

COPY

COURT OF APPEAL, STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS IN
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT, et al.,

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

vs.

JOHN CHIANG, as State Controller, etc.,

Defendant/Appellant,

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, as
Governor, etc., et al.,

Defendants/Respondents.

Court of Appeal Case No. C061011

(Sacramento County Superior Court
Case No. 34-2008-80000126-CU-WM-GDS)

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of the Superior Court for Sacramento County DEENA C. FAWCETT
The Honorable Patrick Marlette BY _____ Deputy

**RESPONDENTS' COMBINED BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO: (1)
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS
IN CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT AND CALIFORNIA
ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL SCIENTISTS AND (2)
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT JOHN CHIANG**

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State of California
Court of Appeal
Third Appellate District

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS
California Rules of Court, rules 8.208, 8.490(i), 8.494(c), 8.496(c), or 8.498(d)

Court of Appeal Case Caption: PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS IN CALIFORNIA
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ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, as Governor, etc., et al. Defendants and Respondents.

Court of Appeal Case Number: C061011 _____

Please check here if applicable:

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Name of Interested Entity or Person (Alphabetical order, please.)	Nature of Interest
1. Please see attached list	
2.	
3.	
4.	

Please attach additional sheets with Entity or Person Information, if necessary.

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Signature of Attorney or Unrepresented Party

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Administration

ATTACH PROOF OF SERVICE ON ALL PARTIES WITH YOUR CERTIFICATE

Approved for Optional Use Within the Third Appellate District. 01/01/2007

Attachment to Certificate of Interested Entities or Persons.

Full Name of Interested Entity or Person	Nature of Interest
Bill Lockyer, as State Treasurer of California	Intervenor and Appellant in related case filed in Third District Court of Appeal.
Board of Administration of California Public Employees' Retirement System	Petitioner in related case filed in San Francisco County Superior Court.
California Association of Psychiatric Technicians	Petitioner in related case filed in Sacramento County Superior Court.
California Attorneys, Administrative Law Judges and Hearing Officers in State Employment	Petitioner and appellant in related cases filed in Third District Court of Appeal, First District Court of Appeal, San Francisco County Superior Court, and Alameda County Superior Court.
California Board of Equalization	Intervenor and Appellant in related case filed in Third District Court of Appeal.
California Correctional Peace Officers Association	Petitioner in related case filed in Alameda County Superior Court.
California Professional Public Employees' Association	Petitioner in related case filed in Sacramento County Superior Court.
CDF Firefighters	Petitioner in related case filed in Sacramento County Superior Court.
Debra Bowen, as Secretary of State of California	Intervenor and Appellant in related case filed in Third District Court of Appeal.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., as Attorney General of the State of California	Intervenor and Appellant in related case filed in Third District Court of Appeal.
Jack O'Connell, as Superintendent of Public Instruction for the State of California	Intervenor and Appellant in related case filed in Third District Court of Appeal.
John Chiang, as Controller of the State of California	Respondent and Appellant in related case filed in Third District Court of Appeal.
John Garamendi, as Lieutenant Governor of the State of California	Intervenor and Appellant in related case filed in Third District Court of Appeal.
Kenneth Hamidi	Petitioner in related case filed in Sacramento County Superior Court.
Service Employees International Union, Local 1000	Petitioner and appellant in related cases filed in Sacramento County Superior Court, Third District Court of Appeal, San Francisco County Superior Court, and Alameda County Superior Court.
Union of American Physicians and Dentists	Petitioner in related case filed in Alameda County Superior Court

Yvonne Walker

Petitioner in related case filed in Alameda
County Superior Court and Sacramento
County Superior Court.

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I.

INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Appellants Professional Engineers in California Government (“PECG”) and California Association of Professional Scientists (“CAPS”) (collectively, “PECG/CAPS”) appeal from the final judgment of the Sacramento County Superior Court denying Appellants’ petition for writ of mandate challenging Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s issuance of Executive Order S-16-08 (the “Executive Order”) directing twice monthly furloughs of state employees.¹ In addition, State Controller John Chiang (“Controller”), who was named as a defendant/respondent in the trial court, but has chosen to proceed as an Appellant in this Court, appeals from that same final judgment.

The fundamental issue before this Court is whether the Governor of the State of California may exercise the executive power, granted him by the California Constitution, statutes, and Memoranda of Understanding (“MOU”) between Appellants and the State, to furlough temporarily state employees as one means of addressing a fiscal crisis of unprecedented dimension. The undisputed evidence submitted to the trial court established that the State was facing an unprecedented budget deficit and, according to estimates by the State Controller, was on the brink of running

¹ On July 1, 2009, the Governor issued Executive Order S-13-09 directing a third furlough day for state employees. This Executive Order was issued subsequent to the judgment in this case and is not before this Court.

out of cash at the time the Governor issued the Executive Order. To address this crisis, the Governor determined that temporarily furloughing state employees two days a month was one necessary step to help alleviate the budget and solvency crisis facing the State. Thus, pursuant to his inherent executive authority as established by the California Constitution, various statutes in the Government Code, and provisions in the MOUs between the State and state employee bargaining units, the Governor issued Executive Order S-16-08 directing the temporary, twice monthly furloughs of state employees.

As the trial court found, and as demonstrated by the discussion below, the Governor, in his role as the state employer, has the authority pursuant to Government Code sections 19851 and 19849 to furlough state employees. In addition, the MOUs between the State and PECG/CAPS grant the Governor the authority to furlough state employees in State Bargaining Units 9 and 10, the state bargaining units represented by PECG and CAPS, respectively. Ultimately, the record before this Court affirms the Governor possesses the authority to furlough state employees. The record further demonstrates every effort was made to avert the necessity of adopting furloughs. However, directing temporary furloughs of state employees was an authorized and necessary response to address the budgetary and cash crisis facing the State. The arguments made by PECG/CAPS and the Controller to the contrary fail to address the obvious:

there was a serious fiscal emergency requiring immediate action and the Governor, in furloughing state employees, took a step within his authority to respond to that emergency.

II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Statement of Facts.

1. Efforts to Resolve the State Budget Crisis Prior to the Issuance of Executive Order S-16-08.

On July 31, 2008, Governor Schwarzenegger issued Executive Order S-09-08 directing the State of California to take various budget mitigation measures in light of the State's budget impasse. (Joint Appendix ["JA"]², Vol. III, Tab X, JA000482 – JA000484) This Executive Order directed all state agencies and departments "to cease and desist authorization of all overtime for employees effective July 31, 2008." (*Id.*, at JA000483.)

On September 23, 2008, Governor Schwarzenegger signed into law a new budget for the 2008-2009 fiscal year. (JA, Vol. III, Tab Y, JA000486; JA, Vol. III, Tab Z, JA000490.) However, the downturn in the

² This case is one of three cases filed in this Court appealing the final judgment of the Sacramento County Superior Court affirming the Governor's authority to furlough state employees. The other two cases are *California Attorneys, Administrative Law Judges and Hearing Officers in State Employment v. Schwarzenegger, et al.*, Third District Court of Appeal Case No. C061009 and *Service Employees International Union, Local 1000 v. Schwarzenegger, et al.*, Third District Court of Appeal No. C061020. The citations to the record in this brief are primarily cites to the Joint Appendix filed in this case. However, because the Controller has filed its brief not only in this case, but has filed a Notice of Adoption of his Opening Brief in the other two cases, it will be necessary to cite to the record in those other two cases in order to address fully the arguments raised by the Controller. When cites to other appendices in related cases are made, it will be noted clearly.

national economy shortly thereafter resulted in an unanticipated and significant reduction in revenues from those forecasted in the 2008-2009 budget. (JA, Vol. III, Tab LL, JA000557.) The State's Department of Finance determined the shortfalls in the budget compromise would cause a budget deficit of approximately \$11.2 billion. (JA, Vol. III, Tab Z, JA000490.) The Department of Finance also initially determined that revenue for the 2009-2010 fiscal year would be \$13 billion lower than projected. (*Id.*) The Department of Finance concluded the "State will run out of cash in February and be unable to meet all of its obligations for the rest of the year." (*Id.*) The Department of Finance issued an October 2008 Finance Bulletin that stated, "Preliminary General Fund agency cash for October was \$923 million below the 2008-09 Budget Act forecast of \$10.667 billion." (JA, Vol. III, Tab AA, JA000516.) The Department of Finance also concluded, "year-to-date revenues are \$1.06 billion below the \$22.58 billion that was expected." (*Id.*)

In response to the unanticipated budget deficit, the Governor issued a special session proclamation on November 6, 2008 calling for an emergency session of the Legislature to address this budget crisis. (JA, Vol. III, Tab BB, JA000518.) On the same day, the Governor issued a letter to all state workers informing them of the potential impact of some of the cost-savings plans he was considering. (JA, Vol. III, Tab CC,

JA000520 – JA000521.) He also informed state employees of the emergency session of the Legislature. (*Id.*, at JA000520.)

The Legislature failed to reach a resolution of the pending budget crisis in the November 2008 special session. (JA, Vol. III, Tab GG, JA000530.) As a result, on December 1, 2008, the Governor issued a Fiscal Emergency Proclamation pursuant to his authority under Article IV, section 10(f) of the California Constitution. (*Id.*, at JA000530 – JA000531.) In his Fiscal Emergency Proclamation, the Governor specifically identified the nature of the fiscal emergency “to be the projected budget imbalance and insufficient cash reserves for Fiscal Year 2008-2009 and the projected insufficient cash reserves and potential budgetary and cash deficit in Fiscal Year 2009-2010 which are anticipated to result from the dramatically lower than estimated General Fund revenues in Fiscal Year 2008-2009.” (*Id.*, at JA000530.) In his Fiscal Emergency Proclamation, the Governor reconvened the Legislature for another special session to address the fiscal emergency. (*Id.*, at JA000531.)

