

Judicial Council of California

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INVITATION TO COMMENT CACI18-02

Title	Action Requested
Civil Jury Instructions (CACI) Revisions	Review and submit comments by August 31, 2018
Proposed Rules, Forms, Standards, or Statutes	Proposed Effective Date
Add, revise, renumber, and revoke jury instructions and verdict forms	November 2018
Proposed by	Contact
Advisory Committee on Civil Jury Instructions	Bruce Greenlee, Attorney, 415-865-7698 bruce.greenlee@jud.ca.gov
Hon. Martin J. Tangeman, Chair	

Executive Summary and Origin

The Judicial Council Advisory Committee on Civil Jury Instructions has posted proposed additions, revisions, and revocations to the Judicial Council civil jury instructions (CACI). Under Rule 10.58 of the California Rules of Court, the advisory committee is responsible for regularly reviewing case law and statutes affecting jury instructions and making recommendations to the Judicial Council for updating, revising, and adding topics to the council's civil jury instructions. On approval by the Judicial Council, all changes will be published in the 2019 edition of the official LexisNexis CACI publication.

Attachments

Proposed revised and new instructions and verdict forms: pp. 2–xxx

The proposals have not been approved by the Judicial Council and are not intended to represent the views of the council, its Rules and Projects Committee, or its Policy Coordination and Liaison Committee. These proposals are circulated for comment purposes only.

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206. Evidence Admitted for Limited Purpose

During the trial, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. You may consider that evidence only for that purpose and for no other.~~I explained to you that certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. You may consider that evidence only for the limited purpose that I described, and not for any other purpose.~~

New September 2003; Revised May 2018, November 2018

Directions for Use

It is recommended that the judge call attention to the purpose to which the evidence applies.

-If appropriate, an instruction limiting the purpose for which evidence is to be considered must be given upon request. (Evid. Code, § 355; *Daggett v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.* (1957) 48 Cal.2d 655, 665-666 [313 P.2d 557]; *Continental Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.* (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 388, 412 [264 Cal.Rptr. 779].) ~~It is recommended that the judge call attention to the purpose to which the evidence applies.~~

A limited-purpose instruction is insufficient to cure hearsay problems with case-specific testimony given by an expert witness. (*People v. Sanchez* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 684 [204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102, 374 P.3d 320].)

For an instruction on evidence applicable to one party or a limited number of parties, see CACI No. 207, *Evidence Applicable to One Party*.

Sources and Authority

- Evidence Admitted for Limited Purpose. Evidence Code section 355.
- Refusal to give a requested instruction limiting the purpose for which evidence is to be considered may constitute error. (*Adkins v. Brett* (1920) 184 Cal. 252, 261–262 [193 P. 251].)
- “The effect of the statute—here, the municipal code section—is to make certain hearsay evidence admissible for a limited purpose, i.e., supplementing or explaining other evidence. This triggers the long-standing rule codified in Evidence Code section 355, which states, ‘When evidence is admissible ... for one purpose and is inadmissible ... for another purpose, the court upon request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.’ In the absence of such a request, the evidence is ‘usable for any purpose.’” (*Seibert v. City of San Jose* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1060-1061 [202 Cal.Rptr.3d 890].)
- ~~Courts have observed that~~ “[w]here the information is admitted for a purpose other than showing the truth of the matter asserted ... , prejudice is likely to be minimal and a limiting instruction under section 355 may be requested to control the jury’s use of the information.” (*Korsak v. Atlas Hotels, Inc.* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1525 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 833].)

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- An adverse party may be excused from the requirement of requesting a limiting instruction and may be permitted to assert error if the trial court unequivocally rejects the argument upon which a limiting instruction would be based. (*Warner Construction Corp. v. City of Los Angeles* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 285, 298-299 [85 Cal.Rptr. 444, 466 P.2d 996].)

Secondary Sources

1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, §§ 32–36

Jefferson, California Evidence Benchbook (3d ed. 1997) §§ 20.11–20.13

1A California Trial Guide, Unit 21, *Procedures for Determining Admissibility of Evidence*, § 21.21 (Matthew Bender)

48 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 551, *Trial*, §§ 551.66, 551.77 (Matthew Bender)

California Judges Benchbook: Civil Proceedings—Trial (2d ed.) §§ 4.106, 13.26 (Cal CJER 2010)

435. Causation for Asbestos-Related Cancer Claims

A substantial factor in causing harm is a factor that a reasonable person would consider to have contributed to the harm. It does not have to be the only cause of the harm.

[Name of plaintiff] may prove that exposure to asbestos from [name of defendant]’s product was a substantial factor causing [his/her/[name of decedent]’s] illness by showing, through expert testimony, that there is a reasonable medical probability that the exposure was a substantial factor contributing to [his/her] risk of developing cancer.

New September 2003; Revised December 2007, May 2018; November 2018

Directions for Use

This instruction is to be given in a case in which the plaintiff’s claim is that he or she contracted an asbestos-related disease from exposure to the defendant’s asbestos-containing product. This instruction is based on *Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 982–983 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 941 P.2d 1203], which addresses only exposure to asbestos from “defendant’s defective asbestos-containing products.” Whether the same causation standards from *Rutherford* would apply to defendants who are alleged to have created exposure to asbestos but are not manufacturers or suppliers of asbestos-containing products is not settled. (Compare *Petitpas v. Ford Motor Co.* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 261, 298–299 [220 Cal.Rptr.3d 185] [not error to give both CACI Nos. 430 and 435 in case with both product liability and premises liability defendants] with *Whitmire v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.* (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1084 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 371] [*Rutherford* causation standards cited in case against contractor alleged to have created exposure to asbestos at construction site].) See the discussion in the Directions for Use to CACI No. 430, *Causation: Substantial Factor*, with regard to whether CACI No. 430 may also be given.

If the issue of medical causation is tried separately, revise this instruction to focus on that issue.

If necessary, CACI No. 431, *Causation: Multiple Causes*, may also be given.

Sources and Authority

- “In the context of a cause of action for asbestos-related latent injuries, the plaintiff must first establish some threshold *exposure* to the defendant’s defective asbestos-containing products, and must further establish in reasonable medical probability that a particular exposure or series of exposures was a ‘legal cause’ of his injury, i.e., a *substantial factor* in bringing about the injury. In an asbestos-related cancer case, the plaintiff need *not* prove that fibers from the defendant’s product were the ones, or among the ones, that actually began the process of malignant cellular growth. Instead, the plaintiff may meet the burden of proving that exposure to defendant’s product was a substantial factor causing the illness by showing that in reasonable medical probability it was a substantial factor contributing to the plaintiff’s or decedent’s *risk* of developing cancer. The jury should be so instructed. The standard instructions on substantial factor and concurrent causation remain correct in this context and should also be given.” (*Rutherford, supra, v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.* (1997) 16 Cal.4th at pp.953, 982–

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983 ~~[67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 941 P.2d 1203]~~, original italics, internal citation and footnotes omitted.)

- “The term ‘substantial factor’ has not been judicially defined with specificity, and indeed it has been observed that it is ‘neither possible nor desirable to reduce it to any lower terms.’ This court has suggested that a force which plays only an ‘infinitesimal’ or ‘theoretical’ part in bringing about injury, damage, or loss is not a substantial factor. Undue emphasis should not be placed on the term ‘substantial.’ For example, the substantial factor standard, formulated to aid plaintiffs as a broader rule of causality than the ‘but for’ test, has been invoked by defendants whose conduct is clearly a ‘but for’ cause of plaintiff’s injury but is nevertheless urged as an insubstantial contribution to the injury. Misused in this way, the substantial factor test ‘undermines the principles of comparative negligence, under which a party is responsible for his or her share of negligence and the harm caused thereby.’ ” (*Rutherford, supra*, 16 Cal.4th at p. 969, internal citations omitted.)
- “[A] very minor force that does cause harm is a substantial factor. This rule honors the principle of comparative fault.” (*Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co.* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 79 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 846, 980 P.2d 398], internal citation omitted.)
- “Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the California Supreme Court’s decision in *Viner v. Sweet* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232 [135 Cal.-Rptr.-2d 629, 70 P.3d 1046] (*Viner*) did not alter the causation requirement in asbestos-related cases. In *Viner*, the court noted that subsection (1) of section 432 of the Restatement Second of Torts, which provides that ‘the actor’s negligent conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm would have been sustained even if the actor had not been negligent,’ ‘demonstrates how the “substantial factor” test subsumes the traditional “but for” test of causation.’ Defendant argues that *Viner* required plaintiffs to show that defendant’s product ‘independently caused [plaintiff’s] injury or that, but for that exposure, [plaintiff] would not have contracted lung cancer.’ *Viner*, however, is a legal malpractice case. It does not address the explicit holding in *Rutherford* that ‘plaintiffs may prove causation in asbestos-related cancer cases by demonstrating that the plaintiff’s exposure to defendant’s asbestos-containing product in reasonable medical probability was a substantial factor in contributing to the aggregate dose of asbestos the plaintiff or decedent inhaled or ingested, and hence to the risk of developing asbestos-related cancer, without the need to demonstrate that fibers from the defendant’s particular product were the ones, or among the ones, that actually produced the malignant growth.’ ” *Viner* is consistent with *Rutherford* insofar as *Rutherford* requires proof that an individual asbestos-containing product is a substantial factor contributing to the plaintiff’s risk or probability of developing cancer.” (*Jones v. John Crane, Inc.* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 990, 998, fn. 3 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 144], internal citations omitted.)
- “ ‘A threshold issue in asbestos litigation is exposure to the defendant’s product. ... If there has been no exposure, there is no causation.’ Plaintiffs bear the burden of ‘demonstrating that exposure to [defendant’s] asbestos products was, in reasonable medical probability, a substantial factor in causing or contributing to [plaintiff’s] risk of developing cancer.’ ‘Factors relevant to assessing whether such a medical probability exists include frequency of exposure, regularity of exposure and proximity of the asbestos product to [plaintiff].’ Therefore, ‘[plaintiffs] cannot prevail against [defendant] without evidence that [plaintiff] was exposed to asbestos-containing materials manufactured or furnished by [defendant] with enough frequency and regularity as to show a reasonable medical probability that this exposure was a factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries.’ ” (*Whitmire v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.* (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1084 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 371], internal citations omitted.)

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- “Further, ‘[t]he mere “possibility” of exposure’ is insufficient to establish causation. ‘[P]roof that raises mere speculation, suspicion, surmise, guess or conjecture is not enough to sustain [the plaintiff’s] burden’ of persuasion.” (*Izell v. Union Carbide Corp.* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 962, 969 [180 Cal.Rptr.3d 382], internal citations omitted.)
- “To support an allocation of liability to another party in an asbestos case, a defendant must ‘present evidence that the aggregate dose of asbestos particles arising from’ exposure to that party’s asbestos ‘constituted a substantial factor in the causation of [the decedent’s] cancer.’ ” (*Soto v. BorgWarner Morse TEC Inc.* (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 165, 205 [191 Cal.Rptr.3d 263].)
- “ ‘[G]iven the long latency period of asbestos-related disease, and the occupational settings that commonly exposed the worker to multiple forms and brands of asbestos products with varying degrees of toxicity,’ our Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff ‘need *not* prove with medical exactitude that fibers from a particular defendant’s asbestos-containing products were those, or among those, that actually began the cellular process of malignancy.’ Rather, a ‘plaintiff may meet the burden of proving that exposure to defendant’s product was a substantial factor causing the illness by showing that in reasonable medical probability it was a substantial factor contributing to the plaintiff’s or decedent’s *risk* of developing cancer.’ ” (*Izell, supra*, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 975, original italics, internal citation omitted.)
- “Many factors are relevant in assessing the medical probability that an exposure contributed to plaintiff’s asbestos disease. Frequency of exposure, regularity of exposure, and proximity of the asbestos product to plaintiff are certainly relevant, although these considerations should not be determinative in every case. [Citation.] Additional factors may also be significant in individual cases, such as the type of asbestos product to which plaintiff was exposed, the type of injury suffered by plaintiff, and other possible sources of plaintiff’s injury. [Citations.] ‘Ultimately, the sufficiency of the evidence of causation will depend on the unique circumstances of each case.’ [Citation.] ” (*Paulus v. Crane Co.* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1363–1364 [169 Cal.Rptr.3d 373].)
- “In this case, [defendant] argues the trial court’s refusal to give its proposed instruction was error because the instruction set forth ‘the requirement in *Rutherford* that causation be decided by taking into account “the length, frequency, proximity and intensity of exposure, the peculiar properties of the individual product, [and] any other potential causes to which the disease could be attributed.” ’ But *Rutherford* does not require the jury to take these factors into account when deciding whether a plaintiff’s exposure to an asbestos-containing product was a substantial factor in causing mesothelioma. Instead, those factors are ones that a medical expert may rely upon in forming his or her expert medical opinion.” (*Davis v. Honeywell Internat. Inc.* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 477, 495 [199 Cal.Rptr.3d 583], internal citation omitted.)
- “Mere presence at a site where asbestos was present is insufficient to establish legally significant asbestos exposure.” (*Shiffer v. CBS Corp.* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 246, 252 [192 Cal.Rptr.3d 346].)
- “We disagree with the trial court’s view that *Rutherford* mandates that a medical doctor must expressly link together the evidence of substantial factor causation. The *Rutherford* court did not create a requirement that specific words must be recited by appellant’s expert. Nor did the *Rutherford*

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court specify that the testifying expert in asbestos cases must always be ‘somebody with an M.D. after his name.’ The *Rutherford* court agreed with the *Lineaweaver* court that ‘the reference to “medical probability” in the standard “is no more than a recognition that asbestos injury cases (like medical malpractice cases) involve the use of medical evidence.” [Citation.]’ The Supreme Court has since clarified that medical evidence does not necessarily have to be provided by a medical doctor.” (*Hernandez v. Amcord, Inc.* (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 659, 675 [156 Cal.Rptr.3d 90], internal citations omitted.)

- “Nothing in *Rutherford* precludes a plaintiff from establishing legal causation through opinion testimony by a competent medical expert to the effect that every exposure to respirable asbestos contributes to the risk of developing mesothelioma. On the contrary, *Rutherford* acknowledges the scientific debate between the ‘every exposure’ and ‘insignificant exposure’ camps, and recognizes that the conflict is one for the jury to resolve.” (*Izell, supra*, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 977.)
- “[T]he identified-exposure theory is a more rigorous standard of causation than the every-exposure theory. As a single example of the difference, we note [expert]’s statement that it ‘takes significant exposures’ to increase the risk of disease. This statement uses the plural ‘exposures’ and also requires that those exposures be ‘significant.’ The use of ‘significant’ as a limiting modifier appears to be connected to [expert]’s earlier testimony about the concentrations of airborne asbestos created by particular activities done by [plaintiff], such as filing, sanding and using an airhose to clean a brake drum.” (*Phillips v. Honeywell Internat. Inc.* (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1088 [217 Cal.Rptr.3d 147].)
- “Nor is there a requirement that ‘specific words must be recited by [plaintiffs] expert.’ [¶] The connection, however, must be made between the defendant’s asbestos products and the risk of developing mesothelioma suffered by the decedent.” (*Paulus, supra*, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1364.)
- “We hold that the duty of employers and premises owners to exercise ordinary care in their use of asbestos includes preventing exposure to asbestos carried by the bodies and clothing of on-site workers. Where it is reasonably foreseeable that workers, their clothing, or personal effects will act as vectors carrying asbestos from the premises to household members, employers have a duty to take reasonable care to prevent this means of transmission. This duty also applies to premises owners who use asbestos on their property, subject to any exceptions and affirmative defenses generally applicable to premises owners, such as the rules of contractor liability. Importantly, we hold that this duty extends only to members of a worker’s household. Because the duty is premised on the foreseeability of both the regularity and intensity of contact that occurs in a worker’s home, it does not extend beyond this circumscribed category of potential plaintiffs.” (*Kesner v. Superior Court* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1140 [210 Cal.Rptr.3d 283, 384 P.3d 283].)

Secondary Sources

3 Witkin, California Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Actions, § 570

Haning et al., California Practice Guide: Personal Injury, Ch. 2(II)-D, Theories of Recovery—Strict Liability For Defective Products, ¶ 2:1259 (The Rutter Group)

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Haning et al., California Practice Guide: Personal Injury, Ch. 2(II)-O, Theories of Recovery—Causation Issues, ¶ 2:2409 (The Rutter Group)

1 Levy et al., California Torts, Ch. 2, *Causation*, § 2.03 (Matthew Bender)

California Products Liability Actions, Ch. 2, *Liability for Defective Products*, § 2.22, Ch. 7, *Proof*, § 7.06 (Matthew Bender)

33 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 380, *Negligence*, § 380.72 (Matthew Bender)

450C. Negligent Undertaking

[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] is responsible for [name of plaintiff]'s harm because [name of defendant] failed to exercise reasonable care ~~to protect~~ in rendering services to [name of third person]. To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:

1. That [name of defendant], voluntarily or for a charge, rendered services ~~to~~ for the protection of [name of third person];
2. That these services were of a kind that [name of defendant] should have recognized as needed for the protection of [name of plaintiff];
3. That [name of defendant] failed to exercise reasonable care in rendering these services;
4. That [name of defendant]'s failure to exercise reasonable care was a substantial factor in causing harm to [name of plaintiff]; and
5. [(a) That [name of defendant]'s failure to use reasonable care added to the risk of harm;]

[or]

[(b) That [name of defendant]'s services were rendered to perform a duty that [name of third person] owed to third persons including [name of plaintiff];]

[or]

[(c) That [name of plaintiff] suffered harm because [[name of third person]/ [or] [name of plaintiff]] relied on [name of defendant]'s services.]

New June 2016; Revised November 2018

Directions for Use

This instruction presents the theory of liability known as the “negligent undertaking” rule. (See Restatement Second of Torts, section 324A.) The elements are stated in *Paz v. State of California* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 550, 553 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 703, 994 P.2d 975].

In *Paz*, the court said that negligent undertaking is “sometimes referred to as the ‘Good Samaritan’ rule,” by which a person generally has no duty to come to the aid of another and cannot be liable for doing so unless the person aiding’s acts increased the risk to the person aided or the person aided relied on the person aiding’s acts. (*Paz, supra*, 22 Cal.4th at p. 553; see CACI No. 450A, *Good Samaritan—Nonemergency*.) It is perhaps more accurate to say that negligent undertaking is another application of the Good Samaritan rule. CACI No. 450A is for use in a case in which the person aided is

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the injured plaintiff. (See Restatement 2d of Torts, § 323.) This instruction is for use in a case in which the defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable care in ~~acting to aid~~performing services to one person has resulted in harm to another person.

Select one or more of the three options for element 5 depending on the facts.

Sources and Authority

- Negligent Undertaking. Restatement Second of Torts section 324A.
- “[T]he [Restatement Second of Torts] section 324A theory of liability--sometimes referred to as the "Good Samaritan" rule--is a settled principle firmly rooted in the common law of negligence. Section 324A prescribes the conditions under which a person who undertakes to render services for another may be liable to third persons for physical harm resulting from a failure to act with reasonable care. Liability may exist *if* (a) the failure to exercise reasonable care increased the risk of harm, (b) the undertaking was to perform a duty the other person owed to the third persons, or (c) the harm was suffered because the other person or the third persons relied on the undertaking.” (*Paz, supra*, 22 Cal.4th at p. 553, original italics.)
- “Thus, as the traditional theory is articulated in the Restatement, and as we have applied it in other contexts, a negligent undertaking claim of liability to third parties requires evidence that: (1) the actor undertook, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another; (2) the services rendered were of a kind the actor should have recognized as necessary for the protection of third persons; (3) the actor failed to exercise reasonable care in the performance of the undertaking; (4) the actor's failure to exercise reasonable care resulted in physical harm to the third persons; and (5) *either* (a) the actor's carelessness increased the risk of such harm, or (b) the actor undertook to perform a duty that the other owed to the third persons, or (c) the harm was suffered because either the other or the third persons relied on the actor's undertaking. [¶] Section 324A's negligent undertaking theory of liability subsumes the well-known elements of any negligence action, viz., duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and damages.” (*Paz, supra*, 22 Cal.4th at p. 559, original italics, internal citation omitted; see also *Scott v. C. R. Bard, Inc.* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 763, 775 [180 Cal.Rptr.3d 479] [jury properly instructed on elements as set forth above in *Paz*].)
- “Section 324A is applied to determine the ‘duty element’ in a negligence action where the defendant has ‘specifically ... undertaken to perform the task that he is charged with having performed negligently, for without the actual assumption of the undertaking there can be no correlative duty to perform that undertaking carefully.’” The negligent undertaking theory of liability applies to personal injury and property damage claims, but not to claims seeking only economic loss.” (*Lichtman v. Siemens Industry Inc.* (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 914, 922 [224 Cal.Rptr.3d 725], internal citations omitted.)
- “[U]nder a negligent undertaking theory of liability, the scope of a defendant's duty presents a jury issue when there is a factual dispute as to the nature of the undertaking. The issue of ‘whether [a defendant's] alleged actions, if proven, would constitute an “undertaking” sufficient ... to give rise to an actionable duty of care is a legal question for the court.’ However, ‘there may be fact questions “about precisely what it was that the defendant undertook to do.” That is, while “[t]he ‘precise nature

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and extent’ of [an alleged negligent undertaking] duty ‘is a question of law ... “it depends on the nature and extent of the act undertaken, a question of fact.” ’ ” [Citation.] Thus, if the record can support competing inferences [citation], or if the facts are not yet sufficiently developed [citation], “ ‘an ultimate finding on the existence of a duty cannot be made prior to a hearing on the merits’ ” [citation], and summary judgment is precluded. [Citations.]’ (see CACI No. 450C [each element of the negligent undertaking theory of liability is resolved by the trier of fact].)” (*O’Malley v. Hospitality Staffing Solutions* (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 21, 27-28 [228 Cal.Rptr.3d 731], internal citations omitted.)

- “To establish as a matter of law that defendant does not owe plaintiffs a duty under a negligent undertaking theory, defendant must negate all three alternative predicates of the fifth factor: ‘(a) the actor’s carelessness increased the risk of such harm, or (b) the undertaking was to perform a duty owed by the other to the third persons, or (c) the harm was suffered because of the reliance of the other or the third persons upon the undertaking.’ ” (*Lichtman, supra*, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 926.)
- “The undisputed facts here present a classic scenario for consideration of the negligent undertaking theory. This theory of liability is typically applied where the defendant has contractually agreed to provide services for the protection of others, but has negligently done so.” (*Lichtman, supra*, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 927.)
- “The general rule is that a person who has not created a peril is not liable in tort for failing to take affirmative action to protect another unless they have some relationship that gives rise to a duty to act. However, one who undertakes to aid another is under a duty to exercise due care in acting and is liable if the failure to do so increases the risk of harm or if the harm is suffered because the other relied on the undertaking. Section 324A integrates these two basic principles in its rule.” (*Paz, supra*, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 558–559.)
- “[T]he ‘negligent undertaking’ doctrine, like the special relationship doctrine, is an exception to the ‘no duty to aid’ rule.” (*Conti v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc.* (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1231 [186 Cal.Rptr.3d 26].)
- “Under the good Samaritan doctrine, CHP may have a duty to members of the public to exercise due care when CHP voluntarily assumes a protective duty toward a certain member of the public and undertakes action on behalf of that member thereby inducing reliance, when an express promise to warn of a danger has induced reliance, or when the actions of CHP place a person in peril or increase the risk of harm. In other words, to create a special relationship and a duty of care, there must be evidence that CHP “made misrepresentations that induced a citizen’s detrimental reliance [citation], placed a citizen in harm’s way [citations], or lulled a citizen into a false sense of security and then withdrew essential safety precautions.” ’ Nonfeasance that leaves the citizen in exactly the same position that he or she already occupied cannot support a finding of duty of care. Affirmative conduct or misfeasance on the part of CHP that induces reliance or changes the risk of harm is required.” (*Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Department of the California Highway Patrol* (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1136 [152 Cal.Rptr.3d 492], internal citations omitted.)
- “A operates a grocery store. An electric light hanging over one of the aisles of the store becomes defective, and A calls B Electric Company to repair it. B Company sends a workman, who repairs the light, but leaves the fixture so insecurely attached that it falls upon and injures C, a customer in the

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store who is walking down the aisle. B Company is subject to liability to C.” (Restat 2d of Torts, § 324A, Illustration 1.)

