

SUPREME COURT COPY

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER HENRIQUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.

CAPITAL CASE

No. S089311

Contra Costa County
Superior Court

No. 961902-4

APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL OPENING BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment of the Superior Court
of the State of California for the County of Contra Costa

Honorable Peter Spinetta, Judge

**SUPREME COURT
FILED**

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INTRODUCTION

In this supplemental brief, appellant provides new support for appellant's claims in Argument XIII. As argued below, appellant asserts that California's capital-sentence scheme violates *Hurst v. Florida* (2016) ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 616. This argument is numbered to correspond to the argument number in appellant's opening brief.

In addition, this supplemental brief presents a new argument that the \$6,000 restitution fine imposed by the trial court was unlawful in violation of *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466 and its progeny. Because this third argument is new, it is numbered XV, which is sequential to the last numbered argument in appellant's opening brief.

ARGUMENT

XIII.

CALIFORNIA'S DEATH PENALTY STATUTE AND CALJIC INSTRUCTIONS, AS INTERPRETED BY THIS COURT AND APPLIED AT APPELLANT'S TRIAL, VIOLATE THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

In his opening brief, appellant challenged the California death penalty scheme on grounds that this Court has rejected in previous decisions holding that the California law does not violate the federal Constitution. (AOB Argument XIII, pages 160-172.) After appellant filed his reply brief on May 19, 2011, the United States Supreme Court held Florida's death penalty statute unconstitutional under *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, *supra*, 530 U.S. 466 and *Ring v. Arizona* (2002) 536 U.S. 584, because the sentencing judge, not the jury, made a factual finding, the existence of an aggravating circumstance, that is required before the death penalty can be imposed. (*Hurst v. Florida*, *supra*, 136 S.Ct. at p. 624 [hereafter "*Hurst*").) *Hurst* provides new support to appellant's claims in Argument XIII.D of his opening brief. (AOB 160-170.) In light of *Hurst*, this Court should reconsider its rulings that imposition of the death penalty does not constitute an increased sentence within the meaning of *Apprendi* (*People v. Anderson* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589, fn. 14); does not require factual findings within the meaning of *Ring* (*People v. Merriman* (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 106); and does not require the jury to find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances

before the jury can impose a sentence of death (*People v. Prieto* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 275).

A. Under *Hurst*, Each Fact Necessary To Impose A Death Sentence, Including The Determination That The Aggravating Circumstances Outweigh The Mitigating Circumstances, Must Be Found By A Jury Beyond A Reasonable Doubt.

In *Apprendi*, a noncapital sentencing case, and *Ring*, a capital sentencing case, the United States Supreme Court established a bright-line rule: if a factual finding is required to subject the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s verdict, it must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. (*Ring v. Arizona, supra*, 536 U.S. at p. 589 [hereafter “*Ring*”]; *Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra*, 530 U.S. at p. 483 [hereafter “*Apprendi*”].) As the Court explained in *Ring*:

The dispositive question, we said, “is one not of form, but of effect.” [Citation]. If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact – no matter how the State labels it – must be found, by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation].

(*Ring, supra*, 536 U.S. at p. 602, quoting *Apprendi, supra*, 530 U.S. at pp. 494, 482-483.) Applying this mandate, the high court invalidated Florida’s death penalty statute in *Hurst*. (*Hurst, supra*, 136 S.Ct. at pp. 621-624.) The Court restated the core Sixth Amendment principle as it applies to capital sentencing statutes: “The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find *each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death*.” (*Hurst, supra*, 136 S.Ct. at p. 619, italics added.) Further, as explained below, in

applying this Sixth Amendment principle, *Hurst* made clear that the weighing determination required under the Florida statute was an essential part of the sentencer’s factfinding within the ambit of *Ring*. (See *Hurst, supra*, 136 S.Ct. at p. 622.)

In Florida, a defendant convicted of capital murder is punished by either life imprisonment or death. (*Hurst, supra*, 136 S.Ct. at p. 620, citing Fla. Stat. §§ 782.04(1)(a), 775.082(1).) Under the statute at issue in *Hurst*, after returning its verdict of conviction, the jury rendered an advisory verdict at the sentencing proceeding, but the judge made the ultimate sentencing determinations. (*Hurst, supra*, at p. 620.) The judge was responsible for finding that “sufficient aggravating circumstances exist” and “that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh aggravating circumstances,” which were prerequisites for imposing a death sentence. (*Hurst, supra*, at p. 622, citing Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3).) The Court found that these determinations were part of the “necessary factual finding that *Ring* requires.” (*Ibid.*)¹

The questions decided in *Ring* and *Hurst* were narrow. As the Supreme Court explained, “*Ring*’s claim is tightly delineated: He contends

¹ The Court in *Hurst* explained:

[T]he Florida sentencing statute does not make a defendant eligible for death until “findings *by the court* that such person shall be punished by death.” Fla.Stat. § 775.082(1) (emphasis added). The trial court alone must find “the facts ... [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist” and “[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.” § 921.141(3); see [*State v.*] *Steele*, 921 So.2d [538,] 546 [(Fla. 2005)].