The Governor’s proclamation of a fiscal emergency was supported by the Department of Finance’s further view and updating of its revenue estimates, which found that actual revenues for the 2008-2009 fiscal year were expected to be \$14.8 billion below the estimated revenues at the time the 2008-2009 budget was passed. (JA, Vol. III, Tab LL, JA000557.) The Department of Finance determined that the deficit would increase to \$41.6

billion by the end of the 2009-2010 fiscal year. (*Id.*) The deficit had increased by more than \$3 billion in the span of approximately two months. (*Id.*) As a result of the devastating budget deficit, the conclusion reached was that the State would run out of cash by February 2009. (*Id.*)

During this same period of time, and in an effort to work with state bargaining unit representatives, the Department of Personnel Administration (“DPA”) put forth proposals to the state employee organizations in early November 2008 including, but not limited to, a proposed one-day furlough and elimination of two holidays per year. (JA, Vol. II, Tab U, JA000435.) Prior to the issuance of Executive Order S-16-08, none of the state bargaining units agreed to either of these proposals. (*Id.*) The state employee organizations, however, including PEEG and CAPS, all recognized and acknowledged the State of California was facing a serious and immediate fiscal crisis. (JA, Vol. III, Tab DD, JA000523; JA, Vol. III, Tab EE, JA000525; JA, Vol. III, Tab FF, JA000528.)

2. **Executive Order S-16-08.**

Faced with the unresolved and mounting fiscal crisis, the Governor issued Executive Order S-16-08 on December 19, 2008. (JA, Vol. III, Tab HH, JA000533 – JA000534.)

With respect to employees represented by recognized bargaining units, the Executive Order directed “that effective February 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010, the Department of Personnel Administration shall adopt a

plan to implement a furlough of represented state employees and supervisors for two days per month, regardless of funding source.” (*Id.*, at JA000534.)

With respect to unrepresented employees, the Executive Order provided “that effective February 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010, the Department of Personnel Administration shall adopt a plan to implement an equivalent furlough or salary reduction for all state managers, including exempt state employees, regardless of funding source.” (*Id.*)

Executive Order S-16-08 articulated clearly, and in detail, the justification for the actions ordered by the Governor. It noted that “the cash reserve in the State Treasury is below the amount established by the State Controller to ensure that the cash balance does not reach zero on any day in the month.” (*Id.*, at JA000533.) The Executive Order confirmed that in two separate special sessions in November and December 2008, “the Legislature failed ... to enact any bills to address the State’s significant economic problems.” (*Id.*) The Executive Order concluded by noting “immediate and comprehensive action is needed to address the fiscal and cash crisis facing the State of California.” (*Id.*)

In order to address the fiscal and cash crisis as described, the Governor issued the Executive Order pursuant to his authority under Government Code section 3516.5 before meeting and conferring with public employee unions. (*Id.*, at JA000534.)

3. **Confirmation of State Fiscal Crisis Following Issuance of Executive Order S-16-08.**

On December 19, 2008, the California State Controller, John Chiang, released a statement urging the Governor and Legislature to reach a resolution in order to prevent the State from running out of cash in late February 2009. (JA, Vol. III, Tab II, JA000536.) On December 22, 2008, Controller Chiang sent a letter to the Governor and the Legislature, reiterating the severity of the fiscal crisis the State was facing. (JA, Vol. III, Tab JJ, JA000538 – JA000540.) In this letter, the Controller stated,

[I]f current projections hold true, the State is less than seventy days from running out of cash. Worse, my office's analyses indicate there will be no shelter from the storm as the State's cash position will remain negative throughout the remainder of the fiscal year. As I indicated during the recent Legislative Budget Session, the failure of the Governor and the Legislature to quickly arrive at an agreement to responsibly address the State's \$41 billion budget crisis would begin a cascading series of regrettable actions necessary to conserve the State's dwindling cash reserves.

(*Id.*, at JA000538.)

On January 13, 2009, the Director of the Department of Finance, Michael Genest, issued a special report titled "California at the Brink of Financial Disaster" detailing the State's financial crisis and the immediate harm that will be caused when the State runs out of cash. (JA, Vol. III, Tab KK, JA000542 – JA000552.) He confirmed the State was expected to run out of cash in February 2009. (JA, Vol. III, Tab LL, JA000557.)

On February 19, 2009, the Legislature agreed on a new State budget which, in relevant part, included a spending reduction of \$1.4 billion in state employee payroll over the 17-month period from enactment of the new budget. Section 38 of the February 2009 budget compromise legislation, added Section 3.90 to the Budget Act of 2008 to provide that each item of appropriation in the Budget Act of 2008 would be reduced to reflect a reduction in employee compensation. Reductions in employee compensation were to be achieved through the collective bargaining process for represented employees *or existing administration authority*, with a proportionate reduction for nonrepresented employees. At the time of the budget compromise, “existing administration authority” included the authority to furlough state employees pursuant to Executive Order S-16-08 and DPA’s furlough plan as the trial court so ruled on January 30, 2009.

4. **Evidence Presented to the Trial Court Regarding Cost Savings Resulting to the State from Furloughs.**

The trial court was presented with uncontradicted evidence showing that for the 2008-2009 fiscal year, the two-day furlough was estimated to result in savings to the General Fund in the amount of \$298,541,141. (JA, Vol. II, Tab V, JA000471.) The savings to the General Fund for excluded unrepresented employees was estimated at \$76,837,793 for fiscal year 2008-2009. (*Id.*) For the 2009-2010 fiscal year, the two-day furlough was estimated to result in savings to the General Fund in the amount of

\$716,498,739. (*Id.*) The savings to the General Fund for fiscal year 2009-2010 for excluded unrepresented employees was estimated at \$184,410,703. (*Id.*) The savings to the General Fund was estimated at \$75,075,787 per month by implementing a temporary two-day a month furlough for represented and excluded unrepresented employees covering a seventeen-month period. (*Id.*, at JA000472.)

5. **Efforts to Meet and Confer with State Public Employee Unions Regarding Furloughs Following Issuance of Executive Order S-16-08.**

Appellants PECG and CAPS are covered by Memoranda of Understandings (MOU) that remain in full force and effect.³ (JA, Vol. III, Tab MM, JA000564 – JA000565.)

On December 19, 2008, DPA telephoned and sent out letters to all of the state public employee unions advising them of the furloughs and offering to bargain over the impacts of their implementation. (JA, Vol. III, Tab MM, JA000563; JA, Vol. III, Tab NN, JA000567 – JA000578.) After sending out the letter, DPA met with various bargaining units to meet and confer over the impact of the furloughs. (JA, Vol. III, Tab MM, JA000563 – JA000564.)

³ Although the MOUs between Appellants PECG and CAPS and the State have expired, both remain in force and effect pursuant to Government Code section 3517.8(a).

B. Procedural History.

1. **Action by State Public Employee Unions Challenging Executive Order S-16-08.**

Less than one month following the Governor's issuance of Executive Order S-16-08, state employee organizations filed suits in Sacramento County Superior Court challenging the Governor's authority to furlough state employees. (JA, Vol. III, Tab XX, JA000661.) On December 22, 2008, the first petition for writ of mandate and complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief was filed in Sacramento County Superior Court by Appellants PEGC and CAPS, Case No. 2008-80000126, against the same Respondents named here. PEGC and CAPS represent, and filed their petitions on behalf of, all state employees in Bargaining Units 9 and 10. (JA, Vol. I, Tab A, JA00001 – JA 000020.)

On January 5, 2009, a second petition was filed against Respondents by California Attorneys, Administrative Law Judges, and Hearing Officers in State Employment ("CASE") in the Sacramento County Superior Court, Case No. 2009-80000134. (JA, Vol. III, Tab XX, JA000661.) CASE represents, and filed its petition on behalf of, all state employees in Bargaining Unit 2.

On January 7, 2009, a third petition was filed against Respondents in Sacramento County Superior Court by Service Employees International Union, Local 1000 ("SEIU"), Case No. 2009-80000135. (JA, Vol. III, Tab

XX, JA000661.) SEIU represents, and filed its petition on behalf of, all state employees in Bargaining Units 1, 3, 4, 11, 14, 15, 17, 20, and 21.

On January 9, 2009, the parties in Case No. 2008-80000126 (PECG/CAPS), Case No. 2009-80000134 (CASE) and 2009-80000135 (SEIU) appeared and stipulated that a hearing on the merits in those cases would be heard on January 29, 2009. (JA, Vol. I, Tab J, JA000093 – JA000094.)

2. **The Trial Court's Ruling.**

On January 29, 2009, the Sacramento County Superior Court held oral argument on the three cases. (JA, Vol. III, Tab WW, JA000652.) All parties were present and appeared at the hearing. (*Id.*) On January 30, 2009, the Sacramento trial court issued an amended and final order denying all three of the petitions and entering judgment for Respondents. (JA, Vol. III, Tab XX, JA000660-JA000671.) The Sacramento trial court's Final Order states in relevant part:

The Court accordingly rules that, with regard to the issues raised by all petitioners regarding the Governor's authority to make the challenged order, the petitions for writ of mandate are denied and judgment shall be entered for the defendants (respondents) on the complaints for declaratory relief. This ruling applies to both state employees represented by all of the petitioners under the Dills Act and to those state employees represented by petitioners PECG and CAPS who are excluded from the Dills Act by law, as the authorities on which the Court has relied in finding that the Governor has the

authority to take the challenged action apply to both classes of employees.