Secondary Sources

4 Witkin, *California Procedure* (4th ed. 1996) Pleadings, § 553

6 Witkin, *Summary of California Law* (10th ed. 2005) Torts, §§ 1060–1065

Flahavan et al., *California Practice Guide: Personal Injury* (The Rutter Group) ¶¶ 2:583.10–2:583.11, 2:876

1 Levy et al., *California Torts*, Ch. 1, *Negligence: Duty and Breach*, § 1.11 (Matthew Bender)

4 *California Trial Guide*, Unit 90, *Closing Argument*, § 90.90 (Matthew Bender)

33 *California Forms of Pleading and Practice*, Ch. 380, *Negligence*, § 380.32[2][d], [5][c] (Matthew Bender)

16 *California Points and Authorities*, Ch. 165, *Negligence*, §§ 165.150, 165.241 (Matthew Bender)

1208. Component Parts Rule

[*Name of defendant*] **[manufactured/distributed/supplied] [a/an] [*component part*], which was then integrated into [a/an] [*end product*]. [*Name of defendant*] may be liable for harm caused by a defective [*end product*] if [*name of plaintiff*] proves that (1) [*name of defendant*] substantially participated in the integration of its [*component part*] into the design of the [*end product*] and (2) as a result of the integration of the [*component part*] into the [*end product*], the [*end product*] was defective under the instruction(s) you have been given on [manufacturing defect/design defect/failure to warn].**

New November 2018

Directions for Use

Give this instruction if the component parts rule is at issue. This rule generally relieves a component parts manufacturer, distributor, or supplier of liability for injuries caused by a defect in the product into which the component was integrated. However, there are two exceptions to the rule so that a component-parts defendant may nevertheless be found liable. First, the component itself may have been defective; or second, (a) the defendant may have substantially participated in the integration of the component into the design of the end product, (b) the integration of the component caused the end product to be defective, and (c) the defect in the product causes the harm. (*Ramos v. Brenntag Specialties, Inc.* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 500, 508 [203 Cal.Rptr.3d 273, 372 P.3d 200].) While the component parts rule is labelled a defense, (see *Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc.* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 183 [202 Cal.Rptr.3d 460, 370 P.3d 1022]; see also *Romine v. Johnson Controls, Inc.* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 990, 1006 fn. 6 [169 Cal.Rptr.3d 208].), the plaintiff has the burden of avoiding the defense by proving one of the exceptions.

This instruction is for use under the second exception. To prove that the end product was defective or lacked a required warning, the plaintiff must prove a manufacturing or design defect, or a failure to warn, as with any other strict product liability claim, using CACI No. 1201, *Strict Liability—Manufacturing Defect—Essential Factual Elements*, CACI Nos. 1203, *Strict Liability—Design Defect—Consumer Expectation Test—Essential Factual Elements*, or 1204, *Strict Liability—Design Defect—Risk-Benefit Test—Essential Factual Elements* (or both), or CACI No. 1205, *Strict Liability—Failure to Warn—Essential Factual Elements*. The plaintiff has the same burden if the claim is that the component itself was defective or lacked a required warning.

The component parts rule does not apply if the injury is caused by the component when it is being used as intended before integration into another product. (See *Ramos, supra*, 63 Cal.4th at p. 504.)

Sources and Authority

- “Another defense protects manufacturers and sellers of component parts from liability to users of finished products incorporating their components. Under the component parts doctrine, the supplier of a product component is not liable for injuries caused by the finished product unless (1) the component itself was defective and caused injury or (2) the supplier participated in integrating the component into a product, the integration caused the product to be defective, and that defect

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caused injury.” (*Webb, supra*, 63 Cal.4th at p. 183.)

- “In *Webb [supra]*, we explained that the component parts doctrine... and as accurately reflected in section 5 of the Restatement Third of Torts, Products Liability—applies (1) when a supplier provides a component or raw material that is not itself defective (by virtue of a manufacturing, design, or warning defect), (2) the component or raw material is changed or transformed when incorporated through the manufacturing process into a different finished or end product, and (3) an end user of the finished product is allegedly injured by a defect in the finished product.” (*Ramos, supra*, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 507–508, internal citations omitted.)
- “[T]he component parts doctrine provides protection to the supplier of the component or raw material, subjecting that entity to liability for harm caused by a product into which the component has been integrated only if the supplier “(b)(1) ... substantially participates in the integration of the component into the design of the product; and [¶] (2) the integration of the component causes the product to be defective ... ; and [¶] (3) the defect in the product causes the harm.” (*Ramos, supra*, 63 Cal.4th at p. 508.)
- “ ‘Component parts are products, whether sold or distributed separately or assembled with other component parts.’ ‘Product components include raw materials, bulk products, and other constituent products sold for integration into other products.’ Component manufacturers and suppliers, as sellers of ‘products,’ are subject to products liability. ‘Like manufacturers, suppliers, and retailers of complete products, component manufacturers and suppliers are “an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise,” and may in a particular case “be the only member of that enterprise reasonably available to the injured plaintiff,” and may be in the best position to ensure product safety.’ ” (*Johnson v. United States Steel Corp.* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 22, 33 [192 Cal.Rptr.3d 158], internal citations omitted.)
- “[T]he duty of a component manufacturer or supplier to warn about the hazards of its products is not unlimited. ... ‘Making suppliers of inherently safe raw materials and component parts pay for the mistakes of the finished product manufacturer would not only be unfair, but it also would impose and [*sic*] intolerable burden on the business world Suppliers of versatile materials like chains, valves, sand gravel, etc., cannot be expected to become experts in the infinite number of finished products that might conceivably incorporate their multi-use raw materials or components.’ Thus, cases have subjected claims made against component suppliers to two related doctrines, the ‘raw material supplier defense’ and ‘the bulk sales/sophisticated purchaser rule.’ Although the doctrines are distinct, their application oftentimes overlaps and together they present factors which should be carefully considered in evaluating the liability of component suppliers. Those factors include whether the raw materials or components are inherently dangerous, whether the materials are significantly altered before integration into an end product, whether the supplier was involved in designing the end-product and whether the manufacturer of the end product was in a position to discover and disclose hazards.” (*Artiglio, supra*, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 837.)
- “[T]he protection afforded to defendants by the component parts doctrine does not apply when the product supplied has not been incorporated into a different finished or end product but instead, as here, itself allegedly causes injury when used in the manner intended by the product supplier.” (*Ramos, supra*, 63 Cal.4th at p. 504.)

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- “The Restatement further explains ‘Product components include raw materials. ... Thus, when raw materials are contaminated or otherwise defective within the meaning of § 2(a), the seller of the raw material is subject to liability for harm caused by such defects.’ California courts have generally adopted the component parts doctrine as it is articulated in the Restatement.” (*Brady v. Calsol, Inc.* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1219 [194 Cal.Rptr.3d 243], internal citation omitted.)
- “The California Supreme Court has not determined whether the component parts defense is limited to fungible products.” (*Romine, supra*, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006, fn. 6.)

Secondary Sources

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1730. Slander of Title—Essential Factual Elements

[Name of plaintiff] **claims that** *[name of defendant]* **harmed [him/her] by [making a statement/taking an action] that cast doubts about** *[name of plaintiff]*'s ownership of *[describe real or personal property, e.g., the residence located at [address]].* **To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:**

1. **That** *[name of defendant]* **[made a statement/[specify other act, e.g., recorded a deed] that cast doubts about** *[name of plaintiff]*'s ownership of the property;
2. **That the** *[statement was made to a person other than [name of plaintiff]/[specify other publication, e.g., deed became a public record]];*
3. **That [the statement was untrue and] [name of plaintiff] did in fact own the property;**
4. **That** *[name of defendant]* **[knew that/acted with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity as to whether] [name of plaintiff] owned the property;**
5. **That** *[name of defendant]* **knew or should have recognized that someone else might act in reliance on the [statement/e.g., deed], causing [name of plaintiff] financial loss;**
6. **That** *[name of plaintiff]* **did in fact suffer immediate and direct financial harm [because someone else acted in reliance on the [statement/e.g., deed]/[or] by incurring legal expenses necessary to remove the doubt cast by the disparagement and to clear title];**
7. **That** *[name of defendant]*'s conduct was a substantial factor in causing *[name of plaintiff]*'s harm.

New December 2012; Revised May 2018; November 2018

Directions for Use

Slander of title may be either by words or an act that clouds title to the property. (See, e.g., *Alpha & Omega Development, LP v. Whillock Contracting, Inc.* (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 656, 661 [132 Cal.Rptr.3d 781] [filing of lis pendens].) If the slander is by means other than words, specify the means in element 1. If the slander is by words, select the first option in element 2.

An additional element of a slander of title claim is that the alleged slanderous statement was without privilege or justification. (*Schep v. Capital One, N.A.* (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1331, 1335 [220 Cal.Rptr.3d 408].) If this element presents an issue for the jury, an instruction on it must be given.

Under the common-interest privilege of Civil Code section 47(c), the defendant bears the initial burden of showing facts to bring the communication within the privilege. The plaintiff then must prove that the

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statement was made with malice. (*Lundquist v. Reusser* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1203 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 875 P.2d 1279].) If the common-interest privilege is at issue, give CACI No. 1723, *Common Interest Privilege—Malice*. The elements of CACI No. 1723 constitute the “unprivileged” element of this basic claim.

If the privilege of Civil Code section 47(d) for a privileged publication or broadcast is alleged, give CACI No. 1724, *Fair and True Reporting Privilege*. (See *J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Phillips & Cohen LLP* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 87 [201 Cal.Rptr.3d 782].) If some other privilege is at issue, an additional element or instruction targeting that privilege will be required.

Beyond the privilege of Civil Code section 47(c), it would appear that actual malice in the sense of ill will toward and intent to harm the plaintiff is not required and that malice may be implied in law from absence of privilege (See *Gudger v. Manton* (1943) 21 Cal.2d 537, 543–544 [134 P.2d 217], disapproved on other grounds in *Albertson v. Raboff* (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, 381 [295 P.2d 405]) or from the attempt to secure property to which the defendant had no legitimate claim (see *Spencer v. Harmon Enterprises, Inc.* (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 614, 623 [44 Cal.Rptr. 683]) or from accusations made without foundation (element 4) (See *Contra Costa County Title Co. v. Waloff* (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 59, 67 [7 Cal.Rptr. 358].)

Sources and Authority

- “[S]lander of title is not a form of deceit. It is a form of the separate common law tort of disparagement, also sometimes referred to as injurious falsehood.” (*Finch Aerospace Corp. v. City of San Diego* (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1248, 1253 [214 Cal.Rptr.3d 628].)
- “The Supreme Court has recently determined a viable disparagement claim, which necessarily includes a slander of title claim, requires the existence of a ‘misleading statement that (1) specifically refers to the plaintiff’s product or business and (2) clearly derogates that product or business. Each requirement must be satisfied by express mention or by clear implication.’ ” (*Finch Aerospace Corp., supra*, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 1253)
- “ ‘Slander of title is effected by one who without privilege publishes untrue and disparaging statements with respect to the property of another under such circumstances as would lead a reasonable person to foresee that a prospective purchaser or lessee thereof might abandon his intentions. It is an invasion of the interest in the vendibility of property. In order to commit the tort actual malice or ill will is unnecessary. Damages usually consist of loss of a prospective purchaser. To be disparaging a statement need not be a complete denial of title in others, but may be any unfounded claim of an interest in the property which throws doubt upon its ownership.’ ‘However, it is not necessary to show that a particular pending deal was hampered or prevented, since recovery may be had for the depreciation in the market value of the property.’ ” (*M.F. Farming, Co. v. Couch Distributing Co.* (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 180, 198–199 [143 Cal.Rptr.3d 160], internal citations omitted.)
- “Slander of title ‘occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes pecuniary loss. [Citation.]’ The false statement must be ‘ ‘maliciously made with the intent to defame.’ ’ ” (*Cyr v. McGovran* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th

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645, 651 [142 Cal.Rptr.3d 34], internal citations omitted.)

- “One who publishes a false statement harmful to the interests of another is subject to liability for pecuniary loss resulting to the other if (a) he intends for publication of the statement to result in harm to interests of the other having a pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should recognize that it is likely to do so, and (b) he knows that the statement is false or acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.” (*Appel v. Burman* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1209, 1214 [206 Cal.Rptr. 259], quoting Rest. 2d Torts § 623A.)
- “One who, without a privilege to do so, publishes matter which is untrue and disparaging to another's property in land, chattels or intangible things under such circumstances as would lead a reasonable man to foresee that the conduct of a third person as purchaser or lessee thereof might be determined thereby is liable for pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the impairment of vendibility thus caused.” (*Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Ostly* (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 663, 674 [117 Cal.Rptr. 167], quoting Rest. Torts, § 624 [motor vehicle case].)
- “Sections 623A, 624 and 633 of the Restatement Second of Torts further refine the definition so it is clear included elements of the tort are that there must be (a) a publication, (b) which is without privilege or justification and thus with malice, express or implied, and (c) is false, either knowingly so or made without regard to its truthfulness, and (d) causes direct and immediate pecuniary loss.” (*Howard v. Schaniel* (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 256, 263–264 [169 Cal.Rptr. 678], footnote and internal citations omitted.)
- “In an action for wrongful disparagement of title, a plaintiff may recover (1) the expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove the doubt cast by the disparagement, (2) financial loss resulting from the impairment of vendibility of the property, and (3) general damages for the time and inconvenience suffered by plaintiff in removing the doubt cast upon his property.” (*Klem v. Access Ins. Co.* (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 595, 624 [225 Cal.Rptr.3d 711].)
- “While it is true that an essential element of a cause of action for slander of title is that the plaintiff suffered pecuniary damage as a result of the disparagement of title, the law is equally clear that the expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove the doubt cast by the disparagement and to clear title is a recognized form of pecuniary damage in such cases.” (*Sumner Hill Homeowners' Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC* (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 999, 1032 [141 Cal.Rptr.3d 109]; see Rest.2d Torts, § 633, subd. (1)(b), internal citations omitted.)
- “Although attorney fees and litigation expenses reasonably necessary to remove the memorandum from the record were recoverable, those incurred merely in pursuit of damages against ... defendants were not.” (*Seeley v. Seymour* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 865-866 [237 Cal.Rptr. 282].)
- “Although the gravamen of an action for disparagement of title is different from that of an action for personal defamation, substantially the same privileges are recognized in relation to both torts in the absence of statute. Questions of privilege relating to both torts are now resolved in the light of section 47 of the Civil Code.” (*Albertson, supra*, 46 Cal.2d at pp. 378–379, internal citations omitted.)

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- “[The privilege of Civil Code section 47(c)] is lost, however, where the person making the communication acts with malice. Malice exists where the person making the statement acts out of hatred or ill will, or has no reasonable grounds for believing the statement to be true, or makes the statement for any reason other than to protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege is given.” (*Earp v. Nobmann* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 270, 285 [175 Cal.Rptr. 767], disapproved on other grounds in *Silberg v. Anderson* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 219 [266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365].)
- “The existence of privilege is a defense to an action for defamation. Therefore, the burden is on the defendant to plead and prove the challenged publication was made under circumstances that conferred the privilege.” (*Palmer v. Zaklama* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1380 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 116] [applying rule to slander of title].)
- “The principal issue presented in this case is whether the trial court properly instructed the jury that, in the jury's determination whether the common-interest privilege set forth in section 47(c) has been established, defendants bore the burden of proving not only that the allegedly defamatory statement was made upon an occasion that falls within the common-interest privilege, but also that the statement was made without malice. Defendants contend that, in California and throughout the United States, the general rule is that, although a defendant bears the initial burden of establishing that the allegedly defamatory statement was made upon an occasion falling within the purview of the common-interest privilege, once it is established that the statement was made upon such a privileged occasion, the plaintiff may recover damages for defamation only if the plaintiff successfully meets the burden of proving that the statement was made with malice. As stated above, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendants on this point. Although, as we shall explain, there are a few (primarily early) California decisions that state a contrary rule, both the legislative history of section 47(c) and the overwhelming majority of recent California decisions support the Court of Appeal's conclusion. Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeal insofar as it concluded that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that defendants bore the burden of proof upon the issue of malice, for purposes of section 47(c).” (*Lundquist, supra*, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1202–1203, internal citations omitted.)
- “Civil Code section 47(b)(4) clearly describes the conditions for application of the [litigation] privilege to a recorded lis pendens as follows: ‘A recorded lis pendens is not a privileged publication unless it identifies an action previously filed with a court of competent jurisdiction which affects the title or right of possession of real property, as authorized or required by law.’ Those conditions are (1) the lis pendens must identify a previously filed action and (2) the previously filed action must be one that affects title or right of possession of real property. We decline to add a third requirement that there must also be evidentiary merit.” (*La Jolla Group II v. Bruce* (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 461, 476 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 716], internal citation omitted.)
- “[T]he property owner may recover for the impairment of the vendibility ‘of his property’ without showing that the loss was caused by prevention of a particular sale. ‘The most usual manner in which a third person’s reliance upon disparaging matter causes pecuniary loss is by preventing a sale to a particular purchaser. . . . The disparaging matter may, if widely disseminated, cause pecuniary loss by depriving its possessor of a market in which, but for the disparagement, his land

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or other thing might with reasonable certainty have found a purchaser.’ ” (*Glass v. Gulf Oil Corp.* (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 412, 424 [96 Cal.Rptr. 902].)

Secondary Sources

5 Witkin, Summary of California Law (11th ed. 2017) Torts § 747

6 Witkin, Summary of California Law (11th ed. 2017) Torts § 1886

3 Levy et al., California Torts, Ch. 40, *Fraud and Deceit and Other Business Torts*, § 40.80 et seq. (Matthew Bender)

30 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 340, *Libel and Slander*, § 340.90 (Matthew Bender)

1802. False Light

[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] violated [his/her] right to privacy. To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:

1. That [name of defendant] ~~publicized~~ **publicly disclosed** information or material that showed [name of plaintiff] in a false light;
2. That the false light created by the ~~disclosure~~ **publication** would be highly offensive to a reasonable person in [name of plaintiff]'s position;
3. [That there is clear and convincing evidence that [name of defendant] knew the ~~publication~~ **disclosure** would create a false impression about [name of plaintiff] or acted with reckless disregard for the truth;]

[or]

[That [name of defendant] was negligent in determining the truth of the information or whether a false impression would be created by its ~~publication~~ **disclosure**;]

4. [That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; and]

[or]

[That [name of plaintiff] sustained harm to [his/her] property, business, profession, or occupation [including money spent as a result of the statement(s)]; and]

5. That [name of defendant]'s conduct was a substantial factor in causing [name of plaintiff]'s harm.
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New September 2003; Revised November 2017, May 2018, November 2018

Directions for Use

If the plaintiff is asserting more than one privacy right, give an introductory instruction stating that a person's right to privacy can be violated in more than one way and listing the legal theories under which the plaintiff is suing.

False light claims are subject to the same constitutional protections that apply to defamation claims. (*Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assn.* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 529, 543 [93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34], overruled on other grounds in *Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc.* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 679, 696, fn. 9 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 663, 101 P.3d 552] [false light claim should meet the same requirements of a libel claim, including proof of malice when required].) Thus, a knowing violation of or reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights is required if the plaintiff is a public figure. (See *Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co.*

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(1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 721–722 [257 Cal.Rptr. 708, 771 P.2d 406].) Give the first option for element 3 if the publication-disclosure involves a public figure. Give the second option for a private citizen, at least with regard to a matter of private concern. (See *id.* at p. 742 [private person need prove only negligence rather than malice to recover for defamation].)

There is perhaps some question as to which option for element 3 to give for a private person if the matter is one of public concern. For defamation, a private figure plaintiff must prove malice to recover presumed and punitive damages for a matter of public concern, but not to recover for damages to reputation. (*Khawar v. Globe Internat.* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 254, 273–274 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 178, 965 P.2d 696].) No case has been found that provides for presumed damages for a false light violation. Therefore, the court will need to decide whether proof of malice is required from a private plaintiff even though the matter may be one of public concern.

If the jury will also be instructed on defamation, an instruction on false light would be superfluous and therefore need not be given. (See *Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1385, fn. 13 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 802]; see also *Briscoe, supra*, 4 Cal.3d at p. 543.) For defamation, utterance of a defamatory statement to a single third person constitutes sufficient publication. (*Cunningham v. Simpson* (1969) 1 Cal.3d 301, 307 [81 Cal.Rptr. 855, 461 P.2d 39]; but see *Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 646, 660 [262 Cal.Rptr. 890] [false light case holding that "account" published in defendant's membership newsletter does not meet threshold allegation of a general public disclosure].)

Sources and Authority

- “False light is a species of invasion of privacy, based on publicity that places a plaintiff before the public in a false light that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and where the defendant knew or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the plaintiff would be placed.” (*Jackson v. Mayweather* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1264 [217 Cal.Rptr.3d 234].)
- “California common law has generally followed Prosser’s classification of privacy interests as embodied in the Restatement.” (*Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 24 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633], internal citation omitted.)
- “In order to be actionable, the false light in which the plaintiff is placed must be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Although it is not necessary that the plaintiff be defamed, publicity placing one in a highly offensive false light will in most cases be defamatory as well.” (*Fellows v. National Enquirer* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 234, 238-239 [228 Cal.Rptr. 215, 721 P.2d 97], internal citation omitted.)
- “When a false light claim is coupled with a defamation claim, the false light claim is essentially superfluous, and stands or falls on whether it meets the same requirements as the defamation cause of action.” (*Eisenberg, supra*, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1385, fn. 13, internal citations omitted.)
- “[A] ‘false light’ cause of action ‘is in substance equivalent to ... [a] libel claim, and should meet the same requirements of the libel claim ... including proof of malice and fulfillment of the requirements of [the retraction statute] section 48a [of the Civil Code].’ ” (*Briscoe, supra*, 4 Cal.3d at p. 543,

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internal citation omitted.)

- “Because in this defamation action [plaintiff] is a private figure plaintiff, he was required to prove only negligence, and not actual malice, to recover damages for actual injury to his reputation. But [plaintiff] was required to prove actual malice to recover punitive or presumed damages” (*Khawar, supra*, 19 Cal.4th at p. 274.)
- “The *New York Times* decision defined a zone of constitutional protection within which one could publish concerning a public figure without fear of liability. That constitutional protection does not depend on the label given the stated cause of action; it bars not only actions for defamation, but also claims for invasion of privacy.” (*Reader’s Digest Assn., Inc. v. Superior Court* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 265 [208 Cal.Rptr. 137, 690 P.2d 610], internal citations omitted.)
- “[T]he constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the application of the New York statute to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.” (*Time, Inc. v. Hill* (1967) 385 U.S. 374, 387–388 [87 S.Ct. 534, 17 L.Ed.2d 456].)
- “We hold that whenever a claim for false light invasion of privacy is based on language that is defamatory within the meaning of section 45a, pleading and proof of special damages are required.” (*Fellows, supra*, 42 Cal.3d at p. 251.)

Secondary Sources

5 Witkin, Summary of California Law (11th ed. 2017) Torts, §§ 784–786

4 Levy et al., California Torts, Ch. 46, *Invasion of Privacy*, § 46.04 (Matthew Bender)

37 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 429, *Privacy*, § 429.33 (Matthew Bender)

18 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 184, *Privacy: Invasion of Privacy*, § 184.21 (Matthew Bender)

1 California Civil Practice: Torts §§ 20:12–20:15 (Thomson Reuters)

2023. Failure to Abate Artificial Condition on Land Creating Nuisance

[Name of plaintiff] **claims that** *[name of defendant]* **unreasonably failed to put an end to an artificial condition on** *[name of defendant]*'s land that was a [public/private] nuisance. To establish this claim, in addition to proving that the condition created a nuisance, *[name of plaintiff]* must also prove all of the following:

1. That *[name of defendant]* was in possession of the land where the artificial condition existed;
 2. That *[name of defendant]* knew or should have known of the condition and that it created a nuisance or an unreasonable risk of nuisance;
 3. That *[name of defendant]* knew or should have known that *[[name of plaintiff]/the affected members of the public]* did not consent to the condition; and
 4. That after a reasonable opportunity, *[name of defendant]* failed to take reasonable steps to put an end to the condition or to protect *[[name of plaintiff]/the public]* from the nuisance.
-

New November 2018

Directions for Use

This instruction is based on the Restatement Second of Torts, section 839 (see *Leslie Salt Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com.* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 605, 618–622 [200 Cal.Rptr. 575]), which applies to both public and private nuisances. (Rest. 2d Torts, § 839, comment (a).) For a private nuisance, select the plaintiff in elements 3 and 4.