(*Hurst, supra*, 136 S.Ct. at p. 622.)



only that the Sixth Amendment required jury findings on the aggravating circumstances asserted against him.” (*Ring, supra*, 536 U.S. at p. 597, fn. 4.) *Hurst* raised the same claim. (See Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, *Hurst v. Florida*, 2015 WL 3523406 at *18 [“Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates this [Sixth Amendment] principle because it entrusts to the trial court instead of the jury the task of ‘find[ing] an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty’”].) In each case, the Court decided only the constitutionality of a judge, rather than a jury, finding the existence of an aggravating circumstance. (See *Ring, supra*, 536 U.S. at p. 588; *Hurst, supra*, 136 S.Ct. at p. 624.)

Nevertheless, the seven-justice majority opinion in *Hurst* shows that its holding, like that in *Ring*, is a specific application of a broader Sixth Amendment principle: any fact that is required for a death sentence, but not for the lesser punishment of life imprisonment, must be found by the jury. (*Hurst, supra*, 136 S.Ct. at pp. 619, 622.) At the outset of the opinion, the Court refers not simply to the finding of an aggravating circumstance, but, as noted above, to findings of “each fact *necessary to impose a sentence of death*.” (*Hurst, supra*, 136 S.Ct. at p. 619, italics added.) The Court reiterated this fundamental principle throughout the opinion.² The Court’s

² See *id.* at p. 621 [“In *Ring*, we concluded that Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme violated *Apprendi*’s rule because the State allowed a judge to find the facts *necessary to sentence a defendant to death*,” italics added]; *id.* at p. 622 [“Like Arizona at the time of *Ring*, Florida does not require the jury to make *the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty*,” italics added]; *id.* at p. 624 [“Time and subsequent cases have washed away the logic of *Spaziano* and *Hildwin*. The decisions are overruled to the extent they allow a sentencing judge to find an aggravating circumstance, independent of a jury’s factfinding, that is *necessary for imposition of the death penalty*,” italics added].

language is clear and unqualified. It also is consistent with the established understanding that *Apprendi* and *Ring* apply to each fact essential to imposition of the level of punishment the defendant receives. (See *Ring*, *supra*, 536 U.S. at p. 610 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.); *Apprendi*, *supra*, 530 U.S. at p. 494.) The high court is assumed to understand the implications of the words it chooses and to mean what it says. (See *Sands v. Morongo Unified School District* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 863, 881-882, fn. 10.)


B. California's Death Penalty Statute Violates *Hurst* By Not Requiring That The Jury's Weighing Determination Be Found Beyond A Reasonable Doubt.

California's death penalty statute violates *Apprendi*, *Ring* and *Hurst*, although the specific defect is different than those in Arizona's and Florida's laws: in California, although the jury's sentencing verdict must be unanimous (Pen. Code, § 190.4, subd. (b)), California applies no standard of proof to the weighing determination, let alone the constitutional requirement that the finding be made beyond a reasonable doubt. (See *People v. Merriman*, *supra*, 60 Cal.4th at p. 106.) Unlike Arizona and Florida, California requires that the jury, not the judge, make the findings necessary to sentence the defendant to death. (See *People v. Rangel* (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235, fn. 16 [distinguishing California's law from that invalidated in *Hurst* on the grounds that, unlike Florida, the jury's "verdict is not merely advisory"].) California's law, however, is similar to the statutes invalidated in Arizona and Florida in ways that are crucial for applying the *Apprendi/Ring/Hurst* principle. In all three states, a death sentence may be imposed only if, after the defendant is convicted of first degree murder, the sentencer makes two additional findings. In each jurisdiction, the sentencer must find the existence of at least one statutorily-delineated circumstance – in California, a special circumstance (Pen. Code, § 190.2) and in Arizona and