(*Id.*, at JA000669.) The trial court ruled the provisions of the Executive Order constitute “a rule in that they establish a standard of general application to state employees.” (*Id.*, at JA000666.)

The trial court specified two separate grounds for its ruling affirming the Governor’s authority to furlough state employees pursuant to Executive Order S-16-08. First, the court found “[t]he Governor has the statutory authority to reduce the hours of state employees pursuant to Government Code section 19851 and 19849.” (*Id.*, at JA000665.) With respect to the application of these two statutes, the trial court stated:

The Court finds that these two statutes, taken together, provide the Governor with authority to reduce the workweek of state employees to meet the needs of state agencies, and to do so by adopting a rule. The provisions of the Executive Order regarding the furlough are a rule in that they establish a standard of general application to state employees. Under the circumstances of the current fiscal crisis, the reduction in the workweek of state employees under the furlough order is indisputably related to the needs of the various state agencies, which, from the evidence respondents have submitted to the Court, run the imminent risk of running out of money and thus being unable to carry out their missions, if immediate action is not taken to reduce expenditures.

(*Id.*, at JA000666.)

Second, the trial court found “on two separate bases, that the Governor has authority to reduce the work hours of the state employees represented by the petitioners in these actions pursuant to the terms of the MOUs the State entered into with the petitioner employee organizations” (*Id.*, at JA000666.) In the first of these two separate bases, the trial court ruled,

[E]ach of the petitioners’ MOUs expressly incorporates the terms of sections 19849 and 19851 into the agreement between the parties, and the terms of the MOU do not conflict with these statutes, notwithstanding that the MOUs call for a normal work week of 40 hours. Thus, these provisions of law are not superseded by the MOUs, and the Governor retains the authority, pursuant to law and contract, to take any actions he would be permitted to take pursuant to Government Code sections 19849 and 19851 as described above.

(*Id.*)

The trial court also ruled “certain of the petitioners’ MOUs expressly permit the State either to reduce hours in case of lack of funds or to take all necessary action to carry out its mission in emergencies.” (*Id.*, at JA000667.) In applying these provisions of the MOUs between the parties, the trial court found “that the current fiscal emergency, which is amply documented in the evidence the respondents have submitted, authorizes the Governor to reduce the working hours of state employees under these cited terms of the various MOUs.” (*Id.*, at JA000667 – JA000668.)

Based upon the above findings, the trial court ruled “both statutory law and the provisions of the petitioners’ MOUs authorized the Governor to reduce the work hours of state employees through a furlough in the current fiscal emergency.” (*Id.*, at JA000668.) In so ruling, the court specifically found Government Code section 19826(b) “does not preclude the Governor from taking such action.” (*Id.*)

Judgment was entered by the trial court on February 11, 2009. (JA, Vol. IV, Tab CCC, JA000696 – JA000711; JA, Vol. IV, Tab DDD, JA000715 – JA000729.)

III.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether pursuant to his constitutional and statutory authority, the Governor has the inherent executive authority to issue an Executive Order directing temporary twice monthly furloughs of state employees.

a. Whether Government Code section 19851 provides such authority.

b. Whether Government Code section 19849 provides such authority.

2. Whether the Governor has the authority pursuant to the MOUs between the State and Appellants to direct temporary, twice monthly furloughs of state employees.

3. Whether the issuance of an Executive Order is an appropriate and authorized means of directing the temporary furloughs of state employees.

4. Whether the “emergency” provision contained in the Ralph C. Dills Act (the “Dills Act,” Gov. Code § 3512, *et seq.*), Government Code section 3516.5, authorized the Governor to issue the Executive Order directing twice monthly furloughs of state employees prior to meeting and conferring with the recognized employee organizations representing state employees.

IV.

ANALYSIS

A. Pursuant to His Constitutional and Statutory Authority, the Governor As the State Employer Has the Inherent Power to Issue the Executive Order Implementing Furloughs.

It is undisputed the Governor and DPA are statutorily “vested with the duties, purposes, responsibilities, and jurisdiction ... with respect to the administration of salaries, hours, and other personnel related matters.” (Gov. Code § 19816(a).) Furthermore, as the Chief Executive of the State, the Governor has the authority to issue orders to ensure the fiscal viability of the State and to safeguard the continual operations of all state departments. (Cal. Const., Art. V, § 1.) As part of his constitutional authority, the Governor also has the authority to declare a fiscal emergency whenever he determines that for a particular fiscal year “General Fund

revenues will decline substantially below the estimate of General Fund revenues upon which the budget bill for that fiscal year, as enacted, was based, or General Fund expenditures will increase substantially above that estimate of General Fund revenues, or both.” (Cal. Const. Art. IV, § 10(f).)

Faced with an unprecedented fiscal crisis requiring immediate action, the Governor, using the authority vested in him by the California Constitution, statutes and the MOUs, issued a Fiscal Emergency Proclamation on December 1, 2008. (JA, Vol. III, Tab GG, JA000530 – JA000531.) On December 19, 2008, he issued Executive Order S-16-08, instructing DPA to adopt a plan temporarily furloughing the state work force two days per month. (JA, Vol. III, Tab HH, JA000533 – JA000534.) The Governor’s use of the Executive Order to promulgate this temporary change to work hours was appropriate and authorized by statutes granting him power to modify work hours to meet the needs of the State during a fiscal crisis. The trial court’s ruling so finding is supported by the record and for this reason the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed.

1. **Government Code Sections 19849 and 19851 Authorize the Governor to Furlough Employees By Reducing Their Work Hours.**

In response to the State’s fiscal crisis, the Governor was authorized to furlough employees reducing the 40-hour workweek to “workweeks and workdays of a different number of hours ...in order to meet the varying needs of the different state agencies.” (Gov. Code § 19851.) Government

Code section 19849 authorizes DPA to “adopt rules governing hours of work.” Included within this authority is the ability to adopt rules reducing hours as directed by the Executive Order.

The plain language of Government Code sections 19851 and 19849 provide the Governor and DPA with the authority to reduce hours. Whenever a dispute arises over statutory interpretation, statutes should first be interpreted using the plain meaning of the language. (See *Green v. State of California* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, 260.) If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to go further and the language should be applied pursuant to its plain meaning. (*Id.*) “The statute’s plain meaning controls the court’s interpretation unless its words are ambiguous. If the plain language of a statute is unambiguous, no court need, or should, go beyond that pure expression of legislative intent.” (*Id.*; *Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003 [“In interpreting a statute where the language is clear, courts must follow its plain meaning”].)

If the language is vague and subject to interpretation, reference to legislative history and prior case precedents may be necessary. (*Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 116, 129.) Here, the language on its face is clear and does not require reference to Legislative history. (*Green v. State of California, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at 260.) However, even the legislative history coupled with Governor’s reasonable use of these statutes support the temporary reduction of hours in order to address

the fiscal crisis. (*MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc.* (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1082.)

- a. **Section 19851 provides the State with authority to establish work schedules to meet the varying needs of different state agencies and departments.**

The Governor, as the state employer, has the statutory authority to reduce the hours of state employees pursuant to Government Code section 19851. Government Code section 19851(a) states in relevant part as follows:

It is the policy of the state that the workweek of the state employee shall be 40 hours and the workday of state employees shall be eight hours, *except that* workweeks and workdays of a different number of hours may be established in order to meet the varying needs of the different state agencies.

(Emphasis added.)

Section 19851 states that it is only the *policy* of the State that workweeks are 40 hours and workdays are 8 hours. The term “policy” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., as “[t]he *general principles* by which a government is *guided in its management* of public affairs, or the legislature in its measures. This term, as applied to a law, ordinance or rule of law, *denotes its general purpose or tendency* considered as directed to the welfare or prosperity of the state or community.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the term “policy” is not synonymous with “mandate” or “obligation” and does not impose on the State an absolute, unequivocal duty to establish

40-hour workweeks for state employees. Furthermore, section 19851 grants the State the discretion to establish workdays and workweeks of a “different number of hours,” i.e., less than 40 hours a workweek, to meet the varying needs of different state agencies and departments.

The fact that section 19851 was intended to provide the State with flexibility to establish work schedules of differing hours depending on operational needs is well established in the legislative history of the statute. The predecessor code to section 19851, Government Code section 18020, was adopted in 1945. (See Exhibit H and I of Appellant State Controller John Chiang’s Request for Judicial Notice.) As early as 1945, at the time of the statute’s adoption, the Legislature demonstrated a clear intent to create a flexible policy for establishing workday and workweek schedules for state employees. The Legislature expressly provided for exceptions to the 40-hour workweek when the operational demands of the various state agencies and departments required it. Section 18020 was amended several times until 1981 when section 19851 was adopted as a replacement statute. All of these amendments to section 18020 preserved the State employer’s right to adjust employee’s workweeks.

Former section 18020’s history demonstrates the Legislature’s intent to provide the Governor and state agencies and departments flexibility in scheduling workweeks other than 40-hour workweeks. For instance, in 1955, the Legislature sought to amend former section 18020. This

amendment focused on the abolition of the State Personnel Board's four-tiered employee classification system for determination of workweeks. The Office of Legislative Counsel summarized Assembly Bill 1464, in the following manner:

Recasts existing sections and deletes provisions establishing four work week groups and requiring overtime compensation for first three groups. Provides it is state policy that work week shall be 40 hours, *but work weeks with different number of hours may be established to meet needs of state agencies*

(Emphasis added.)