Give this instruction with either CACI No. 2020, *Public Nuisance—Essential Factual Elements*, or CACI No. 2021, *Private Nuisance—Essential Factual Elements*. For public nuisance, modify element 1 of CACI No. 2020 to replace “created a condition” with “allowed a condition to exist.” For private nuisance, this instruction replaces element 3 of CACI No. 2021.

Sources and Authority

- Under the common law, liability for a public nuisance may result from the failure to act as well as from affirmative conduct. Thus, for example, section 839 of the Restatement Second of Torts declares that ‘A possessor of land is subject to liability for a nuisance caused while he is in possession by an abatable artificial condition on the land [such as the placement of fill], if the nuisance is otherwise actionable [e.g., prohibited by statute], and [para.] (a) the possessor knows or should know of the condition and the nuisance or unreasonable risk of nuisance involved, and [para.] (b) he knows or should know that it exists without the consent of those affected by it, and [para.] (c) he has failed after a reasonable opportunity to take reasonable steps to abate the condition or to protect the affected persons against it.’” (*Leslie Salt Co., supra*, 153 Cal.App.3d at pp. 619–620.)

2400. Breach of Employment Contract—Unspecified Term—“At-Will” Presumption

An employment relationship may be ended by either the employer or the employee, at any time, for any [lawful] reason, or for no reason at all. This is called “at-will employment.”

An employment relationship is not “at will” if the employee proves that the parties, by words or conduct, agreed that *[specify the nature of the alleged agreement, e.g., the employee would be discharged only for good cause]*.

New September 2003; Revised June 2006, *November 2018*

Directions for Use

If the plaintiff has made no claim other than the contract claim, then the word “lawful” may be omitted. If the plaintiff has made a claim for wrongful termination or violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, then the word “lawful” should be included in order to avoid confusing the jury.

Sources and Authority

- At-Will Employment. Labor Code section 2922.
- Contract of Employment. Labor Code section 2750.
- “Labor Code section 2922 has been recognized as creating a presumption. The statute creates a presumption of at-will employment which may be overcome ‘by evidence that despite the absence of a specified term, the parties agreed that the employer’s power to terminate would be limited in some way, e.g., by a requirement that termination be based only on “good cause.” ’” (*Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co.* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1488 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 248], internal citations omitted.)
- “Where there is no express agreement, the issue is whether other evidence of the parties’ conduct has a ‘tendency in reason’ to demonstrate the existence of an actual mutual understanding on particular terms and conditions of employment. If such evidence logically permits conflicting inferences, a question of fact is presented. But where the undisputed facts negate the existence or the breach of the contract claimed, summary judgment is proper.” (*Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 337 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089], internal citations omitted.)
- “Because the presumption of at-will employment is premised upon public policy considerations, it is one affecting the burden of proof. Therefore, even if no substantial evidence was presented by defendants that plaintiff’s employment was at-will, the presumption of Labor Code section 2922 required the issue to be submitted to the jury.” (*Alexander v. Nextel Communications, Inc.* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1381–1382 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 293], internal citations omitted.)

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- “The presumption that an employment relationship of indefinite duration is intended to be terminable at will is therefore ‘subject, like any presumption, to contrary evidence. This may take the form of an agreement, express or implied, that ... the employment relationship will continue indefinitely, pending the occurrence of some event such as the employer’s dissatisfaction with the employee’s services or the existence of some “cause” for termination.’ ” (*Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.* (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 680 [254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373], internal citation omitted.)

Secondary Sources

3 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Agency and Employment, § 231

Chin et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Employment Litigation ¶¶ 4:2-4:4, 4:65 (The Rutter Group)

1 Wrongful Employment Termination Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.) Contract Actions, §§ 8.4-8.14

4 Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 60, *Liability for Wrongful Termination and Discipline*, § 60.02 (Matthew Bender)

21 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 249, *Employment Law: Termination and Discipline*, §§ 249.10, 249.11, 249.13, 249.21, 249.43 (Matthew Bender)

10 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 100, *Wrongful Termination and Discipline*, §§ 100.20–100.23 (Matthew Bender)

Draft—Not Approved by Judicial Council

**2401. Breach of Employment Contract—Unspecified Term—Actual or Constructive Discharge—
Essential Factual Elements**

[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] breached their employment contract [by forcing [name of plaintiff] to resign]. To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:

1. That [name of plaintiff] and [name of defendant] entered into an employment relationship. [An employment contract or a provision in an employment contract may be [written or oral/partly written and partly oral/created by the conduct of the parties]]];
 2. That [name of defendant] promised, by words or conduct, to ~~[discharge/demote]~~ [name of plaintiff] [specify the nature of the alleged agreement, e.g., only for good cause];
 3. That [name of plaintiff] substantially performed [his/her] job duties [unless [name of plaintiff]’s performance was excused [or prevented]]];
 4. That [name of defendant] [constructively] [discharged/demoted] [name of plaintiff] [e.g., without good cause]; and —
 5. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed by the [discharge/demotion]; and
 6. That [name of defendant]’s breach of contract was a substantial factor in causing [name of plaintiff]’s harm.
-

New September 2003; Revised November 2018

Directions for Use

~~In cases where constructive discharge is alleged, use CACI No. 2402 instead of this one.~~

~~The e~~Element 3 of on substantial performance should not be confused with the “good cause” defense: “The action is primarily for breach of contract. It was therefore incumbent upon plaintiff to prove that he was able and offered to fulfill all obligations imposed upon him by the contract. Plaintiff failed to meet this requirement; by voluntarily withdrawing from the contract he excused further performance by defendant.” (*Kane v. Sklar* (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 480, 482 [265 P.2d 29], internal citation omitted.) Element 3 may be deleted if substantial performance is not a disputed issue.

~~See also CACI No. 304, *Oral or Written Contract Terms*, and CACI No. 305, *Implied-in-Fact Contract*.~~

An employee may be “constructively” discharged if the employer intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions to exist that were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have had no reasonable alternative except to resign. (*Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1251 [32

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Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022].) If constructive rather than actual discharge is alleged, include “by forcing [name of plaintiff] to resign” in the introductory paragraph and “constructively” in element 4. Then also give CACI No. 2510, “*Constructive Discharge*” Explained.

Elements 4 and 5 may be modified for adverse employment actions other than discharge, for example demotion. The California Supreme Court has extended the implied contract theory to encompass demotions or adverse employment actions other similar employment decisions that violate the terms of an implied contract. (See *Scott v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 454, 473-474 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 427, 904 P.2d 834].) See CACI No. 2509, “*Adverse Employment Action*” Explained. As a result, the bracketed language regarding an alleged wrongful demotion may be given, or other appropriate language for other similar employment decisions, depending on the facts of the case.

For an instruction on damages, give CACI No. 3903P, *Damages from Employer for Wrongful Discharge (Economic Damages)*. See also CACI No. 304, *Oral or Written Contract Terms*, and CACI No. 305, *Implied-in-Fact Contract*.

Sources and Authority

- At-Will Employment. Labor Code section 2922.
- Contractual Conditions Precedent. Civil Code section 1439.
- “Where there is no express agreement, the issue is whether other evidence of the parties’ conduct has a ‘tendency in reason’ to demonstrate the existence of an actual mutual understanding on particular terms and conditions of employment. If such evidence logically permits conflicting inferences, a question of fact is presented. But where the undisputed facts negate the existence or the breach of the contract claimed, summary judgment is proper.” (*Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 337 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089], internal citations omitted.)
- The employee bears the ultimate burden of proving that he or she was wrongfully terminated. (*Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc. (Pugh I)* (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 330 [171 Cal.Rptr. 917].)
- “The presumption that an employment relationship of indefinite duration is intended to be terminable at will is therefore ‘subject, like any presumption, to contrary evidence. This may take the form of an agreement, express or implied, that ... the employment relationship will continue indefinitely, pending the occurrence of some event such as the employer’s dissatisfaction with the employee’s services or the existence of some “cause” for termination.’ ” (*Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.* (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 680 [254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373], internal citation omitted.)
- “In *Foley*, we identified several factors, apart from express terms, that may bear upon ‘the existence and content of an ... [implied-in-fact] agreement’ placing limits on the employer’s right to discharge an employee. These factors might include ‘ “the personnel policies or practices of the employer, the employee’s longevity of service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is engaged.” ’ ” (*Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 336-337 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089], internal citations omitted.)

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- “Standing alone, constructive discharge is neither a tort nor a breach of contract, but a doctrine that transforms what is ostensibly a resignation into a firing. Even after establishing constructive discharge, an employee must independently prove a breach of contract or tort in connection with employment termination in order to obtain damages for wrongful discharge.” (*Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1251 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022], internal citation omitted.)
- “Constructive discharge occurs when the employer’s conduct effectively forces an employee to resign. Although the employee may say, ‘I quit,’ the employment relationship is actually severed involuntarily by the employer’s acts, against the employee’s will. As a result, a constructive discharge is legally regarded as a firing rather than a resignation.” (*Turner, supra*, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1245-1246, internal citation omitted.)
- “In order to amount to constructive discharge, adverse working conditions must be unusually ‘aggravated’ or amount to a ‘continuous pattern’ before the situation will be deemed intolerable. In general, ‘[s]ingle, trivial, or isolated acts of [misconduct] are insufficient’ to support a constructive discharge claim. Moreover, a poor performance rating or a demotion, even when accompanied by reduction in pay, does not by itself trigger a constructive discharge.” (*Turner, supra*, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1247, internal citation and fns. omitted.)
- “Whether conditions were so intolerable as to justify a reasonable employee’s decision to resign is normally a question of fact.” (*Valdez v. City of Los Angeles* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1056 [282 Cal.Rptr. 726].)
- “In some circumstances, a single intolerable incident, such as a crime of violence against an employee by an employer, or an employer’s ultimatum that an employee commit a crime, may constitute a constructive discharge. Such misconduct potentially could be found ‘aggravated.’ ” (*Turner, supra*, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1247, fn. 3.)
- “[T]he standard by which a constructive discharge is determined is an objective one—the question is ‘whether a reasonable person faced with the allegedly intolerable employer actions or conditions of employment would have no reasonable alternative except to quit.’ ” (*Turner, supra*, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1248, internal citations omitted.)
- “In order to establish a constructive discharge, an employee must plead and prove, by the usual preponderance of the evidence standard, that the employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions that were so intolerable or aggravated at the time of the employee’s resignation that a reasonable employer would realize that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would be compelled to resign. [¶] For purposes of this standard, the requisite knowledge or intent must exist on the part of either the employer or those persons who effectively represent the employer, i.e., its officers, directors, managing agents, or supervisory employees.” (*Turner, supra*, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1251.)
- “The length of time the plaintiff remained on the job may be one relevant factor in determining the intolerability of employment conditions from the standpoint of a reasonable person. Neither logic nor

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precedent suggests it should always be dispositive.” (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1254.)

- ~~• Civil Code sections 1619-1621 together provide as follows: “A contract is either express or implied. An express contract is one, the terms of which are stated in words. An implied contract is one, the existence and terms of which are manifested by conduct.”~~
- “ ‘Good cause’ or ‘just cause’ for termination connotes ‘ “a fair and honest cause or reason,” ’ regulated by the good faith of the employer. The term is relative. Whether good cause exists is dependent upon the particular circumstances of each case. In deciding whether good cause exists, there must be a balance between the employer’s interest in operating its business efficiently and profitably and the employee’s interest in continued employment. Care must be exercised so as not to interfere with the employer’s legitimate exercise of managerial discretion. While the scope of such discretion is substantial, it is not unrestricted. Good cause is not properly found where the asserted reasons for discharge are ‘trivial, capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual.’ Where there is a contract to terminate only for good cause, the employer has no right to terminate for an arbitrary or unreasonable decision.” (*Walker v. Blue Cross of California* (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 985, 994 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 184], internal citations omitted, abrogated on another ground in *Guz, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at p. 351.)
- “The general rule is that the measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is the amount of salary agreed upon for the period of service, less the amount which the employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned or with reasonable effort might have earned from other employment.” (*Parker v. Twentieth Century-FoxFilm Corp.* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 176, 181 [89 Cal.Rptr. 737, 474 P.2d 689], internal citations omitted.)

Secondary Sources

Chin et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Employment Litigation ¶¶ 4:2, 4:8, 4:15, 4:65, 4:81, 4:105, 4:270–4:273 (The Rutter Group)

1 Wrongful Employment Termination Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.) Contract Actions, §§ 8.4–8.20B

4 Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 60, *Liability for Wrongful Termination and Discipline*, §§ 60.05, 60.07 (Matthew Bender)

21 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 249, *Employment Law: Termination and Discipline*, §§ 249.90, 249.43, Ch. 250, *Employment Law: Wage and Hour Disputes*, § 250.66 (Matthew Bender)

5 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 50, *Contracts*, §§ 50.10, 50.11, 50.350 (Matthew Bender)

10 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 100, *Employer and Employee: Wrongful Termination and Discipline*, §§ 100.21, 100.22, 100.28, 100.29 (Matthew Bender)

California Civil Practice: Employment Litigation §§ 6:9–6:11 (Thomson Reuters)

2402. Breach of Employment Contract—Unspecified Term—Constructive Discharge—Essential Factual Elements

~~[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] breached their employment contract by forcing [name of plaintiff] to resign. To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:~~

- ~~1. That [name of plaintiff] and [name of defendant] entered into an employment relationship. [An employment contract or a provision in an employment contract may be [written or oral/partly written and partly oral/created by the conduct of the parties]];~~
- ~~2. That [name of defendant] promised, by words or conduct, to discharge [name of plaintiff] only for good cause;~~
- ~~3. That [name of plaintiff] substantially performed [his/her] job duties [unless [name of plaintiff]'s performance was excused [or prevented]];~~
- ~~4. That [name of defendant] intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions to exist that were so intolerable that a reasonable person in [name of plaintiff]'s position would have had no reasonable alternative except to resign;~~
- ~~5. That [name of plaintiff] resigned because of the intolerable conditions; and~~
- ~~6. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed by the loss of employment.~~

~~To be intolerable, the adverse working conditions must be unusually or repeatedly offensive to a reasonable person in [name of plaintiff]'s position.~~

New September 2003

Directions for Use

The element of substantial performance should not be confused with the “good cause” defense: “The action is primarily for breach of contract. It was therefore incumbent upon plaintiff to prove that he was able and offered to fulfill all obligations imposed upon him by the contract. Plaintiff failed to meet this requirement; by voluntarily withdrawing from the contract he excused further performance by defendant.” (*Kane v. Sklar* (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 480, 482 [265 P.2d 29], internal citation omitted.) Element 3 may be deleted if substantial performance is not a disputed issue.

Sources and Authority

- ~~At Will Employment. Labor Code section 2922.~~

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- ~~Contractual Conditions Precedent. Civil Code section 1439.~~
- ~~“Where there is no express agreement, the issue is whether other evidence of the parties’ conduct has a ‘tendency in reason’ to demonstrate the existence of an actual mutual understanding on particular terms and conditions of employment. If such evidence logically permits conflicting inferences, a question of fact is presented. But where the undisputed facts negate the existence or the breach of the contract claimed, summary judgment is proper.” (*Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 337 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089], internal citations omitted.)~~
- ~~The employee bears the ultimate burden of proving that he or she was wrongfully terminated. (*Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc. (Pugh I)* (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 330 [171 Cal.Rptr. 917].)~~
- ~~“Standing alone, constructive discharge is neither a tort nor a breach of contract, but a doctrine that transforms what is ostensibly a resignation into a firing. Even after establishing constructive discharge, an employee must independently prove a breach of contract or tort in connection with employment termination in order to obtain damages for wrongful discharge.” (*Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1251 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022], internal citation omitted.)~~
- ~~“The presumption that an employment relationship of indefinite duration is intended to be terminable at will is therefore ‘subject, like any presumption, to contrary evidence. This may take the form of an agreement, express or implied, that ... the employment relationship will continue indefinitely, pending the occurrence of some event such as the employer’s dissatisfaction with the employee’s services or the existence of some “cause” for termination.’” (*Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.* (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 680 [254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373], internal citation omitted.)~~
- ~~“In *Foley*, we identified several factors, apart from express terms, that may bear upon ‘the existence and content of an ... [implied in fact] agreement’ placing limits on the employer’s right to discharge an employee. These factors might include “‘the personnel policies or practices of the employer, the employee’s longevity of service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is engaged.’”’” (*Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 336-337 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089], internal citations omitted.)~~
- ~~Civil Code sections 1619–1621 together provide as follows: “A contract is either express or implied. An express contract is one, the terms of which are stated in words. An implied contract is one, the existence and terms of which are manifested by conduct.”~~
- ~~“ ‘Good cause’ or ‘just cause’ for termination connotes ‘ “a fair and honest cause or reason,” ’ regulated by the good faith of the employer. The term is relative. Whether good cause exists is dependent upon the particular circumstances of each case. In deciding whether good cause exists, there must be a balance between the employer’s interest in operating its business efficiently and profitably and the employee’s interest in continued employment. Care must be exercised so as not to interfere with the employer’s legitimate exercise of managerial discretion. While the scope of such discretion is substantial, it is not unrestricted. Good cause is not properly found where the asserted reasons for discharge are ‘trivial, capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual.’”~~

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~~Where there is a contract to terminate only for good cause, the employer has no right to terminate for an arbitrary or unreasonable decision.” (Walker v. Blue Cross of California (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 985, 994 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 184], internal citations omitted, abrogated on another ground in Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 351.)~~

- ~~• “Constructive discharge occurs when the employer’s conduct effectively forces an employee to resign. Although the employee may say, ‘I quit,’ the employment relationship is actually severed involuntarily by the employer’s acts, against the employee’s will. As a result, a constructive discharge is legally regarded as a firing rather than a resignation.” (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1245-1246, internal citation omitted.)~~
- ~~• “In order to amount to constructive discharge, adverse working conditions must be unusually ‘aggravated’ or amount to a ‘continuous pattern’ before the situation will be deemed intolerable. In general, ‘[s]ingle, trivial, or isolated acts of [misconduct] are insufficient’ to support a constructive discharge claim. Moreover, a poor performance rating or a demotion, even when accompanied by reduction in pay, does not by itself trigger a constructive discharge.” (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1247, internal citation and fn. omitted.)~~
- ~~• “Whether conditions were so intolerable as to justify a reasonable employee’s decision to resign is normally a question of fact.” (Valdez v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1056 [282 Cal.Rptr. 726].)~~
- ~~• “In some circumstances, a single intolerable incident, such as a crime of violence against an employee by an employer, or an employer’s ultimatum that an employee commit a crime, may constitute a constructive discharge. Such misconduct potentially could be found ‘aggravated.’” (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1247, fn. 3.)~~
- ~~• “[T]he standard by which a constructive discharge is determined is an objective one—the question is ‘whether a reasonable person faced with the allegedly intolerable employer actions or conditions of employment would have no reasonable alternative except to quit.’” (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1248, internal citations omitted.)~~
- ~~• “In order to establish a constructive discharge, an employee must plead and prove, by the usual preponderance of the evidence standard, that the employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions that were so intolerable or aggravated at the time of the employee’s resignation that a reasonable employer would realize that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would be compelled to resign. [¶] For purposes of this standard, the requisite knowledge or intent must exist on the part of either the employer or those persons who effectively represent the employer, i.e., its officers, directors, managing agents, or supervisory employees.” (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1251.)~~
- ~~• “The length of time the plaintiff remained on the job may be one relevant factor in determining the intolerability of employment conditions from the standpoint of a reasonable person. Neither logic nor precedent suggests it should always be dispositive.” (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1254.)~~
- ~~• “The general rule is that the measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is the amount~~

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of salary agreed upon for the period of service, less the amount which the employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned or with reasonable effort might have earned from other employment.” (*Parker v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 176, 181 [89 Cal.Rptr. 737, 474 P.2d 689], internal citations omitted.)

Secondary Sources

~~3 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Agency and Employment, §§223–227~~

~~Chin et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Employment Litigation ¶¶ 4:2, 4:65, 4:81, 4:105, 4:405–4:407, 4:409–4:410, 4:270–4:273, 4:420, 4:422, 4:440 (The Rutter Group)~~

~~1 Wrongful Employment Termination Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.) Contract Actions, §§ 8.1–8.21~~

~~4 Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 60, *Liability for Wrongful Termination and Discipline*, §§ 60.05, 60.07 (Matthew Bender)~~

~~21 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 249, *Employment Law: Termination and Discipline*, § 249.15 (Matthew Bender)~~

~~California Civil Practice: Employment Litigation §§ 6:9–6:11 (Thomson Reuters)~~

2404. Breach of Employment Contract—Unspecified Term—“Good Cause” Defined

Good cause exists when an employer’s decision to ~~[discharge/demote]~~ an employee is made in good faith and based on a fair and honest reason. An employer has substantial but not unlimited discretion regarding personnel decisions[, particularly with respect to an employee in a sensitive or confidential managerial position]. Good cause does not exist if the employer’s reasons for the ~~[discharge/demotion]~~ are trivial, arbitrary, inconsistent with usual practices, ~~[or]~~ unrelated to business needs or goals, ~~[or if the stated reasons conceal the employer’s true reasons].~~

In deciding whether *[name of defendant]* had good cause to ~~[discharge/demote]~~ *[name of plaintiff]*, you must balance *[name of defendant]*’s interest in operating the business efficiently and profitably against the interest of *[name of plaintiff]* in maintaining employment.

~~[If *[name of plaintiff]* had a sensitive managerial position, then *[name of defendant]* had substantial, though not unlimited, discretion in ~~[discharging/demoting]~~ *[him/her]*.]~~

New September 2003; Revised November 2018

Directions for Use

This instruction may not be appropriate in the context of an implied employment contract where the parties have agreed to a particular meaning of “good cause” (e.g., a written employment agreement specifically defining “good cause” for discharge). If so, the instruction should be modified accordingly.

~~Include the bracketed language in the opening paragraph if the defense alleges that the plaintiff was in a sensitive or confidential managerial position. Only read the last bracketed phrase in the first paragraph in cases where there is an issue involving pretext.~~

~~The last optional paragraph should be given when the employee is in such a position that the employer would be allowed greater discretion in its decision to discharge the employee: “[W]here, as here, the employee occupies a sensitive managerial or confidential position, the employer must of necessity be allowed substantial scope for the exercise of subjective judgment.” (*Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc.* (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 330 [171 Cal.Rptr. 917], disapproved on other grounds in *Guz v. Bechtel National Inc.* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 350–351 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089].) Note that the term “confidential position” has not been defined by California case law.~~

When the reason given for the discharge is misconduct, and there is a factual dispute whether the misconduct occurred, then the court should give CACI No. 2405, *Breach of Implied Employment Contract—Unspecified Term—“Good Cause” Defined—Misconduct*, instead of this instruction. (See *Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall International, Inc.* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 93, 107 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 900, 948 P.2d 412].)