Florida, an aggravating circumstance (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703(G); Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3)). This finding alone, however, does not permit the sentencer to impose a death sentence. The sentencer must make another factual finding: in California, that “the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances” (Pen. Code, § 190.3); in Arizona, that “there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency” (*Ring, supra*, 536 U.S. at p. 593, quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703(F)); and in Florida, as stated above, “that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh aggravating circumstances” (*Hurst, supra*, 136 S.Ct. at p. 622, quoting Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3)).³

Although *Hurst* did not decide the standard of proof issue, the Court made clear that the weighing determination was an essential part of the sentencer’s factfinding within the ambit of *Ring*. (See *Hurst, supra*, 136 S.Ct. at p. 622 [in Florida the judge, not the jury, makes the “critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty,” including the weighing determination among the facts the sentencer must find “to make a defendant eligible for death”].) The pertinent question is not what the weighing determination is called, but what is its consequence. *Apprendi* made this clear: “the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect – does the

³ As *Hurst* made clear, “the Florida sentencing statute does not make a defendant eligible for death until ‘findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death.’” (*Hurst, supra*, 136 S.Ct. at p. 622, citation and italics omitted.) In *Hurst*, the Court uses the concept of death penalty eligibility in the sense that there are findings which actually authorize the imposition of the death penalty in the sentencing hearing, and not in the sense that an accused is only potentially facing a death sentence, which is what the special circumstance finding establishes under the California statute. For *Hurst* purposes, under California law, it is the jury’s determination that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors that finally authorizes imposition of the death penalty.



required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?" (*Apprendi, supra*, 530 U.S. at p. 494.) So did Justice Scalia in *Ring*:

[T]he fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant receives – whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane – must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

(*Ring, supra*, 536 U.S. at p. 610 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.)) The constitutional question cannot be answered, as this Court has done, by collapsing the weighing finding and the sentence-selection decision into one determination and labeling it “normative” rather than factfinding. (See, e.g., *People v. Karis* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 639-640; *People v. McKinzie* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1302, 1366.) At bottom, the *Ring* inquiry is one of function.

In California, when a jury convicts a defendant of first degree murder, the maximum punishment is imprisonment for a term of 25 years to life. (Pen. Code, § 190, subd. (a) [cross-referencing §§ 190.1, 190.2, 190.3, 190.4 and 190.5].) When the jury returns a verdict of first degree murder with a true finding of a special circumstance listed in Penal Code section 190.2, the penalty range increases to either life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or death. (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a).) Without any further jury findings, the maximum punishment the defendant can receive is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (See, e.g., *People v. Banks* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 794 [where jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and found special circumstance true and prosecutor did not seek the death penalty, defendant received “the mandatory lesser sentence for special circumstance murder, life imprisonment without parole”]; *Sand v. Superior*



Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 567, 572 [where defendant is charged with special-circumstance murder, and the prosecutor announced he would not seek death penalty, defendant, if convicted, will be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, and therefore prosecution is not a “capital case” within the meaning of Penal Code section 987.9]; *People v. Ames* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1217 [life in prison without possibility of parole is the sentence for pleading guilty and admitting the special circumstance where death penalty is eliminated by plea bargain].) Under the statute, a death sentence can be imposed only if the jury, in a separate proceeding, “concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.” (Pen. Code, § 190.3.) Thus, under Penal Code section 190.3, the weighing finding exposes a defendant to a greater punishment (death) than that authorized by the jury's verdict of first degree murder with a true finding of a special circumstance (life in prison without parole). The weighing determination is therefore a factfinding.⁴

C. This Court’s Interpretation Of The California Death Penalty Statute In *People v. Brown* Supports The Conclusion That The Jury’s Weighing Determination Is A Factfinding Necessary To Impose A Sentence of Death.

This Court’s interpretation of Penal Code section 190.3’s weighing directive in *People v. Brown* (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512 (revd. on other grounds

⁴ Justice Sotomayor, the author of the majority opinion in *Hurst*, previously found that *Apprendi* and *Ring* are applicable to a sentencing scheme that requires a finding that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors before a death sentence may be imposed. More importantly here, she has gone on to find that it “is clear, then, that this factual finding exposes the defendant to a greater punishment than he would otherwise receive: death, as opposed to life without parole.” (*Woodward v. Alabama* (2013) ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 405, 410-411 (dis. opn. from denial of certiorari, Sotomayor, J.).)



sub nom. California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538) does not require a different conclusion. In *Brown*, the Court was confronted with a claim that the language “shall impose a sentence of death” violated the Eighth Amendment requirement of individualized sentencing. (*Id.* at pp. 538-539.) As the Court explained:

Defendant argues, by its use of the term “outweigh” and the mandatory “shall,” the statute impermissibly confines the jury to a mechanical balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors Defendant urges that because the statute requires a death judgment if the former “outweigh” the latter under this mechanical formula, the statute strips the jury of its constitutional power to conclude that the totality of constitutionally relevant circumstances does not warrant the death penalty.