The Office of the Attorney General also summarized Assembly Bill 1464 as setting forth "a statement of State policy that State workers shall be employed forty hours a week, *except that to meet the varying needs of the different State agencies workweeks of a different number of hours may be established.*" (Emphasis added.)

When section 19851 finally replaced section 18020 in 1981, it incorporated the nearly 40-year legislative history of providing the state employer with the discretion and flexibility to adjust work hours consistent with the "varying needs of the different state agencies." In this case, the reduction in the work hours of state employees directly impacts every single state agency and department by preserving the ability to retain cash reserves. The State's cash reserves are used to pay employees and to fund essential services provided to the public by these agencies and departments.

Here, the varying needs of the different state agencies and departments were met by reducing the hours of state employees to increase the State's cash reserves and address the budget deficit. Due to the extraordinarily dire fiscal circumstances facing the State, the Governor's issuance of the Executive Order to reduce temporarily the working hours of state employees was justified "in order to meet the varying needs of the different state agencies." (Gov. Code, § 19851.)

PECG/CAPS and the Controller have provided no support for the proposition that Government Code section 19851 was not intended to incorporate the State employer's authority to reduce hours. PECG/CAPS's reliance on a 1962 Attorney General Opinion is misplaced and inapplicable. (See PECG/CAPS's Opening Brief, at 5, 26.) The Attorney General Opinion in question was issued in response to the California Highway Patrol's request for an opinion "as to whether uniformed officers of the Highway Patrol are entitled to credit for overtime work while 'standing by' or 'on call.'" This requested opinion had nothing to with interpreting whether the former version of section 19851 authorized a reduction in hours or required a minimum 40 hour workweek. PECG/CAPS's reference to Title 2 of the California Code of Regulations, section 599.703 is also inappropriate as this provision relates to overtime compensation and not reduction of working hours resulting from furloughs. The reference to 40 hours in the regulation does not reflect a 40-hour minimum workweek but

rather reflects that overtime must be paid after employees work 40 hours in a workweek.

The Controller's arguments on this point are equally unavailing. The Controller concedes in its brief that the language of section 19851 encompasses the concept of less than 40-hour workweeks in order "to meet the varying needs of the differing state agencies." (See Controller's Brief, at 18.) The Controller argues, however, that in applying furloughs throughout the state workforce, the Governor was not acting in a fashion to meet *varying* needs of *differing* state agencies. (*Id.*) Yet, the Controller's argument ignores his own pronouncements on the dire nature of the State's fiscal and cash crisis at the time the Governor issued the Executive Order, which by its very magnitude impacted every state entity. On December 19, 2008, the very day the Governor issued Executive Order S-16-08, the Controller released a statement urging the Governor and Legislature to reach a resolution in order to prevent the State from running out of cash in late February. (JA, Vol. III, Tab II, JA000536.) On December 22, 2008, the Controller sent a letter to the Governor and the Legislature, reiterating the severity of the fiscal crisis the State was facing. (JA, Vol. III, Tab JJ, JA000538 – JA000540.) In this letter, the Controller stated,

[I]f current projections hold true, the State is less than seventy days from running out of cash. Worse, my office's analyses indicate there will be no shelter from the storm as the State's cash position will remain negative throughout the

remainder of the fiscal year. As I indicated during the recent Legislative Budget Session, the failure of the Governor and the Legislature to quickly arrive at an agreement to responsibly address the State's \$41 billion budget crisis would begin a cascading series of regrettable actions necessary to conserve the State's dwindling case reserves.

(Id., at JA000538.)

The Controller cannot now ignore the import of his dire predictions. His own analysis was that the State was on the brink of running out of cash, which affected the ability of all state agencies and departments to meet their financial obligations (such as being able to pay vendors and contractors for their services). (JA, Vol. III, Tab JJ, JA000538 – JA000540.) The Controller now argues the Governor cannot address this fiscal emergency by implementing furloughs throughout the state workforce, but rather must implement furloughs on each state agency or department to meet the needs of each state agency or department. This interpretation is not supported by the language of section 19851. While section 19851 allows the hours of work to be different in different agencies and departments in order to meet the varying needs of the different state departments, the language of the code section in no way limits the Governor to this agency-by-agency or department-by-department approach as the Controller contends. There is no language prohibiting the Governor from determining that the needs of the state agencies and departments are met by the implementation of statewide furlough. Furthermore, the Controller's interpretation is belied

by the code section's legislative history. The Controller fails to offer any cogent argument for finding section 19851 does not authorize the Governor to furlough state workers under the facts present at the time of the issuance of the Executive Order.

The remainder of the Controller's arguments regarding section 19851 also lack merit. The Controller argues that Government Code section 19852, which grants the State the authority to establish 40-hour workweeks consisting of four 10-hour days prohibits the Governor from establishing workweeks of less than 40 hours. (See Controller's Brief, at 22.) Yet, the fact the State has the flexibility to establish 40-hour workweeks of four 10-hour days cannot be read as a limitation on the authority to establish workweeks of less than 40 hours. Such an interpretation of section 19852 would effectively nullify the language of section 19851, which states it is the policy of the State to establish 40-hour workweeks, "*except that workweeks ... of a different number of hours may be established to meet the varying needs of the differing state agencies.*" The plain meaning of section 19851 is the State may establish workweeks consisting of a number of hours different than 40. The Controller's proffered interpretation of sections 19851 and 19852 would render this language meaningless and, therefore, must be rejected. (See *Compulink Management Center, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.* (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 289, 296, ["[a] statutes every word and clause should be given

effect so that no part or provision is rendered meaningless or inoperative.”].)

The Controller also argues Government Code sections 19996.21 and 19996.22 prohibit the Governor from furloughing state employees. Once again, this argument lacks merit. (See Controller’s Brief, at 22-23.) These code sections permit the State to offer workweeks of less than 40 hours to accommodate employee special needs and requests. If anything, these code sections serve to further demonstrate the Governor’s inherent authority as the state employer to establish varying schedules for state employees. These code sections, granting the State the ability to accommodate employees’ needs and requests, cannot be read as a limitation on the Governor’s executive authority to furlough state employees in the face of a fiscal crisis. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed.

b. **Section 19849(a) provides the State with authority to adopt rules regarding work hours.**

Whereas section 19851 provides the State with the overall flexibility to establish work schedules of varying numbers of hours, Government Code section 19849(a) provides the State with authority to adopt rules regarding work hours that must be enforced by the varying agencies and departments of the State. That code section provides in relevant part:

The department [DPA] shall adopt rules governing hours of work ... Each appointing power shall administer and enforce such rules.

Read together, sections 19851 and 19849 provide the state employer with the statutory authority to establish hours of work including workweeks of less than 40 hours to meet the varying needs of the State. These statutes also establish the Governor's authority, acting as the state employer, to issue the Executive Order furloughing state employees two days per month.

B. The Governor Has the Authority to Direct Temporary, Twice Monthly Furloughs Pursuant to the MOUs Between the State and Appellants.

In addition to his constitutional and statutory authority to furlough state employees, the trial court found the Governor had such authority pursuant to the MOUs between the State and the various state bargaining units that were represented at the January 29, 2009 hearing. (JA, Vol. III, Tab XX, JA000666.) The trial court found there were two separate and independent bases on which the MOUs provided the Governor this authority.

First, the trial court ruled that each of the subject MOUs expressly incorporated the terms of sections 19851 and 19849 into the agreement between the parties. (*Id.*) In this regard, the trial court further found the terms of the MOUs do not conflict with these statutes, notwithstanding that the MOUs call for a normal workweek of 40 hours. (*Id.*) Thus, the trial court found these provisions of law were not superseded by the MOUs, and the Governor retained the authority, pursuant to law and contract, to take

any actions he would be permitted to take pursuant to Government Code sections 19851 and 19849 as described above. (*Id.*)

Second, the trial court ruled the “State Rights” clauses in some of the MOUs also provided the Governor with authority to issue the Executive Order directing the furloughs of state employees. (*Id.*, at JA000667 – JA000668.)

“All modern California decisions treat labor-management agreements, whether in public employment or private, as enforceable contracts which should be interpreted to execute the mutual intent and purpose of the parties.” (*Glendale City Employees Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 339.) In order to achieve this goal, courts “must thus interpret the intent and scope of the agreements by focusing on the usual and ordinary meaning of the language used and the circumstances under which the agreement was made.” (*Riverside Sheriff’s Assn. v. County of Riverside* (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1424.)

Application of these rules of interpretation to the parties’ MOUs at issue demonstrates that both grounds articulated by the trial court for finding the MOUs support the Governor’s authority to furlough state employees are supported by the record. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed.

1. **The MOUs Between the State and Appellants Incorporate the Provisions of Government Codes Sections 19851 and 19849 and, Therefore, these Statutes Are Not Superseded by the MOUs.**

The Dills Act is a supersession statute. (*Department of Personnel Administration v. Superior Court (Greene)* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 155, 174-175.) Government Code section 3517.6 lists a variety of code sections which, *if in conflict with the provisions of the MOU*, are superseded by the MOU. Both sections 19851 and 19849 are listed among those code sections superseded *if in conflict with the provisions of the parties' MOU*. Thus, the critical question in applying the rules of contract interpretation cited above to the question of whether sections 19851 and 19849 are superseded by the parties' MOUs is whether those code sections conflict with any provision of the MOUs.

