fair Trial and the Effective Assistance of Counsel			

	E.	McClain's Waiver of the Right to Counsel Was Not Knowing, Voluntary, or Intelligent
	F.	The Deprivation of Counsel at McClain's Capital Penalty Phase Requires Reversal Without a Showing of Prejudice
XIV.	PRES TRIA WHE ALLO	TRIAL COURT VIOLATED McCLAIN'S RIGHTS TO SENT A DEFENSE, DUE PROCESS, A FAIR PENALTY L, AND A RELIABLE PENALTY DETERMINATION ON IT FORCED McCLAIN TO WEAR A STUN BELT AND OWED DISCLOSURE TO THE JURY THAT McCLAIN ELECTRONICALLY RESTRAINED
	A.	Introduction
	B.	Proceedings Below
		1. The trial court's decision to require stun belts 312
		2. The disclosure of the stun belts to the jury 315
		3. The stun belt device used on McClain
	C.	The Trial Court Violated McClain's State Law Rights, His Federal Constitutional Rights to Present a Defense, Due Process, a Fair Trial, and a Reliable Penalty Determination, and His International Law Rights by Erroneously Forcing McClain to Wear a Stun Belt Finding Manifest Need for Electronic Restraints
	D.	The Trial Court Violated McClain's State Law Rights and His Federal Constitutional Rights to Due Process, a Fair Trial, and a Reliable Penalty Determination by Erroneously Permitting the Jury to Be Tainted with the Disclosure That He Was Wearing a Stun Belt
	E.	The Trial Court Violated McClain's State Law and Federal Constitutional Rights by Giving the Jury an Erroneous Instruction on the Use of Restraints

	F.	he Errors in Forcing McClain to Wear a Stun Belt and bisclosing this Fact to the Jury, Taken Independently and ogether, Require Reversal of His Death Sentences 329
		. Wearing the stun belt prejudiced McClain 330
		The trial court and the prosecutor both exacerbated the prejudice by emphasizing McClain's potential for future dangerousness
		The trial court also exacerbated the prejudice by permitting the sheriff's department to force McClain witness Clarence Jones to appear before the jury in shackles, permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine him about his shackling at a previous trial, and delaying its instruction to the jury that the restraints should not reflect on McClain
		The trial court further exacerbated the prejudice by giving an instruction that invited the jury to consider the restraints as evidence of McClain's dangerousness
		. The errors taken together require reversal 341
XV.	OF PI AFTI AGG INSU	RIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ASSUMED THE ROLE OSECUTOR WHEN IT INTRODUCED SUA SPONTE THE CLOSE OF PENALTY PRESENTATIONS AVATING EVIDENCE FOR WHICH THERE WAS AN FICIENT FACTUAL BASIS AND WHICH VIOLATED IN'S RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES
	A.	ntroduction
	B.	Proceedings Below
	C.	The Trial Court Assumed the Role of Prosecutor When it introduced Legally Insufficient Aggravating Evidence of a Criminal Threat and Admitted Statements of Newborn Who Was Unavailable for Cross-examination

	D.	The Trial Court's Assumption of the Role of Prosecutor When it Admitted Evidence of Legally Insufficient Aggravating Evidence Which Led to the Disclosure to the Jury That McClain Was Wearing a Stun Belt Requires Reversal
XVI.	McCL EVIDI THAT INFLA IN VIO	TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY INTERFERED WITH AIN'S DEFENSE WHEN IT ELICITED CHARACTER ENCE FROM WITNESS CLARENCE JONES AND RULED ITS OWN QUESTIONS OPENED THE DOOR TO AMMATORY AND IMPROPER CROSS-EXAMINATION OLATION OF THE SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH NDMENTS
	A.	Proceedings Below
	B.	The Trial Court Erroneously Ruled That its Own Questioning of Jones Opened the Door to Inflammatory and Improper Cross-examination Outside the Scope of McClain's Own Direct Examination
	C.	The Prejudice Requires Reversal
XVII.	PROP PROS DOUB LING	TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF McCLAIN'S OSED LINGERING DOUBT EVIDENCE, THE ECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN ARGUING LINGERING BT, AND THE ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON ERING DOUBT VIOLATED McCLAIN'S FEDERAL STITUTIONAL AND STATE LAW RIGHTS
	A. B.	Introduction
	C.	The Trial Court Erroneously and Prejudicially Excluded McClain's Evidence of Lingering Doubt
		1. Lingering doubt evidence is relevant, mitigating, and admissible