Sources and Authority

Draft—Not Approved by Judicial Council

- “If the evidence is uncontradicted and permits only one conclusion, then the issue [of good cause] is legal, not factual. Where, however, as here, the evidence is contradicted, the issue is one for the trier of fact to decide.” (*Wallis v. Farmers Group, Inc.* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 718, 733 [269 Cal.Rptr. 299], disapproved on other grounds in *Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 394 fn. 2 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 668, 139 P.3d 56].)
- “ ‘Good cause’ in the context of implied employment contracts is defined as: ‘fair and honest’ reasons, regulated by good faith on the part of the employer, that are not trivial, arbitrary or capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual.’ ” (*Serri v. Santa Clara University* (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 872 [172 Cal.Rptr.3d 732], internal citations omitted.)
- “The term is relative. Whether good cause exists is dependent upon the particular circumstances of each case. In deciding whether good cause exists, there must be a balance between the employer’s interest in operating its business efficiently and profitably and the employee’s interest in continued employment. Care must be exercised so as not to interfere with the employer’s legitimate exercise of managerial discretion. . . . Where there is a contract to terminate only for good cause, the employer has no right to terminate for an arbitrary or unreasonable decision.” (*Walker v. Blue Cross of California* (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 985, 994 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 184], internal citations omitted, abrogated on another ground in *Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 351 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089].)
- “ “[W]here, as here, the employee occupies a sensitive managerial or confidential position, the employer must of necessity be allowed substantial scope for the exercise of subjective judgment.” (*Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc.* (Pugh I) (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 330 [171 Cal.Rptr. 917], disapproved on other grounds in *Guz, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 350–351.)
- “ ‘[G]ood cause’ in [the context of wrongful termination based on an implied contract] is quite different from the standard applicable in determining the propriety of an employee’s termination under a contract for a specified term.” (*Pugh, supra*, 116 Cal.App.3d at p. 330.)
- “We have held that appellant has demonstrated a prima facie case of wrongful termination in violation of his contract of employment. The burden of coming forward with evidence as to the reason for appellant’s termination now shifts to the employer. Appellant may attack the employer’s offered explanation, either on the ground that it is pretextual (and that the real reason is one prohibited by contract or public policy, or on the ground that it is insufficient to meet the employer’s obligations under contract or applicable legal principles. Appellant bears, however, the ultimate burden of proving that he was terminated wrongfully.” (*Pugh, supra*, 116 Cal.App.3d at pp. 329-330, internal citation omitted.)

Secondary Sources

3 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Agency and Employment, §§ 208, 209, 231

Chin et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Employment Litigation ¶¶ 4:270–4:273, 4:300 (The Rutter Group)

1 Wrongful Employment Termination Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.) Contract Actions, §§ 8.22–8.25

Draft—Not Approved by Judicial Council

4 Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 60, *Liability for Wrongful Termination and Discipline*, § 60.09[5][b] (Matthew Bender)

21 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 249, *Employment Law: Termination and Discipline*, §§ 249.21, 249.63 (Matthew Bender)

10 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 100, *Employer and Employee: Wrongful Termination and Discipline*, §§ 100.21, 100.27, 100.29, 100.34 (Matthew Bender)

California Civil Practice: Employment Litigation, § 6:19 (Thomson Reuters)

~~2407. Affirmative Defense—Employee’s Duty to Mitigate Damages~~
~~(Renumbered as CACI No. 3923, November 2018)~~

~~[Name of defendant] claims that if [name of plaintiff] is entitled to any damages, they should be reduced by the amount that [he/she] could have earned from other employment. To succeed, [name of defendant] must prove all of the following:~~

- ~~1. That employment substantially similar to [name of plaintiff]’s former job was available to [him/her];~~
- ~~2. That [name of plaintiff] failed to make reasonable efforts to seek [and retain] this employment; and~~
- ~~3. The amount that [name of plaintiff] could have earned from this employment.~~

~~In deciding whether the employment was substantially similar, you should consider, among other factors, whether:~~

- ~~(a) The nature of the work was different from [name of plaintiff]’s employment with [name of defendant];~~
- ~~(b) The new position was substantially inferior to [name of plaintiff]’s former position;~~
- ~~(c) The salary, benefits, and hours of the job were similar to [name of plaintiff]’s former job;~~
- ~~(d) The new position required similar skills, background, and experience;~~
- ~~(e) The job responsibilities were similar; [and]~~
- ~~(f) The job was in the same locality; [and]~~
- ~~(g) [insert other relevant factor(s)].~~

~~[In deciding whether [name of plaintiff] failed to make reasonable efforts to retain comparable employment, you should consider whether [name of plaintiff] quit or was discharged from that employment for a reason within [his/her] control.]~~

New September 2003; Revised February 2007, December 2014

~~Directions for Use~~

~~This instruction may be given when there is evidence that the employee’s damages could have~~

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~~been mitigated. The bracketed language at the end of the instruction regarding plaintiff's failure to retain a new job is based on the holding in *Stanchfield v. Hamer Toyota, Inc.* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1502-1503 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 565].~~

~~In deciding whether the plaintiff could have obtained a substantially similar job, the trier of fact may consider several factors, including salary, benefits, hours of work per day, hours of work per year, locality, and availability of a merit-based system. (See *California School Employees Assn. v. Personnel Commission* (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 241, 250-255 [106 Cal.Rptr. 283].) Read only those factors that have been shown by the evidence.~~

~~This instruction should be given in all employment cases, not just in breach of contract cases. See Chin et al., *California Practice Guide: Employment Litigation*, ¶ 17:492 (Rutter Group).~~

~~This instruction should not be used for wrongful demotion cases.~~

Sources and Authority

- ~~• “The general rule is that the measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is the amount of salary agreed upon for the period of service, less the amount which the employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned or with reasonable effort might have earned from other employment. However, before projected earnings from other employment opportunities not sought or accepted by the discharged employee can be applied in mitigation, the employer must show that the other employment was comparable, or substantially similar, to that of which the employee has been deprived; the employee's rejection of or failure to seek other available employment of a different or inferior kind may not be resorted to in order to mitigate damages.” (*Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 176, 181-182 [89 Cal.Rptr. 737, 474 P.2d 689], internal citations omitted; see also *Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Industries, Inc.* (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 91, 98 [127 Cal.Rptr. 222] [“Plaintiff concedes that the trial court was entitled to deduct her actual earnings”]; but see *Villacorta v. Cemex Cement, Inc.* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1432 [165 Cal.Rptr.3d 441] [wages actually earned from an inferior job may not be used to mitigate damages].)~~
- ~~• “[B]efore projected earnings from other employment opportunities not sought or accepted by the discharged employee can be applied in mitigation, the employer must show that the other employment was comparable, or substantially similar, to that of which the employee has been deprived” (*Kao v. University of San Francisco* (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 437, 454 [177 Cal.Rptr.3d 145].)~~
- ~~• “[W]e conclude that the trial court should not have deducted from plaintiff's recovery against defendant the amount that the court found she might have earned in employment which was substantially inferior to her position with defendant.” (*Rabago-Alvarez, supra*, 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 99.)~~
- ~~• “[I]n those instances where the jury determines the employee was fired from a substantially similar position for cause, any amount the employee with reasonable effort could have~~

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~~earned by retaining that employment should be deducted from the amount of damages which otherwise would have been awarded to the employee under the terms of the original employment agreement.” (Stanchfield, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1502–1503.)~~

- ~~• “The location of the new job is one of the factors to consider in determining whether the new job is inferior.” (Villacorta, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1432.)~~
- ~~• “There is some authority for the proposition that whether or not the other employment is comparable or substantially similar or equivalent to the prior position is a question of fact. On the other hand the issue of substantial similarity or inferiority of employment is one that has often been decided as a matter of law in California.” (California School Employees Assn., supra, 30 Cal.App.3d at pp. 253–254, internal citations omitted.)~~
- ~~• “The court could reasonably admit the evidence of other available jobs and leave the question of their substantial similarity to the jury.” (Kao, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 454.)~~
- ~~• “[S]elf employment is not unreasonable mitigation as long as the discharged employee applies sufficient effort trying to make the business successful, even if those efforts fail.” (Cordero Sacks v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1284–1285 [134 Cal.Rptr.3d 883].)~~

Secondary Sources

~~Chin et al., California Practice Guide: Employment Litigation, Ch. 17 F, *Mitigation Of Damages (Avoidable Consequences Doctrine)*, ¶¶ 17:490, 17:495, 17:497, 17:499–17:501 (The Rutter Group)~~

~~1 Wrongful Employment Termination Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.) Contract Actions, §§ 8.40–8.41~~

~~4 Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 60, *Liability for Wrongful Termination and Discipline*, § 60.08[4] (Matthew Bender)~~

~~21 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 249, *Employment Law: Termination and Discipline*, §§ 249.18, 249.65 (Matthew Bender)~~

2430. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy—Essential Factual Elements

[Name of plaintiff] claims [he/she] was discharged from employment for reasons that violate a public policy. It is a violation of public policy [specify claim in case, e.g., to discharge someone from employment for refusing to engage in price fixing]. To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:

1. That [name of plaintiff] was employed by [name of defendant];
 2. That [name of defendant] discharged [name of plaintiff];
 3. That [insert alleged violation of public policy, e.g., “[name of plaintiff]’s refusal to engage in price fixing”] was a substantial motivating reason for [name of plaintiff]’s discharge;
 4. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; and
 45. That the discharge was a substantial factor in caused-causing [name of plaintiff] harm.
-

New September 2003; Revised June 2013, June 2014, December 2014, November 2018

Directions for Use

The judge should determine whether the purported reason for firing the plaintiff would amount to a violation of public policy. (See *Gantt v. Sentry Insurance* (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1092 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680]; overruled on other grounds in *Green v. Ralee Engineering Co.* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80 fn. 6 [78 Cal. Rptr.2d 16, 960 P.2d 1046].) The jury should then be instructed that the alleged conduct would constitute a public-policy violation if proved.

Note that there are two causation elements. First, there must be causation between the public policy and the discharge (element 3). ~~this~~ This instruction uses the term “substantial motivating reason” to express this causation element. ~~between the public policy and the discharge (see element 3).~~ “Substantial motivating reason” has been held to be the appropriate standard for cases alleging termination in violation of public policy. (*Alamo v. Practice Management Information Corp.* (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 466, 479 [161 Cal.Rptr.3d 758]; see *Harris v. City of Santa Monica* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 232 [152 Cal.Rptr.3d 392, 294 P.3d 49]; CACI No. 2507, “*Substantial Motivating Reason*” Explained.)

Element 5 then expresses a second causation requirement; that the plaintiff was harmed as a result of the wrongful discharge. It is unlikely that this element will be contested in termination cases. A termination of employment will generally cause the employee some damages.

~~This instruction must be supplemented with CACI No. 2433, *Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy—Damages*.~~ If plaintiff alleges he or she was forced or coerced to resign, then CACI No. 2431, *Constructive Discharge in Violation of Public Policy—Plaintiff Required to Violate Public Policy*, or

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CACI No. 2432, *Constructive Discharge in Violation of Public Policy—Plaintiff Required to Endure Intolerable Conditions That Violate Public Policy*, should be given instead. See also CACI No. 2510, “*Constructive Discharge*” Explained.

This instruction may be modified for adverse employment actions other than discharge, for example demotion, if done in violation of public policy. (See *Garcia v. Rockwell Internat. Corp.* (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1556, 1561 [232 Cal.Rptr. 490], disapproved on other grounds in *Gantt v. Sentry Ins.* (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1093 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680] [public policy forbids retaliatory action taken by employer against employee who discloses information regarding employer's violation of law to government agency].) See also CACI No. 2509, “*Adverse Employment Action*” Explained.

[For an instruction on damages, give CACI No. 3903P, *Damages From Employer for Wrongful Discharge \(Economic Damages\)*.](#)

Sources and Authority

- “[W]hile an at-will employee may be terminated for no reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate for an unlawful reason or a purpose that contravenes fundamental public policy. Any other conclusion would sanction lawlessness, which courts by their very nature are bound to oppose.” (*Casella v. SouthWest Dealer Services, Inc.* (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1138–1139 [69 Cal.Rptr.3d 445], internal citations omitted.)
- “[W]hen an employer’s discharge of an employee violates fundamental principles of public policy, the discharged employee may maintain a tort action and recover damages traditionally available in such actions.” (*Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 170 [164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330].)
- “The elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are (1) an employer-employee relationship, (2) the employer terminated the plaintiff's employment, (3) the termination was substantially motivated by a violation of public policy, and (4) the discharge caused the plaintiff harm.” (*Yau v. Allen* (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 154 [176 Cal.Rptr.3d 824].)
- “[T]his court established a set of requirements that a policy must satisfy to support a tortious discharge claim. First, the policy must be supported by either constitutional or statutory provisions. Second, the policy must be ‘public’ in the sense that it ‘inures to the benefit of the public’ rather than serving merely the interests of the individual. Third, the policy must have been articulated at the time of the discharge. Fourth, the policy must be ‘fundamental’ and ‘substantial.’ ” (*Stevenson v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 889-890 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157], footnote omitted.)
- “Policies are not ‘public’ (and thus do not give rise to a common law tort claim) when they are derived from statutes that ‘simply regulate conduct between private individuals, or impose requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy concerns.’ ” (*Diego v. Pilgrim United Church of Christ* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 913, 926 [180 Cal.Rptr.3d 359].)
- “[T]he cases in which violations of public policy are found generally fall into four categories: (1) refusing to violate a statute; (2) performing a statutory obligation (3) exercising a statutory right or

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privilege; and (4) reporting an alleged violation of a statute of public importance.” (*Gantt, supra*, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1090-1091, internal citations and footnote omitted, overruled on other grounds in *Green v. Ralee Engineering Co.* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80, fn. 6 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 960 P.2d 1046]; accord *Stevenson, supra*, 16 Cal.4th at p. 889.)

- “[T]ermination of an employee most clearly violates public policy when it contravenes the provision of a statute forbidding termination for a specified reason” (*Diego, supra*, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 926)
- “[Discharge because of employee’s] [r]efusal to violate a governmental regulation may also be the basis for a tort cause of action where the administrative regulation enunciates a fundamental public policy and is authorized by statute.” (*Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc.* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 708–709 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 159].)
- “In the context of a tort claim for wrongful discharge, tethering public policy to specific constitutional or statutory provisions serves not only to avoid judicial interference with the legislative domain, but also to ensure that employers have adequate notice of the conduct that will subject them to tort liability to the employees they discharge” (*Stevenson, supra*, 16 Cal.4th at p. 889.)
- “[A]n employee need not prove an actual violation of law; it suffices if the employer fired him for reporting his ‘reasonably based suspicions’ of illegal activity.” (*Green, supra*, 19 Cal.4th at p. 87, internal citation omitted.)
- “[A]n employer’s authority over its employee does not include the right to demand that the employee commit a criminal act to further its interests, and an employer may not coerce compliance with such unlawful directions by discharging an employee who refuses to follow such an order” (*Tameny, supra*, 27 Cal.3d at p. 178.)
- “[T]here is a ‘fundamental public interest in a workplace free from illegal practices’ ‘[T]he public interest is in a lawful, not criminal, business operation. Attainment of this objective requires that an employee be free to call his or her employer’s attention to illegal practices, so that the employer may prevent crimes from being committed by misuse of its products by its employees.’ ” (*Yau, supra*, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 157.)
- “An action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy ‘can only be asserted against *an employer*. An individual who is not an employer cannot commit the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; rather, he or she can only be the agent by which *an employer* commits that tort.’ ” (*Kim v. Konad USA Distribution, Inc.* (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1351 [172 Cal.Rptr.3d 686], original italics.)
- Employees in both the private and public sector may assert this claim. (*See Shoemaker v. Myers* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1407 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 203].)
- “Sex discrimination in employment may support a claim of tortious discharge in violation of public policy.” (*Kelley v. The Conco Cos.* (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 191, 214 [126 Cal.Rptr.3d 651].)

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- “In sum, a wrongful termination against public policy common law tort based on sexual harassment can be brought against an employer of any size.” (*Kim, supra*, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.)
- “To establish a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, an employee must prove causation. (See CACI No. 2430 [using phrase ‘substantial motivating reason’ to express causation].) Claims of whistleblower harassment and retaliatory termination may not succeed where a plaintiff ‘cannot demonstrate the required nexus between his reporting of alleged statutory violations and his allegedly adverse treatment by [the employer].’ ” (*Ferrick v. Santa Clara University* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1357 [181 Cal.Rptr.3d 68].)
- “It would be nonsensical to provide a different standard of causation in FEHA cases and common law tort cases based on public policies encompassed by FEHA.” (*Mendoza v. Western Medical Center Santa Ana* (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1341 [166 Cal.Rptr.3d 720].)
- “If claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy must track FEHA, it necessarily follows that jury instructions pertinent to causation and motivation must be the same for both. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in giving the instructions set forth in the CACI model jury instructions.” (*Davis v. Farmers Ins. Exchange* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1323 [200 Cal.Rptr.3d 315].)
- “Under California law, if an employer did not violate FEHA, the employee's claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy necessarily fails.” (*Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1169 [217 Cal.Rptr.3d 258].)
- “FEHA's policy prohibiting disability discrimination in employment is sufficiently substantial and fundamental to support a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.” (*Rope v. Auto-Chlor System of Washington, Inc.* (2013) 220 Cal. App. 4th 635, 660 [163 Cal.Rptr.3d 392].)
- “Although the fourth cause of action references FEHA as one source of the public policy at issue, this is not a statutory FEHA cause of action. FEHA does not displace or supplant common law tort claims for wrongful discharge.” (*Kim, supra*, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349.)
- “[T]o the extent the trial court concluded Labor Code section 132a is the exclusive remedy for work-related injury discrimination, it erred. The California Supreme Court held ‘[Labor Code] section 132a does not provide an exclusive remedy and does not preclude an employee from pursuing FEHA and common law wrongful discharge remedies.’ ” (*Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc.* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1381 [196 Cal.Rptr.3d 68].)
- “California's minimum wage law represents a fundamental policy for purposes of a claim for wrongful termination or constructive discharge in violation of public policy.” (*Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc.* (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 831–832 [166 Cal.Rptr.3d 242].)
- “ ‘Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), which prohibits employer retaliation against an employee who reports a reasonably suspected violation of the law to a government or law enforcement agency, reflects the broad public policy interest in encouraging workplace ‘whistleblowers,’ who may without fear of retaliation report concerns regarding an employer's illegal

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conduct. This public policy is the modern day equivalent of the long-established duty of the citizenry to bring to public attention the doings of a lawbreaker. [Citation.] ...’ ” (*Ferrick, supra*, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1355.)

- “That [defendant]’s decision not to renew her contract for an additional season *might* have been influenced by her complaints about an unsafe working condition ... does not change our conclusion in light of the principle that a decision not to renew a contract set to expire is not actionable in tort.” (*Touchstone Television Productions v. Superior Court* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 676, 682 [145 Cal.Rptr.3d 766], original italics.)
- “ ‘ “[P]ublic policy’ as a concept is notoriously resistant to precise definition, and ... courts should venture into this area, if at all, with great care” [Citation.] Therefore, *when the constitutional provision or statute articulating a public policy also includes certain substantive limitations in scope or remedy, these limitations also circumscribe the common law wrongful discharge cause of action.* Stated another way, the common law cause of action cannot be broader than the constitutional provision or statute on which it depends, and therefore it ‘presents no impediment to employers that operate within the bounds of law.’ ” (*Dutra v. Mercy Medical Center Mt. Shasta* (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 750, 756 [146 Cal.Rptr.3d 922], original italics.)

Secondary Sources

8 Witkin, Summary of California Law (11th ed. 2017) Agency and Employment, § 235

Chin et al., California Practice Guide: Employment Litigation, Ch. 5-A, *Wrongful Discharge In Violation Of Public Policy (Tameny Claims)*, ¶¶ 5:2, 5:47, 5:50, 5:70, 5:105, 5:115, 5:150, 5:151, 5:170, 5:195, 5:220, 5:235 (The Rutter Group)

1 Wrongful Employment Termination Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.) Public Policy Violations, § 5.45

4 Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 60, *Liability for Wrongful Termination and Discipline*, § 60.04 (Matthew Bender)

21 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 249, *Employment Law: Termination and Discipline*, §§ 249.12, 249.50–249.52 (Matthew Bender)

10 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 100, *Employer and Employee: Wrongful Termination and Discipline*, §§ 100.52–100.58 (Matthew Bender)

California Civil Practice: Employment Litigation §§ 6:23–6:25 (Thomson Reuters)

2433. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy—Damages
(Renumbered as CACI No. 3903P and Revised November 2018)

If you find that [name of defendant] [discharged/constructively discharged] [name of plaintiff] in violation of public policy, then you must decide the amount of damages that [name of plaintiff] has proven [he/she] is entitled to recover, if any. To make that decision, you must:

- 1. —Decide the amount that [name of plaintiff] would have earned up to today, including any benefits and pay increases; [and]**
- 2. —Add the present cash value of any future wages and benefits that [he/she] would have earned for the length of time the employment with [name of defendant] was reasonably certain to continue; [and]**
- 3. —[Add damages for [describe any other damages that were allegedly caused by defendant’s conduct, e.g., “emotional distress”] if you find that [name of defendant]’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing that harm.]**

In determining the period that [name of plaintiff]’s employment was reasonably certain to have continued, you should consider such things as:

- (a) —[Name of plaintiff]’s age, work performance, and intent regarding continuing employment with [name of defendant];**
 - (b) —[Name of defendant]’s prospects for continuing the operations involving [name of plaintiff]; and**
 - (c) —Any other factor that bears on how long [name of plaintiff] would have continued to work.**
-

New September 2003

Directions for Use

This instruction should be followed by CACI No. 2407, *Employee’s Duty to Mitigate Damages*, in cases where the employee’s duty to mitigate damages is at issue.

Other types of tort damages may be available to a plaintiff. For an instruction on emotional distress damages, see CACI No. 3905A, *Physical Pain, Mental Suffering, and Emotional Distress (Noneconomic Damage)*. See punitive damages instructions in the damages section (CACI No. 3940 et seq.).

Sources and Authority

- —Standard for Punitive Damages. Civil Code section 3294(a).

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- ~~Employer Liability for Punitive Damages. Civil Code section 3294(b).~~
- ~~A tortious termination subjects the employer to “‘liability for compensatory and punitive damages under normal tort principles.’” (*Gantt v. Sentry Insurance* (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1101 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680], internal citation omitted.)~~
- ~~“The general rule is that the measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is the amount of salary agreed upon for the period of service, less the amount which the employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned or with reasonable effort might have earned from other employment.” (*Parker v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 176, 181 [89 Cal.Rptr. 737, 474 P.2d 689], internal citations omitted; see *Smith v. Brown Forman Distillers Corp.* (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 503, 518 [241 Cal.Rptr. 916].)~~
- ~~“A plaintiff may recover for detriment reasonably certain to result in the future. While there is no clearly established definition of ‘reasonable certainty,’ evidence of future detriment has been held sufficient based on expert medical opinion which considered the plaintiff’s particular circumstances and the expert’s experience with similar cases.” (*Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc.* (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976, 995 [16 Cal.Rptr.2d 787], internal citations omitted, disapproved of on another ground in *Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 664 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 109, 863 P.2d 179].)~~
- ~~“[I]t is our view that in an action for wrongful discharge, and pursuant to the present day concept of employer-employee relations, the term ‘wages’ should be deemed to include not only the periodic monetary earnings of the employee but also the other benefits to which he is entitled as a part of his compensation.” (*Wise v. Southern Pac. Co.* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 600, 607 [83 Cal.Rptr. 202, 463 P.2d 426].)~~
- ~~In determining the period that plaintiff’s employment was reasonably certain to have continued, the trial court took into consideration plaintiff’s “‘physical condition, his age, his propensity for hard work, his expertise in managing defendants’ offices, the profit history of his operation, [and] the foreseeability of the continued future demand for tax return service to small taxpayers’” (*Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc.* (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 695, 705 [101 Cal.Rptr. 169].)~~
- ~~In adding subdivision (b) to section 3294 in 1980, “[t]he drafters’ goals were to avoid imposing punitive damages on employers who were merely negligent or reckless and to distinguish ordinary respondeat superior liability from corporate liability for punitive damages.” (*White v. Ultramar, Inc.* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 572 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 981 P.2d 944], see *Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie* (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1150-1151 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 510].)~~

Secondary Sources

Chin et al., California Practice Guide: Employment Litigation ¶¶ 17:237, 17:362, 17:365 (The Rutter Group)

1 Wrongful Employment Termination Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.) Public Policy Violations, §§ 5.64–

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5.67

~~4 Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 60, *Liability for Wrongful Termination and Discipline*, § 60.08[2] (Matthew Bender)~~

~~21 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 249, *Employment Law: Termination and Discipline*, §§ 249.18, 249.50–249.55, 249.80–249.81, 249.90 (Matthew Bender)~~

~~10 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 100, *Employer and Employee: Wrongful Termination and Discipline*, §§ 100.41–100.59 (Matthew Bender)~~

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2510. “Constructive Discharge” Explained

[Name of plaintiff] must prove that [he/she] was constructively discharged. To establish constructive discharge, [name of plaintiff] must prove the following:

1. That [name of defendant] [through [name of defendant]’s officers, directors, managing agents, or supervisory employees] intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions to exist that were so intolerable that a reasonable person in [name of plaintiff]’s position would have had no reasonable alternative except to resign; and
2. That [name of plaintiff] resigned because of these working conditions.