Far from being in conflict with any provisions of the parties' MOUs, sections 19851 and 19849 *are expressly incorporated as terms of the parties MOUs*. For instance, section 19.2 of the MOU between the State and Appellant PEGC for employees in State Bargaining Unit 9, entitled "Supersession," provides as follows:

The following Government Code sections and all DPA regulations and/or rules related thereto are hereby incorporated into this MOU.

(JA, Vol. I, Tab N, JA000192.) Subsection 12 of section 19.2 is entitled, "Workweek," and lists section 19851 as one of the code sections expressly incorporated into the MOU. (*Id.*, at JA000195.) Similarly, subsection 13

of section 19.2 is entitled, “Overtime,” and expressly incorporates the provisions of section 19849 into the MOU. (*Id.*)

The MOU between the State and Appellant CAPS for employees in State Bargaining Unit 10 contains nearly identical supersession language at section 13.6 of that MOU. (JA, Vol. II, Tab O, JA000301 – JA000308.)

That section reads in relevant part:

The following enumerated Government Code Sections ... and all existing rules, regulations, standards, practices, and polices which implement the enumerated Government Code sections ... are hereby incorporated into this Agreement.

(*Id.*, at JA000301.) Once again, subsection 12, “Workweek,” and subsection 13, “Overtime,” list sections 19851 and 19849, respectively, as code sections incorporated into the MOU. (*Id.*, at JA000305.)

Accordingly, the express terms of both MOUs, far from superseding sections 19851 and 19849, expressly incorporate the terms of those code sections as terms of the MOUs. Given that sections 19851 and 19849 provide the Governor with authority to furlough state employees, as established above, the inescapable conclusion is that the MOUs similarly authorize such action by the Governor in light of the fact that the MOUs expressly incorporate the provisions of those two code sections.

PECG/CAPS argue, however, that both of the supersession sections of their MOUs state that “if any other provision of the Agreement alters or

is in conflict with” any of the incorporated code sections, “the Agreement shall be controlling.” They contend that to the extent they authorize the Governor to furlough state employees, sections 19851 and 19849 conflict with the MOUs because those agreements provide for 40-hour workweeks. However, this argument disregards the plain language of other sections of the parties’ MOUs. For instance, the State/CAPS MOU provides at section 7.2, “Alternative Work Schedule,” for work schedules involving “reduced work time for a Unit 10 employee.” (JA, Vol. II, Tab O, JA000281.) The State/PECG MOU provides at section 8.4.B, “Work Shift Schedules,” in language nearly identical to that found in Government Code section 19851, that the State may establish varying work shifts for Bargaining Unit 9 employees, which the MOU defines, in part, to include “*any* work shift other than a traditional day shift” “*in order to meet the needs of the State agencies.*” (JA, Vol. I, Tab N, JA000172.) Thus, it is clear from an examination of various provisions in the MOUs that allowances are made for work schedules that differ from the traditional 40-hour a week schedule. In contrast, Appellants cannot direct this Court to a single provision of the MOUs expressly forbidding the furloughing of employees subject to those MOUs. Accordingly, application of sections 19851 and 19849 do not conflict with the MOUs and, as a consequence of their express incorporation into the MOUs, the Governor has contractual authority, in addition to his constitutional and statutory authority, to furlough state

employees governed by these MOUs.

The same is also true for the MOUs between the State and the other state employee organizations in the related cases. For instance, section 4.4 of the MOU between the State and CASE, entitled “Supersession,” provides as follows:

The following Government Code sections and all DPA regulations and/or rules related thereto are hereby incorporated into this MOU.

(JA in Case No. CO61009, Vol. II, Tab SS, JA000399.) Subsection 12 of section 4.4 is entitled, “Workweek,” and lists section 19851 as one of the code sections expressly incorporated into the MOU. (*Id.*, at JA000402.) Similarly, subsection 13 of section 4.4 is entitled, “Overtime,” and expressly incorporates the provisions of section 19849 into the MOU. (*Id.*)

Finally, the MOUs between the State and multiple bargaining units represented by SEIU expressly incorporate sections 19851 and 19849. For instance, the MOU for State Bargaining Unit 1 represented by SEIU has the identical incorporation language cited above for PEGC and CASE at section 5.6, subsections (A)(11) and (A)(12). (JA in Case No. C061020, Vol. II, Tab MM, JA000364 – JA000367.) The incorporation of sections 19851 and 19849 also are found at the exact same sections of the MOUs for State Bargaining Unit 3 (JA in Case No. C061020, Vol. III, Tab NN, JA000560 – JA000566), State Bargaining Unit 4 (see JA in Case No. C061020, Vol. IV, Tab OO, JA000800-JA000805.), State Bargaining Unit

11 (see JA in Case No. CO61020, Vol. V, Tab PP, JA000944 – JA000949), State Bargaining Unit 14 (see JA in Case No. C061020, Vol. VI, Tab QQ, JA001111 – JA001117.), State Bargaining Unit 15 (see JA in Case No. C061020, Vol. VII, Tab RR, JA001252 – JA001257.), State Bargaining Unit 17 (see JA in Case No. C061020, Vol. VIII, Tab SS, JA001431 – JA001436.), State Bargaining Unit 20 (see JA in Case No. C061020, Vol. IX, Tab TT, JA001637 – JA001642.), and State Bargaining Unit 21 (see JA in Case No. C061020, Vol. X, Tab UU, JA001795 – JA001800.).

Given that sections 19851 and 19849 provide the Governor with authority to furlough state employees, as established above, the inescapable conclusion is that the MOUs similarly authorize such action by the Governor in light of the fact that the MOUs expressly incorporate the provisions of those two code sections. Accordingly, application of sections 19851 and 19849 do not conflict with the MOUs and, as a consequence of their express incorporation into the MOUs, the Governor has contractual authority, in addition to his constitutional and statutory authority, to furlough state employees governed by these MOUs.

2. **The “State Rights” Clauses of the MOUs Give the Governor the Authority to Furlough Employees Subject to those MOUs.**

As an independent ground for finding the Governor was authorized by the parties’ MOUs to furlough state employees, the trial court found that the State Rights clauses in the MOUs provided contractual authorization for

the furloughs. (JA, Vol. III, Tab XX, JA00067.) The State Rights clause at section 12.1 of State/CAPS MOU expressly provides the rights of the State include, but are not limited to, the right to “maintain efficiency of State operations,” “to determine ... the procedures and standards for ... scheduling,” and “to take all necessary action to carry out its mission in emergencies.” (JA, Vol. II, Tab O, JA000300.) This language certainly provides the state employer with the right to furlough employees governed by the MOU to maintain efficient operation and fulfill the mission of the varying state agencies and departments during the fiscal emergency faced by the State.

Appellant PECG argues, however, they have no such State Rights clause in their MOU. Yet, the State Rights clause in the State/PECG MOU, Section 17.1 of the MOU, provides that “[a]ll the functions, rights, power, and authority not specifically abridged by this MOU are retained by the employer.” (JA, Vol. I, Tab N, JA000187.) The MOU does not abridge the rights of the state employer to furlough state employees. Rather, the MOU provides authority for furloughs through its incorporation of Government Code sections 19851 and 19849. (*Id.*, at JA000195.) Accordingly, the State Rights clause in the State/PECG MOU authorizes furloughs.

The Controller argues the State Rights provisions must be given a narrow interpretation and the reference to “emergencies” contained in these clauses must be limited to those emergencies described in Government

Code section 8558, a part of the Emergency Services Act. (See Controller's Brief, at 37-38.) The Controller's argument, however ignores the fact the Dills Act does not limit the definition of "emergencies," as the term is used in Government Code section 3516.5, to those emergencies subject to a Proclamation of a State of Emergency under the Emergency Services Act. In fact, there are a variety of different recognized emergencies under California law, including the declaration of a local state of emergency (Gov. Code, §8630), the Governor's proclamation of a state of emergency (Gov. Code, §8558), the Governor's proclamation of a fiscal emergency (Cal. Const., Art. IV, § 10(f)), and emergencies in the labor relations context that excuse an employer's bargaining obligation before implementation of a new work rule to address an emergency situation. (Gov. Code, § 3516.5. See also *Sonoma County Organization v. County of Sonoma* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 267.) The absence of any limiting language regarding "emergencies" as referenced in the Dills Act, argues in favor a more expansive concept of "emergency" in the labor relations context to provide the state employer with the flexibility to address factual circumstances such as that present in this case.

Here, the Governor exercised his authority pursuant to Article IV, section 10(f) of the California Constitution, enacted in 2004 pursuant to Proposition 58, to issue a proclamation declaring a fiscal emergency. The Governor issued such a proclamation on December 1, 2009, less than three

weeks prior to issuing Executive Order S-16-08. (JA, Vol. III, Tab GG, JA000530 – JA000531.) On this point, the Controller argues that when the Governor issues such a proclamation, the only action he may take is to call a special session of the Legislature to address the crisis. (See Controller’s Brief, at 12.) This argument is irrelevant to the issue before this Court. While Proposition 58 gives the Governor the authority to call a special session of the Legislature to address a fiscal emergency, the Governor may issue a fiscal emergency proclamation only if the following conditions are met: the Governor determines that for the current fiscal year, General Fund revenues will decline substantially below the estimate upon which the budget bill for the current fiscal year, as enacted, was based or General Fund expenditures will increase substantially above the estimate of General Fund revenues, or both. It is the conditions giving rise to the Governor’s fiscal emergency proclamation that are relevant to the issue before this Court. The undisputed evidence presented to the trial court regarding the satisfaction of the conditions for proclaiming a fiscal emergency created a presumption – unrebutted by the petitioners or the Controller in the trial court – that the State was indeed facing a budget and fiscal deficit in the current fiscal year and needed extraordinary action to address the fiscal emergency. There is nothing in this constitutional provision suggesting the otherwise inherent executive powers the Governor possesses as the Chief Executive Officer of the State of California (see Cal. Const. Art. V, § 1) or

as the state employer (see Gov. Code, § 19816(a)) are in any way diminished in the face of a fiscal crisis. The Governor relied upon the authority granted to him pursuant to Government Code sections 19851 and 19849 in order to realize the necessary savings via the temporary furloughs. As such, the Executive Order falls squarely within his executive powers and the powers he exercised by issuing the Executive order were in no way diminished or impaired by the passage of Proposition 58 as the Controller suggests. The Executive Order is a constitutional exercise of the Governor's executive power.