(*Id.* at p. 538.) The Court recognized that the “the language of the statute, and in particular the words ‘shall impose a sentence of death,’ leave room for some confusion as to the jury’s role” (*id.* at p. 545, fn. 17) and construed this language to avoid violating the federal Constitution (*id.* at p. 540). To that end, the Court explained the weighing provision in Penal Code section 190.3 as follows:

[T]he reference to “weighing” and the use of the word “shall” in the 1978 law need not be interpreted to limit impermissibly the scope of the jury’s ultimate discretion. In this context, the word “weighing” is a metaphor for a process which by nature is incapable of precise description. The word connotes a mental balancing process, but certainly not one which calls for a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of the imaginary “scale,” or the arbitrary assignment of “weights” to any of them. Each juror is free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value he deems appropriate to each and all of the various factors he is permitted to consider, including factor “k” as we have interpreted it. By directing that the jury “shall” impose the death penalty if it finds that aggravating factors “outweigh” mitigating, the statute should not be understood to require

any juror to vote for the death penalty unless, upon completion of the “weighing” process, he decides that death is the appropriate penalty under all the circumstances. Thus the jury, by weighing the various factors, simply determines under the relevant evidence which penalty is appropriate in the particular case.

(*People v. Brown, supra*, at p. 541, [hereafter “*Brown*”], footnotes omitted.)⁵

Under *Brown*, the weighing requirement provides for jury discretion in both the assignment of the weight to be given to the sentencing factors and the ultimate choice of punishment. Despite the “shall impose death” language, Penal Code section 190.3, as construed in *Brown*, provides for jury discretion in deciding whether to impose death or life without possibility of parole, i.e. in deciding which punishment is appropriate. The weighing decision may assist the jury in reaching its ultimate determination of whether death is appropriate, but it is a separate, statutorily-mandated finding that precedes the final sentence selection. Thus, once the jury finds that the aggravation outweighs the mitigation, it still retains the discretion to reject a death sentence. (See *People v. Duncan* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 979 [“[t]he jury may decide, even in the absence of mitigating evidence, that the aggravating evidence is not comparatively substantial enough to warrant death”].)

In this way, Penal Code section 190.3 requires the jury to make two determinations. The jury must weigh the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances. To impose death, the jury must find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. This is a

⁵ In *Boyde v. California* (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 377, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory “shall impose” language of the pre-*Brown* jury instruction implementing Penal Code section 190.3 did not violate the Eighth Amendment requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases. Post-*Boyde*, California has continued to use *Brown*’s gloss on the sentencing instruction.



factfinding under *Ring* and *Hurst*. (See *State v. Whitfield* (Mo. 2003) 107 S.W.3d 253, 257-258 [finding weighing is *Ring* factfinding]; *Woldt v. People* (Colo. 2003) 64 P.3d 256, 265-266 [same].) The sentencing process, however, does not end there. There is the final step in the sentencing process: the jury selects the sentence it deems appropriate. (See *Brown, supra*, 40 Cal.3d at p. 544 [“Nothing in the amended language limits the jury’s power to apply those factors as it chooses in deciding whether, under all the relevant circumstances, defendant deserves the punishment of death or life without parole”].) Thus, the jury may reject a death sentence even after it has found that the aggravating circumstances outweighs the mitigation. (*Brown, supra*, 40 Cal.3d at p. 540.) This is the “normative” part of the jury’s decision. (*Brown, supra*, 40 Cal.3d at p. 540.)

This understanding of Penal Code section 190.3 is supported by *Brown* itself. In construing the “shall impose death” language in the weighing requirement of section 190.3, this Court cited to Florida’s death penalty law as a similar “weighing” statute:

[O]nce a defendant is convicted of capital murder, a sentencing hearing proceeds before judge and jury at which evidence bearing on statutory aggravating, and all mitigating, circumstances is adduced. The jury then renders an advisory verdict “[w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist...which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and ... [b]ased on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life [imprisonment] or death.” (Fla. Stat. (1976-1977 Supp.) § 921.141, subd. (2)(b), (c).) The trial judge decides the actual sentence. He may impose death if satisfied in writing “(a) [t]hat sufficient [statutory] aggravating circumstances exist ... and (b) [t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances ... to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.” (*Id.*, subd. (3).)