To be intolerable, the adverse working conditions must be unusually or repeatedly offensive to a reasonable person in [name of plaintiff]’s position.

New June 2012; Revised November 2018

Directions for Use

Give this instruction with CACI No. 2500, *Disparate Treatment—Essential Factual Elements*, CACI No. 2505, *Retaliation*, CACI No. 2540, *Disability Discrimination—Disparate Treatment—Essential Factual Elements*, CACI No. 2560, *Religious Creed Discrimination—Failure to Accommodate—Essential Factual Elements*, or CACI No. 2570, *Age Discrimination—Disparate Treatment—Essential Factual Elements*, if the employee alleges that because of the employer’s actions, he or she had no reasonable alternative other than to leave the employment. Constructive discharge can constitute the adverse employment action required to establish a FEHA violation for discrimination or retaliation. (See *Steele v. Youthful Offender Parole Bd.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1253 [76 Cal.Rptr.3d 632].)

Sources and Authority

- “[C]onstructive discharge occurs only when an employer terminates employment by forcing the employee to resign. A constructive discharge is equivalent to a dismissal, although it is accomplished indirectly. Constructive discharge occurs only when the employer coerces the employee’s resignation, either by creating working conditions that are intolerable under an objective standard, or by failing to remedy objectively intolerable working conditions that actually are known to the employer. We have said ‘a constructive discharge is legally regarded as a firing rather than a resignation.’ ” (*Mullins v. Rockwell Internat. Corp.* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 731, 737 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 936 P.2d 1246], internal citations omitted.)
- “Actual discharge carries significant legal consequences for employers, including possible liability for wrongful discharge. In an attempt to avoid liability, an employer may refrain from actually firing an employee, preferring instead to engage in conduct causing him or her to quit. The doctrine of constructive discharge addresses such employer-attempted ‘end runs’ around wrongful discharge and other claims requiring employer-initiated terminations of employment.” (*Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1244 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022].)

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- “Standing alone, constructive discharge is neither a tort nor a breach of contract, but a doctrine that transforms what is ostensibly a resignation into a firing.” (*Turner, supra*, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1251.)
- “In order to amount to constructive discharge, adverse working conditions must be unusually ‘aggravated’ or amount to a ‘continuous pattern’ before the situation will be deemed intolerable. In general, ‘[s]ingle, trivial, or isolated acts of [misconduct] are insufficient’ to support a constructive discharge claim. Moreover, a poor performance rating or a demotion, even when accompanied by reduction in pay, does not by itself trigger a constructive discharge.” (*Turner, supra*, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1247, internal citation and footnotes omitted.)
- “In some circumstances, a single intolerable incident, such as a crime of violence against an employee by an employer, or an employer’s ultimatum that an employee commit a crime, may constitute a constructive discharge. Such misconduct potentially could be found ‘aggravated.’ ” (*Turner, supra*, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1247, fn. 3.)
- “Although situations may exist where the employee’s decision to resign is unreasonable as a matter of law, ‘[w]hether conditions were so intolerable as to justify a reasonable employee’s decision to resign is normally a question of fact. [Citation.]’ ” (*Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc.* (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 827 [166 Cal.Rptr.3d 242].)
- “[T]he standard by which a constructive discharge is determined is an objective one—the question is ‘whether a reasonable person faced with the allegedly intolerable employer actions or conditions of employment would have no reasonable alternative except to quit.’ ” (*Turner, supra*, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1248, internal citations omitted.)
- “[U]nder *Turner*, the proper focus is on the working conditions themselves, not on the plaintiff’s subjective reaction to those conditions.” (*Simers v. Los Angeles Times Communications, LLC* (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1248, 1272 [227 Cal.Rptr.3d 695].)
- “The length of time the plaintiff remained on the job may be *one* relevant factor in determining the intolerability of employment conditions from the standpoint of a reasonable person.” (*Turner, supra*, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1254, original italics.)
- “[T]here was, as the trial court found, substantial evidence that plaintiff’s age and disability were ‘substantial motivating reason[s]’ for the adverse employment action or actions to which plaintiff was subjected. But the discriminatory motive for plaintiff’s working conditions has no bearing on whether the evidence was sufficient to establish constructive discharge.” (*Simers, supra*, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 1271.)
- “In order to establish a constructive discharge, an employee must plead and prove, by the usual preponderance of the evidence standard, that the employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions that were so intolerable or aggravated at the time of the employee’s resignation that a reasonable employer would realize that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would be compelled to resign. [¶] For purposes of this standard, the requisite knowledge or intent must exist on the part of either the employer or those persons who effectively represent the

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employer, i.e., its officers, directors, managing agents, or supervisory employees.” (*Turner, supra*, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1251.)

Secondary Sources

3 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Agency and Employment, § 225

Chin et al., California Practice Guide: Employment Litigation, Ch. 4-G, *Constructive Discharge*, ¶ 4:405 et seq. (The Rutter Group)

3 Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 43, *Civil Actions Under Equal Employment Opportunity Laws*, § 43.01 (Matthew Bender)

11 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 115, *Civil Rights: Employment Discrimination*, § 115.34 (Matthew Bender)

21 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 249, *Employment Law: Termination and Discipline*, § 249.15 (Matthew Bender)

10 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 100, *Employer and Employee: Wrongful Termination and Discipline*, § 100.31 et seq. (Matthew Bender)

Draft—Not Approved by Judicial Council

2528. Failure to Prevent Sexual Harassment by Nonemployee (Gov. Code, § 12940(j))

[Name of plaintiff] **claims that** *[name of defendant]* **failed to take reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment by a nonemployee. To establish this claim, *[name of plaintiff]* must prove all of the following:**

- 1. That *[name of plaintiff]* [was an employee of *[name of defendant]*]/applied to *[name of defendant]* for a job/was a person providing services under a contract with *[name of defendant]*];**
 - 2. That while in the course of employment, *[name of plaintiff]* was subjected to sexual harassment by a nonemployee;**
 - 3. That *[name of defendant]* knew or should have known that the nonemployee’s conduct placed employees at risk of sexual harassment;**
 - 4. That *[name of defendant]* failed to take immediate and appropriate [preventive/corrective] action;**
 - 5. That the ability to take [preventive/corrective] action was within the control of *[name of defendant]*];**
 - 6. That *[name of plaintiff]* was harmed; and**
 - 7. That *[name of defendant]*’s failure to take immediate and appropriate steps to [prevent/put an end to] the sexual harassment was a substantial factor in causing *[name of plaintiff]*’s harm.**
-

New November 2018

Directions for Use

Give this instruction on a claim by an employee against the employer for failure to prevent sexual harassment by a nonemployee. Note that unlike claims for failure to prevent acts of a coemployee (see Gov. Code, § 12940(k)), only sexual harassment is covered. (Gov. Code, § 12940(j)(1). If there is such a thing as discrimination or retaliation by a nonemployee, there is no employer duty to prevent it under the FEHA.

The employer’s duty is to “take immediate and appropriate corrective action.” (Gov. Code § 12940(j)(1).) In contrast, for the employer’s failure to prevent acts of an employee, the duty is to “take *all* reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring.” (Gov. Code, § 12940(k).)

Whether the employer must prevent or later correct the harassing situation would seem to depend on the facts of the case. If the issue is to stop harassment from recurring after becoming aware of it, the

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employer’s duty would be to “correct” the problem. If the issue is to address a developing problem before the harassment occurs, the duty would be to “prevent” it. Choose the appropriate words in elements 4, 5, and 7 depending on the facts.

Sources and Authority

- Prevention of Harassment by a Nonemployee. Government Code section 12940(j)(1).
- Prevention of Discrimination and Harassment. Government Code section 12940(k).
- “The FEHA provides: ‘An employer may ... be responsible for the acts of nonemployees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees ... , where the employer, or its agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. In reviewing cases involving the acts of nonemployees, the extent of the employer’s control and any other legal responsibility that the employer may have with respect to the conduct of those nonemployees shall be considered.’ ... ’ A plaintiff cannot state a claim for failure to prevent harassment unless the plaintiff first states a claim for harassment.” (*M.F. v. Pacific Pearl Hotel Management LLC* (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 693, 700-701 [224 Cal.Rptr.3d 542].)
- “Once an employer is informed of the sexual harassment, the employer must take adequate remedial measures. The measures need to include immediate corrective action that is reasonably calculated to (1) end the current harassment and (2) to deter future harassment. [Citation.] The employer’s obligation to take prompt corrective action requires (1) that temporary steps be taken to deal with the situation while the employer determines whether the complaint is justified and (2) that permanent remedial steps be implemented by the employer to prevent future harassment” (*M.F., supra*, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 701.)
- “[T]he language of section 12940, subdivision (j)(1), does not limit its application to a particular fact pattern. Rather, the language of the statute provides for liability whenever an employer (1) knows or should know of sexual harassment by a nonemployee and (2) fails to take immediate and appropriate remedial action (3) within its control. (*M.F., supra*, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 702.)
- “[W]hether an employer sufficiently complied with its mandate to ‘take immediate and appropriate corrective action’ is a question of fact.” (*M.F., supra*, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 703, internal citation omitted.)
- “The more egregious the abuse and the more serious the threat of which the employer has notice, the more the employer will be required under a standard of reasonable care to take steps for the protection of likely future victims.” (*M.F., supra*, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 701.)

Secondary Sources

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2705. Affirmative Defense to Wage Order Violations—Plaintiff Was Not Defendant’s Employee

[Name of defendant] claims that [he/she/it] is not liable for any wage order violations because [name of plaintiff] was not [his/her/its] employee, but rather an independent contractor. To establish this defense, [name of defendant] must prove all of the following:

- a. That [name of plaintiff] is [under the terms of the contract and in fact] free from the control and direction of [name of defendant] in connection with the performance of the work that [name of plaintiff] was hired to do;
 - b. That [name of plaintiff] performs work for [name of defendant] that is outside the usual course of [name of defendant]'s business; and
 - c. That [name of plaintiff] is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved in the work performed for [name of defendant].
-

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Directions for Use

This instruction may be needed if there is a dispute as to whether the defendant was the plaintiff’s employer for purposes of a claim covered by a California wage order. The wage orders, which are constitutionally-authorized, quasi-legislative regulations that have the force of law, impose obligations relating to the minimum wages, maximum hours, and a limited number of very basic working conditions (such as minimally required meal and rest breaks) of California employees. (See *Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, 913–914, and fn. 3 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 416 P.3d 1].) The defendant has the burden to prove independent contractor status. (*Id.*, *supra*, 4 Cal.5th at p. 916.)

Under the wage orders, “to employ” has three alternative definitions. It means: (a) to exercise control over the wages, hours or working conditions, or (b) to suffer or permit to work, or (c) to engage, thereby creating a common law employment relationship. (*Martinez v. Combs* (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 64 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259].) In *Dynamex*, the Supreme Court found no need to address definition (a) on exercising control. It acknowledged that definition (c), the common law test, could be used, but held that the controlling test was definition (b), “to suffer or permit to work.” It then defined this test, known as the ABC test, as involving the three factors of the instruction. (*Dynamex Operations W.*, *supra*, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 916–917.)

The rule on employment status has been that if there are disputed facts, it’s for the jury to decide whether one is an employee or an independent contractor. (*Espejo v. The Copley Press, Inc.* (2017) 13 Cal.App 5th 329, 342.) However, on undisputed facts, the court may decide that the relationship is employment as a matter of law. (*Dynamex Operations W.* *supra*, 4 Cal.5th at p. 963.) The court may address the three factors in any order when making this determination, and if the defendant’s undisputed facts fail to prove

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any one of them, the inquiry ends; the plaintiff is an employee as a matter of law and the question does not reach the jury.

If, however, there is no failure of proof as to any of the three factors without resolution of disputed facts, the determination of whether the plaintiff was defendant's employee should be resolved by the jury using this instruction. If the court concludes based on undisputed facts that the defendant *has* proved one or more of the three factors, that factor (or factors) should be removed from the jury's consideration and the jury should only consider whether the employer has proven those factors that cannot be determined without further factfinding.

Include the bracketed language in element 1 if there is a contract between the parties covering the work at issue.

Sources and Authority

- The ABC test presumptively considers all workers to be employees, and permits workers to be classified as independent contractors only if the hiring business demonstrates that the worker in question satisfies each of three conditions: (a) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hirer in connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact; and (b) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity's business; and (c) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved in the work performed.” (*Dynamex Operations W.*, *supra*, -- Cal.5th at p. --.)
- “[W]e conclude that there is no need in this case to determine whether the exercise control over wages, hours or working conditions definition is intended to apply outside the joint employer context, because we conclude that the suffer or permit to work standard properly applies to the question whether a worker should be considered an employee or, instead, an independent contractor, and that under the suffer or permit to work standard, the trial court class certification order at issue here should be upheld. (*Dynamex Operations W.*, *supra*, -- Cal.5th at p. --.)
- “A business that hires any individual to provide services to it can always be said to knowingly "suffer or permit" such an individual to work for the business. A literal application of the suffer or permit to work standard, therefore, would bring within its reach even those individuals hired by a business--including unquestionably independent plumbers, electricians, architects, sole practitioner attorneys, and the like--who provide only occasional services unrelated to a company's primary line of business and who have traditionally been viewed as working in their own independent business.” (*Dynamex Operations W.*, *supra*, -- Cal.5th at p. --.)
- “A multifactor standard--like the economic reality standard or the *Borello* standard--that calls for consideration of all potentially relevant factual distinctions in different employment arrangements on a case-by-case, totality-of-the-circumstances basis has its advantages. A number of state courts, administrative agencies and academic commentators have observed, however, that such a wide-ranging and flexible test for evaluating whether a worker should be considered an employee or an independent contractor has significant disadvantages, particularly when applied in the wage and hour context.” (*Dynamex Operations W.*, *supra*, -- Cal.5th at p. --.)

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- “Thus, on the one hand, when a retail store hires an outside plumber to repair a leak in a bathroom on its premises or hires an outside electrician to install a new electrical line, the services of the plumber or electrician are not part of the store's usual course of business and the store would not reasonably be seen as having suffered or permitted the plumber or electrician to provide services to it as an employee. On the other hand, when a clothing manufacturing company hires work-at-home seamstresses to make dresses from cloth and patterns supplied by the company that will thereafter be sold by the company, or when a bakery hires cake decorators to work on a regular basis on its custom-designed cakes, the workers are part of the hiring entity's usual business operation and the hiring business can reasonably be viewed as having suffered or permitted the workers to provide services as employees. In the latter settings, the workers' role within the hiring entity's usual business operations is more like that of an employee than that of an independent contractor” (*Dynamex Operations W., supra*, -- Cal.5th at p. --, internal citations omitted.)
- “A company that labels as independent contractors a class of workers who are not engaged in an independently established business in order to enable the company to obtain the economic advantages that flow from avoiding the financial obligations that a wage order imposes on employers unquestionably violates the fundamental purposes of the wage order. The fact that a company has not prohibited or prevented a worker from engaging in such a business is not sufficient to establish that the worker has independently made the decision to go into business for himself or herself.” (*Dynamex Operations W., supra*, -- Cal.5th at p. --.)
- “The trial court's determination of employee or independent contractor status is one of fact if it depends upon the resolution of disputed evidence or inferences and, as such, must be affirmed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. The question is one of law only if the evidence is undisputed. ‘The label placed by the parties on their relationship is not dispositive, and subterfuges are not countenanced.’ ” (*Espejo v. The Copley Press, Inc.* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 329, 342-343 [221 Cal.Rptr.3d 1].)
- “It bears emphasis that in order to establish that a worker is an independent contractor under the ABC standard, the hiring entity is required to establish the existence of each of the three parts of the ABC standard. Furthermore, inasmuch as a hiring entity's failure to satisfy any one of the three parts itself establishes that the worker should be treated as an employee for purposes of the wage order, *a court* is free to consider the separate parts of the ABC standard in whatever order it chooses. Because in many cases it may be easier and clearer for *a court* to determine whether or not part B or part C of the ABC standard has been satisfied than for *the court* to resolve questions regarding the nature or degree of a worker's freedom from the hiring entity's control for purposes of part A of the standard, the significant advantages of the ABC standard--in terms of increased clarity and consistency--will often be best served by first considering one or both of the latter two parts of the standard in resolving the employee or independent contractor question.” (*Dynamex Operations W., supra*, -- Cal.5th at p. --, italics added.)
- “An entity that controls the business enterprise may be an employer even if it did not ‘directly hire, fire or supervise’ the employees. Multiple entities may be employers where they ‘control different aspects of the employment relationship.’ ‘This occurs, for example, when one entity (such as a temporary employment agency) hires and pays a worker, and another entity supervises

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the work.’ ‘Supervision of the work, in the specific sense of exercising control over how services are performed, is properly viewed as one of the “working conditions”’ ” (*Castaneda v. Ensign Group, Inc.* (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1019 [177 Cal.Rptr.3d 581].)

Secondary Sources

Draft—Not Approved by Judicial Council

3066. Bane Act—Essential Factual Elements (Civ. Code, § 52.1)

[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] intentionally interfered with [or attempted to interfere with] [his/her] civil rights by threats, intimidation, or coercion. To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:

1. ~~[That by threats, intimidation or coercion, [name of defendant]-caused made threats of violence against [name of plaintiff] causing [name of plaintiff] to reasonably believe that if [he/she] exercised [his/her] right [insert right, e.g., “to vote”], [name of defendant] would commit violence against [[him/her]/ [or] [his/her] property] and that [name of defendant] had the apparent ability to carry out the threats;]~~

[or]

~~[That [name of defendant] acted violently against [[name of plaintiff]/ [and] [name of plaintiff]’s property] [to prevent [him/her] from exercising [his/her] right [insert right e.g., to vote]/to retaliate against [name of plaintiff] for having exercised [his/her] right [insert right e.g., to vote]];~~

- ~~2. That [name of defendant] intended to deprive [name of plaintiff] of [his/her] enjoyment of the interests protected by the right [e.g., to vote];]~~

- ~~23. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; and~~

- ~~34. That [name of defendant]’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing [name of plaintiff]’s harm.~~

New September 2003; Renumbered from CACI No. 3025 and Revised December 2012; Revised November 2018

Directions for Use

Select the first option for element 1 if the defendant’s conduct involved threats of violence. (See Civ. Code, § 52.1(j).) Select the second option if the conduct involved actual violence.

The Bane Act provides that speech alone is not sufficient to constitute a violation unless it involves a credible threat of violence. (Civ. Code, § 52.1(j).) This limitation would appear to foreclose a claim based on threats, intimidation, or coercion involving a nonviolent consequence. (See *Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Industries* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 101, 111 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 60] [to state a cause of action under Bane Act there must first be violence or intimidation by threat of violence].) For example, it would not be a violation to threaten to report someone to immigration if the person exercises a right granted under labor law. No case has been found, however, that applies the speech limitation to foreclose such a claim, and several courts have suggested that this point is not fully settled. (See *Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 [137 Cal.Rptr.3d 839] [we “need not decide that every plaintiff must allege violence or threats of violence in order to maintain an action under section 52.1”];

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City and County of San Francisco v. Ballard (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 381, 408 [39 Cal.Rptr.3d 1] [also noting issue but finding it unnecessary to address].) To assert such a claim, modify element 2-1, option 1 to allege coercion based on a nonviolent threat with severe consequences.

Civil Code section 52(a) provides for damages up to three times actual damages but a minimum of \$4,000 for violations of Civil Code section 51 (Unruh Act), 51.5, and 51.6. Civil Code section 52(b) provides for punitive damages for violations of Civil Code sections 51.7 (Ralph Act) and 51.9. Neither subsection of Section 52 mentions the Bane Act or Civil Code section 52.1. Nevertheless, the reference to section 52 in subsection (b) of the Bane Act would seem to indicate that damages may be recovered under both subsections (a) and (b) of section 52.

Under the Unruh Act, if only the statutory minimum damages of \$4,000 is sought, it is not necessary to prove harm and causation. (See *Koire v. Metro Car Wash* (1985) 40 Cal.3d 24, 33 [219 Cal.Rptr. 133, 707 P.2d 195] [Section 52 provides for minimum statutory damages for every violation of section 51, regardless of the plaintiff's actual damages]; see also Civ. Code, § 52(h) [“actual damages” means special and general damages].) Presumably, the same rule applies under the Bane Act as the statutory minimum of section 52(a) should be recoverable. Therefore, omit elements 2 and 3 unless actual damages are sought. If actual damages are sought, combine CACI No. 3067, *Unruh Civil Rights Act—Damages*, and CACI No. 3068, *Ralph Act—Damages and Penalty*, to recover damages under both subsections (a) and (b) of section 52.

It has been the rule that in a wrongful detention case, the coercion required to support a Bane Act claim must be coercion independent from that inherent in the wrongful detention itself. (*Bender v. County of Los Angeles* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 968, 981, 981 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 204].) One court, however, did not apply this rule in a wrongful arrest case. The court instead held that the “threat, intimidation or coercion” element requires a specific intent to violate protected rights. (*Cornell v. City & County of San Francisco* (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 790–804 [225 Cal.Rptr.3d 356].) Element 2 expresses this requirement.

Sources and Authority

- Bane Act. Civil Code section 52.1.
- Remedies Under Bane Act. Civil Code section 52.
- “The Bane Act permits an individual to pursue a civil action for damages where another person ‘interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.’ ‘The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., “threat[, intimidation or coercion]”), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law.’ ” (*King v. State of California* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 294 [195 Cal.Rptr.3d 286], internal citation omitted.)
- “[S]ection 52.1, was enacted a decade [after the Ralph Act] as part of Assembly Bill No. 63 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 63) and is known as the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act. It was

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intended to supplement the Ralph Civil Rights Act as an additional legislative effort to deter violence. The stated purpose of the bill was ‘to fill in the gaps left by the Ralph Act’ by allowing an individual to seek relief to prevent the violence from occurring before it was committed and providing for the filing of criminal charges. (*Stamps v. Superior Court* (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1447 [39 Cal.Rptr.3d 706], internal citation omitted.)

- “The Legislature enacted section 52.1 to stem a tide of hate crimes.” (*Jones v. Kmart Corp.* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 338 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 949 P.2d 941], internal citation omitted.)
- “[T]o state a cause of action under section 52.1 there must first be violence or intimidation by threat of violence. Second, the violence or threatened violence must be due to plaintiff’s membership in one of the specified classifications set forth in Civil Code section 51.7 or a group similarly protected by constitution or statute from hate crimes.” (*Gabrielle A. v. County of Orange* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1268, 1290 [217 Cal.Rptr.3d 275].)
- “The plaintiff must show ‘the defendant interfered with or attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s legal right by threatening or committing violent acts.’ ” (*Julian v. Mission Community Hospital* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 360, 395 [218 Cal.Rptr.3d 38].)
- “However, the statutory language does not limit its application to hate crimes. Notably, the statute does not require a plaintiff to allege the defendant acted with discriminatory animus or intent based upon the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class of persons.” (*Shoyoye, supra*, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.)
- “The phrase ‘under color of law’ indicates, without doubt, that the Legislature intended to include law enforcement officers within the scope of Section 52.1 if the requisites of the statute are otherwise met.” (*Cornell, supra*, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 800.)
- “Civil Code section 52.1, the Bane Act civil counterpart of [Penal Code] section 422.6, recognizes a private right of action for damages and injunctive relief for interference with civil rights.” (*In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 715 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].)
- “[T]he Bane Act requires that the challenged conduct be intentional.” (*Simmons v. Superior Court* (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1125 [212 Cal.Rptr.3d 884].)
- “[S]ection 52.1 does require an attempted or completed act of interference with a legal right, accompanied by a form of coercion.” (*Jones, supra*, 17 Cal.4th at p. 334.)
- “The statutory framework of section 52.1 indicates that the Legislature meant the statute to address interference with constitutional rights involving more egregious conduct than mere negligence.” (*Shoyoye, supra*, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 958.)
- Section 52.1 is not a remedy to be used against private citizens for violations of rights that apply only to the state or its agents. (*Jones, supra*, 17 Cal.4th at p. 337 [right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure].)