For these reasons, the trial court's judgment finding that the MOUs between the State and state employee organizations provide contractual authority for the Governor's Executive Order directing temporary, twice monthly furloughs for state employees should be affirmed.

C. The Emergency Provision of the Dills Act Allows the Governor to Issue the Executive Order Temporarily Implementing Furloughs Without First Meeting and Conferring with the Recognized Employee Organizations.

Although furloughs may be subject to the meet and confer process under the Dills Act, the Dills Act also authorized the Governor to unilaterally act because of the extreme fiscal crisis at the time of the issuance of the Executive Order. (Gov. Code, § 3516.5, see also *Sonoma County Organization v. County of Sonoma*, *supra*, 1 Cal.App.4th 267.)

Government Code section 3516.5 establishes the duty of the state employer to bargain over any proposed rule or regulation impacting terms

and conditions of employment. (Gov. Code, § 3516.5.) This statutory duty to meet and confer prior to implementation is a general governing principal in labor relations. However, the Legislature in enacting Government Code section 3516.5 also added a specific exception to this general obligation to meet and confer. Government Code section 3516.5 provides, in relevant part:

Except in cases of emergency as provided in this section, the employer shall give reasonable written notice to each recognized employee organization affected by any law, rule, resolution, or regulation directly relating to matters within the scope of representation proposed to be adopted by the employer, and shall give such recognized employee organizations the opportunity to meet and confer...

In cases of emergency when the employer determines that a law, rule, resolution, or regulation must be adopted immediately *without prior notice or meeting with a recognized employee organization*, the [employer] ... shall provide such notice and opportunity to meet and confer in good faith at the earliest practical time following the adoption of such law, rule, resolution, or regulation.

(Emphasis added.) This legislatively enacted exception authorizes the Governor to enact rules affecting terms and conditions of employment without first meeting and conferring in cases of emergency.

In *Sonoma County, supra*, the court interpreted language in the Meyers Milias Brown Act (“MMBA,” Gov. Code, § 3504.5) providing an

emergency exception to local public employers' bargaining obligations that is nearly identical to the language found in Government Code section 3516.5. The court held a county employer was not required to bargain with one of its unions before implementing a new work rule giving local supervisors authority to put employees on unpaid leave of absence in the wake of job actions by union members. The court held that irrespective of the county's possible managerial right to implement the new work rule, the county's *obligation to meet and confer was excused by an emergency*. (Emphasis added; *Sonoma County, supra*, 1 Cal.App.4th at 274.) The court further held that since the county already had determined there was an emergency, as reflected in the emergency ordinance, the burden shifted to the union to demonstrate there was not a bona fide emergency. (*Id.*, at 275-276, citing Evid. Code, § 663—presumption that public officers have properly exercised their duties.) The California Supreme Court, in approving the holding in *Sonoma County*, has held courts review public employer declarations of an emergency under an abuse of discretion standard. (See *San Francisco Fire Fighters, Local 798 v. City and County of San Francisco* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 652, 669.)

Here, the evidence presented to the trial court overwhelmingly demonstrated the State of California was facing a fiscal crisis of unprecedented dimension at the time the Governor issued the Executive Order. On December 1, 2008, the Governor issued a Proclamation of

Fiscal Emergency pursuant to Article IV, section 10, subdivision (f) of the California Constitution. (JA, Vol. III, Tab GG, JA000530 – JA000531) The Governor’s fiscal emergency proclamation created a rebuttable presumption an emergency in fact existed. (See *Sonoma County, supra*, 1 Cal.App.4th at 275-276 and Evid. Code, § 664.) The burden in the trial court shifted to the Appellants to demonstrate there was not an emergency justifying the Governor’s action. Yet, Appellants failed to present any evidence demonstrating the absence of an emergency or rebutting the Governor’s fiscal emergency proclamation.

To the contrary, the record in the trial court established that Appellants conceded the extreme magnitude of the fiscal crisis. (JA, Vol. III, Tab FF, JA000528.) PECG, one of the Appellants here, admitted in its “Weekly Update” of January 9, 2009, “the state is running out of cash.” (*Id.*) Other public employees similarly acknowledged their awareness “of the fact that California is facing an unprecedented financial crisis” (JA, Vol. III, Tab DD, JA000523), and that “California is headed over a cliff.” (JA, Vol. III, Tab EE, JA000525)

The Governor’s Executive Order S-16-08 made several specific findings regarding the extreme fiscal crisis. (JA, Vol. III, Tab HH, JA000533 – JA000534.) Specifically, the Executive Order stated, “due to developments in the worldwide and national financial markets, and continuing weak performance in the California economy, there is an

approximately \$15 billion General Fund deficit for the 2008-09 fiscal year, which without effective action, is estimated to grow to a \$42 billion General Fund budget shortfall over the next 18 months” and that “without effective action to address the fiscal and cash crisis, the cash reserve in the State Treasury is estimated to be a negative \$5 billion in March 2009.” (*Id.*, at JA000533.) The Executive Order further stated that “it [is] likely that the State will miss payroll and other essential services payments at the beginning of 2009.” (*Id.*)

The Department of Finance and the State Controller’s Office agreed at the time an unprecedented fiscal crisis existed. (JA, Vol. III, Tab JJ, JA0000538 – JA000540; JA, Vol. III, Tab KK, JA000542 – JA000552; JA, Vol. III, Tab LL, JA000557.) In a statement on the Governor’s website, Michael Genest, Director of the Department of Finance stated “[i]n a matter of weeks, California, the world's eighth largest economy, will run out of cash and delay making refunds to our hard-working taxpayers.” (JA, Vol. II, Tab U, JA 000441.)

The Controller himself acknowledged the existence of the fiscal emergency. In a statement at the Senate and Assembly Joint Convention on December 8, 2008, the Controller commented, “[f]ailure to act threatens our ability to respond to natural disasters, our ability to provide life preserving care to the elderly and the ill, and our ability to protect our communities from crime.” (JA, Vol. II, Tab U, JA000441.) The Controller went on to

state, “[t]he size of the revenue shortfall for the remainder of the fiscal year was most recently estimated at \$7.8 billion by the Legislative Analyst and at \$9.7 billion by the Department of Finance. My office’s economists think even \$9.7 billion may be an understatement. My office tested the latest cash flows associated with this \$9.7 billion deterioration, and what we found was a clear threat to the State’s ability to pay all of its bills starting this spring. By February, we will only have \$882 million in cash on-hand. By March, we will have exhausted our general and borrowable funds and run more than \$1.9 billion in the red. If revenues continue to deteriorate, this number will only grow.” (*Id.*, at JA000441 – JA000442.)

Based on this evidence, which was uncontradicted by PECG/CAPS or the Controller, the trial court was correct to conclude the Governor’s proclamation of fiscal emergency, was “amply documented in the evidence the respondents have submitted.” (JA, Vol. III, Tab XX, JA000667.) The existence of such a fiscal emergency specifically authorized the Governor to bypass the State’s meet and confer requirement prior to directing the temporary, twice monthly furloughs of state employees pursuant to Government Code section 3516.5.

D. The Governor’s Executive Order Implementing Furloughs is Not a Reduction in Salary Ranges.

While the adoption and implementation of temporary furloughs has resulted in a reduction of hours worked by state employees, this temporary

reduction in total hours and corresponding reduction in total compensation to state employees is not a salary range reduction in violation of Government Code section 19826(b) as Appellants claim. Moreover, Appellants' reliance on *Department of Personnel Administration v. Superior Court (Greene)*, *supra*, 5 Cal.App.4th 155 as authority for invalidating the Governor's Executive Order is misplaced because *Greene* is inapposite to this case.

1. **Furloughs Are Not Synonymous with "Salary Ranges" As That Term Is Used in Section 19826.**

One of the principal arguments advanced by both PECG/GAPS and the Controller is the two-day furloughs ordered by the Governor in his Executive Order violate Government Code section 19826(b). That code section provides as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the department shall not establish, adjust, or recommend *a salary range* for any employees in an appropriate unit where an employee organization has been chosen as the exclusive representative pursuant to Section 3520.5.

(Emphasis added.)

Contrary to the claims made by PECG/CAPS and the Controller, furloughs, and the corresponding diminution in total compensation to state employees, are not equivalent to reductions in salary ranges. Employees' wage rates or salary ranges have not been reduced as a result of the furlough. A furlough only constitutes a reduction in hours worked, not a

reduction in the wage rate paid for that work. The undisputed evidence presented to the trial court was that the hours worked will be impacted by the furloughs, not the rate of pay for those hours worked.