	2.	McClain's evidence was relevant, mitigating, and essential to support his lingering doubt penalty defense			
		a.	Dr. K	Kathy Pezdek	
			i.	Pina's identification of McClain was a key element of the prosecution's case	
			ii.	Dr. Pezdek's testimony was admitted at guilt phase	
			iii.	The trial court conceded that the defense could challenge Pina's identification as part of its lingering doubt case 385	
		b.		mony of Codefendants Bowen and Bailey	
			i.	Had they been available, McClain would have been entitled to call Bowen and Bailey at his guilt phase 387	
			ii.	California law permits new evidence of innocence at penalty retrials regardless of prior availability	
			iii.	The trial court lacked discretion to exclude the testimony of Bailey and Bowen	
	. •	c.	requ	trial court erred in denying the jury's est to view the evidence introduced at guilt e	
D.	Add	litional	Federa	Constitutional Bases for Relief 393	
	1.			ourt prevented McClain from presenting a efense and deprived him of compulsory	

	process and a fair and reliable penalty determination
	2. The trial court deprived McClain of Equal Protection Under the Law, by treating McClain differently from both the prosecutor and similarly situated defendants
	3. The trial court's error arbitrarily deprived McClain of a state created liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 396
Е.	The Prosecutor's False Statement to the Trial Court and Misleading Statements to the Jury Deprived McClain of the Rights to Present Mitigating Evidence, to Present a Defense, and to Rebut Evidence and Argument Used Against Him 397
	1. The prosecutor engaged in misconduct by making false statements to the trial court about the Bowen and Bailey guilty pleas
	2. The prosecutor engaged in further misconduct by using deceptive methods to argue for death 399
F.	The Trial Court's Erroneous Lingering Doubt Instruction Prevented McClain's Penalty Jury from Giving Effect to Relevant Mitigating Evidence
G.	The Trial Court's Errors Require Reversal
XVIII.	McCLAIN WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR PENALTY TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BY THE ERRONEOUS EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OF FAVORABLE DISPOSITIONS GRANTED TO CODEFENDANTS BOWEN AND BAILEY, AND BY UNFAIR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOITING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULING;

		McCLAIN'S DEATH SENTENCE VIOLATES EIGHTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
	A.	Summary of Facts
	В.	The Trial Court's Error and Prosecutorial Exploitation of That Error Violated McClain's Right to Due Process and His Right to a Proportionate, Non-Arbitrary Sentence Under the Eighth Amendment
	C.	The Requirement of Reversal
XIX.	AND DETE EIGH UNIT ADM	LAIN WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS, A FAIR TRIAL, AN INDIVIDUALIZED AND RELIABLE PENALTY ERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, SIXTH, ITH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE ED STATES CONSTITUTION BY THE ERRONEOUS ISSION OF A VIDEOTAPE OF CODEFENDANT HOLMES' FANE OUTBURST
	A.	Summary of Facts
	B.	The Trial Court's Errors
	C.	The Resulting Prejudice
XX.	PENA DETI REST	LAIN WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS, A FAIR ALTY TRIAL, AND A RELIABLE PENALTY ERMINATION BECAUSE HIS DEATH SENTENCE TED ON HIS UNRELIABLE CONVICTION FOR THE EMPTED MURDER OF ROBERT PRICE
	A.	Proceedings Below
	B.	Argument
	C	Prejudice 423

XXI.	THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO SEVER McCLAIN FROM HIS CODEFENDANTS AT HIS PENALTY RETRIAL DEPRIVED HIM OF DUE PROCESS, INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING, AND A RELIABLE PENALTY DETERMINATION			
	Α.	Introduction		
	B.	Proceedings Below		
		1. Objections and rulings		
		2. The holding cell graffiti		
		3. Other Aggravating Evidence		
		a. Aggravating evidence pertaining to Newborn		
		b. Aggravating evidence against McClain 428		
		c. Aggravating Evidence against Holmes 429		
	٠	4. Mitigating Evidence		
:		a. Newborn's Mitigating Evidence 430		
		b. McClain's Mitigating Evidence 431		
		c. Holmes's Mitigating Evidence 432		
	C.	The Denial of Severance Violated McClain's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Reliable Penalty and Individualized Sentencing Determinations and Resulted in Gross Unfairness		
	D.	The Failure to Sever Requires Reversal		
XXII		INSTRUCTIONS DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE JURY'S TENCING DISCRETION AND THE NATURE OF ITS		

	IBERATIVE PROCESS VIOLATED McCLAIN'S STITUTIONAL RIGHTS440
A.	The Instructions Caused The Jury's Penalty Choice To Turn On An Impermissibly Vague And Ambiguous Standard That Failed To Provide Adequate Guidance And Direction 441
В.	The Instructions Failed To Inform The Jurors That The Central Determination Is Whether the Death Penalty Is The Appropriate Punishment, Not Simply An Authorized Penalty, For McClain
C.	The Instructions Failed To Inform The Jurors That If They Determined That Mitigation Outweighed Aggravation, They Were Required To Return A Sentence of Life Without The Possibility Of Parole
D.	The Instructions Failed To Inform The Jurors That McClain Did Not Have To Persuade Them The Death Penalty Was Inappropriate
E.	Conclusion
XXIII.	THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO DEFINE THE PENALTY OF LIFE WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE
XXIV.	CALIFORNIA'S DEATH PENALTY STATUTE, AS INTERPRETED BY THIS COURT AND APPLIED AT McCLAIN'S TRIAL, VIOLATES THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 458
A.	McClain's Death Penalty Is Invalid Because Penal Code § 190.3(a) as Applied Allows Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of Death in Violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
В.	California's Death Penalty Statute Contains No Safeguards to Avoid Arbitrary and Capricious Sentencing and Deprives