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- “[W]here coercion is inherent in the constitutional violation alleged, ... the statutory requirement of “threats, intimidation, or coercion” is not met. The statute requires a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself.’ ” (*Simmons, supra*, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 1126.)
- Assembly Bill 2719 (Stats. 2000, ch. 98) abrogated the holding of *Bocato v. City of Hermosa Beach* (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1797 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 282], which held that a plaintiff was required to be a member of a specified protected class in order to bring an action under section 52.1: “It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this act to clarify that an action brought pursuant to Section 52.1 of the Civil Code does not require the individual whose rights are secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of California, to be a member of a protected class identified by its race, color, religion, or sex, among other things.”
- “Subdivision (j) of Civil Code section 52.1 provides that speech alone is insufficient to support such an action, except upon a showing that the speech itself threatens violence against a specific person or group of persons, the person or group of persons against whom the speech is directed ‘reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence will be committed against them or their property and that the person threatening violence has the apparent ability to carry out the threat.’ ... The presence of the express ‘reasonable fear’ element, in addition to the ‘apparent ability’ element, in Civil Code section 52.1, governing civil actions for damages, most likely reflects the Legislature’s determination [that] a defendant’s civil liability should depend on the harm actually suffered by the victim.” (*In re M.S., supra*, 10 Cal.4th at p. 715, internal citation omitted.)
- “[Q]ualified immunity of the kind applied to actions brought under section 1983 does not apply to actions brought under Civil Code section 52.1.” (*Venegas v. County of Los Angeles* (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1246 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 741].)
- “[A] wrongful detention that is ‘accompanied by the requisite threats, intimidation, or coercion’— ‘coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself’ that is ‘deliberate or spiteful’—is a violation of the Bane Act.” (*Bender, supra, v. County of Los Angeles* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 968, 981 [~~159 Cal.Rptr.3d 204~~], internal citations omitted.)
- “Here, there clearly *was* a showing of coercion separate and apart from the coercion inherent in an unlawful arrest. [Defendant officer] wrongfully detained and arrested plaintiff, because he had no probable cause to believe plaintiff had committed any crime. But, in addition, [defendant officer] deliberately and unnecessarily beat and pepper sprayed the unresisting, already handcuffed plaintiff. That conduct was not the coercion that is inherent in a wrongful arrest.” (*Bender, supra*, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 979, original italics.)
- “We acknowledge that some courts have read *Shoyoye* as having announced ‘independen[ce] from [inherent coercion]’ as a requisite element of all Section 52.1 claims alleging search-and-seizure violations, but we think those courts misread the statute as well as the import of *Venegas*. By its plain terms, Section 52.1 proscribes any ‘interfere[nce] with’ or attempted ‘interfere[nce] with’ protected rights carried out ‘by threat, intimidation or coercion.’ Nothing in the text of the statute requires that the offending ‘threat, intimidation or coercion’ be ‘independent’ from the constitutional violation alleged.” (*Cornell, supra*, 17 Cal.App.5th at pp. 799–800.)

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- “[W]here, as here, an unlawful arrest is properly pleaded and proved, the egregiousness required by Section 52.1 is tested by whether the circumstances indicate the arresting officer had a specific intent to violate the arrestee's right to freedom from unreasonable seizure, not by whether the evidence shows something beyond the coercion ‘inherent’ in the wrongful detention.” (Cornell, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at pp. 801–802.)
- “[T]his test ‘essentially sets forth two requirements for a finding of ‘specific intent’ The first is a purely legal determination. Is the . . . right at issue clearly delineated and plainly applicable under the circumstances of the case? If the trial judge concludes that it is, then the jury must make the second, factual, determination. Did the defendant commit the act in question with the particular purpose of depriving the citizen victim of his enjoyment of the interests protected by that . . . right? If both requirements are met, even if the defendant did not in fact recognize the [unlawfulness] of his act, he will be adjudged as a matter of law to have acted [with the requisite specific intent]—i.e., ‘in reckless disregard of constitutional [or statutory] prohibitions or guarantees.’ ” ’ ” (Cornell, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 803.)
- “Civil Code section 52.1 does not address the immunity established by section 844.6 [public entity immunity for injury to prisoners]. Nothing in Civil Code section 52.1 indicates an intent to abrogate this specific immunity provision. The immunity that it creates therefore applies to [plaintiff]’s Bane Act claim.” (*Towery v. State of California* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 226, 234 [221 Cal.Rptr.3d 692].)

Secondary Sources

8 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Constitutional Law, § 895

Cheng, et al., Calif. Fair Housing and Public Accommodations § 9:38 (The Rutter Group) (The Bane Act)

California Civil Practice: Civil Rights Litigation, §§ 3:1–3:15 (Thomson Reuters)

2 Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 40, *Overview of Equal Employment Opportunity Laws*, § 40.12 (Matthew Bender)

11 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 117A, *Civil Rights: Interference With Civil Rights by Threats, Intimidation, Coercion, or Violence*, § 117A.11 (Matthew Bender)

3 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 35, *Civil Rights: Unruh Civil Rights Act*, §§ 35.01, 35.27 (Matthew Bender)

3210. Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability—Essential Factual Elements

[Name of plaintiff] claims that the [consumer good] did not have the quality that a buyer would reasonably expect. This is known as “breach of an implied warranty.” To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:

1. That [name of plaintiff] bought a[n] [consumer good] [from/manufactured by] [name of defendant];
 2. That at the time of purchase [name of defendant] was in the business of [selling [consumer goods] to retail buyers/manufacturing [consumer goods]]; ~~and~~
 3. That the [consumer good] [insert one or more of the following:]

[was not of the same quality as those generally acceptable in the trade;] [or]

[was not fit for the ordinary purposes for which the goods are used;] [or]

[was not adequately contained, packaged, and labeled;] [or]

[did not measure up to the promises or facts stated on the container or label.]
 4. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; and
 5. That [name of defendant]’s breach of the implied warranty was a substantial factor in causing [name of plaintiff]’s harm.
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New September 2003; Revised December 2005, December 2014; November 2018

Directions for Use

If remedies are sought under the California Uniform Commercial Code, the plaintiff may be required to prove reasonable notification within a reasonable time. (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 2607(3).) If the court determines that proof of notice is necessary, add the following element to this instruction:

That [name of plaintiff] took reasonable steps to notify [name of defendant] within a reasonable time that the [consumer good] did not have the quality that a buyer would reasonably expect;

See also CACI No. 1243, *Notification/Reasonable Time*. Instructions on damages and causation may be necessary in actions brought under the California Uniform Commercial Code.

In addition to sales of consumer goods, the Consumer Warranty Act applies to leases. (See Civ. Code, §§ 1791(g)–(i), 1795.4.) This instruction may be modified for use in cases involving the implied warranty of merchantability in a lease of consumer goods.

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Sources and Authority

- Buyer’s Action for Breach of Implied Warranties. Civil Code section 1794(a).
- Damages. Civil Code section 1794(b).
- Implied Warranties. Civil Code section 1791.1(a).
- Duration of Implied Warranties. Civil Code section 1791.1(c).
- Remedies. Civil Code section 1791.1(d).
- Implied Warranty of Merchantability. Civil Code section 1792.
- Damages for Breach; Accepted Goods. California Uniform Commercial Code section 2714.
- “As defined in the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, ‘an implied warranty of merchantability guarantees that ‘consumer goods meet each of the following: [¶] (1) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description. [¶] (2) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. [¶] (3) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled. [¶] (4) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label.’ Unlike an express warranty, ‘the implied warranty of merchantability arises by operation of law’ and ‘provides for a minimum level of quality.’ ‘The California Uniform Commercial Code separates implied warranties into two categories. An implied warranty that the goods “shall be merchantable” and “fit for the ordinary purpose” is contained in California Uniform Commercial Code section 2314. Whereas an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for a particular purpose is contained in section 2315. [¶] Thus, there exists in every contract for the sale of goods by a merchant a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable. The core test of merchantability is fitness for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. (§ 2314.)’ ” (*Isip v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 19, 26–27 [65 Cal.Rptr.3d 695], internal citations omitted.)
- “Here the alleged wrongdoing is a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability imposed by the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Under the circumstances of this case, which involves the sale of a used automobile, the element of wrongdoing is established by pleading and proving (1) the plaintiff bought a used automobile from the defendant, (2) at the time of purchase, the defendant was in the business of selling automobiles to retail buyers, (3) the defendant made express warranties with respect to the used automobile, and (4) the automobile was not fit for ordinary purposes for which the goods are used. Generally, ‘[t]he core test of merchantability is fitness for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used.’ ” (*Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California* (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1246 [228 Cal.Rptr.3d 699] [citing this instruction], internal citations omitted.)
- “[T]he buyer of consumer goods must plead he or she was injured or damaged by the alleged breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.” (*Gutierrez, supra*, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1247.)
- “Unless specific disclaimer methods are followed, an implied warranty of merchantability

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accompanies every retail sale of consumer goods in the state.” (*Music Acceptance Corp. v. Lofing* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 610, 619 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 159].)

- The implied warranty of merchantability “does not ‘impose a general requirement that goods precisely fulfill the expectation of the buyer. Instead, it provides for a minimum level of quality.’ ” (*American Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Superior Court* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1295–1296 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 526], internal citation omitted.)
- “The [Song Beverly] act provides for both express and implied warranties, and while under a manufacturer's express warranty the buyer must allow for a reasonable number of repair attempts within 30 days before seeking rescission, that is not the case for the implied warranty of merchantability's bulwark against fundamental defects.” (*Brand v. Hyundai Motor America* (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1545 [173 Cal.Rptr.3d 454].)
- “The Song-Beverly Act incorporates the provisions of [California Uniform Commercial Code] sections 2314 and 2315. It ‘supplements, rather than supersedes, the provisions of the California Uniform Commercial Code’ by broadening a consumer’s remedies to include costs, attorney’s fees, and civil penalties.” (*American Suzuki Motor Corp., supra*, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1295, fn. 2, internal citation omitted.)
- “The implied warranty of merchantability may be breached by a latent defect undiscoverable at the time of sale. Indeed, ‘[u]ndisclosed latent defects ... are the very evil that the implied warranty of merchantability was designed to remedy.’ In the case of a latent defect, a product is rendered unmerchantable, and the warranty of merchantability is breached, by the existence of the unseen defect, not by its subsequent discovery.” (*Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc.* (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1304–1305 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 285], internal citations omitted.)
- “[Defendant] suggests ‘the implied warranty of merchantability can be breached only if the vehicle manifests a defect that is so basic it renders the vehicle unfit for its ordinary purpose of providing transportation.’ As the trial court correctly recognized, however, a merchantable vehicle under the statute requires more than the mere capability of ‘just getting from point “A” to point “B.” ’ ” (*Brand, supra*, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1546.)
- “[A]llegations showing an alleged defect that created a substantial safety hazard would sufficiently allege the vehicle was not “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used” and, thus, breached the implied warranty of merchantability.” (*Gutierrez, supra*, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1247–1248.)
- “The notice requirement of [former Civil Code] section 1769 ... is not an appropriate one for the court to adopt in actions by injured consumers against manufacturers with whom they have not dealt. ‘As between the immediate parties to the sale [the notice requirement] is a sound commercial rule, designed to protect the seller against unduly delayed claims for damages. As applied to personal injuries, and notice to a remote seller, it becomes a booby-trap for the unwary.’ ” (*Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 61 [27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897], internal citations omitted.)

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Secondary Sources

4 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Sales, §§ 70, 71

1 California UCC Sales & Leases (Cont.Ed.Bar) Warranties, §§ 3.21–3.23, 3.25–3.26

2 California UCC Sales & Leases (Cont.Ed.Bar) Leasing of Goods, §§ 19.31–19.32

California Products Liability Actions, Ch. 2, *Liability for Defective Products*, § 2.31[2][a] (Matthew Bender)

44 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 502, Sales: *Warranties*, § 502.51 (Matthew Bender)

20 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 206, *Sales*, § 206.42 (Matthew Bender)

5 California Civil Practice Business Litigation, §§ 53:5–53:7 (Thomson Reuters)

3211. Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose—Essential Factual Elements

[*Name of plaintiff*] claims that [he/she] was harmed because the [*consumer good*] was not suitable for [his/her] intended use. This is known as a “breach of an implied warranty.” To establish this claim, [*name of plaintiff*] must prove all of the following:

1. That [*name of plaintiff*] bought a[n] [*consumer good*] [from/manufactured by/distributed by] [*name of defendant*];
 2. That, at the time of purchase, [*name of defendant*] knew or had reason to know that [*name of plaintiff*] intended to use the [*consumer good*] for a particular purpose;
 3. That, at the time of purchase, [*name of defendant*] knew or had reason to know that [*name of plaintiff*] was relying on [his/her/its] skill and judgment to select or provide a [*consumer good*] that was suitable for that particular purpose;
 4. That [*name of plaintiff*] justifiably relied on [*name of defendant*]’s skill and judgment; and
 5. That the [*consumer good*] was not suitable for the particular purpose;
 6. That [*name of plaintiff*] was harmed; and
 7. That [*name of defendant*]’s breach of the implied warranty was a substantial factor in causing [*name of plaintiff*]’s harm.
-

New September 2003; Revised November 2018

Directions for Use

If remedies are sought under the California Uniform Commercial Code, the plaintiff may be required to prove reasonable notification within a reasonable time. (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 2607(3).) If the court determines such proof is necessary, add the following element to this instruction:

That [*name of plaintiff*] took reasonable steps to notify [*name of defendant*] within a reasonable time that the [*consumer good*] was not suitable for its intended use;

See also CACI No. 1243, *Notification/Reasonable Time*.

If appropriate to the facts, add: “It is not necessary for [*name of plaintiff*] to prove the cause of a defect of the [*consumer good*].” The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act does not require a consumer to prove the cause of the defect or failure, only that the consumer good “did not conform to the express warranty.” (See *Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc.* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1102, fn. 8 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d

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In addition to sales of consumer goods, the Consumer Warranty Act applies to leases of consumer goods—see Civil Code sections 1791(g)-(i) and 1795.4. This instruction may be modified for use in cases involving the implied warranty of fitness in a lease of consumer goods.

Sources and Authority

- “Implied Warranty of Fitness” Defined. Civil Code section 1791.1(b).
- Remedies for Breach of Warranty of Fitness. Civil Code section 1791.1(d).
- Waiver of Warranty of Fitness. Civil Code section 1792.3.
- Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act: Right of Action. Civil Code section 1794(a).
- Measure of Damages. Civil Code section 1794(b).
- Manufacturer’s Implied Warranty of Fitness. Civil Code section 1792.1.
- Retailer’s or Distributor’s Implied Warranty of Fitness. Civil Code section 1792.2(a).
- Damages for Nonconforming Goods. California Uniform Commercial Code section 2714(1).
- Damages for Breach of Warranty. California Uniform Commercial Code section 2714(2).
- “The Consumer Warranty Act makes ... an implied warranty [of fitness for a particular purpose] applicable to retailers, distributors, and manufacturers. ... An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises only where (1) the purchaser at the time of contracting intends to use the goods for a particular purpose, (2) the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know of this particular purpose, (3) the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish goods suitable for the particular purpose, and (4) the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know that the buyer is relying on such skill and judgment.” (*Keith v. Buchanan* (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 13, 25 [220 Cal.Rptr. 392], internal citations omitted.)
- “ ‘A “particular purpose” differs from the ordinary purpose for which the goods are used in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his business whereas the ordinary purposes for which goods are used are those envisaged in the concept of merchantability and go to uses which are customarily made of the goods in question.’ ” (*American Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Superior Court* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1295, fn. 2 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 526], internal citation omitted.)
- “The reliance elements are important to the consideration of whether an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose exists. ... The major question in determining the existence of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is the reliance by the buyer upon the skill and judgment of the seller to select an article suitable for his needs.” (*Keith, supra*, 173 Cal.App.3d at p. 25, internal

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citations omitted.)

- “The question of reimbursement or replacement is relevant only under [Civil Code] section 1793.2. ... [T]his section applies only when goods cannot be made to conform to the ‘applicable *express* warranties.’ It has no relevance to the implied warranty of merchantability.” (*Music Acceptance Corp. v. Lofing* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 610, 620 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 159].)
- “The Song-Beverly Act incorporates the provisions of [California Uniform Commercial Code] sections 2314 and 2315. It ‘supplements, rather than supersedes, the provisions of the California Uniform Commercial Code’ by broadening a consumer’s remedies to include costs, attorney’s fees, and civil penalties.” (*American Suzuki Motor Corp., supra*, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1295, fn. 2, internal citation omitted.)
- “The notice requirement of [former Civil Code] section 1769 ... is not an appropriate one for the court to adopt in actions by injured consumers against manufacturers with whom they have not dealt. As between the immediate parties to the sale [the notice requirement] is a sound commercial rule, designed to protect the seller against unduly delayed claims for damages. As applied to personal injuries, and notice to a remote seller, it becomes a booby-trap for the unwary.’ ” (*Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 61 [27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897], internal citations omitted.)

Secondary Sources

4 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Sales, §§ 72, 73

1 California UCC Sales & Leases (Cont.Ed.Bar) Warranties, §§ 3.33–3.40

2 California UCC Sales & Leases (Cont.Ed.Bar) Leasing of Goods, §§ 19.31–19.32

California Products Liability Actions, Ch. 2, *Liability for Defective Products*, § 2.31[2][b] (Matthew Bender)

44 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 502, *Sales: Warranties*, § 502.51 (Matthew Bender)

20 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 206, *Sales*, § 206.64 et seq. (Matthew Bender)

5 California Civil Practice: Business Litigation §§ 53:5–53:7 (Thomson Reuters)

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3220. Affirmative Defense—Unauthorized or Unreasonable Use

[Name of defendant] is not responsible for any harm to [name of plaintiff] if [name of defendant] proves that the [specify defect in the any [defect[s] in the [consumer good]]/[failure to match any the [written/implied] warranty] [was/were] caused by unauthorized or unreasonable use of the [consumer good] after it was sold.

New September 2003; Revised February 2005, November 2018

Sources and Authority

- Unauthorized or Unreasonable Use. Civil Code section 1794.3.
- “The Song-Beverly Act provides that a breach of the warranty of merchantability occurs when a good becomes unfit for the ordinary purpose for which it is used. An exception occurs when the defect or nonconformity is caused by the buyer's unauthorized or unreasonable use under Civil Code section 1794.3. ‘It is a “familiar” and “longstanding” legal principle that “ ‘[w]hen a proviso ... carves an exception out of the body of a statute or contract those who set up such exception must prove it.’ ” [Citations.]’ Defendant, as the party claiming the exemption from the Song-Beverly Act, had the burden to prove the exemption. ... Plaintiff alleged the vehicle became unfit and presented uncontradicted evidence that the vehicle had ceased functioning; to avail itself of Civil Code section 1794.3, defendant had to allege and prove that, notwithstanding the unfitness, the Song-Beverly Act did not apply due to plaintiff's improper use or maintenance.” (Jones v. Credit Auto Center, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 10-11 [188 Cal.Rptr.3d 578], internal citations omitted.)

Secondary Sources

4 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Sales, §§ 314, 315

California Products Liability Actions, Ch. 8, *Defenses*, § 8.07[7] (Matthew Bender)

44 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 502, *Sales: Warranties*, § 502.51 (Matthew Bender)

5 California Civil Practice: Business Litigation § 53:59 (Thomson Reuters)

3244. Civil Penalty—Willful Violation (Civ. Code, § 1794(c))

[Name of plaintiff] **claims that** [name of defendant]’s failure to [describe obligation under Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, e.g., repurchase or replace the vehicle after a reasonable number of repair opportunities] **was willful and therefore asks that you impose a civil penalty against** [name of defendant]. **A civil penalty is an award of money in addition to a plaintiff’s damages. The purpose of this civil penalty is to punish a defendant or discourage [him/her/it] from committing violations in the future.**

If [name of plaintiff] **has proved that** [name of defendant]’s failure was willful, **you may impose a civil penalty against [him/her/it]. The penalty may be in any amount you find appropriate, up to a maximum of two times the amount of [name of plaintiff]’s actual damages.**

“Willful” means that [name of defendant] **knew of [his/her/its] legal obligations and intentionally declined to follow them. However, a violation is not willful if you find that [name of defendant] reasonably and in good faith believed that the facts did not require** [describe statutory obligation, e.g., repurchasing or replacing the vehicle].

New September 2003; Revised February 2005, December 2005, December 2011, May 2018, November 2018

Directions for Use

This instruction is intended for use when the plaintiff requests a civil penalty under Civil Code section 1794(c). In the opening paragraph, set forth all claims for which a civil penalty is sought.

An automobile buyer may also obtain a penalty of two times actual damages without a showing of willfulness under some circumstances. (See Civ. Code, § 1794(e).) However, a buyer who recovers a civil penalty for a willful violation may not also recover a second civil penalty for the same violation. (Civ. Code, § 1794(e)(5).) If the buyer seeks a penalty for either a willful or a nonwillful violation in the alternative, the jury must be instructed on both remedies. (See *Suman v. BMW of North America, Inc.* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1, 11 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 133]; see also *Suman v. Superior Court* (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1322 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 507] (*Suman II*) [setting forth instructions to be given on retrial].)

Depending on the nature of the claim at issue, factors that the jury may consider in determining willfulness may be added. (See, e.g., *Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc.* (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 136 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 295] [among factors to be considered by the jury are whether (1) the manufacturer knew the vehicle had not been repaired within a reasonable period or after a reasonable number of attempts, and (2) whether the manufacturer had a written policy on the requirement to repair or replace].)

Sources and Authority

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- Civil Penalty for Willful Violation. Civil Code section 1794(c).
- “[I]f the trier of fact finds the defendant willfully violated its legal obligations to plaintiff, it has discretion under [Civil Code section 1794,] subdivision (c) to award a penalty against the defendant. Subdivision (c) applies to suits concerning any type of ‘consumer goods,’ as that term is defined in section 1791 of the Act.” (*Suman v. Superior Court* (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1315 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 507].)
- “Whether a manufacturer willfully violated its obligation to repair the car or refund the purchase price is a factual question for the jury that will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.” (*Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc.* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 583].)
- “ ‘In civil cases, the word “willful,” as ordinarily used in courts of law, does not necessarily imply anything blamable, or any malice or wrong toward the other party, or perverseness or moral delinquency, but merely that the thing done or omitted to be done was done or omitted intentionally. It amounts to nothing more than this: That the person knows what he is doing, intends to do what he is doing, and is a free agent.’ ” (*Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co.* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 894 [263 Cal.Rptr. 64], internal citations omitted.)
- “In regard to the *willful* requirement of Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (c), a civil penalty may be awarded if the jury determines that the manufacturer ‘knew of its obligations but intentionally declined to fulfill them. There is no requirement of blame, malice or moral delinquency. However, ‘. . . a violation is not willful if the defendant's failure to replace or refund was the result of a good faith and reasonable belief the facts imposing the statutory obligation were not present.’ ” (*Schreidel v. American Honda Motor Co.* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249–1250 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 576], original italics, internal citations omitted; see also *Bishop v. Hyundai Motor Am.* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 750, 759 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 134] [defendant agreed that jury was properly instructed that it “acted ‘willfully’ if you determine that it knew of its obligations under the Song-Beverly Act but intentionally declined to fulfill them.”].)
- “[A] violation . . . is not willful if the defendant’s failure to replace or refund was the result of a good faith and reasonable belief the facts imposing the statutory obligation were not present. This might be the case, for example, if the manufacturer reasonably believed the product *did* conform to the warranty, or a reasonable number of repair attempts had not been made, or the buyer desired further repair rather than replacement or refund. [¶] Our interpretation of section 1794(c) is consistent with the general policy against imposing forfeitures or penalties against parties for their good faith, reasonable actions. Unlike a standard requiring the plaintiff to prove the defendant *actually knew* of its obligation to refund or replace, which would allow manufacturers to escape the penalty by deliberately remaining ignorant of the facts, the interpretation we espouse will not vitiate the intended deterrent effect of the penalty. And unlike a simple equation of willfulness with volition, which would render ‘willful’ virtually all cases of refusal to replace or refund, our interpretation preserves the Act’s distinction between willful and nonwillful violations. Accordingly, ‘[a] decision made without the use of reasonably available information germane to that decision is not a reasonable, good faith decision.’ ” (*Lukather v. General Motors, LLC* (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051 [104 Cal.Rptr.3d 853], original italics, internal citation omitted.)