A change to the number of hours worked does not impact an employee's "salary range" as that term is used in section 19826(b). The arguments of PECG/CAPS and the Controller to the contrary would lead to absurd results. For example, when an employee works overtime, his or her total compensation is increased due to the increased hours. If the argument is that a change in work hours is synonymous with a change in salary range, then PECG/CAPS and the Controller would have also would have to concede that a violation of section 19826(b) occurs every time an employee is paid increased compensation resulting from working overtime hours. Obviously, they are not making such a claim. A furlough is a reduction in hours resulting in a reduction in total compensation in the same way that overtime is an increase in hours resulting in an increase in total compensation. Neither one, however, constitutes a change in "salary range." A salary range adjustment occurs where an employee's total work hours remain unchanged and their corresponding pay either increases or decreases.

This conclusion is supported by longstanding DPA regulations regarding salary issues. The DPA regulations, enacted twenty years prior, define "salary range" as the "minimum and maximum rate currently

authorized for the class.” (2 CCR, § 599.666.1.) “Rate” for hourly employees is “any one of the dollar and cents amounts found within the salary range.” (*Id.*) In this respect, “[m]onthly or hourly rates of pay may be converted from one to the other when the Director of [DPA] considers it advisable.” (2 CCR, § 599.670.) In other words, “salary range” concerns the hourly rate an employee is paid. “Salary range” does not refer to the employee’s “total compensation.” Accordingly, the Governor’s Executive Order establishing two-day a month furloughs for state employees does not fall within the ambit of section 19826(b).

2. **Section 19826 Is Suppressed by Operation of the Dills Act Due to the Existence of the Current Terms and Conditions in Effect in the MOUs Between the Parties.**

Government Code section 19826 is also inapplicable to the case at hand because it is superseded by existing MOUs between the parties. The Dills Act governs the labor relations between the State and its employees. Pursuant to Government Code section 3517.8(a) contained in the Dills Act,

If a memorandum of understanding has expired, and the Governor and the recognized employee organization have not agreed to a new memorandum of understanding and have not reached an impasse in negotiations, subject to subdivision (b), the parties to the agreement shall continue to give effect to the provisions of the expired memorandum of understanding, including, but not limited to, all provisions that supersede existing law, any arbitration provisions, any no strike provisions, any agreements regarding matters covered in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.”

(Emphasis added; Gov. Code, § 3517.8(a).)

In this case, PEGC and CAPS are parties to continuing, albeit expired, MOUs with the State of California. (JA, Vol. III, Tab MM, JA000564 – JA000565.) PEGC/CAPS have alleged neither that successor MOUs have been agreed upon, nor that the parties have reached a labor impasse in negotiations for a new MOU. Accordingly, pursuant to Government Code section 3517.8(a), the parties must continue to give effect to the terms and conditions of the expired MOUs, including all provisions which supersede existing law.

As stated in *Department of Personnel Administration v. Superior Court (Greene)*, *supra*, 5 Cal.App.4th at 174-175, a case heavily relied upon by both PEGC/CAPS and the Controller,

The Dills Act is a ‘supersession statute’, designed so that, in the absence of a MOU, as is the case when an existing MOU has expired and the parties have bargained to impasse, numerous Government Code provisions concerning state employees’ wages, hours and working conditions take effect. One of the provisions which is effective in the absence of an MOU is section 19826.”

(Emphasis added.) Thus, the present case is exactly the opposite situation of that in *Greene*. In that case, the State and two of its employee bargaining units (one of which was CAPS, an Appellant here), had reached impasse in their labor negotiations resulting in no MOU remaining in effect and, therefore, numerous provisions of the Government Code, including

section 19826, had taken effect. Here, in contrast, the parties' labor relations continue to be governed by expired MOUs that remain in effect and, therefore, pursuant to section 3517.8, the parties must continue to give effect to that MOU, including all provisions which supersede existing law.

Government Code section 3517.6(a) sets forth the code sections superseded by an MOU in effect between the parties. Among the superseded code sections identified in section 3517.6(a) is section 19826. Therefore, section 19826 is superseded by the Dills Act and the terms of the expired MOUs. In other words, unlike the situation with sections 19851 and 19849, which were specifically incorporated into the parties' MOUs, section 19826 has no legal force and effect between these parties in the face of a valid, operative MOU because that code section has been superseded by the MOUs as specified in the Dills Act. As section 19826 is superseded, it is inapplicable to the matter at hand and has no role in consideration of the validity of the Executive Order.

3. **PECG/CAPS's and the Controller's Reliance on *DPA v. Greene* is Misplaced.**

The argument made by PECG/CAPS and the Controller challenging the implementation of furloughs pursuant to Government Code section 19826 is premised on the applicability of the decision in *Greene, supra*, 5 Cal.App.4th 155 to this case. However, *Greene* is inapposite for several reasons.

In *Greene*, the Court held DPA could not implement a final wage proposal containing a salary reduction after having bargained to impasse. (*Id.*, at 172.) In particular, the *Greene* court held the Legislature retains “ultimate authority over state workers’ employment conditions,” and section 19826 was a specific delegation of this authority to the DPA with respect to unrepresented employees but not with respect to represented employees. (*Id.*, at 177-8.) “As a consequence, the question of represented employees’ wages at impasse must ultimately be resolved by the Legislature itself.” (*Id.*, at 178.)

There are several key factual distinctions between *Greene* case and this case. First and most significantly, *Greene* involved an across-the-board 5% salary reduction for employees. (*Id.*, at 164.) In *Greene*, employees were going to continue working their normal hours but receive 5% less pay, an effective reduction in their rate of pay. (*Id.*) Here, no such reduction in state employees’ rate of pay will occur. Rather, state employees’ rate of pay will remain exactly the same; those employees will work fewer hours for a temporary period.

Second, in *Greene* the parties had bargained to impasse on their MOUs when the employer decided to adopt the pay reductions. (*Id.*, at 172.) Here, it is undisputed that the labor relations between the parties are defined by their MOUs, which legally remain in force and effect. (See Govt. Code, § 3517.8(a).) In fact, *Greene* was decided before the

enactment of Government Code section 3517.8, which incorporated the “evergreen” provision of the Dills Act cited above, *i.e.*, MOUs between the state employer and its bargaining units remain in force and effect past the expiration of the MOU as long as the parties remain in good faith bargaining for a successor MOU. Pursuant to section 3517.8(a), the current terms and conditions contained in the MOUs remain in effect until the parties either reach impasse or agree to a new MOU.

Third, it is important to note the *Greene* court held section 19826 only prohibited the state employer from altering salary ranges. The *Greene* court was never asked to consider the legality of furloughs. In fact, the *Greene* court held the state employer was authorized to reduce and limit employee total compensation in other ways. (See *Greene, supra*, 5 Cal.App.4th at 187.) For example, DPA has the authority to layoff employees which reduces the work force. (See Gov. Code, § 19997.) DPA is also authorized to reduce or eliminate overtime which directly reduces employees’ total compensation. (See Gov. Code, § 19816.10.) None of these actions implicate section 19826. Indeed, although *Greene* held DPA could not unilaterally reduce employees’ salaries, it nevertheless found DPA could unilaterally reduce an employee’s benefits, even though this would limit an employee’s total compensation. (See *Greene, supra*, 5 Cal.App.4th at 187.) The adoption of temporary furloughs is an alternative

method of reducing employee total compensation without implicating Government Code section 19826 (b).

Finally, *Greene* did not involve the Governor's exercise of the emergency authority granted him by section 3516.5 to adopt a temporary, pre-impasse rule in an emergency situation. In short, *Greene* is inapposite to the present situation and its holding does not serve as a legal impediment to the Governor's exercise of his statutory and executive authority to issue the Executive Order.

E. The Governor's Issuance of the Executive Order Was a Proper Method of Adopting the Rule Implementing Furloughs.

The California Constitution grants the Governor "supreme executive power" and requires him to see that the law is faithfully executed. (Cal. Const., Art. V, § 1.) Article V, section 1, of the California Constitution grants the Governor the authority to issue directives to subordinate civil executive officers concerning the enforcement of the law. (63 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 583 (1980) WL 96881 (Cal.A.G.)) The Governor is charged with supervising the official conduct of all executive and ministerial officers. (Gov. Code, § 12010.) The subject Executive Order constitutes a proper exercise of the Governor's executive authority, as the state employer, to set the work hours of state employees.

In addition to the executive powers granted him by the California Constitution, the Governor is also vested with the sole authority to

collectively bargain on behalf of the state employer with the state bargaining unit representatives. DPA is charged with representing the Governor, as the State employer, in administering those aspects of the state personnel system subject to collective bargaining under the Dills Act, Government Code section 3512, et seq. (See Gov. Code, §§ 3513(j), 19815.4(g), 19816(a), 19816.4, 19816.8, 19816.17, 19819.5-19819.7.) Included within these powers is the duty to bargain and meet and confer with the state bargaining units' exclusive representatives over wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. (Gov. Code, §§ 3512, 3517; *CCPOA v. State of California* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 198, 202.) DPA acts as the Governor's representative for purposes of meeting and conferring with all of the state bargaining units. (Gov. Code, § 3517; *CCPOA v. State, supra*, 142 Cal.App.4th at 202.) The Governor's Executive Order ordering furloughs and DPA's implementation of the furloughs falls within the category of "wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment," and therefore, are within the scope of collective bargaining pursuant to the Dills Act.

PECG/CAPS and the Controller claim the Governor's Executive Order violates the separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislature because California law grants to the Legislature exclusive authority to set the salaries of state employees. Separate and apart from the fact that the furlough of state employees does not impact state employee

salary rates, the concept of separation of powers is being misapplied with respect to the matter before the Court. The separation of powers doctrine places limits upon the actions of each branch with respect to the other branches to prevent one branch from usurping authority of the other branches. (*Superior Court v. County of Mendocino* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 52-53.) However, the separation of powers doctrine does not require a sharp demarcation between the operations of the three branches of government. Rather, California courts have long recognized that, in reality, the separation of powers doctrine allows the three departments of government to affect each other significantly. (*Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal Comm.* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1, 24-25.)