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- “[Defendant] was entitled to an instruction informing the jury its failure to refund or replace was not willful if it reasonably and in good faith believed the facts did not call for refund or replacement. Such an instruction would have given the jury legal guidance on the principal issue before it in determining whether a civil penalty could be awarded.” (*Kwan v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am.* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 186–187 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 371], fn. omitted.)
- “There is evidence [defendant] was aware that numerous efforts to find and fix the oil leak had been unsuccessful, which is evidence a jury may consider on the question of willfulness. Additionally, the jury could conclude that [defendant]’s policy, which requires a part be replaced or adjusted before [defendant] deems it a repair attempt but excludes from repair attempts any visit during which a mechanic searches for but is unable to locate the source of the problem, is unreasonable and not a good faith effort to honor its statutory obligations to repurchase defective cars. Finally, there was evidence that [defendant] adopted internal policies that erected hidden obstacles to the ability of an unwary consumer to obtain redress under the Act. This latter evidence would permit a jury to infer that [defendant] impedes and resists efforts by a consumer to force [defendant] to repurchase a defective car, regardless of the presence of an unrepairable defect, and that [defendant]’s decision to reject [plaintiff]’s demand was made pursuant to [defendant]’s policies rather than to its good faith and reasonable belief the car did not have an unrepairable defect covered by the warranty or that a reasonable number of attempts to effect a repair had not yet occurred.” (*Oregel, supra*, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1104–1105, internal citations omitted.)
- “[T]he penalty under section 1794(c), like other civil penalties, is imposed as punishment or deterrence of the defendant, rather than to compensate the plaintiff. In this, it is akin to punitive damages. Neither punishment nor deterrence is ordinarily called for if the defendant’s actions proceeded from an honest mistake or a sincere and reasonable difference of factual evaluation. As our Supreme Court recently observed, ‘. . . courts refuse to impose civil penalties against a party who acted with a good faith and reasonable belief in the legality of his or her actions.’ ” (*Kwan, supra*, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 184–185, internal citation omitted.)
- “Thus, when the trial court concluded that subdivision (c)’s requirement of willfulness applies also to subdivision (e), and when it, in effect, instructed the jury that subdivision (c)-type willfulness is the sole basis for awarding civil penalties, the court ignored a special distinction made by the Legislature with respect to the seller of new automobiles. In so doing, the court erred. The error was prejudicial because it prevented the jurors from considering the specific penalty provisions in subdivision (e) and awarding such penalties, in their discretion, if they determined the evidence warranted such an award.” (*Suman, supra*, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 11.)

Secondary Sources

4 Witkin, Summary of California Law (11th ed. 2017) Sales, §§ 321–324

1 California UCC Sales & Leases (Cont.Ed.Bar) Warranties, § 3.90

California Products Liability Actions, Ch. 2, *Liability for Defective Products*, § 2.30 (Matthew Bender)

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44 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 502, *Sales: Warranties*, § 502.53[1][b] (Matthew Bender)

20 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 206, *Sales*, § 206.129 (Matthew Bender)

5 California Civil Practice: Business Litigation § 53:32 (Thomson Reuters)

3704. Existence of “Employee” Status Disputed

[Name of plaintiff] must prove that *[name of agent]* was *[name of defendant]*'s employee.

In deciding whether *[name of agent]* was *[name of defendant]*'s employee, the most important factor is whether *[name of defendant]* had the right to control how *[name of agent]* performed the work, rather than just the right to specify the result. One indication of the right to control is that the hirer can discharge the worker *[without cause]*. It does not matter whether *[name of defendant]* exercised the right to control.

In deciding whether *[name of defendant]* was *[name of agent]*'s employer, in addition to the right of control, you must consider the full nature of their relationship. You should take into account the following additional factors, which, if true, may show that *[name of defendant]* was the employer of *[name of agent]*. No one factor is necessarily decisive. Do not simply count the number of applicable factors and use the larger number to make your decision. It is for you to determine the weight and importance to give to each of these additional factors based on all of the evidence.

- (a) *[Name of defendant]* supplied the equipment, tools, and place of work;
 - (b) *[Name of agent]* was paid by the hour rather than by the job;
 - (c) *[Name of defendant]* was in business;
 - (d) The work being done by *[name of agent]* was part of the regular business of *[name of defendant]*;
 - (e) *[Name of agent]* was not engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
 - (f) The kind of work performed by *[name of agent]* is usually done under the direction of a supervisor rather than by a specialist working without supervision;
 - (g) The kind of work performed by *[name of agent]* does not require specialized or professional skill;
 - (h) The services performed by *[name of agent]* were to be performed over a long period of time; *[and]*
 - (i) *[Name of defendant]* and *[name of agent]* believed that they had an employer-employee relationship~~./~~; *[and]*
 - (j) *[Specify other factor]*.
-

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Directions for Use

This instruction is based on *S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 354–355 [256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399] and the Restatement Second of Agency, section 220. It is sometimes referred to as the *Borello* test or the common-law test. (See *Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, 934 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 416 P.3d 1].) It is primarily intended to address the employer-employee relationship for purposes of assessing vicarious responsibility on the employer for the employee's acts. Most of the factors are less appropriate for analyzing other types of agency relationships, such as franchisor/franchisee. For an instruction more appropriate to these kinds of relationships, see CACI No. 3705, *Existence of "Agency" Relationship Disputed*.

Secondary factors (a)–(i) come from the Restatement ~~Second of Agency~~, section 220. (See also *Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc.* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 522, 532 [173 Cal.Rptr.3d 332, 327 P.3d 165]; Rest.3d Agency, § 7.07, com. f.) They have been phrased so that a yes answer points toward an employment relationship. Omit any that are not relevant. Additional factors have been endorsed by the California Supreme Court and may be included if applicable. (See *S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc., supra*, ~~*v. Department of Industrial Relations* (1989) 48 Cal.3d at pp.341, 354–355 [256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399]~~.) Therefore, an “other” option (j) has been included.

Borello was a workers' compensation case. In *Dynamex, supra*, the court, in holding that *Borello* did not control the specific wage order dispute at issue, noted that “it appears more precise to describe *Borello* as calling for resolution of the employee or independent contractor question by focusing on the intended scope and purposes of the particular statutory provision or provisions at issue.” (*Id.* at p. 934.) The court also said that “The *Borello* decision repeatedly emphasizes statutory purpose as the touchstone for deciding whether a particular category of workers should be considered employees rather than independent contractors for purposes of social welfare legislation.” (*Id.* at p. 935.) With respondeat superior, there is no statutory provision or social welfare legislation to be considered.

Sources and Authority

- Principal-Agent Relationship. Civil Code section 2295.
- Rebuttable Presumption that Contractor Is Employee Rather Than Independent Contractor; Proof of Independent Contractor Status. Labor Code section 2750.5.
- “[S]ubject to certain policy considerations, a hirer ... cannot be held vicariously liable for the negligence of his independent contractors.” (*Blackwell v. Vasilas* (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 160, 168 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 753].)
- “Whether a common law employer-employee relationship exists turns foremost on the degree of a hirer's right to control how the end result is achieved.” (*Ayala, supra*, 59 Cal.4th at p. 528.)
- “However, the courts have long recognized that the ‘control’ test, applied rigidly and in isolation, is often of little use in evaluating the infinite variety of service arrangements. While conceding that the right to control work details is the ‘most important’ or ‘most significant’ consideration, the authorities also endorse several ‘secondary’ indicia of the nature of a service relationship.” (*S. G. Borello &*

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Sons, Inc., *supra*, 48 Cal.3d at p. 350, internal citations omitted.)

- “While the extent of the hirer's right to control the work is the foremost consideration in assessing whether a common law employer-employee relationship exists, our precedents also recognize a range of secondary indicia drawn from the Second and Third Restatements of Agency that may in a given case evince an employment relationship. Courts may consider ‘(a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision; (c) the skill required in the particular occupation; (d) whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (e) the length of time for which the services are to be performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (g) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; and (h) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee.’ ” (*Ayala, supra*, 59 Cal.4th at p. 532.)
- “ ‘Generally, . . . the individual factors cannot be applied mechanically as separate tests; they are intertwined and their weight depends often on particular combinations.’ ” (*S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc.*, *supra*, 48 Cal.3d at p. 351, internal citations omitted.)
- “[T]he Restatement guidelines heretofore approved in our state remain a useful reference.” (*S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc.*, *supra*, 48 Cal.3d at p. 354.)
- “We also note the six-factor test developed by other jurisdictions which determine independent contractorship in light of the remedial purposes of the legislation. Besides the ‘right to control the work,’ the factors include (1) the alleged employee's opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial skill; (2) the alleged employee's investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of helpers; (3) whether the service rendered requires a special skill; (4) the degree of permanence of the working relationship; and (5) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business. [¶] As can be seen, there are many points of individual similarity between these guidelines and our own traditional Restatement tests. We find that all are logically pertinent to the inherently difficult determination whether a provider of service is an employee or an excluded independent contractor for purposes of workers' compensation law.” (*S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc.*, *supra*, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 354–355, internal cross-reference omitted.)
- “[A]t common law the problem of determining whether a worker should be classified as an employee or an independent contractor initially arose in the tort context--in deciding whether the hirer of the worker should be held vicariously liable for an injury that resulted from the worker's actions. In the vicarious liability context, the hirer's right to supervise and control the details of the worker's actions was reasonably viewed as crucial, because ‘ “[t]he extent to which the employer had a right to control [the details of the service] activities was . . . highly relevant to the question whether the employer ought to be legally liable for them” ’ For this reason, the question whether the hirer controlled the details of the worker's activities became the primary common law standard for determining whether a worker was considered to be an employee or an independent contractor.” (*Dynamex Operations W.*, *supra*, 4 Cal.5th at p. 927, internal citations omitted.)
- “[A]lthough we have sometimes characterized *Borello* as embodying the common law test or standard

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for distinguishing employees and independent contractors, it appears more precise to describe *Borello* as calling for resolution of the employee or independent contractor question by focusing on the intended scope and purposes of the particular statutory provision or provisions at issue. In other words, *Borello* calls for application of a statutory purpose standard that considers the control of details and other potentially relevant factors identified in prior California and out-of-state cases in order to determine which classification (employee or independent contractor) best effectuates the underlying legislative intent and objective of the statutory scheme at issue.” (*Dynamex Operations W.*, *supra*, -- Cal.5th at p. --, internal citation omitted.)

- “Whether a person is an independent contractor or an employee is a question of fact if dependent upon the resolution of disputed evidence or inferences.” (*Bowman v. Wyatt* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 286, 297, fn. 4 [111 Cal.Rptr.3d 787].)
- The burden of proving the existence of an agency rests on the one affirming its existence. (*Burbank v. National Casualty Co.* (1941) 43 Cal.App.2d 773, 781 [111 P.2d 740].)
- “The label placed by the parties on their relationship is not dispositive, and subterfuges are not countenanced.” (*S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc.*, *supra*, 48 Cal.3d at p. 342.)
- “It is not essential that the right of control be exercised or that there be actual supervision of the work of the agent. The existence of the right of control and supervision establishes the existence of an agency relationship.” (*Malloy v. Fong* (1951) 37 Cal.2d 356, 370 [232 P.2d 241], internal citations omitted.)
- “Perhaps the strongest evidence of the right to control is whether the hirer can discharge the worker without cause, because ‘[t]he power of the principal to terminate the services of the agent gives him the means of controlling the agent’s activities.’ ” (*Ayala*, *supra*, 59 Cal.4th at p. 531.)
- “The worker’s corresponding right to leave is similarly relevant: ‘ “An employee may quit, but an independent contractor is legally obligated to complete his contract.” ’ ” (*Ayala*, *supra*, 59 Cal.4th at p. 531 fn. 2.)
- “A finding of employment is supported where the workers are ‘a regular and integrated portion of [the] business operation.’ ” (*Garcia v. Seacon Logix Inc.* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1476, 1487 [190 Cal.Rptr.3d 400].)
- “Where workers are paid weekly or by the hour, rather than by the job, it suggests an employment relationship.” (*Garcia*, *supra*, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488.)
- “In cases where there is a written contract, to answer that question [the right of control] without full examination of the contract will be virtually impossible. ... [¶] ... [T]he rights spelled out in a contract may not be conclusive if other evidence demonstrates a practical allocation of rights at odds with the written terms.” (*Ayala*, *supra*, 59 Cal.4th at p. 535.)
- “[T]he right to exercise complete or authoritative control must be shown, rather than mere suggestion as to detail. A worker is an independent contractor when he or she follows the employer’s desires only

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in the result of the work, and not the means by which it is achieved.” (*Jackson v. AEG Live, LLC* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1179 [183 Cal.Rptr.3d 394].)

- “[T]he owner may retain a broad general power of supervision and control as to the results of the work so as to insure satisfactory performance of the independent contract—including the right to inspect [citation], ... the right to make suggestions or recommendations as to details of the work [citation], the right to prescribe alterations or deviations in the work [citation]—without changing the relationship from that of owner and independent contractor” (*Beaumont-Jacques v. Farmers Group, Inc.* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1143 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 102], quoting *McDonald v. Shell Oil Co.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 785, 790 [285 P.2d 902].)
- “Agency and independent contractorship are not *necessarily* mutually exclusive legal categories as independent contractor and servant or employee are. In other words, an agent may also be an independent contractor. One who contracts to act on behalf of another and subject to the other's control, except with respect to his physical conduct, is both an agent and an independent contractor.” (*Jackson, supra*, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184, original italics, internal citations omitted.)
- “[W]hen a statute refers to an ‘employee’ without defining the term, courts have generally applied the common law test of employment to that statute.” (*Arnold v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.* (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 580, 586 [135 Cal.Rptr.3d 213].)
- “[A] termination at-will clause for both parties may properly be included in an independent contractor agreement, and is not by itself a basis for changing that relationship to one of an employee.” (*Arnold, supra*, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 589.)
- Restatement Second of Agency, section 220, provides:
 - (1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control.
 - (2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
 - (a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work;
 - (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
 - (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
 - (d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
 - (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
 - (f) the length of time for which the person is employed;

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- (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
- (h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
- (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and
- (j) whether the principal is or is not in business.

Secondary Sources

3 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Agency and Employment, §§ 2–42

1 Levy et al., California Torts, Ch. 8, *Vicarious Liability*, § 8.03[2] (Matthew Bender)

2 Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 30, *Employers' Tort Liability to Third Parties for Conduct of Employees*, § 30.04 (Matthew Bender)

21 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 248, *Employer's Liability for Employee's Torts*, §§ 248.15, 248.22, 248.51 (Matthew Bender)

37 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 427, *Principal and Agent*, § 427.13 (Matthew Bender)

10 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 100A, *Employer and Employee: Respondeat Superior*, § 100A.41 et seq. (Matthew Bender)

1 California Civil Practice: Torts §§ 3:5–3:6 (Thomson Reuters)

3903J. Damage to Personal Property (Economic Damage)

[Insert number, e.g., “10.”] **The harm to [name of plaintiff]’s [item of personal property, e.g., automobile].**

To recover damages for harm to personal property, [name of plaintiff] must prove the reduction in the [e.g., automobile]’s value or the reasonable cost of repairing it, whichever is less. [If there is evidence of both, [name of plaintiff] is entitled to the lesser of the two amounts.]

[However, if you find that the [e.g., automobile] can be repaired, but after repairs it will be worth less than it was before the harm, the damages are (1) the difference between its value before the harm and its lesser value after the repairs have been made; plus (2) the reasonable cost of making the repairs. The total amount awarded may not exceed the [e.g., automobile]’s value before the harm occurred.]

To determine the reduction in value if repairs cannot be made, you must determine the fair market value of the [e.g., automobile] before the harm occurred and then subtract the fair market value immediately after the harm occurred.

“Fair market value” is the highest price that a willing buyer would have paid to a willing seller, assuming:

- 1. That there is no pressure on either one to buy or sell; and**
 - 2. That the buyer and seller are fully informed of the condition and quality of the [e.g., automobile].**
-

New September 2003; Revised December 2011, June 2013, December 2015, [November 2018](#)

Directions for Use

Do not give this instruction if the property had no monetary value either before or after injury. (See *Kimes v. Grosser* (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1556, 1560 [126 Cal.Rptr.3d 581] [CACI No. 3903J has no application to prevent proof of out-of-pocket expenses to save the life of a pet cat].) See CACI No. 3903O, *Injury to Pet (Economic Damage)*.

[An insurer may draft around this rule in the policy by limiting recovery to either cost of repair or diminution in value, but not both. \(*Baldwin v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange* \(2016\) 1 Cal.App.5th 545, 550 \[204 Cal.Rptr.3d 433\].\)](#)

Give the optional second paragraph if the property can be repaired, but the value after repair may be less than before the harm occurred. (See *Merchant Shippers Association v. Kellogg Express and Draying Co.* (1946) 28 Cal.2d 594, 600 [170 P.2d 923].)

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Sources and Authority

- “The general rule is that the measure of damages for tortious injury to personal property is the difference between the market value of the property immediately before and immediately after the injury, or the reasonable cost of repair if that cost be less than the diminution in value. This rule stems from the basic code section fixing the measure of tort damage as ‘the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby.’ [citations]” (*Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Munteer* (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 809, 812 [136 Cal.Rptr. 280].)
- “It has also been held that the price at which a thing can be sold at public sale, or in the open market, is some evidence of its market value. In *San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego*, the rule is announced that the judicial test of market value depends upon the fact that the property in question is marketable at a given price, which in turn depends upon the fact that sales of similar property have been, and are being, made at ascertainable prices. In *Quint v. Dimond*, it was held competent to prove market value in the nearest market.” (*Tatone v. Chin Bing* (1936) 12 Cal.App.2d 543, 545–546 [55 P.2d 933], internal citations omitted.)
- “ ‘Where personal property is injured but not wholly destroyed, one rule is that the plaintiff may recover the depreciation in value (the measure being the difference between the value immediately before and after the injury), and compensation for the loss of use.’ In the alternative, the plaintiff may recover the reasonable cost of repairs as well as compensation for the loss of use while the repairs are being accomplished. If the cost of repairs exceeds the depreciation in value, the plaintiff may only recover the lesser sum. Similarly, if depreciation is greater than the cost of repairs, the plaintiff may only recover the reasonable cost of repairs. If the property is wholly destroyed, the usual measure of damages is the market value of the property.” (*Hand Electronics, Inc. v. Snowline Joint Unified School Dist.* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 862, 870 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 446], internal citations omitted.)
- The cost of replacement is not a proper measure of damages for injury to personal property. (*Hand Electronics Inc., supra*, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 871.)
- “When conduct complained of consists of intermeddling with personal property ‘the owner has a cause of action for trespass or case, and may recover only the actual damages suffered by reason of the impairment of the property or the loss of its use.’ ” (*Itano v. Colonial Yacht Anchorage* (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 84, 90 [72 Cal.Rptr. 823], internal citations omitted.)
- “The measure of damage for wrongful injury to personal property is that difference between the market value of the property immediately before and immediately after the injury, or the reasonable cost of repair if such cost be less than the depreciation in value.” (*Smith v. Hill* (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 374, 388 [47 Cal.Rptr. 49], internal citations omitted.)
- “[I]t is said ... that ‘if the damaged property cannot be completely repaired, the measure of damages is the difference between its value before the injury and its value after the repairs have been made, plus the reasonable cost of making the repairs. The foregoing rule gives the plaintiff the difference between the value of the machine before the injury and its value after such injury, the amount thereof being made up of the cost of repairs and the depreciation notwithstanding such repairs.’ The rule urged by defendant, which limits the recovery to the cost of repairs, is applicable only in those cases

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in which the injured property ‘can be entirely repaired.’ This latter rule presupposes that the damaged property can be restored to its former state with no depreciation in its former value.” (*Merchant Shippers Association, supra*, 28 Cal.2d at p. 600, internal citations omitted.)

- “In personal property cases, plaintiffs are entitled to present evidence of the cost of repairs even in cases where recovery is limited to the lost market value of property. The cost of repairs constitutes a prima facie measure of damages, and it is the defendant's burden to respond with proof of a lesser diminution in value.” (*Kimes, supra*, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1560, internal citation omitted.)
- “In this case, the policy language was clear and explicit. Regarding coverage for car damage, it provided that [insurer] ‘may pay the loss in money or repair ... damaged ... property.’ The policy's use of the term ‘may’ suggests [insurer] had the discretion to choose between the two options.” (*Baldwin, supra*, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 550, original italics.)

Secondary Sources

6 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, §§ 1718, 1719

Haning et al., California Practice Guide: Personal Injury, Ch. 3-C, *Specific Items Of Compensatory Damages*, ¶ 3:220 et seq. (The Rutter Group)

California Tort Damages (Cont.Ed.Bar) Vehicles and Other Personal Property, §§ 13.8–13.11

4 Levy et al., California Torts, Ch. 52, *Medical Expenses and Economic Loss*, § 52.31 (Matthew Bender)

15 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 177, *Damages*, §§ 177.41, 177.44 (Matthew Bender)

6 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 64, *Damages: Tort*, § 64.26 et seq. (Matthew Bender)

1 California Civil Practice: Torts § 5:16 (Thomson Reuters)

24333903P. Damages from Employer for Wrongful Discharge (Economic Damage) in Violation of Public Policy—Damages

[Insert number, e.g., “3.”] Past and future lost earnings.

If you find that [name of defendant] **[constructively] [discharged/~~constructively discharged~~]** [name of plaintiff] in violation of **[specify, e.g., public policy and the Fair Employment and Housing Act]**, then you must decide the amount of **past and future lost earnings damages** that [name of plaintiff] has proven [he/she] is entitled to recover, if any. To make that decision, you must:

1. Decide the amount that [name of plaintiff] would have earned up to today, including any benefits and pay increases; ~~{and}~~
2. Add the present cash value of any future wages and benefits that [he/she] would have earned for the length of time the employment with [name of defendant] was reasonably certain to continue; ~~{and}~~
- ~~3. **[Add damages for [describe any other damages that were allegedly caused by defendant’s conduct, e.g., “emotional distress”] if you find that [name of defendant]’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing that harm.]**~~

In determining the period that [name of plaintiff]’s employment was reasonably certain to have continued, you should consider such things as:

- (a) [Name of plaintiff]’s age, work performance, and intent regarding continuing employment with [name of defendant];
 - (b) [Name of defendant]’s prospects for continuing the operations involving [name of plaintiff]; and
 - (c) Any other factor that bears on how long [name of plaintiff] would have continued to work.
-

New September 2003; Renumbered from CACI No. 2433 and Revised November 2018

Directions for Use

Give this instruction for any claim in which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for past and future lost earnings from an employer for a wrongful termination of employment, for example in violation of public policy (see CACI No. 2400 et seq.) or under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (see CACI No. 2500 et seq.) Include “constructively” in the opening paragraph if the plaintiff alleges constructive discharge instead of an actual discharge. (See CACI No. 2510, “Constructive Discharge” Explained.)

This instruction should be followed by CACI No. 3965, Affirmative Defense—Employee’s Duty to

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Mitigate, if 2407, Employee's Duty to Mitigate Damages, in cases where the employee's duty to mitigate damages is at issue. Also give CACI Nos. 3904A, Present Cash Value, and 3904B, Use of Present Value Tables.

Other types of tort damages may be available to a plaintiff. For an instruction on emotional distress damages, see CACI No. 3905A, *Physical Pain, Mental Suffering, and Emotional Distress (Noneconomic Damage)*. See punitive damages instructions in the ~~D~~damages ~~Series~~section (CACI No. 3940 et seq.).

Sources and Authority

- Standard for Punitive Damages. Civil Code section 3294(a).
- Employer Liability for Punitive Damages. Civil Code section 3294(b).
- A tortious termination subjects the employer to “ ‘liability for compensatory and punitive damages under normal tort principles.’ ” (*Gantt v. Sentry Insurance* (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1101 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680], internal citation omitted.)
- “The general rule is that the measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is the amount of salary agreed upon for the period of service, less the amount which the employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned or with reasonable effort might have earned from other employment.” (*Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 176, 181 [89 Cal.Rptr. 737, 474 P.2d 689], internal citations omitted; see *Smith v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp.* (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 503, 518 [241 Cal.Rptr. 916].)
- “A plaintiff may recover for detriment reasonably certain to result in the future. While there is no clearly established definition of ‘reasonable certainty,’ evidence of future detriment has been held sufficient based on expert medical opinion which considered the plaintiff’s particular circumstances and the expert’s experience with similar cases.” (*Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc.* (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976, 995 [16 Cal.Rptr.2d 787], internal citations omitted, disapproved of on another ground in *Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 664 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 109, 863 P.2d 179].)
- “[I]t is our view that in an action for wrongful discharge, and pursuant to the present day concept of employer-employee relations, the term ‘wages’ should be deemed to include not only the periodic monetary earnings of the employee but also the other benefits to which he is entitled as a part of his compensation.” (*Wise v. Southern Pac. Co.* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 600, 607 [83 Cal.Rptr. 202, 463 P.2d 426].)
- In determining the period that plaintiff’s employment was reasonably certain to have continued, the trial court took into consideration plaintiff’s “ ‘physical condition, his age, his propensity for hard work, his expertise in managing defendants’ offices, the profit history of his operation, [and] the foreseeability of the continued future demand for tax return service to small taxpayers’ ” (*Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc.* (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 695, 705 [101 Cal.Rptr. 169].)
- In adding subdivision (b) to section 3294 in 1980, “[t]he drafters’ goals were to avoid imposing

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punitive damages on employers who were merely negligent or reckless and to distinguish ordinary respondeat superior liability from corporate liability for punitive damages.” (*White v. Ultramar, Inc.* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 572 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 981 P.2d 944], see *Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie* (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1150-1151 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 510].)

Secondary Sources

Chin et al., California Practice Guide: Employment Litigation ¶¶ 17:237, 17:362, 17:365 (The Rutter Group)

1 Wrongful Employment Termination Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.) Public Policy Violations, §§ 5.64–5.67

4 Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 60, *Liability for Wrongful Termination and Discipline*, § 60.08[2] (Matthew Bender)

21 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 249, *Employment Law: Termination and Discipline*, §§ 249.18, 249.50–249.55, 249.80–249.81, 249.90 (Matthew Bender)

10 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 100, *Employer and Employee: Wrongful Termination and Discipline*, §§ 100.41–100.59 (Matthew Bender)

24073963. Affirmative Defense—Employee’s Duty to Mitigate Damages

[Name of defendant] claims that if [name of plaintiff] is entitled to any damages, they should be reduced by the amount that [~~he/she~~name of plaintiff] could have earned from other employment. To succeed, [name of defendant] must prove all of the following:

1. That employment substantially similar to [name of plaintiff]’s former job was available to [him/her];
2. That [name of plaintiff] failed to make reasonable efforts to seek [and retain] this employment; and
3. The amount that [name of plaintiff] could have earned from this employment.

In deciding whether the employment was substantially similar, you should consider, among other factors, whether:

- (a) The nature of the work was different from [name of plaintiff]’s employment with [name of defendant];
- (b) The new position was substantially inferior to [name of plaintiff]’s former position;
- (c) The salary, benefits, and hours of the job were similar to [name of plaintiff]’s former job;
- (d) The new position required similar skills, background, and experience;
- (e) The job responsibilities were similar; [and]
- (f) The job was in the same locality; [and]
- (g) [insert other relevant factor(s)].

[In deciding whether [name of plaintiff] failed to make reasonable efforts to retain comparable employment, you should consider whether [name of plaintiff] quit or was discharged from that employment for a reason within [his/her] control.]

New September 2003; Revised February 2007, December 2014; Renumbered From CACI No. 2407 November 2018

Directions for Use

This instruction may be given for any claim in which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for

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past and future lost earnings from an employer for a wrongful termination of employment, for example in violation of public policy (see CACI No. 2400 et seq.) or under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (see CACI No. 2500 et seq.), when there is evidence that the employee's damages could have been mitigated. The bracketed language at the end of the instruction regarding plaintiff's failure to retain a new job is based on the holding in *Stanchfield v. Hamer Toyota, Inc.* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1502-1503 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 565].

In deciding whether the plaintiff could have obtained a substantially similar job, the trier of fact may consider several factors, including salary, benefits, hours of work per day, hours of work per year, locality, and availability of a merit-based system. (See *California School Employees Assn. v. Personnel Commission* (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 241, 250-255 [106 Cal.Rptr. 283].) Read only those factors that have been shown by the evidence.

~~This instruction should be given in all employment cases, not just in breach of contract cases. See Chin et al., California Practice Guide: Employment Litigation, ¶ 17:492 (Rutter Group).~~

~~This instruction should not be used for wrongful demotion cases.~~

Sources and Authority

- “The general rule is that the measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is the amount of salary agreed upon for the period of service, less the amount which the employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned or with reasonable effort might have earned from other employment. However, before projected earnings from other employment opportunities not sought or accepted by the discharged employee can be applied in mitigation, the employer must show that the other employment was comparable, or substantially similar, to that of which the employee has been deprived; the employee's rejection of or failure to seek other available employment of a different or inferior kind may not be resorted to in order to mitigate damages.” (*Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 176, 181-182 [89 Cal.Rptr. 737, 474 P.2d 689], internal citations omitted; see also *Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Industries, Inc.* (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 91, 98 [127 Cal.Rptr. 222] [“Plaintiff concedes that the trial court was entitled to deduct her actual earnings”]; but see *Villacorta v. Cemex Cement, Inc.* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1432 [165 Cal.Rptr.3d 441] [wages actually earned from an inferior job may not be used to mitigate damages].)
- “[B]efore projected earnings from other employment opportunities not sought or accepted by the discharged employee can be applied in mitigation, the employer must show that the other employment was comparable, or substantially similar, to that of which the employee has been deprived” (*Kao v. University of San Francisco* (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 437, 454 [177 Cal.Rptr.3d 145].)
- “[W]e conclude that the trial court should not have deducted from plaintiff's recovery against defendant the amount that the court found she might have earned in employment which was substantially inferior to her position with defendant.” (*Rabago-Alvarez, supra*,

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55 Cal.App.3d at p. 99.)

- “[I]n those instances where the jury determines the employee was fired from a substantially similar position for cause, any amount the employee with reasonable effort could have earned by retaining that employment should be deducted from the amount of damages which otherwise would have been awarded to the employee under the terms of the original employment agreement.” (*Stanchfield, supra*, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1502-1503.)
- “The location of the new job is one of the factors to consider in determining whether the new job is inferior.” (*Villacorta, supra*, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1432.)
- “There is some authority for the proposition that whether or not the other employment is comparable or substantially similar or equivalent to the prior position is a question of fact. On the other hand the issue of substantial similarity or inferiority of employment is one that has often been decided as a matter of law in California.” (*California School Employees Assn., supra*, 30 Cal.App.3d at pp. 253–254, internal citations omitted.)
- “The court could reasonably admit the evidence of other available jobs and leave the question of their substantial similarity to the jury.” (*Kao, supra*, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 454.)
- “[S]elf-employment is not unreasonable mitigation as long as the discharged employee applies sufficient effort trying to make the business successful, even if those efforts fail.” (*Cordero-Sacks v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles* (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1284–1285 [134 Cal.Rptr.3d 883].)

Secondary Sources

Chin et al., California Practice Guide: Employment Litigation, Ch. 17-F, *Mitigation Of Damages (Avoidable Consequences Doctrine)*, ¶¶ 17:490, 17:495, 17:497, 17:499–17:501 (The Rutter Group)

1 Wrongful Employment Termination Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.) Contract Actions, §§ 8.40–8.41

4 Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 60, *Liability for Wrongful Termination and Discipline*, § 60.08[4] (Matthew Bender)

21 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 249, *Employment Law: Termination and Discipline*, §§ 249.18, 249.65 (Matthew Bender)

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39633965. No Deduction for Workers' Compensation Benefits Paid

Do not consider whether or not [name of plaintiff] received workers' compensation benefits for [his/her] injuries. If you decide in favor of [name of plaintiff], you should determine the amount of your verdict according to my instructions concerning damages.

New September 2003; Revised December 2009; Renumbered to CACI No. 3965 November 2018

Directions for Use

This instruction is intended for use in conjunction with a special verdict form, ~~in which case if~~ the judge ~~can may need to~~ make ~~any necessary~~ deductions from the verdict to avoid aif double recovery ~~is an issue~~. It may also be read ~~in cases in which if~~ there are no allegations regarding the employer's comparative fault.

Sources and Authority

- ~~“Since the employer was not negligent, the death benefits paid did If the employer has not been negligent, the workers' compensation benefits do~~ “not constitute an impermissible double recovery but rather a payment from a source wholly independent of the wrongdoer.” (*Curtis v. State of California ex rel. Department of Transportation* (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 668, 682 [180 Cal.Rptr. 843].)
- “Here the collateral source was workers' compensation benefits paid by the [defendant]'s policy. Under the general principles just described, this would not be an independent source; defendant is the policyholder, so the collateral source rule would not apply. Yet the California Supreme Court held that the rule did apply in a case in which an employee received benefits from the employer's workers' compensation policy and then sued a third party tortfeasor, the compensation insurer having waived its right of subrogation against the third party.” (*Lee v. West Kern Water Dist.* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 606, 637 [210 Cal.Rptr.3d 362] [action by employee against employer on claim alleged to not be within scope of employment].)
- “ “The average reasonably well-informed person who may be called to serve upon a jury knows that a workman injured in his employment receives compensation. It is a delusion to think that this aspect of the case can be kept from the minds of the jurors simply by not alluding to it in the course of the trial.’ ” (*Berryman v. Bayshore Construction Co.* (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 331, 336 [24 Cal.Rptr. 380], internal citations omitted.)
- “To prevent a double recovery, the court may instruct the jury to segregate types of damage as between the employee and employer, awarding to the employee only those tort damages not recoverable by the employer.” (*Demkowski v. Lee* (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1259 [284 Cal.Rptr. 919], footnote omitted.)
- “Alternatively, the jury may generally be instructed on the types of tort damages to which the

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employee may be entitled and then given a special verdict form that requires the jury to find whether the defendant was negligent, whether the negligence was the proximate cause of the employee's injuries, what the employee's total tort damages are, without taking into account his or her receipt of workers' compensation benefits, and what the reasonable amount of benefits paid by the employer were. Thereafter, the court enters individual judgments on the special verdict for the amounts to which the employee and employer are entitled." (*Demkowski, supra*, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1259, footnote omitted.)

- "Prior to Proposition 51, a negligent third party was allowed an offset for the workers' compensation benefits paid to the plaintiff. This prevented double recovery under the then-existing joint and several liability rule. Proposition 51, however, limited joint and several liability to plaintiff's economic damages." (*Rosales v. Thermex-Thermatron, Inc.* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 187, 197 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 861].)
- "The *Espinoza* approach has provided an effective solution for pre-verdict settlements, and we believe that it is also the most suitable means of dealing with workers' compensation benefits." (*Torres v. Xomox Corp.* (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1, 37 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 455].)

Secondary Sources

2 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Workers' Compensation, §§ 20, 24–26, 31, 34, 39–42

1 Levy et al., California Torts, Ch. 10, *Effect of Workers' Compensation Law*, § 10.10 (Matthew Bender)

51 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 577, *Workers' Compensation*, § 577.319 (Matthew Bender)

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4550. Affirmative Defense—Statute of Limitations—Patent Construction Defect (Code Civ. Proc., § 337.1)

[Name of plaintiff] claims that [his/her] harm was caused by a defect in the [design/specifications/surveying/planning/supervision/ [or] observation] of [a construction project/a survey of real property/[specify project, e.g., the roof replacement]]. [Name of defendant] contends that [name of plaintiff]'s lawsuit was not filed within the time set by law. To succeed on this defense, [name of defendant] must prove both of the following:

1. That an average person during the course of a reasonable inspection would have discovered the defect; and
 2. That the date on which the [construction project/survey of real property/[specify project, e.g., roof replacement]] was substantially complete was more than four years before [insert date], the date on which this action was filed.
-

New December 2011; Revised November 2018

Directions for Use

Give this instruction if the defendant asserts the running of the statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 337.1 as a defense. This section provides a four-year limitation period from the date of substantial completion for harm caused by a patent construction defect. Do not give this instruction if the claim is for injuries to persons or property based on tort principles occurring in the fourth year after substantial completion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 337.1(b).)

For discussion of substantial completion, see the Directions for Use to CACI No. 4532, *Owner's Damages for Breach of Construction Contract—Liquidated Damages Under Contract for Delay*. See also CACI No. 4524, *Contractor's Claim for Compensation Due Under Contract—Substantial Performance*.

Code of Civil Procedure 337.1 does not apply to construction defect claims within the Right to Repair Act (Civ. Code, § 895 et seq.). (Civ. Code, § 941(d).) The Act applies to all claims for property damage or economic loss except for breach of contract, fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civ. Code, § 943(a); see *McMillin Albany LLC v. Superior Court* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 241, 249 [227 Cal.Rptr.3d 191, 408 P.3d 797]; see also Civ. Code, § 941 [statute of limitations under Right to Repair Act].)

Sources and Authority

- Statute of Limitations for Patent Defects. Code of Civil Procedure section 337.1.
- “The statute of limitations in section 337.1 exists to ‘provide a final point of termination, to protect some groups from extended liability.’ ” (*Delon Hampton & Associates, Chartered v. Superior Court* (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 250, 254 [173 Cal.Rptr.3d 407].)

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- “[A] patent defect is one that can be discovered by the kind of inspection made in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence. In contrast, a latent defect is hidden, and would not be discovered by a reasonably careful inspection.” (*The Luckman Partnership, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 30, 35 [108 Cal.Rptr.3d 606].)
- “The test to determine whether a construction defect is patent is an objective test that asks ‘whether the average consumer, during the course of a reasonable inspection, would discover the defect. The test assumes that an inspection takes place.’ This test generally presents a question of fact, unless the defect is obvious in the context of common experience; then a determination of patent defect may be made as a matter of law (including on summary judgment).” (*Creekridge Townhome Owners Assn., Inc. v. C. Scott Whitten, Inc.* (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 251, 256 [99 Cal.Rptr.3d 258], internal citations omitted.)
- “[T]he [Right to Repair Act] leaves the common law undisturbed in some areas, expressly preserving actions for breach of contract, fraud, and personal injury. In other areas, however, the Legislature's intent to reshape the rules governing construction defect actions is patent. Where common law principles had foreclosed recovery for defects in the absence of property damage or personal injury the Act supplies a new statutory cause of action for purely economic loss. And, of direct relevance here, even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history reflect a clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions with a statutory claim under the Act. (*McMillin Albany LLC, supra*, 4 Cal.5th at p. 249, internal citations omitted.)

Secondary Sources

6 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 1159

3 Witkin, California Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Actions, § 484

12 California Real Estate Law and Practice, Ch. 441, *Consumer's Remedies*, § 441.08 (Matthew Bender)

10 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 104, *Building Contracts*, §§ 104.54, 104.267 (Matthew Bender)

19 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 190, *Products Liability*, § 190.248 (Matthew Bender)

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4551. Affirmative Defense—Statute of Limitations—Latent Construction Defect (Code Civ. Proc., § 337.15)

[Name of defendant] contends that [name of plaintiff]'s lawsuit was not filed within the time set by law. To succeed on this defense, [name of defendant] must prove that the date on which the [construction project/survey of real property/[specify project, e.g., roof replacement]] was substantially complete was more than 10 years before [insert date], the date on which this action was filed.

New December 2011; *Revised November 2018*

Directions for Use

Give this instruction if the defendant asserts the running of the statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15 as a defense. This section provides a 10-year outside limitation period for harm caused by a latent construction defect regardless of delayed discovery.

The jury may also be instructed on the limitations periods for the particular theories of recovery alleged. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., §§ 338 [three years for injury to real property], 337 [four years for breach of written contract].) However, for latent defects, delayed discovery (see CACI No. 455, *Statute of Limitations—Delayed Discovery*) generally defeats that otherwise applicable statute.

The most likely question of fact for the jury is the date of substantial completion. The statute provides four possible events, the earliest of which may constitute substantial completion of an improvement. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 337.15(g).) The latest date is one year from cessation of all work on the improvement. However, substantial completion of an improvement may occur before any of these dates. (See *Nelson v. Gorian & Assocs.* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 93, 97 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 345].) The statute of limitations may start to run at a later date against the developer if the development includes many improvements. (*Id.* at p. 99; cf. *Schwetz v. Minnerly* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 296, 298 [269 Cal.Rptr. 417] [“developer” can be an “improver” and a “development” is a “work of improvement” for purposes of subsection (g)].) For further discussion of substantial completion, see the Directions for Use to CACI No. 4532, *Owner’s Damages for Breach of Construction Contract—Liquidated Damages Under Contract for Delay*. See also CACI No. 4524, *Contractor’s Claim for Compensation Due Under Contract—Substantial Performance*.

Code of Civil Procedure 337.15 does not apply to construction defect claims within the Right to Repair Act (Civ. Code, § 895 et seq.). (Civ. Code, § 941(d).) The Act applies to all claims for property damage or economic loss except for breach of contract, fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civ. Code, § 943(a); see *McMillin Albany LLC v. Superior Court* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 241, 249 [227 Cal.Rptr.3d 191, 408 P.3d 797]; see also Civ. Code, § 941 [statute of limitations under Right to Repair Act].)

Sources and Authority

- Statute of Limitations: Latent Defects. Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15.

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- “The purpose of section 337.15 has been stated as ‘to protect developers of real estate against liability extending indefinitely into the future.’ ... [We have] noted that ‘[a] contractor is in the business of constructing improvements and must devote his capital to that end; the need to provide reserves against an uncertain liability extending indefinitely into the future could seriously impinge upon the conduct of his enterprise.’ ” (*Martinez v. Traubner* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 755, 760 [187 Cal.Rptr. 251, 653 P.2d 1046], internal citations omitted.)
- “A ‘latent’ construction defect is one that is ‘not apparent by reasonable inspection.’ As to a latent defect that is alleged in the context of the challenged causes of action here—negligence, breach of warranty, and breach of contract—three statutes of limitations are in play: sections 338, 337 and 337.15. ‘The interplay between these [three] statutes sets up a two-step process: (1) actions for a latent defect must be filed within three years (§ 338 [injury to real property]) or four years (§ 337 [breach of written contract]) of discovery, but (2) in any event must be filed within ten years (§ 337.15) of substantial completion.’ ” (*Creekridge Townhome Owners Assn., Inc. v. C. Scott Whitten, Inc.* (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 251, 257–258 [99 Cal.Rptr.3d 258], internal citations omitted.)
- “The test to determine whether a construction defect is patent is an objective test that asks ‘whether the average consumer, during the course of a reasonable inspection, would discover the defect. The test assumes that an inspection takes place.’ This test generally presents a question of fact, unless the defect is obvious in the context of common experience; then a determination of patent defect may be made as a matter of law (including on summary judgment).” (*Creekridge Townhome Owners Assn., Inc., supra*, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 256, internal citations omitted.)
- “Our reading of the express words of section 337.15, our giving consideration to its legislative history, and harmonizing that section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole, leads us to conclude that section 337.15 does not limit the time within which direct actions for personal injury damages or wrongful death may be brought against the persons specified in the statute.” (*Martinez, supra*, 32 Cal.3d at p. 759.)
- “The 10-year period commences to run in respect to a person who has contributed towards ‘an improvement’ when such improvement has been substantially completed irrespective of whether or not the improvement is part of a development.” (*Liptak v. Diane Apartments, Inc.* (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 762, 772 [167 Cal.Rptr. 440].)
- “In 1981, the Legislature codified the holding in *Liptak* by adding subdivision (g) to section 337.15. ‘The Senate Committee on Judiciary and the Senate Republican Caucus digests for the bill that became Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15, subdivision (g) state in pertinent part: “‘In [*Liptak*], the [C]ourt of [A]ppeal held that with respect to a developer, the ten-year limitation period does not commence until the development is substantially completed. [¶] With respect to a person who has contributed to an improvement on the developed property, the court held that the period commences when that particular improvement has been substantially completed, regardless of the completion time of the development itself. [¶] AB 605 would codify the *Liptak* holding on these issues.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (*Nelson, supra*, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 96–97, internal citations omitted.)

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- “Turning to the plain meaning of the statute as well as the legislative intent of enactment of section 337.15, subdivision (g), it is clear the intent was to define what event triggered the 10-year period and not what label is used to define the person who performed the work of improvement. The particular development or work of improvement can be one ‘improvement’ such as grading. It can also be a ‘particular development,’ i.e., a completed structure or dwelling. When the work of improvement meets one of the four criteria of section 337.15, subdivision (g), the ‘improver’—whether an architect, engineer, subcontractor, contractor, or developer—is entitled to raise the provisions of section 337.15, subdivision (g), as a bar to an action which seeks damages for latent defects after the 10-year period has passed.” (*Schwetz, supra*, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 308.)
- “Appellants claim that the 10-year period is calculated pursuant to section 337.15, subdivision (g)(1)–(4), which describes four events: (1) a final inspection, (2) the notice of completion, (3) use or occupancy of the property, or (4) termination or cessation of work for one year. Subdivision (g), however, states that the 10-year period ‘shall commence upon substantial completion of the improvement, but not later than’ the occurrence of any one of the four events described in subdivision (g)(1) through (g)(4). ... [¶] The trial court correctly ruled that the notice of completion date (§ 337.15, subd. (g)(2)) did not control if the improvement was substantially completed at an earlier date.” (*Nelson, supra*, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 97, original italics.)
- “‘As used in section 337.15 “an improvement” is in the singular and refers separately to each of the individual changes or additions to real property that qualifies as an “improvement” irrespective of whether the change or addition is grading and filling, putting in curbs and streets, laying storm drains or of other nature.’ ” (*Nelson, supra*, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 97.)
- “The purpose of section 337.15 and its definition of the ‘substantial completion’ that begins the running of the 10-year period make clear that the statute's protection applies to claims for damage due to defects in how an improvement was designed and constructed, not to claims based on how the improvement was used *after* its construction is complete and independent of the manner in which it was designed and constructed.” (*Estuary Owners Assn. v. Shell Oil Co.* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 899, 915 [221 Cal.Rptr.3d 190], original italics.)
- “[T]he [Right to Repair Act] leaves the common law undisturbed in some areas, expressly preserving actions for breach of contract, fraud, and personal injury. In other areas, however, the Legislature's intent to reshape the rules governing construction defect actions is patent. Where common law principles had foreclosed recovery for defects in the absence of property damage or personal injury the Act supplies a new statutory cause of action for purely economic loss. And, of direct relevance here, even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history reflect a clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions with a statutory claim under the Act. (*McMillin Albany LLC, supra*, 4 Cal.5th at p. 249, internal citations omitted.)

Secondary Sources

3 Witkin, California Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Actions, § 488

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12 California Real Estate Law and Practice, Ch. 441, *Consumer's Remedies*, § 441.08A (Matthew Bender)

10 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 104, *Building Contracts*, §§ 104.25, 104.267 (Matthew Bender)

14 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 143, *Limitation of Actions*, § 143.49 (Matthew Bender)