The Executive Order was issued in order to alleviate part of the State's catastrophic and ever-worsening fiscal crisis. In the absence of immediate action, the State was projected to run out of cash by February 2009. (JA, Vol. III, Tab Z, JA000490.) By issuing the Executive Order, the Governor took action to address the fiscal crisis and directed DPA to implement a temporary two-day furlough in order to realize immediate necessary cash savings to the General Fund. (JA, Vol. III, Tab HH, JA000533–JA000534.) Here, the Governor relied upon the authority granted to him pursuant to Government Code sections 19851 and 19849 in order to realize the necessary savings via the temporary furloughs. As such, the Executive Order in no way impairs, limits or hinders the powers

of the Legislature or Judiciary, but rather falls squarely within the authority delegated to the Governor by the California Constitution, Government Code sections 19851 and 19849, and the Dills Act to address the fiscal crisis of the State and to administer the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of state employment through DPA.

The constitutional and statutory provisions cited above, as well as Government Code sections 19851 and 19849 already discussed, establish the Governor's authority to issue the Executive Order in question. As such, the Executive Order constitutes a proper exercise of the Governor's executive authority. (See e.g., *Superior Court v. County of Mendocino*, *supra*, 13 Cal.4th 45, 52-53; *Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal Com.*, *supra*, 36 Cal.4th 1, 24-25.)

F. The Governor's Executive Order Adopting Temporary Furloughs Did Not Require Legislative Approval.

Since the Governor's Executive Order adopting temporary furloughs was authorized by Government Code sections 19851 and 19849, legislative approval was not necessary. As the State employer, the Governor and DPA are expressly authorized to bargain terms and conditions of employment with the state collective bargaining unit representatives. The temporary furloughing of State employees does not require an expenditure of funds subject to legislative approval. Finally, as furloughs constitute a temporary

reduction in hours and not a change to salary ranges, section 19826 was not implicated and legislative approval was not required.

PECG/CAPS and the Controller erroneously contend the Governor is barred from furloughing employees because he initially attempted to gain support from the Legislature in adopting furloughs. PECG/CAPS and the Controller cite to the fact that prior to issuing the Executive Order, the Governor sent a letter to state employees indicating he would ask the Legislature to approve the furloughing of state employees. They also reference the two special sessions held prior to the issuance of the Executive Order where the Governor provided a bill adopting furloughs to the Legislature. The fact the Governor attempted to work collaboratively with the Legislature in reaching a solution in no way limited his authority or precluded him from subsequently issuing Executive Order S-16-08 directing temporary, twice monthly furloughs.

The fact the Governor attempted to work with the Legislature to reach a solution demonstrates the Governor was making every effort to explore all viable alternative solutions to resolving the budget and cash crisis. The Governor called for a special legislative session in early November in order for the Legislature to address the fiscal crisis. (JA, Vol. III, Tab BB, JA000518.) Despite the special session, the Legislature failed to resolve the pending crisis. (JA, Vol. III, Tab GG, JA000530.) As a result of the Legislature's inaction, on December 1, 2009, the Governor

issued a Fiscal Emergency Proclamation, identifying the projected budget imbalance and insufficient cash reserves. (*Id.*, at JA000530 – JA000531.) The Governor was forced to reconvene the Legislature for another special session to attempt again to resolve the state's budget and cash emergency. (*Id.*) Despite the Governor's efforts, the Legislature was unable to provide solutions that would adequately or comprehensively address the state's fiscal crisis. With the fiscal crisis worsening and the Legislature's repeated failure to act, the Governor acted by issuing the Executive Order. (JA, Vol. III, Tab HH, JA000533 – JA000534.) The Governor's inherent executive authority to implement furloughs is in no way impacted by this prior interaction with the Legislature.

PECG/CAPS and the Controller also erroneously contend Government Code sections 19851 and 19849 do not authorize furloughs because no prior Governor has ever used these statutes to attempt to furlough employees. The fact the statutes were not previously used for this purpose does not demonstrate their inapplicability to furloughs or establish the Governor was prohibited from relying on these statutes to furlough state employees. Prior conduct or inaction by former Governors does not preclude the Governor's use of this statutorily proscribed conduct. In fact, the Governor's unprecedented use of furloughs underscores the equally unprecedented fiscal emergency California faced and the need for immediate solutions to that crisis. Here, the Governor was authorized by

these statutes to reduce temporarily employee hours through furloughs regardless of whether previous Governors had chosen to use their executive authority in this manner.

G. Neither the February 2009 Budget Compromise, Nor the May 2009 Special Election Invalidate the Governor's Authority to Furlough State Employees.

Finally, the Controller argues the legislation passed in February 2009 as part of a budget compromise to address the fiscal crisis, as well as the results of the May 2009 special election, demonstrate “the Legislature has not given the Governor the authority to reduce salaries.” This argument is both improper because it is based on facts occurring after the rendition of judgment and inapplicable because it rests on a faulty premise. Therefore, this argument should be disregarded by this Court.

1. **The Controller's Argument Regarding the February 2009 Budget Compromise and the May 2009 Special Election Are Based on Facts Occurring After the Rendition of Judgment and, Therefore, Must Be Disregarded by this Court.**

The trial court rendered judgment in this action in its Final Amended Ruling dated January 30, 2009. (JA, Vol. III, Tab XX, JA000660 – JA 000671.) Judgment was entered on February 11, 2009. (JA, Vol. IV, Tab CCC, JA000696 – JA000711; JA, Vol. IV, Tab DDD, JA000715 – JA000729.)

Both the February budget legislation and the results of the May 2009 special election occurred *after* the rendition of judgment in this case. It is an elementary rule of appellate procedure that, when reviewing the

correctness of a trial court's judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment was entered. (*People's Home Sav. Bank v. Sadler* (1905) 1 Cal.App. 189, 193.) This rule preserves an orderly system of appellate procedure by preventing litigants from circumventing the normal sequence of litigation. (*Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta* (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 813.) Furthermore, the exception to this rule for post-judgment legislative changes is inapplicable here because the post-judgment legislative actions relied upon by the Controller, namely, amendments to Government Code section 13312, admittedly never became law because they were rejected by the voters in the May 2009 special election. Therefore, there was no post-judgment legislative change. It is improper for the Controller to have raised these facts as a basis for challenging the trial court's judgment and the argument on this point should be disregarded by this Court.

2. **The Controller's Argument Regarding the February 2009 Budget Compromise and the May 2009 Special Election Is Based on a Faulty Premise.**

The Controller's argument regarding the February 2009 budget compromise and the results of the May 2009 special election is used in an effort to demonstrate a purported legislative intent to restrict the Governor's authority to reduce salaries. (See Controller's Brief, at 13.) Thus, the Controller's argument on this point is applicable only if furloughs are synonymous with reductions in salaries. They are not. As the discussion

above makes clear, and as the trial court explicitly found, furloughs are not synonymous with salary reductions. The Controller's arguments regarding the February 2009 budget compromise legislation and/or the May 2009 special election are inapposite to this situation and do not establish a basis for invalidating the Governor's action in issuing Executive Order S-16-08 or reversing the judgment of the trial court affirming the Governor's authority to issue that Executive Order.

V.

CONCLUSION

At the time of the Governor's issuance of Executive Order S-16-08, the State was in a dire fiscal emergency and was only weeks away from insolvency. Appellants did not, and cannot, dispute the existence of this fiscal emergency in the trial court. The Governor has the inherent constitutional, statutory, and contractual authority to address this emergency. Moreover, the emergency provision of the Dills Act was created specifically to permit the Governor to address this type of fiscal emergency through unilateral action such as the issuance of the subject Executive Order. The Governor's Executive Order was a constitutionally,

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statutorily, and contractually authorized use of his executive powers to address the fiscal emergency. Accordingly, Respondents respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Dated: October 19, 2009

KRONICK, MOSKOVITZ, TIEDEMANN
& GIRARD
A Law Corporation

By: Meredith Kacher FOR


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CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

I, Meredith H. Packer, Attorney for Respondents GOVERNOR ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER and DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the number of words in the Brief of Respondents GOVERNOR ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER and DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION equals 13,520 words, as per the word count feature in Microsoft Word.

Dated: October 19, 2009

KRONICK, MOSKOVITZ, TIEDEMANN &
GIRARD
A Law Corporation

By: 
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PROOF OF SERVICE

I, May Marlowe, declare:

I am a resident of the State of California and over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action; my business address is 400 Capitol Mall, 27th Floor, Sacramento, CA 95814-4416. On October 19, 2009, I served the within documents:

RESPONDENTS' COMBINED BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO: (1) OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS IN CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT AND CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL SCIENTISTS AND (2) OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT JOHN CHIANG

- by transmitting via facsimile from (916) 321-4555 the above listed document(s) without error to the fax number(s) set forth below on this date before 5:00 p.m. A copy of the transmittal/confirmation sheet is attached.
- by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Sacramento, California addressed as set forth below.
- by causing personal delivery by Messenger of the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth below.
- by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed Federal Express envelope and affixing a pre-paid air bill, and causing the envelope to be delivered to a Federal Express agent for delivery.
- by causing to be transmitted via e-mail or electronic transmission the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at the e-mail address(es) set forth below.

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
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on October 19, 2009, at Sacramento, California.



May Marlowe